Burying Gaza: How Israel's Military Put Away the Oranim Revelations

Related Post: The Israeli Military and Gaza’s Civilians - Returning to The Oranim Transcripts

I was working yesternoon afternoon when the news came through, via the Jerusalem Post, that the Israeli military had categorically dismissed accounts --- all but two from the graduates of military course at Oranim College ---of the abuse and killing of civilians in the Gaza War.

I was struck by how quickly the Israel Defense Forces threw out the claims, noted by nine Israeli human rights groups: ""The speedy closing of the investigation immediately raises suspicions that the very opening of this investigation was merely the army's attempt to wipe its hands of all blame for illegal activity during Operation Cast Lead."

Even more blatant, however, was the disconnect between the military's "findings" and the actual statements of the Oranim soldiers.

For example, the Post noted the IDF's conclusion report on "Aviv", who "claimed to have known of a soldier who had been given orders to fire at an elderly Palestinian woman. During his interrogation, Aviv admitted he had never witnessed such an incident and that he'd based his statement on a rumor he had heard."

In fact, it is unclear from the original testimony "Aviv" never claimed in his testimony, reprinted in the Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz and on this website, whether he witnessed the order by a company commander to a sniper squad to kill the woman, who was walking in a prohibited area. It is clear, however, that he was under orders to use deadly force to ensure "that we wouldn’t get hurt and they wouldn’t fire on us":

[We were] to go into a house. We were supposed to go in with an armored personnel carrier..., to burst through the lower door, to start shooting inside....From above they said it was permissible, because anyone who remained in the sector and inside Gaza City was in effect condemned, a terrorist, because they hadn’t fled.

Significantly (and unnoted in the Post article, "Zvi" follows the testimony of "Aviv" with the clarification that this was "force protection" and not the deliberate murder of civilians:

Aviv’s descriptions are accurate, but it’s possible to understand where this is coming from. And that woman, you don’t know whether she’s … She wasn’t supposed to be there, because there were announcements and there were bombings. Logic says she shouldn’t be there. The way you describe it, as murder in cold blood, that isn’t right.

Put bluntly, the Israeli military invaded one of the most densely-populated areas in the world and marked off parts of it as "prohibited", with shoot-to-kill orders against anyone who trespassed. The Israeli military could have stated this: inevitably civilians were going to die in a war.

Even this, however, could not be admitted. Instead, the Oranim testimony had to be discredited: "A claim made by a different soldier, Ram, who had supposedly been ordered to open fire at a woman and two children, was also found by the probe to be false."

This was a blatant distortion of the testimony of "Ram", who made clear that it was not he but a sharpshooter who killed the woman and children after a breakdown in communication:

There was a house with a family inside. Entry was relatively calm. We didn’t open fire, we just yelled at everyone to come down. We put them in a room and then left the house and entered it from a different lot. A few days after we went in, there was an order to release the family. They had set up positions upstairs. There was a sharpshooters’ position on the roof. The platoon commander let the family go and told them to go to the right. One mother and her two children didn’t understand and went to the left, but they forgot to tell the sharpshooter on the roof they had let them go, and it was was okay and he should hold his fire and he … he did what he was supposed to, like he was following his orders.

In the Gaza War of public opinion, Israel's effort was to ensure that it always held the higher moral ground. That, however, is difficult when Israel and not Hamas had overwhelming force, and that force --- inevitably --- was being used against civilians. In recent weeks, reports by bodies such as the United Nations and Human Rights Watch had detailed the humanitarian costs, but the Oranim revelations were even more damaging. They came from within Israeli ranks.

So Tel Aviv had to step up its "information" campaign. Reporters were summoned to a briefing by an armoured unit commander, Colonel Roi Elkabets, to give "examples of what he said were the dilemmas they faced". Ethan Bronner of The New York Times wrote accordingly, "Officers are stepping forward, some at the urging of the top command, others on their own, offering numerous accounts of having held their fire out of concern for civilians, helping Palestinians in need and punishing improper soldier behavior".

And the campaign, far more effectively than the military invasion of Gaza, worked. Today's British and American media faithfully cite the IDF's findings on Oranim, "The Israeli military on Monday rejected allegations that its soldiers committed atrocities against Palestinians in Gaza" (CNN); "Brig. Gen. Avichai Mendelblit, the IDF's advocate general, found no evidence to support the most serious accusations, including alleged instances in which civilians were shot without cause" (Washington Post); "The military police found that the crucial components of their descriptions were based on hearsay and not supported by specific personal knowledge" (New York Times).

None of those reporters referred to the original Oranim transcripts.

War is about winning, not about the truth. So one can set aside last week's commentary by Larry Derfner, ironically in the same Jerusalem Post that moved quickly to put the military's "findings2:

We can refuse to think about this, we can tell ourselves that Oranim is a hotbed of left-wingers, we can bury this so the anti-Semites and The Hague don't use it against us. Or we can admit the truth and decide that we have to change.

We can be loyal to Israel's image. Or we can be loyal to our sons.

Hamas' Khalid Meshaal on Relations with Israel, US

Hamas political director Khalid Meshaal spoke for three hours last week with Paul McGeough, an Australian journalist who has written a book about the rise of Hamas and Israel's attempts to kill Meshaal. In the interview, Meshaal talked about relations with Israel (“Hamas has declared it’s acceptance of a Palestinian state in the occupied territories; we have joined the political process; we have entered short-term truces with Israel - this is the reality that the world needs to deal with" and relations with countries outside the region ("We’re willing to open a new page with the US and Europe....But they have to be serious about dealing with us on Palestinian rights.”), and the political prospects of the organisation (“If the Palestinian people were gamblers, they would bet on Hamas").

This is McGeough's summary, reprinted from Syria Comment:

DAMASCUS: The tea-cup stops short of his lip, as Khalid Mishal pauses to consider the ironies of trench warfare in the Middle East - a lurch to the political right has anointed as Israel’s next prime minister the man who, 11 years ago, sent Mossad agents on a bizarre mission to assassinate Mishal.

It is late Wednesday evening - March 18 - and Mishal sits deep in a plump armchair, in a second-floor reception room. “Netanyahu…,” he asks, returning to his cup of tea. “Its fate, God’s destiny, but we can’t set policy on the basis of personal grudges.”

The Palestinian resistance leader, whose suicide bombers and assassins have taken their own toll on Israeli life over the years, then declares his would-be-killer to be a man of straw. “We’ve already experienced Netanyahu as prime minister of Israel, so Palestinians are not afraid of him second time round,” Mishal vouches.

“After the battle of Gaza [in December-January] and the steadfastness of our people in the face of the Zionist war machine, do you expect a single Palestinian to be scared of this man? It doesn’t matter if he tries again to kill me, because he’s already killed my people.”

At the time of the 1997 attempt on his life, Mishal was an unlikely target - a mid-level Hamas operative, based in Amman, the capital of Jordan.

These days he is the supreme leader of Hamas, hunkering in a bunker set against a scrabbly hillside in the southern suburbs of the Syrian capital, deep inside a secure enclave which is reserved for high officials of the Damascus regime, foreign diplomats and the staff of foreign NGOs.

It is an unmarked, nondescript apartment block that doubles as jihad headquarters and as Mishal’s family home, where his teenage children are just as likely to wander in, taking a seat for the most intense discussions on Hamas operations.

Festooned with swivelling security cameras, the building also is watched over by an outer ring of leather-jacketed security men who juggle firearms and walkie-talkies as they prowl the pavement.

A Hamas car collects select visitors from city hotels - only by prior arrangement. When discretion is needed, one of a fleet of heavy black Mercedes Benz sedans is wheeled out - black curtains are drawn behind the tinted glass.

When greater discretion is required, the Hamas driver jumps the car on to the pavement, easing to a halt under an outstretched awning that hangs from the perimeter wall of the Hamas HQ. The house guards, moving with practised precision, then seize the loose ends of two bunched canvas flaps suspended from the awning, and draw them quickly out to the edge of the pavement, enveloping vehicles as they arrive, before some of Mishal’s more mysterious callers dare to alight.

The arrival of an outsider is an emergency event for Mishal’s suit-and-tied inner security ring. These men frequently speak into microphones concealed in the cuff of their jacket sleeve. Their thoroughness reveals an understanding that their boss is a constant target for a determined enemy.

Beyond an airport-like, walk-through security scanner and up a set of stairs with a dog-legged turn, a heavy, double-bolted door leads into a hallway, from which a visitor is escorted through a set of big double doors into Mishal’s diwan, or meeting place.

Armchairs line the long walls and the décor is various shades of Hamas green. But upon entering, it is a wall of mostly gaunt faces that locks the attention of a visitor - arranged in a honeycomb pattern; they are 20 Hamas leaders, fighters and bomb-makers, all victims of Israel’s campaign of targeted assassination. It is a sobering achievement in life that Mishal has reached age 53 without his visage being added to this wall of death.

The Hamas leader holds forth expansively, negotiating the tripwires of the diplomatic and political minefields that he inhabits daily, with certainty and a confidence that verges on bombast, as he lectures a fast-changing world on how it should respond to his movement - not than the reverse.

This is the first interview in which Mishal, designated a terrorist by Washington and Europe, makes his first detailed response to the outcome of transformative elections in the US and Israel; the Gaza war; and the imminent return to power in Israel of his would-be assassin - Benjamin Netanyahu.

Mishal starts, on what he genuinely seems to believe is a conciliatory note. However, in the corridors of power in Washington and the other capitals of the Middle East Quartet, they likely will be heard as a challenge.

“We’re willing to open a new page with the US and Europe,” he says through an interpreter, daring President Barack Obama to chart a radical change of course in the Middle East as an acknowledgement of decades of failed US policy in the region. “He’ll continue to repeat the mistakes of those who went before him, unless there is a marked change.”

But as Mishal expanded on his ‘new page’ theme, it soon emerges that what he really means to say is that Hamas requires the US and the European Union to open a new page with the Palestinian Islamist movement.

“I don’t mean that Hamas will take a new [policy] position. I’m talking about a readiness on our part to deal with Washington and Europe. But they have to be serious about dealing with us on Palestinian rights.”

Arguing that Washington and its European allied need to abandon their policy of isolating Hamas until the movement folds to conditions set by the Middle East Quartet, Mishal lectures: “They’ve been trying the wrong way and the wrong approach.”

Then he takes apart what he sees as early signs that nothing has changed in Washington since George W. Bush departed the White House in January.

There is little value, Mishal says, in appointing the experienced Northern Irish peace-broker George Mitchell as a US envoy to the Middle East, if he is not authorised to talk to Hamas. “Would he have succeeded in Belfast if he was ordered to ignore the IRA?”

Mishal is derisory of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s ready acceptance of the Bush Administrations’ insistence that Hamas accede to Quartet demands that the Islamists renounce violence, recognise the state of Israel and abide by all previous undertakings on behalf of the Palestinian people.

He belittles Clinton’s warning that international donations for the reconstruction of Gaza had to be kept out of the “wrong hands.” And he ridiculed the seeming contradiction in her invitation to Iran to attend a regional conference on the future of Afghanistan, at the same time as she shunned Hamas on the grounds that not only was it a terrorist group, but “increasingly it was a client of Iran.”

“So despite a new presidency, it’s the same attitude in Washington,” Mishal says. “We expected real change from Obama - not just talk about change.

“They refused to accept the results of the Palestinian election because Hamas won - that failed. They resorted to imposing a siege on the Gaza Strip - that failed. Then they went to war against the Palestinians - and that failed.

“Despite all this, Hamas has advanced and grown, [so] within the logic of real politick, it is Washington that must reconsider its position if they want to achieve an outcome that is not failure.

“The US and Europe have become accustomed to insisting, that the change they demand of the Arabs will be that which is demanded by Israel, [but] the Israeli vision of peace creates only war and chaos.”

The bulk of the Hamas leader’s critique is aimed at Washington’s conduct of what Mishal calls the Palestinian file. And he denies there can be any reason for concern in Hamas at the Obama Administrations dramatic departure from the other policies of its predecessor in the region - its efforts to engage Tehran and Damascus, which could expose Hamas to uncertainties about its future.

Washington is seeking a thaw in its relations with Syria. At the same time it has asked Russia to intervene with Iran, hoping Moscow middlemen might persuade the Iranian regime to back away from its nuclear program. But Syria and Iran are Hamas’ principal sponsors in the region.

Mishal concedes that these indeed are significant events unfolding around his movement. But he prefers to cast them as Obama’s admission of the errors of the Bush II era, or as he puts it, “Washington having to deal with parties that have proved themselves on the ground.”

There’s more lecturing on this theme before he will address the question - which is about the risk that Hamas might become a sacrificial small-fry in any big-picture horse-trading between Washington and Damascus and or Tehran. Mishal inches up to the issue, warning that the U.S. should not seek to “isolate certain parties at the expense of other parties.”

Finally he bites in terms of the position of Hamas. “We’re not worried,” he says. “Hamas is not a card in anyone’s hand. We play an effective role, even in times of dramatic change. Nothing is going to happen in this region until the Palestinian issue is properly addressed - and many countries in the region, including Iran and Syria, hold a principled commitment to the Palestinian cause.”

As much as Mishal criticises Washington, he also pitches a quick plea that it not accept an argument in some quarters that perhaps the U.S. should seek achievable goals elsewhere, while leaving the Palestine-Israel diplomacy to regional players - like Cairo and an increasingly assertive Istanbul. “Israel doesn’t listen to the regional players. The only party that has the power to pressure Israel and to dictate terms to it is Washington.”

Does Khalid Mishal have any regrets about the extent of the damage Israeli forces inflicted on Gaza in December-January - about 1300 Palestinians dead, thousands injured and thousands of homes and other buildings damaged and destroyed? The assault came after Hamas refused to renegotiate a truce, on the grounds that Israel had consistently violated what Hamas understood to be the terms of the six-month ceasefire.

Reminded that the Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah had publicly acknowledged that had he known the ferocity of the Israeli retaliation when it invaded Lebanon after the abduction of three Israeli soldiers in 2006, he would not have taken the soldiers, Mishal insists that Gaza and Hamas are different cases.

“The 2006 captures were an option, a choice for Hezbollah; so they are entitled to assess the validity of what they did in terms of the consequences for Lebanon. But for the Palestinians, Gaza wasn’t a question of choice.

“Israel was supposed to end the siege and open the border-crossings in return for a halt to the rockets - the rockets stopped, but the siege remained and the crossings stayed closed. It’s unfair to ask Palestinians if they want to die slowly under siege, or quickly under fire.”

Hamas senses a thaw in its isolation. Mishal’s visitors on the day he is interviewed, include parliamentary delegations from Greece and Italy. A few days previously, they came from the British and European parliaments.

These MPs come in a wave of publicity, challenging their governments to engage Hamas. But the trail-blazers came earlier - analysts from American and European think-tanks who decided the time had come to make discrete efforts to understand the Hamas mindset.

These are small, non-government delegations. But they are signs of different times for Hamas, of feelers being extended from corners of the world that till now have gone along with the US-led campaign to keep Hamas snap-frozen. And they are in marked contrast to the cold shoulder Israel is feeling around the world in the aftermath of its ferocious assault on Gaza, a chill that is billed in Israel as the country’s worst diplomatic crisis in two decades.

As Israel increases its PR spend in a bid to arrest its plummeting stocks internationally in the aftermath of Gaza, Hamas is buoyed by confirmation from Britain that, notwithstanding consternation in Washington, it is moving to ease its isolation of Hezbollah, Hamas’ counterpart in Lebanon, by agreeing to talk to its political wing.

London says the move is justified because Hezbollah joined a government of national unity. Given that national unity talks are on foot in the Palestinian Occupied Territories, an argument is being formulated in Hamas that it should be granted the same dispensation by London.

France too has intimated a willingness to open dialogue with Hamas and a growing army of former government officials and international peace negotiators is urging that Hamas be given a seat at the table. Led by former US president Jimmy Carter, who has visited Mishal in Damascus, it includes the likes of former British Prime Minister Tony Bair and the head of Saudi intelligence, Prince Turki Bin Faisal.

Despite, or perhaps because of the carnage in Gaza, the mood in the Hamas bunker is upbeat - support for the Islamist movement among Palestinians rose markedly after the January hostility, just as it fell for the US-backed Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas and his enfeebled Fatah faction, whose writ is confined to the West Bank.

“More and more, the US and Israel and others in their camp understand that they cannot implement their agenda against us - because of the strength that we have acquired,” Mishal says. “Netanyahu destroyed the peace process the last time he was prime minister and his plan now for Palestinians to be limited to some kind of economic independence will fail too.”

Pressed on what policy changes Hamas might make as a gesture to a new regional order, Mishal offers little, arguing: “Hamas has already changed - we accepted the national accords for a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders and we took part in the 2006 Palestinian elections. Where is the response by Washington and the others? All we got was hostility and negativity.”

In particular, Mishal refuses to entertain rewriting Hamas’ offensive charter, despite the chance that such a move could alter perceptions of the movement at the same time as it might serve to protect the movement’s underbelly from sniping by its critics.

In 2005, the Hamas had appointed a committee to review its controversial 1988 Charter - with its offensive language, its anti Semitism, its incitement to battle and is calls for the elimination f the state of Israel. In a costly fit of pique over being consigned to the sinbin by the US and others after its election win, Hamas shelved the review.

Policy changes by Hamas have rendered much of the document redundant. But the continued inclusion of the call for the destruction of Israel has exposes Hamas to regular atacks.

Revealing that the pique of 2006 is just as potent today, Mishal says: “They didn’t give us a chance after we won the election, irrespective of what we might have done.” Will the charter be rewritten - “not a chance.”

“The message to us from the world was absolute rejection of the election outcome, because the result was not acceptable to the US and to corrupt elements of the Palestinian community [read Fatah].

“Our approach is not by means of changing the charter, a document written in 1988, but by virtue of our policy program today. Judge us by what we do today - not by what was written more than 20 years ago.

“Hamas has declared it’s acceptance of a Palestinian state in the occupied territories; we have joined the political process; we have entered short-term truces with Israel - this is the reality that the world needs to deal with. You say people use the Charter as a weapon against us - well, let them.”

For now, at least, Mishal’s public face is that Hamas is prepared to engage the world - but on his terms.

He becomes irritable when questioned about a letter from Hamas to President Obama, which reportedly was passed to US Senator John Kerry during a recent visit to Israel and Gaza.

“I don’t want to talk about it,” he says. Pressed, he claims that the letter was on behalf of an individual - not the movement.

“If Hamas wishes to communicate with the US Administration, it will do so in a different way - at the right time; in the appropriate manner. Up to now, the Americans have rejected any communication with us. Hamas knows itself well and those who reject it today will find themselves compelled to deal with it tomorrow,” he says.

“In the meantime, Hamas will communicate with Washington through its actions on the ground - I’m talking about all our activities; about our weight and effectiveness; our social welfare and our resistance.”

If that’s how he feels about talking to Washington, what about direct talks with Israel?

Neither side likes to admit it, but Israel and Hamas have demonstrated that they actually can negotiate and in some circumstances, achieve outcomes that are acceptable to each other.

For all the squabbling over how the Gaza truce was breached and by which party, they did agree to a six-month ceasefire last summer - which Hamas held to, despite its view that Israel did not stick to its side of the deal.

There was no agreed text. This was an indirect understanding, arrived at through talks by negotiators for Hamas and Israel who met separately with Egyptian middlemen.

Israel believed that Hamas had agreed to stop the rain of rockets fired from Gaza into nearby Israeli communities. Hoping to breathe some life back into the strip’s comatose economy, Hamas understood that in exchange, Israel would end its year-long siege of Gaza.

Figures quoted by The New York Times, indicate that the rocket-rate was reduced by as much as 80-90 per cent as Hamas curbed its own fire and that of the lesser militia groups in Gaza.

But in comparison, the number of trucks entering Gaza increased only marginally. By closing its border crossings into Gaza, Israel can stop the movement of goods, fuel and people, often allowing a trickle of movement that imposes a level of hardship that amounts to total economic collapse.

Under the June deal, the daily rate of trucks entering Gaza did increase - but only from about 70 a day to about 90 which, according to the figures quoted in The New York Times - well short of a pre-siege delivery-rate of 500-600 trucks a day.

In light of that experience, would Hamas negotiate directly with Israel, to produce documented deals that might allow third parties to more accurately verify compliance or violations?

“Direct or indirect is not the point,” Mishal says. “What really matters is will Israel be truly ready to recognise Palestinian rights and to end the occupation? When Israel is ready to accept this,” he goes on, “we will decide what to do … but we’ll not give them a platform for useless negotiation, for trying to improve their image internationally [because] they always try to buy time and to create new facts on the ground.”

When the shooting stopped in Gaza earlier this year, there were more indirect talks. But Hamas refuses to buckle to Israel’s terms and as Mishal describes it, rather cumbersomely, “the situation is not war like it was in January … and it’s not a state of calm.”

At this point, the Hamas leader stubbornly refuses to acknowledge a more colourful description of events on the ground by one of his colleagues, who told reporters in February, “the [smuggling] tunnels are still operating and rockets are still being fired.”

Mishal refuses to take the question. Pressed to explain, he says: “I am a leader. From my position as leader, I describe and express myself in a manner which I deem to be best when I speak about the situation.”

“But the tunnels are open and rockets are firing, aren’t they?” he is asked. At this point, Mishal becomes Delphic: “You know my way of talking. There is an Arab proverb -‘every situation has its way of being expressed’!”

Mishal insists that it is the Israelis who must explain why the latest truce negotiations collapsed - including their failure to agree terms for the release of the captured Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit. But in what Israel will read as a threat, he warns there is a risk that more Israeli troops will captured by Hamas - to increase the pressure for Israel to agree to Hamas’ demand for the release of as many as 1400 Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli jails.

Asked about reports the accuracy of reports that Hamas is seeking freedom for 1400 prisoners, Mishal explains the calculus of the negotiations - from Hamas’ perspective.

In the most celebrated exchanged in the past, three Israeli soldiers were swapped, in 1985, for 1150 Palestinians - almost 400 Palestinians for each Israeli.

Asked how Hamas now could demand more than three times that many Palestinians in return for Shalit’s freedom, he says: “Israel’s prisoner numbers were relatively low in ‘85 - 1150 would have been most of those they held. The number we are seeking for Shalit is only one-tenth of today’s number of Palestinians in Israeli jails.

“The Israelis just don’t learn. When they refuse to release Palestinians, it forces the Palestinians to resort to other means to gain their release - and inevitable this incudes the capture of more Israeli soldiers.”

In the March 18 interview in Damascus, Mishal recommits Hamas to the electoral process in the Occupied Territories - despite Israel rounding up and jailing more than 30 of Hamas’ West Bank MPs in the aftermath of the 2006 election. And in the days after the interview, taking in 10 senior Hamas figures in the West Bank, including four MPs, who Israel described as ‘terror operatives’ - reportedly in a bid to pressure Hamas to accept Israel’s terms in the haggling over Shalit.

Underlying Mishal’s analysis is Hamas’ determination to avoid what it sees as the pitfalls, for the Palestinian side, of the years that followed the 1993 Oslo Accords.

Under the leadership of Yasser Arafat, the Fatah movement and the PLO renounced violence as a weapon and recognised the state of Israel, but achieved little in endless rounds of so-called peace talks as Israel continued to carve up the Occupied Territories to suit its own needs. Since Arafat’s death at the end of 2004, his successor Mahmoud Abbas has made no headway either.

Finishing up, Mishal lays out the pieces of the geopolitical puzzle and he laughs. Despite Islam’s prohibition on gambling, he concludes: “If the Palestinian people were gamblers, they would bet on Hamas.”

Full Text: UN Human Rights Council Report on Israel's Human Rights Violations in Gaza

Yesterday, we reported on the presentation of a report to the Human Rights Council of a report by UN investigators on Israel's operations in Gaza. We have finally found an advance copy of the report into the human rights situation in Palestine and other occupied Arab territories. We publish it in full below without further comment. You can also download a pdf copy of the report at the HRC's website.

A

ADVANCE EDITED
VERSION

Distr.
GENERAL

A/HRC/10/22
20 March 2009

Original:  ENGLISH

Human Rights Council
Tenth session
Agenda item 7

HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN PALESTINE AND OTHER OCCUPIED ARAB
TERRITORIES

Combined report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, the
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict,
the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, the
Representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights of internally displaced
persons, the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to
an adequate standard of living, and on the right to non-discrimination in this context,
the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,
summary or arbitrary executions, the Special Rapporteur on the right to education
and the independent expert on the question of human rights and extreme poverty

A/HRC/10/22
Page 2

CONTENTS

Paragraphs Page
I.  INTRODUCTION ………………………………………………………. 1 – 8

II.  LEGAL FRAMEWORK ………………………....................................... 9 – 25

A International humanitarian law ……………………………………….  9 – 18
B  Human rights law …………………………………………………….. 19 – 23
C  The continued application of human rights law during
armed conflict ………………………………………………………… 24 – 25

III.  CONTRIBUTIONS BY INDIVIDUAL MANDATE-HOLDERS ……….. 26 – 98

A.  Independent expert on the question of human rights and
extreme poverty ……………………………………………………….. 26 – 36
B.  Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of
the right to an adequate standard of living, and on the right to
non-discrimination in this context …………………………………….. 37 – 44
C.  Special Rapporteur on the right to food ……………………………….. 45 – 53
D.  Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment
of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health ……… 54 – 63
E.  Special Rapporteur on the right to education ………………………….. 64 – 73
F.  Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes
and consequences ……………………………………………………… 74 – 79
G.  Representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights
of internally displaced persons ………………………………………... 80 – 88
H.  Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial Summary or Arbitrary
Executions …………………………………………………………… 89 – 98

IV.  RECOMMENDATIONS ………………………………………………… 99 – 105

Annex :  Special report on Gaza and southern Israel prepared by the Special
Representative of the secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict.

A/HRC/10/22
Page 3

Summary

The present report is submitted pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution S-9/1 of 12
January 2009 in which the Council requested all relevant special procedures mandate-holders, in
particular the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories
occupied since 1967, the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, the Special Rapporteur on violence against
women, its causes and consequences, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the
human rights of internally displaced persons, the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a
component of the right to an adequate standard of living, and on the right to non-discrimination in
this context, the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,
arbitrary or summary executions, the Special Rapporteur on the right to education and the
independent expert on the question of human rights and extreme poverty, to urgently seek and
gather information on violations of the human rights of the Palestinian people and submit their
reports to the Council at its next session.

The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories
occupied since 1967 has submitted a separate report to the Council (A/HRC/10/20). The present
report is submitted by the other above-mentioned mandate-holders, and includes individual
sections submitted by each one as well as a joint introduction, legal analysis and set of
recommendations.  The section submitted by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General
for Children and Armed Conflict.

A/HRC/10/22
Page 4

I INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution S-9/1 on the
grave violations of human rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, particularly due to the
recent Israeli military attacks against the occupied Gaza Strip.

2. In its resolution, the Council requested all relevant special procedures mandate-holders, in
particular the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories
occupied since 1967, the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, the Special Rapporteur on violence against
women, its causes and consequences, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the
human rights of internally displaced persons, the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a
component of the right to an adequate standard of living, and on the right to non-discrimination in
this context, the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,
summary or arbitrary executions, the Special Rapporteur on the right to education and the
independent expert on the question of human rights and extreme poverty, to urgently seek and
gather information on violations of the human rights of the Palestinian people and submit their
reports to the Council at its next session.

3. The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories
occupied since 1967 has submitted a separate report to the Council (A/HRC/10/20). The present
report is submitted by the other above-mentioned mandate-holders, and includes individual
sections submitted by each one as well as a joint introduction, legal analysis and set of
recommendations. The section submitted by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General
for Children and Armed Conflict is annexed to the report. Following her visit to the Occupied
Palestinian Territory and Southern Israel from 2 to 6 February 2009, the information submitted
was compiled by the inter-agency working group on children and armed conflict on the ground, in
accordance with Security Council resolution 1612 (2005)..

4. The mandate-holders solicited information from concerned parties, including relevant
Governments, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations, and received a
significant number of submissions. They extend their sincere thanks for the cooperation they

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received in gathering information. In view of the extremely limited time available, brief report
cannot do justice to the large volume of information received.

5. The special rapporteurs on violence against women, on the right to education, on the right
to food, on the right to the highest attainable standard of health and the independent expert on
extreme poverty requested to visit the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Gaza, and to
discuss with the relevant Israeli authorities the issues covered by their mandates.

6. The Occupied Palestinian Territory, particularly the Gaza Strip, has been affected by
protracted conflict and occupation policies for decades. On 27 December 2008, the Israeli military
launched a large-scale operation against Hamas in response to rockets fired at populated areas in
Israeli territory. According to available estimates, a total of 1,453 people were killed.  Of these,
1,440 were Palestinian, including 431 children and 114 women.  A total of 13 were Israelis,
including three civilians and six soldiers killed by Hamas, and four soldiers killed in friendly fire
incidents.1 This operation also resulted in a dramatic deterioration of the living conditions of the
civilian population. At the onset of the recent military operation, the population of the Gaza Strip
was already rendered vulnerable following a 20-month-long blockade, which severely restricted
the movement of people and goods and the delivery of humanitarian and development assistance.
In addition, the discriminatory legislation and policies of the occupying Power in, inter alia, access
to housing, health care, food and water systems, have governed for decades the institutional set up
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, thus aggravating the situation of its residents. An estimated
80 per cent of the population in Gaza, particularly women and children, was already dependent on
humanitarian assistance before the recent military operation.

7. Targeted and indiscriminate attacks on public facilities, including medical facilities, water
and sanitation networks, Government and municipal buildings, electricity, gas, transportation,
agriculture, fisheries and industries further eroded people’s access to basic services and goods.
Combined with the decreasing ability of the authorities to manage basic public services and the
collapse of the local economy, the recent military operation exacerbated the situation of the 1.5
million Gaza residents whose rights, including the rights to education, food, health and housing

1
In addition to the 1,440 killed, the Palestinian Ministry of Health lists 5,380 Palestinians injured, including 1,872
children and 800 women. In addition to the 13 killed, the Magen David Adom lists 518 Israelis injured, including 182
civilians and 336 soldiers. For additional data on children, see Annex. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs,  The Humanitarian Monitor, Occupied Palestinian Territory, No. 33, January 2009.

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and to be free from violence could not be protected. The conflict further exacerbated the desperate
situation of those living in poverty in Gaza and pushed even more people into a life of poverty.

8. Even after the ceasefire was declared on 18 January 2009, restrictions on movement of
people and goods as well as humanitarian assistance continued, thus hampering efforts for
recovery and return to normalcy.

II   LEGAL FRAMEWORK

A. International humanitarian law

9. The most relevant conventional international humanitarian law standards binding Israel are
set out in the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War of 1949. In addition, Israel is bound by the customary rules of international humanitarian law,
which are applicable in the present context.  The State’s responsibilities in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory as the Occupying Power are set out in this Convention as well as in the
Hague Regulations, which have become part of customary international humanitarian law.2 The
International Court of Justice has concluded that the Fourth Geneva Convention is applicable in
the Palestinian territories, which before the 1967 conflict lay to the east of the Green Line and
which, during that conflict, were occupied by Israel. This is also the case for the Gaza Strip
despite the unilateral withdrawal by Israel of its forces from the Strip in 2005, as the continuing
occupation has been confirmed repeatedly since then by the General Assembly and the Security
Council.3

10. Hamas and other armed Palestinian groups are bound by the obligations of Common
Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and by the applicable rules of customary international
humanitarian law, concerning, inter alia, the conduct of hostilities and the treatment of civilians
and other protected persons.   In the text of the National Unity Government programme delivered
by then Prime Minister Ismail Haniya before the Palestinian Legislative Council on 17 March

2
In its advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territories of 2004, the International Court of Justice recalled that, while Israel was not a party to the Hague
Convention of 18 October 1907 concerning the Laws and Customs of War and Land (Convention IV), to which the
Hague Regulations are annexed, the provisions of the Hague Regulations had become part of customary international
law.
3
See General Assembly resolutions 62/181, and 63/98, and Security Council resolution 1860 (2009).

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2007, Hamas accepted that it was bound by as it has confirmed its commitment to respect
international law and international humanitarian law.

11. The most relevant rules of customary international humanitarian law applicable to the
conduct of hostilities in the present context relate to the principles of distinction, proportionality
and precaution.4 These obligations are cumulative; an attack must comply with all of the rules in
order to be lawful.

12. First, under the principle of distinction, the parties to a conflict must, at all times,
distinguish between civilians and combatants; attacks may be directed only at military objectives,
defined as those objects which, by their nature, location, purpose or use, make an effective
contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization in
the circumstances ruling at the time offers a definite military advantage. The only circumstance in
which civilians may be targeted is for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities. Thus,
attacks on civilian objects are unlawful unless at the time of the attack they were used for military
purposes and their destruction offered a definite military advantage.

13. Indiscriminate attacks are similarly prohibited. They are those that (a) are not directed at a
specific military objective; (b) employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a
specific military objective; or (c) employ a method or means of combat the effects of which
cannot be limited as required by international humanitarian law; and consequently, in each such
case, are of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without
distinction. Attacks by bombardment which treat a number of clearly separated and distinct
military objectives located in an urban area or rural village as a single military objective are
prohibited. The prohibition of indiscriminate attacks must not only determine the strategy adopted
for a particular military operation but also limit the use of certain weapons in situations where the
civilian population will be affected.

14. Second, under the principle of proportionality, attacks on legitimate military objectives
which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to

4
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Customary International Humanitarian Law, J-M. Henckaerts
and L. Doswald-Beck (eds.), Cambridge University Press, 2005 ICRC Study).  The study was prepared at the request
of States at the twenty-sixth International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent in December 1995 and is
based on an extensive analysis of State practice (e.g. military manuals) and documents expressing opinio iuris. Rules,
6-9, 11-13, 15-24, 97.

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civilian objects or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated, are prohibited.

15. Third, the parties to a conflict must take all feasible precautions to avoid, and in any event
to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects. This
obligation is two-fold. Precautions must be taken when planning and conducting attacks. A
number of specific precautionary measures are prescribed by humanitarian law, inter alia, the
determination of the military character of the objective and the evaluation of compliance with the
principle of proportionality. In addition, parties to a conflict are required to give effective advance
warning of attacks, which may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit.

16. Parties to a conflict must also take precautions to protect civilians and civilian objects
under its control from the effects of attacks; this includes avoiding placing military objectives
within or near densely populated areas and keeping civilians away from military targets. The use
of human shields is also prohibited. Contrary to the general principle of precautions against the
effects of attacks, this prohibition must be understood to require the specific intent to use civilians
to immunize otherwise legitimate military objectives from lawful attack.

17. A violation of the obligation to take precautionary measures vis-à-vis the civilian
population or their use as human shields by one side to a conflict does not change the obligations
incumbent on the other party to the conflict to evaluate what constitutes an excessive attack in
relation to concrete and direct military advantage.5

18. With regard to the treatment of protected persons in the occupied territories, article 33 of
the Fourth Geneva Convention forbids collective punishment of civilians for crimes they have not
personally committed. The provision of assistance to protected persons and civilian property also
benefit from specific protections. Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits the
destruction by the occupying Power of private or public property unless rendered absolutely
necessary by military operations. In addition, articles 55 and 59 provide that the occupying Power
shall ensure food and medical supplies of the population and at the very least agree to relief
schemes on behalf of the population of an occupied territory, and shall facilitate them by all the
means at its disposal, if the whole or part of this population is inadequately supplied. Articles 23

5
Article 28 of the Fourth Geneva Convention specifies that the presence of a protected person may not be used to
render certain points or areas immune from military operations.

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and 59 further provide that all contracting parties shall permit the free passage of these
consignments and guarantee their protection.6

B. Human rights law
19. Israel is party to the major human rights treaties relevant to the current situation7.

20. As regards the territorial scope of application, article 2 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights obliges each State party to respect and to ensure to all individuals within
its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized within it.8  In particular, in relation
to the responsibilities Israel under its international human rights treaty obligations with regard to
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, in its advisory opinion on the Wall, the International Court of
Justice concluded that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child
were applicable.9 United Nations human rights treaty bodies also underscore that, as a State party
to international human rights instruments, Israel continues to bear responsibility for implementing
its human rights conventional obligations in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, to the extent that
it continues to exercise jurisdiction there.10 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women contain no provisions limiting their application to
the territory of States parties.  In this respect, the International Court of Justice also noted that the

6
In resolution 1860 (2009), the Security Council called for the unimpeded provision and distribution throughout Gaza
of humanitarian assistance, including food, fuel and medical treatment.
7
TheY include the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the
Optional Protocol thereto on the involvement of children in armed conflict.
8
The Human Rights Committee has clarified that “a State party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the
Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control of that State party, even if not situated within the territory of
the State party”.  General comment No. 31 (CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13), para. 10.
9
In its advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territories of 2004, the International Court of Justice recalled that, while Israel was not a party to the Hague
Convention of 18 October 1907 concerning the Laws and Customs of War and Land (Convention IV), to which the
Hague Regulations are annexed, the provisions of the Hague Regulations had become part of customary international
law.
10
An examination of the concluding observations of different United Nations treaty bodies confirms this view: In its
concluding observations of 2003, the Human Rights Committee reiterated that the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights provisions apply “to the benefit of the population of the Occupied Territories for all conduct by the
State party’s authorities or agents in those territories that affect the enjoyment of rights enshrined in the Covenant”.
Similarly, in its 2003 concluding observations, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights reaffirmed its
view that “the State party’s obligations under the Covenant apply to all territories and populations under its effective
control” (E/C.12/1/Add.90). The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination  drew a similar conclusion in
its concluding observations of March 2007 (CERD/C/ISR/CO/13), para. 32.

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obligations of Israel under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
include an obligation not to raise any obstacle to the exercise of such rights in those fields where
competence has been transferred to Palestinian authorities. The unilateral disengagement from the
Gaza Strip by Israel, which was formally completed on 12 September 2005, does not dispense
Israel from complying with its human rights obligations towards the population of that territory;
Israel remains bound to the extent that the measures it adopts affect the enjoyment of human rights
of the residents of the Gaza Strip.

21. The Palestinian Authority, as recognized in a number of public undertakings whereby the
Palestinian Authority, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Palestinian
Legislative Council have declared their commitment to respect international human rights law, is
also bound to abide by international human rights obligations.11

22. With respect to Hamas, it is worth recalling that non-State actors that exercise
government-like functions and control over a territory are obliged to respect human rights
norms when their conduct affects the human rights of the individuals under their control.12

23. Although the full body of human rights law is applicable in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, the particular relevance of some human rights norms stands out in the current context,
namely the right to life and freedom of movement, as well as a number of economic and social
rights, particularly the right to an adequate standard of living, including the rights to food and to
adequate housing, the rights to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and
mental health, the right to work, the rights to education and to the prohibition of discrimination as
enshrined in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. These rights
impose obligations on State parties: the obligations to respect protect and fulfil, which in turn
incorporates both an obligation to facilitate and an obligation to provide.13

11
PLO chairman Yasser Arafat repeatedly stated that he and his Government were committed to respecting to
all international human rights standards, for instance, to representatives of Amnesty International on 2 October 1993
and 7 February 1996.
12
For example, in a joint report on Lebanon and Israel, a group of four special rapporteurs concluded that: “Although
Hezbollah, a non-State actor, cannot become a party to these human rights treaties, it remains subject to the demand of
the international community, first expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that every organ of society
respect and promote human rights … It is especially appropriate and feasible to call for an armed group to respect
human rights norms when it exercises significant control over territory and population and has an identifiable political
structure.” (A/HRC/2/7),  para. 19.
13
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, general comment No. 13 on the right to education.

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C. The continued application of human rights law during armed conflict
24. Human rights law, which consists of the full range of economic, social and cultural rights
as well as civil and political rights, does not cease to apply in times of war; only certain
derogations which are in accordance with precise provisions relating to times of emergency are
permissible.14

25. More specifically, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other
international human rights instruments allow for the possibility, in circumstances that threaten the
life of the nation, to derogate from some of its guarantees provided that the measures are strictly
necessary and are lifted as soon as the public emergency or armed conflict ceases to exist.15
Certain guarantees, in particular the prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or the right to life, are non-derogable16. Israel remains in the state of public emergency
proclaimed on 19 May 1948, four days after its declaration of establishment.17  With regard to
economic, social and cultural rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights does not explicitly allow for derogations in time of public emergency, but the guarantees of
the Covenant may, in times of armed conflict, be limited in accordance with its articles 4 and 5
and because of the possible scarcity of available resources in the sense of article 2, paragraph 1.18

III. Contributions by individual mandate-holders

A. Independent expert on the question of human rights and extreme poverty

26. In situations of armed conflict, the poor always suffer disproportionately. In the specific
case of Gaza, the recent conflict and, in particular, the impact that Israeli military operations have
had on the infrastructure and the economy have pushed even more people below the poverty line.
Poverty has been a long standing concern in Gaza. Even prior to the recent conflict, 78.9 per cent

14
International Court of Justice, “Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons”, advisory opinion of 8 July
1996, ICJ Reports 1996 (I), para. 25; advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a wallin the
Occupied Palestinian Territory; para. 106; “Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of
the Congo v. Uganda)”, ICJ Reports 2005, para. 219 (finding substantive violations of human rights law during an
armed conflict). See also concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee on the second periodic report of
Israel, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-eighth Session, Supplement No.  40 (A/58/40), vol. I, para. 11.
15
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 4, para. 1: see also Human Rights Committee, general
comment No. 29 (2001), para. 3.
16
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 4, para. 2.
17
CCPR/C/ISR/2001/2, para. 71.
18
See Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, general comment No. 14 (2000), paras. 28-29.

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of Gaza residents were already living below the official poverty line.19 The recent conflict, the
occupation and the 19-month blockade imposed by Israel on Gaza have exasperated this situation
and had a devastating effect on the economy and the infrastructure and a profound pervasive
impact on the lives of Palestinian people, particularly the poor.

27. While the blockade is the primary cause of poverty in Gaza, the situation has been further
exacerbated by the limitation of aid in 2006, insufficient access for humanitarian organizations
and the deterioration of the internal security situation owing to the escalation of intra-Palestinian
violence. A full assessment is still under way. However, there is no doubt that the three-week
military offensive by Israel has compounded the already catastrophic humanitarian situation of the
Palestinian people and led to a range of human rights violations.

28. The military operation launched by Israel on 27 December 2008 has not only forced more
people into a life of poverty, but also exacerbated the miserable situation of those already living in
poverty by creating a need for urgent, massive humanitarian efforts to secure basic rights and
minimum standards of living. The almost complete dependency on external aid and reliance on the
informal market has further exposed the population to political manipulation affecting the poor
disproportionately.

29. The independent expert expresses her grave concern at the fact that poverty in Gaza is a
direct consequence of systematic violations of a wide range of civil, political, economic, social
and cultural rights against Gazan residents, and that poverty in Gaza has also led to specific
violations of human rights. Many of these violations are described in other sections of the present
report and all are relevant to assessing the situation of the poor. In particular, the poor have
suffered greatly from violations of the right to education, food, housing and health, which are
described below in detail by other mandate-holders.

1.  Cumulative and increasing destruction of livelihoods in Gaza

30. Reports received by the independent expert reveal that, over the years, the damage that the
blockade and military incursions by Israel has inflicted upon the land, the environment and

19
The official poverty line is 2.3 USD per person per day, this rates reflects household income. World Bank, Palestinian Economic
Prospects: Aid, Access and Reform, 22 September 2008, p.20. The figure set out here was recorded in 2007, no figures are
available for 2008.

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industrial infrastructure in Gaza has led to an escalation in unemployment and undermined the
ability of the Palestinian people to find basic means of subsistence. The World Bank estimates that
98 per cent of Gaza industrial operations were inactive as a result of the closures. Up to 70,000
workers are reported to have lost their jobs since 2007.20 In December 2008, the Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimated that 18 months of closures had caused a 50 per
cent increase in unemployment. Women are particularly affected; the female participation in the
Gaza job market was only 11.5 per cent in 2007, one of the lowest rates in the world.21

31. The lack of regular payment of salaries caused mainly by the suspension of financial aid
and the discontinuation of the transfer of taxes and revenues as well as by the tensions between the
different political parties controlling services to the Palestinian population had caused a steady
deterioration in the living conditions of public sector employees that has left them vulnerable to
poverty. Restrictions imposed by Israel on the transport of currency have resulted in a liquidity
crisis. The lack of currency has seriously compromised the provision of basic social services,
including the payment of social allowances, thereby making the poorest to a fully dependent on
aid and informal arrangements to survive.

2.  Impact of the recent military operation on the poor

32. Preliminary assessments indicate that, during the recent military operations, health
facilities, water and sanitation infrastructure, land and cellular communication networks, schools,
universities, mosques, residential buildings, factories commercial enterprises and farms were
deliberately attacked and damaged as a result of fighting.22 This has had a disastrous impact on the
economy, the infrastructure and the enjoyment of human rights by the poorest Palestinian people.

33. It is reported that during the military intervention Israel deliberately obstructed the work of
humanitarian personnel leaving the poor without basic medical, food and other services in
violation of both international humanitarian and human rights law.23 After the cessation of
hostilities, reports suggest that the authorities in Gaza have also obstructed the distribution of

20
Ibid.
21
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Programme of Assistance to the Palestinian People Mid-term Strategic
Framework for the period 2008-2011 (2008)
22
See UNRWA News, 16 January 2009; the Statement by Commissioner General Karen AbuZayd,  27 January 2009; International
Committee of the Red Cross, Operational Update of 25 January 2009; Field update on Gaza from the Humanitarian Coordinator,
24-26 January 2009; Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions, “The collapse of Gaza’s water and waste water sector. Grave
breaches of international humanitarian Law and serious violations of international human rights law”, 2009, sections B, C and E.
23
See “WFP launches Operation Lifeline Gaza to get food to the hungry”, 10 January 2009; Zarocostas, J. ‘’Agencies call for
health workers in Gaza to be respected”, British Medical Journal, 7 January 2009 and “The Conflict in Gaza”, AI report, January
2009, section D.

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humanitarian aid to Gaza and imposed restrictions on the work of civil society organizations and
human rights defenders.24

34. For Gaza's economy to revive (offering opportunities to people to pull themselves out of
poverty) all of Gaza’s entry points must be opened to ensure freedom of movement for all, the free
inflow of industrial and agricultural inputs and cash and the export of products from Gaza25. There
is also an urgent need to ensure that there are sufficient quantities of fuel, spare parts for the
damaged infrastructure (e.g. the power plant) as well as cement, sand and other construction
materials.

35. Recovery will also require that Palestinians be provided with income-generating and work
opportunities, including access to work in Israel. Furthermore, Palestinians require access to
education at all levels and students and professionals, such as doctors and teachers, must be able to
receive education abroad. Special attention must also be paid to people who have been seriously
wounded or disabled; they must be provided with rehabilitation services and have the means to
live a dignified life and enjoying an adequate standard of living.

36. In addition to the above-mentioned measures, the independent expert stresses that, to
improve the lives of those living in poverty, psychosocial support for those in need, in particular
children, is urgently needed. The rights of the victims of human rights violations to have access to
remedy and reparations must also be respected.

B. Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a component of the right to an adequate
standard of living, and on the right to non-discrimination in this context

37. Disregard for the right to adequate housing in the Occupied Palestinian Territory far predates
the recent military offensive. Overcrowding, lack of sanitation and other difficult living conditions
have been not only the result of demolitions and destruction of homes in the present and previous
military offensives, but a permanent urban condition that prevents the people of Gaza from having

24
See Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, Special Reports, (February 2009), “Inter-Palestinian Human Rights Violations in the
Gaza Strip”, 3 February 2009
25
On 12 February, a single truck with nearly 50,000 flowers was reportedly allowed to cross out of Gaza through
Kerem Shalom for export. According to the same source, it was the first time since 18 January 2008 that Israel had
allowed any exports from Gaza; however, it remains unclear as to whether further exports will be allowed. The Office
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that, on 6 February, Israel allowed, for the first time since mid
December 2008, the transfer of NIS 170 million ($ 42 million) from banks in the West Bank to banks in the Gaza
Strip. The new supply would enable the Palestinian Authority to pay the salaries of some 70,000 Gaza-based
employees. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Situation Report, No. 21, February 2009.

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access to the acceptable minimal standards of adequate housing.

38. The Special Rapporteur on adequate housing has received reports from numerous sources
concerning the extensive destruction of homes and civilian property during the Israeli military
offensive in Gaza from 27 December 2008 to 24 January 2009. Initial estimates indicate that more
than 4,240 residences were destroyed and 44,306 were damaged, most of them rendered
uninhabitable without considerable rehabilitation.26  An estimated 2.6 per cent of homes in Gaza
were completely destroyed, an additional 20 per cent sustained serious damage,27 reportedly
forcibly evicting an estimated 80,000 to 90,000 people who have been rendered homeless, many
forced to live in open space.28  For buildings that are apparently still intact, it is unclear how much
of their internal structure was damaged, which may cause problems in the long term, including
collapse or fragility in the event of natural disaster.

39. The massive destruction and damage caused by the Israeli offensive to homes and
infrastructure, including roads, water stations and electrical facilities, and the continued
restrictions imposed on the urgent transport of reconstruction materials into Gaza could constitute
grave violations of the right to adequate housing and are the cause of a severe humanitarian crisis.

40. Reports indicate that Israeli attacks have not always complied with the principle of
distinction between civilians and combatants, and that some of the houses and properties attacked
did not meet the definition of military objectives.

41. Countless communities in Gaza have been rendered virtually uninhabitable.  In urban areas
and several refugee camps in the northern part of Gaza, entire neighborhoods have been flattened.
These acts seem to be contrary to the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, in particular Article 53.29

42. The extensive damage to basic social services and infrastructures has severely eroded the

26
Rapid Shelter/NFI assessment, 11 February 2009.
27
United Nations, Gaza Flash Appeal, January 2009; and Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics.
28
Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions “European governments and citizens hold the key to imposing
accountability on Israel”, 12 January 2009; and Emergency Architects, information flash: “The foundation of
Emergency Architects helps with emergency re-housing in Gaza”, 18 February 2009.
29
“Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging individually or collectively to
private persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities, or to social or cooperative organizations, is prohibited,
except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations”.

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ability of the people of Gaza to live according to the acceptable minimal standards of adequate
housing. Many water tanks used by individual homes were also damaged,30 causing 500,000
people to have no access to running water, and the rest of the population only sporadic access
during the hostilities.31 Thousands of people have been affected by damaged sewage networks and
pumping stations, owing to both repeated bombing and the scarcity of fuel supplies resulting from
the closure of the border.27 Unexploded ordinance has been discovered by civilians in residential
areas; property and water supplies have been contaminated by sewage spills and reports allege
further contamination by toxic remnants from munitions.32

43. At a time when international support for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of homes and
neighbourhoods is urgently needed, the Special Rapporteur is deeply concerned about persisting
impediments to the entry of reconstruction materials into Gaza, either through their outright
prohibition or protracted administrative delays.  In addition, she recalls that, according to the
Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, destruction of infrastructure and houses resulted in the
waste of approximately $1.9 billion in international aid dollars given by donors and the
international community.

44. The recent attacks have worsened the living conditions of the people of Gaza, who have
been confined for decades to a small territory, in overcrowded conditions, with poor housing and
sanitation conditions, problems that have been poorly managed to date. The Special Rapporteur is
particularly concerned that the scale of destruction bringing further destitution and the hardship
endured by the people of Gaza will only add to the cycle of violence.

C.   Special Rapporteur on the right to food

45. The right to food is realized when every man, woman and child has physical and economic
access at all times to adequate food or the means for its procurement. This right is violated on a
large scale, and on a routine basis, in the Gaza Strip, owing to both recent events and long-
standing trends. The breakdown of the food system in Gaza and the lasting damage, that has been
inflicted on the Gaza food production infrastructure, resulting in the loss of jobs and incomes for
many families, further aggravate a situation which, even before the recent military operation of

30
Aid Worker Diary: part 15, July 14 2009.
31
New York Times, “Israel and Hamas: Conflict in Gaza”  11 July 2009
32
IPS “Unexploded bombs hold more deaths”,  24 January 2009.

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December 2008-January 2009, was intolerable. The chronic restrictions on the movements of
goods and people have also had a major impact on the right to food of the people living in Gaza.

1.  Destruction of property and means of subsistence

46. According to the Palestinian Centre for the Human Rights and the Integrated Regional
Information Network, farmland and greenhouses were bombed extensively in Gaza, which has had
a devastating impact on the ability of people to produce food for subsistence or trade purposes.
The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics estimated that 80 per cent of agricultural land and
crops was damaged during the recent hostilities, as evidenced by 395 impact craters resulting from
shelling.33 Arable land has been contaminated by spills of sewage and toxic munitions.34  The
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that extensive destruction debilitated
commercial enterprises and public infrastructure, including the largest flour mill and food
processing plants in Gaza. The Special Rapporteur considers that this constitutes a serious
violation of customary international humanitarian law, which prohibits attacking, destroying,
removing or rendering useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population.35

2.  Closures and restrictions to free movement of goods, including food aid

47. Even before the recent conflict, recurrent closure of border crossings and other security
measures had impeded the passage and delivery of food assistance and of traded foodstuffs. The
consequences have been dramatic; for example, the closure of the Karni border crossing for over
46 days in the first quarter of 2006 resulted in severe shortages of food and the depletion of food
reserves, and most bakeries in the Gaza Strip were forced to close owing to shortages of flour and
fuel, leading to the rationing of bread. The prohibition of the export of agricultural products from
Gaza at the height of the harvesting season reportedly led to the waste of hundreds of tons of
tomatoes, peppers, cucumbers and strawberries and a loss of millions of dollars.36 Restrictions on
the entry of supplies essential for food production, such as fuel, fertilizers, plastics and seeds, have
also been imposed over the years by the Israeli blockade.

48. The complete closure of Gaza’s borders during the recent armed conflict affected both
family-level food production and public and commercial centres. In a situation report from the

33
UNOSAT damage assessment, 20 January
34
The Observer, “Gaza desperately short of food after Israel destroys farmland”, 3 February 2009.
35
ICRC study, rule 54.
36
A/HRC/4/30/Add.1, para. 37.

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Humanitarian Coordinator, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that
in early January, only nine bakeries remained operational, causing many people to wait from five
to six hours a day just to purchase a day’s supply of bread. According to the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations, shortages of nutritious and affordable food have further
eroded food security for people in Gaza; meat and many vegetables are scarce and cost three times
their regular price.

49. According to the Palestine Monitor Factsheet of 18 December 2008, even before the
hostilities, approximately 80 per cent of families in Gaza relied on humanitarian food aid in order
to survive,36  this number had reached approximately 91 per cent by early February 2009.37 In this
context, obstacles to the delivery of urgently needed food aid during the recent hostilities caused
by fuel shortages and the closure of the borders resulted in violations of the right to food on a large
scale.  The continuous bombing of civilian areas further impeded aid agencies from having access
to hungry people, who were unable, or too afraid, to meet aid convoys;23  the number of hungry
people without access to basic food necessary for their survival soared as a result.  Normal
caseloads from the World Food Programme and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East UNRWA normal caseloads have therefore increased, bringing
the total number of people dependent on food aid from both organizations to 1,275,300.38

50. Even after the cessation of the hostilities, humanitarian aid convoys still met restrictions on
providing for the urgent food and nutritional needs of the population of Gaza, a violation of the
obligations of Israel as the occupying Power of the Gaza Strip.39 These obstacles to food aid were
further exacerbated by incidents of confiscation of food parcels destined for distribution to
beneficiary families reportedly by Hamas police personnel.40 While noting that these food parcels
were returned, the Special Rapporteur would like to recall that respecting the right to food entails,
inter alia, refraining from taking any measures that result in preventing people’s access to food.

37
Save the Children, children of the Gaza crisis, Fact Sheet, 27 January 2009.
38
Ibid., 9 February 2009.
39
“To the fullest extent of the means available to it, the Occupying Power has the duty of ensuring the food and
medical supplies of the population; it should, in particular, bring in the necessary foodstuffs, medical stores and other
articles if the resources of the occupied territory are inadequate” Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 55.
40
UN News, “UN suspends aid operation after second Hamas-Linked theft of supplies”, 6 February 2009.

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3.  Impact on the right to food

51. According to the Palestine Monitor Factsheet of 18 December 2008, rates of food
insecurity rose from 34 percent in 2006 to 38 per cent in 2008, as 75 per cent of Palestinians
reduced the quantity of food purchased and 89 per cent switched to less nutritious diets in 2006
and 2007. This has had a particularly severe impact on children, who are often the first victims of
malnutrition.41 The Palestine Monitor estimates that, in 2009, the rate of chronic malnutrition of
Palestinian children under two has reached 10 per cent.42 Close to half of children of that age
group suffer from anaemia. Two thirds of all children reportedly suffer from a lack of vitamin A.43
One in 10 girls and boys under the age of five evidence stunted growth in Gaza.44

52. Global food price increases have further driven the cost of food in Gaza far beyond the
purchasing power of most of the population. According to the Palestine Monitor Factsheet, the end
of 2008, food cost on average 23 per cent more than in 2007. The Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs reports that shops and markets continue to provide limited food supplies at
exorbitantly high prices. Shortage of currency further undermines access to food. Because
agricultural inputs are prohibitively expensive, many farmers have been unable to invest in the
2009 agricultural cycle. Livestock owners have reportedly been reducing their flock size. Fishing
has declined dramatically. The ability of these groups to feed themselves and their families is
seriously jeopardized.45

53. The destruction of food production capabilities, mounting scarcities and rising costs
together with obstructions to the delivery of aid constitute grave threats to the right to food. The
ability of the people of Gaza to provide for their food and nutritional needs is essential to
overcoming the underlying causes of conflict in the region and to ensuring a life of dignity.

41
The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Gaza Strip Inter-Agency Humanitarian Fact Sheet, March
2008.
42
“Why the Gaza disaster is not three weeks old and has not stopped along with the bombs”, 22 January 2009.  See
www.palestinemonitor.org
43
See the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), “Aid for Gaza’s Children,”  11 January 2009, and Richard Falk,
“The Siege of Gaza,”  22 December 2008.
44
See Save the Children, West Bank and Gaza at www.savethechildren.org
45
See the FAO and emergencies page dedicated to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip at the FAO website
(www.fao.org)

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D.  Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest
attainable standard of physical and mental health
54. The long-standing Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Israeli military offensive launched on
27 December 2008 resulted in grave violations of the right to the highest attainable standard of
health in Gaza. According to article 24 of the Convention on the Rights on the Child, the right to
health encompasses not only access to health care, but also the underlining determinants of health,
such as access to clean water and sanitation, food and nutrition, adequate housing and a healthy
environment.

55. The prolonged conflict has seriously damaged the health infrastructure in Gaza, which has
greatly undermined public health and service delivery throughout the affected area. The health
situation has been further aggravated by the long-standing blockade imposed by Israel since June
2007. The blockade has prevented the passage of basic goods, including medical supplies, spare
parts and fuel necessary for the normal functioning of medical facilities.

56. The conflict and its exacerbation by the blockade and consequent lack of fuel has resulted
in severe electricity shortages. Hospitals were running on back-up generators, and medical
personnel worked under tremendous strain, as many of them worked consecutive 12 to 24 hour
shifts to attend to medical emergencies.23 The number of hospital beds has been insufficient to
cope with the mounting number of injured civilians, causing many health centres to have to send
gravely ill and wounded people home before completing the necessary treatment.

57. The lack of fuel has also affected water supplies, which left approximately a million people
without access to safe and potable water.46 Waste water pumps repeatedly stopped working,
threatening to cause grave environmental hazards. Monitoring and surveillance of water quality
has been suspended since the closure of the central public health laboratory on 3 January 2009,
thus seriously affecting an already deteriorating public health system.  Additionally, the lack of
access to clean water and the closure of waste water pumping stations has resulted in exposure to
numerous diseases.  Farmland and urban areas have been flooded with sewage, and the remains of

46
World Health Organization, Health Action Crisis, Highlights No. 245, 2-8 February 2009.

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a number of unrecovered bodies in advanced stages of decomposition has further exacerbated the
grave risks to public health in the Gaza Strip.

58. The obstacles faced by humanitarian medical efforts have particularly affected the most
vulnerable groups among the civilian population, namely children and women. The
discontinuation of preventive health care, including vaccination of children, has further threatened
the long-term health of the population in Gaza, rendering the population vulnerable to outbreaks of
highly infectious diseases such as measles, polio and hepatitis.47

59. Mental health represents an integral part of the right to the highest attainable standard of
health. The prolonged conflict, and in particular the latest offensive, has affected the psychosocial
well-being of the population and has been particularly challenging for women, children and
disabled persons.  The state of mental health of the population in Gaza has also been evidenced by
a dramatic increase in drug abuse, estimated to affect almost 10 per cent of the young population
in the region. Signs of extreme psychosocial distress and related psychosocial conditions have also
increased.48

60. The denial of access to medical treatment outside of Gaza Strip for seriously ill Palestinian
patients is a long-standing issue (see A/HRC/4/28/Add.1).  There are indications of a worsening
trend in the denial of access to healthcare, as evidenced by the decline in the percentage of
requests approved for medical permits for patients referred for treatment outside Gaza Strip, from
80 per cent in 2007 to 66 per cent in the first half of 2008.47

61. The Special Rapporteur notes that under international humanitarian law, all medical
personnel and facilities must be protected at all times.49

62. The Special Rapporteur strongly condemns the targeting of medical facilities and workers
by Israeli forces. For example, 16 medical workers were killed and 25 injured while on duty.
Furthermore, 15 hospitals, 43 primary health centres and 29 ambulances were destroyed. In early
February 2009, only 44 of 56 primary health care centres were functioning.  Use of primary

47
WHO, Health Situation in the Gaza Strip, 7 January 2009.
48
Integrated Regional Information Network, “Drug abuse on the Rise in Gaza – specialists”, 16 January 2009 at the
website www.irinnews.org
49
Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 20, and the International Committee of the Red Cross study, rules, 25, 28 and 29,

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health-care facilities has significantly declined since the military offensive; WHO estimates that
40 per cent of chronically ill patients no longer turn to public health-care centres for care.

63. The material damages caused by the recent hostilities, the border closures resulting in the
restricted entry of medical supplies and equipment and the denial of access to health care outside
the borders of Gaza constitute grave violations of the right to the highest attainable standard of
health.

E.  Special Rapporteur on the right to education
64. The blockade on Gaza imposed in June 2007 and the resulting restrictions on movement
and goods have resulted in serious violations of the right to education, which was further
exacerbated by the Israeli offensive on Gaza that began on 27 December 2008.  Consequently,
educational facilities have suffered extensive damage and destruction, their repair and
reconstruction has been obstructed and students have experienced significant psychosocial distress,
all of which pose great challenges to the creation of an environment conducive to the realization of
the right to education.

65. The Special Rapporteur on the right to education received numerous reports of Israeli
strikes on schools in Gaza, leading to major damage to seven public schools and partial damage to
an additional 236 schools (public, private and kindergarten) and to 36 UNRWA schools.50  Israeli
shells are reported to have hit two UNRWA schools and landed close to another, al-Fakhura
school in Jabaliya refugee camp, which were sheltering displaced families. According to the Save
the Children Alliance and UNICEF, these incidents resulted in the killing of 47 people, including
15 children.  On 17 January, the American International School of Gaza near the northern town of
Beit Lahiya was destroyed by aerial bombing, leaving its 220 students without a place to continue
their schooling.  Warplanes also hit the science and engineering laboratories of the Islamic
University in Gaza City, the territory's oldest and biggest facility for higher education, affecting
over 20,000 students.51

66. The Special Rapporteur deplores the targeting of schools during wartime, an act that
provided the schools are not military objectives- is explicitly prohibited under customary

50
OCHA, Rapid Needs Assessment Report (Education Cluster) 30 January 2009
51
Associated Press,  “Israel-Hamas war deals blow to schools in Gaza”,  3 February, 2009

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international law, 52  and notes that such an attack has been qualified as a war crime by the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court which, has been ratified by 108 States.

67. As often occurs during emergencies, educational activities ceased during the weeks of
heavy bombing and ground fire and the pervasive insecurity across the Gaza strip, causing
540,000 students of all educational levels to miss almost one month of classes27.  Following the
ceasefire, there were delays to the restoration of regular schooling, as insecurity persisted,
reconstruction was been impeded and numerous people continued to seek shelter in school
buildings after being displaced by the fighting.53

68. Continued restrictions on the entry of reconstruction materials into Gaza have also posed
serious threats to the right to education for Gaza children and youth, as construction materials
have repeatedly been denied entry into the region, and Israeli authorities have insisted on  case-by-
case approval of all reconstruction projects affecting schools, resulting in long administrative
delays.54

69. In addition to the particular violations of the right to education caused by the hostilities that
began on 27 December 2008, access to safe and adequate educational conditions in Gaza has faced
long-standing obstacles that far pre date recent events.  Overcrowding in the schools in Gaza had
already caused a restriction in the hours of schooling, in order to allow for morning and afternoon
shifts to accommodate the region’s 450,000 students51; this problem has particularly affected the
schooling of some 200,000 refugee children in Gaza, who have attended UNRWA schools in the
past year.55  Efforts by UNRWA to continue the regular school feeding programme have been
hampered by repeated restrictions on the entry of supplies.  According to UNICEF, power
shortages owing to restrictions on the entry of fuel caused students to gather in classrooms that
lacked heating and electricity, as well as light bulbs and other basic supplies, such as paper, chalk
and essential equipment for teaching, such as printers and overhead projectors.  Higher education

52
The targeting of civilian objects such as schools is prohibited by the general principle of distinction between civilian
objects and military objectives (see sec. II); in addition, customary law prescribes that special care must be taken in
military operations to avoid damage to buildings dedicated to education. ICRC study, rule 38.
53
“Displaced Gazans seek shelter from the cold”, at www.irinnews.org
54
Briefing by staff of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs based in Jerusalem, Inter-Agency
Consultation on Gaza, United Nations Office at Geneva, 21 January 2009.
55
“United Nations moves to counter deteriorating Gaza education levels”, 17 September 2007 at www.irinnews.org

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has also been affected, illustrated by the denial by Israel, in November 2007, of permission for 670
Palestinian scholars to leave Gaza in order to study abroad, including six Fulbright scholars.56

70. Another concern is the fact that, in August 2008, Gaza lost around half of its teachers in
Ministry of Education schools after they were fired for striking. Although new teachers have been
recruited and trained, public schools were still lacking maths, science and Arabic teachers for all
levels, resulting in fewer hours of teaching in these essential subjects. It is estimated that 250,000
students, more than half of Gaza’s student population, in 381 schools were affected by the strike at
that time.57

71. The Special Rapporteur notes with concern a 5.6 per cent decline in enrolment rates for
school grades 1 to 10 between 2000-2001 and 2006-2007.58  In September 2007, UNRWA
reported a failure rate of 80 per cent for grades 4 to 9, with rates of failure as high as 90 per cent in
mathematics. The protracted collapse of the economy of Gaza and mounting food insecurity has
further impeded the enjoyment of the right to education, as hundreds of children have been forced
to search for work in order to contribute to the basic needs of their families at the expense of their
schooling.59

72. The destruction of schools and restrictions on the entry of supplies necessary to guarantee
access to education, as well as the prolonged deterioration of Gaza educational infrastructure,
constitute violations of the right to education.  The Special Rapporteur recalls that, while
education is often interrupted in times of conflict, its restoration is an urgent priority.  It is
essential to generating a culture of mutual respect, breaking the cycle of hatred and prejudice
between the peoples of the region and establishing a lasting peace.

73. As pointed out in the Special Rapporteur’s first report, military occupations are an
appreciable curb on the human right to education, and the most egregious example is that of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict (E/CN.4/20005/50, para. 124). The recent events in Gaza provide an even
stronger illustration of the violations of the right to education in a conflict situation.

56
Human Rights Watch, “Israel Blocks 670 students from studies abroad”,  20 November 2007.
57
See Tamer Institute for Community Education, Fact Sheet August-October 2008, and Office of the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs, Protection of Civilians Weekly Report No. 276, September 2008.
58
Agence France Press, “Gaza blockade threatens education crisis: UNICEF”, 1 February 2008.
59
Save the Children, “Crisis Deepens for the Children of Gaza”,  30 December 2008  and Oxfam America,
“Escalating Humanitarian Crisis in Gaza,” 11 March 2008.

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F.  Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences
74. The Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences,
expresses her grave concern at the violations of human rights and international humanitarian law
witnessed during the recent Israeli military attacks against the Gaza strip. The scale of civilian
deaths, injuries and destruction during the offensive was unprecedented by all accounts. Among
the casualties, it is estimated that 114 women were killed and 800 suffered injuries.

75. The Palestinian Centre for Human Rights stated that women suffered critical injuries from
bombs, artillery shells, rockets and live ammunition as well as from bombs believed to have
contained white phosphorous. The Special Rapporteur is particularly concerned by reports of
women being killed while inside their own homes trying to protect their children or attempting to
escape bombardment, sometimes after having been ordered to leave their houses by the Israel
Defense Forces.24 Some of the injuries sustained by women resulted in maiming, including
amputations conducted in inadequate medical facilities.

76. The denial of safe access to pregnant women to appropriate health care and hospitals
owing to the constant shelling constitutes a grave violation of human rights. In a press release
dated 14 January 2009, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) warned that the continuing
violence and displacement presented serious risks to more than 40,000 pregnant women in Gaza,
and reported on many cases of premature labour and delivery resulting from shock and trauma
from continuous bombing, and the exposure of premature and newborn infants to hypothermia
owing to the lack of electricity. UNFPA findings for the period during the crisis showed a 40 per
cent increase in cases of miscarriage admitted to maternities, a 50 per cent increase in neonatal
deaths and an important increase in the number of premature deliveries.  For example, on
10 January 2009, Wafa al-Masrai, 40 years old and nine months pregnant, left her home in Beit
Lahia in north Gaza with her sister, Rada, and attempted to reach her local hospital. While en
route to the hospital, she was struck by an Israeli rocket and critically injured. She gave birth to a
healthy baby after having one of her legs amputated.24 Given the primary role of women as
caregivers, such a disability will not only adversely reflect on the level and quality of care of
children and the family but it will also seriously undermine a woman’s “value” in society as a
whole.

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77. The Palestinian Centre for Human Rights reported that women and children that had taken
shelter inside schools administered by UNRWA suffered shell attacks inside those protected areas.
The Special Rapporteur received alarming reports of entire families being hit by Israeli shelling. 60

78. In addition, the worsening food insecurity in Gaza following the military operation led to a
further deterioration in the health and nutritional status of the majority of Gazans, in particular
women and children, many of whom are already largely dependent on meagre humanitarian
assistance. In addition, the Special Rapporteur would like to highlight the disproportionate effects
of house demolitions on women, children and the elderly (see also sections A, C and D above).

79. In 2005, following her visit to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the Special Rapporteur
concluded that the protracted conflict and occupation had contributed to creating an integrated
system of violence that had a profound impact on Palestinian women. This situation has been
aggravated by the recent military attacks.  A UNFPA survey of 8 February 2009 on the situation
of women in Gaza highlighted the immediate psychological problems endured by women, such as
extreme feelings of fear and insecurity, depression and sadness, the debilitating effects of which
often made them unable to fulfil their vital role as care-givers.  The extent of the destruction in the
latest military campaign, which took place in the wake of over a year and a half of severe blockade
that brought the Gaza economy to the brink of collapse and has yet again debilitated the coping
mechanisms of an already impoverished and traumatized population, will further increase the
degree and extent of oppression of the occupation. Without a lifting of the blockade, women will
continue to be prevented from having access to vital, sometimes life-saving medical treatment in
Israel or neighbouring countries, owing to restrictions on their freedom of movement and denial of
travel permits. In addition, women will continue to endure the burden of chronic shortages of basic
supplies such as food, fuel, electricity and safe drinking water, when having to provide for their
children and families. As highlighted in the Special Rapporteur’s mission report, this particularly
precarious and traumatic environment is likely to heighten women’s vulnerability to violence in
the private sphere as well.

60
In one case, 22 members of the Al-Sammoni family, including nine children and seven women, were killed in
Zaytoun, east of Gaza city on 4 and 5 January 2009. The majority of the victims were killed while sheltering inside a
house that collapsed after having been struck by three missiles launched by the Israel Defense Forces, see Office for
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Protection of Civilians Weekly Report, 16-20 January 2009.

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G.  Representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights of
internally displaced persons
80. The occupation policies and practices that Israel has pursued since the 1967 war have
infringed on the human rights of Palestinians and resulted in large-scale forced displacement of
Palestinians within the Occupied Palestinian Territory, even before the Israeli military incursion
into Gaza that began on 27 December 2008.61  Displacement is often caused by incursions and
military clearing operations, evictions and land appropriation, the illegal expansion of settlements
on occupied territory and related infrastructure, the illegal construction of the Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, violence and harassment by settlers, the revocation of residency
rights in East Jerusalem, discriminatory denial of building permits and house demolitions.62
Forced displacement is also caused by a system of closures and restrictions on the right to freedom
of movement through an elaborate regime of permits and checkpoints that make life untenable for
many residents in Palestinian enclaves and force them to leave.

81. The Israeli military incursion into Gaza resulted in further massive forced displacement of
Palestinians inside Gaza. On 14 January 2009, at the height of the crisis, the Under-Secretary-
General for the Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator estimated that up to
100,000 Palestinians could be displaced. The preliminary report of a shelter / Intern Development
Programme joint rapid needs assessment, conducted in 45 localities in Gaza several days after the
ceasefire of 18 January 2008, indicated that 71,657 displaced persons were staying with host
families.63

82. As border crossings into Egypt and Israel were closed, large numbers of civilians tried to
find refuge in other parts or sites of Gaza. At the height of the conflict, more than 50,000 displaced
persons sought refuge in UNRWA schools. Many were also displaced because their homes had

61
Estimates on the displaced population vary owing to differences in definitions and available date.  The non-
governmental organization Badil Resource Centre for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights estimated in a survey
of September 2007 that 115,000 Palestinians were displaced between 1967 and 2006.
62
The International Court of Justice, in its advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory found that the route of the wall in the West Bank and its associated regime of
permits and restrictions was contrary to international law, including applicable norms of international humanitarian
law and human rights law. The court also reaffirmed that, Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
(including East Jerusalem) had been established in breach of international law. See also note 2.
63
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Field Update on Gaza from the Humanitarian Coordinator, 30
January-2 February 2009.

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been destroyed or become uninhabitable, especially in rural areas.64 On a number of occasions, the
Israel Defense Forces also warned or ordered the civilian population to flee areas or sites, which
were often attacked shortly thereafter.

83. International law prohibits arbitrary displacement, a notion that includes displacement in
situations of armed conflict that is incompatible with international humanitarian law because it is
not warranted by the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons65.

84. The conduct of the hostilities exacerbated forced displacement within Gaza. The Israel
Defense Forces resorted to aerial bombardment and artillery shelling in densely populated areas of
Gaza, reportedly disregarding the above-mentioned standards and the general rules of international
humanitarian law concerning the targeting of objects (see para. 102 below). Incidents of
Palestinian combatants placing military installations close to civilians or civilian objects, thereby
increasing the dangers for the civilian population and triggering their displacement, were also
reported.

85. Displaced persons also became victims as a consequence of military attacks. On 6 January
2009, Israeli shelling is reported to have killed 37 persons and injured 55 outside a UNRWA
school in Jabalya that sheltered a large number of displaced persons at the time (see annex).

86. When the present report was finalized, thousands of persons remained homeless because
their homes had been destroyed or damaged during the fighting; the total number of displaced was
unknown. Most displaced persons are staying in poor, overcrowded living conditions with host
families who are already overstretched and face shortages of food, non-food items (such as
mattresses and blankets), water and electricity. Continuing an 19-month blockade of Gaza, which
had created a serious humanitarian crisis even before the military incursion began, Israel still
restricts access to Gaza for goods urgently required to address emergency humanitarian needs and
to permit rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts. On 9 February 2009, the Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, in a field update, reported that international agencies had
faced unprecedented denial of access to Gaza since 5 November 2008.

64
Initial estimates indicate that over 4,240 residences were destroyed and 44,306 were damaged, most of them
rendered inhabitable without considerable rehabilitation.
65
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2), principle 6, restating articles 12 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and customary international humanitarian law (ICRC study, rules
24 and 129 – 131). See also chap. II.

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87. Some of the recently displaced persons inside Gaza, especially in rural areas, are
Palestinians belonging to families from Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The remainder
are Palestinian refugees, who fled or were driven from their homes on the territory inside the State
of Israel or their descendants. The renewed displacement of Palestinian refugees inside Gaza
creates additional vulnerabilities for them.

88. The Representative underscores the fact that being displaced in one’s own country or
country of habitual residence is a factual state, that neither confers a special legal status under
international law nor alters a pre-existing special status. Palestinian refugees who suffered
secondary displacement inside Gaza retain all rights under international law, including the right of
return as reaffirmed by the General Assembly in its resolution 194 (III). Israel, as occupying
Power, and the Palestinian Authority must address the specific assistance and protection needs of
all recently displaced persons, whether they are internally displaced in the sense of the description
provided by the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement or secondary displaced Palestinian
refugees.

H.   Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions
89. All killings during the Gaza conflict that violated applicable human rights and
humanitarian law norms come within the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,
summary or arbitrary executions.  For that reason, the major focus is on the principle of
accountability.

90. According to available estimates, a total of 1,440 people were killed (see paras. 1-8). The
principal dispute concerns the proportion of the Palestinian men killed who can be classified as
civilians or combatants.  Israel has estimated that at least 700 Hamas fighters were among the dead,
while the estimate of the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights is closer to 300.  The difference
relates in part to the status of those members of the civilian police force in Gaza whom were not
engaged in fighting, and who Israel apparently intentionally targeted.

91. There are strong and credible reports of war crimes and other violations of international
norms.  On the basis of the extensive information available, the great majority of observers have
concluded that systematic and impartial war crimes investigations must be undertaken.  To date, as

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described below, there is no indication of any credible moves in this direction at the national level;
on the contrary, all developments point in the opposite direction.

92. There are, however, also some who have sought to refute or discredit the information
gathered and the conclusions drawn in those reports. To take but one example, a group called
NGO Monitor in a report entitled “The NGO front in the Gaza war:  the Durban strategy
continues” of February 2009, called “entirely unfounded” a claim that Israel had committed
indiscriminate attacks against civilians, a claim that it attributed to Human Rights Watch, the
Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, Amnesty International, Al Mezan and a range of other
groups.  This refutation is based on the argument that the Israel Defense Forces had ‘legal advisors
embedded with combat units making analyses prior to any military action.” The assumption is that
indiscriminate attacks could never occur given the role of these advisers.  Moreover, the Non-
Governmental Organization levelling these charges are said not to “possess military expertise,
detailed information on the dispersal of weapons by Hamas”, nor to be “privy to Israeli targeting
decisions”.  As a result, the report argues that they can make no “credible evaluation”.

93. This exchange goes to the heart of the issue.  No amount of legal input into decision-
making by lawyers can render post hoc accountability unnecessary.  Indeed, such assiduous
conduct should make a party more willing to be subject to scrutiny.  Similarly, the suggestion that
international monitors lack the expertise or the information required to evaluate compliance
precisely begs the question.  If accepted, such a critique would undermine the entire concept of
international accountability and leave States and others as the only ones qualified to judge their
own compliance.  Rather than the rule of law, this would be the law of the jungle.

94. While the Israeli military operation in Gaza was but one episode in a long-standing,
complex and highly contentious conflict, these characteristics make it more, rather than less,
imperative that there be full accountability in relation to alleged violations.  The alternative is de
facto impunity, which mocks the international legal order, makes hollow the international
obligations undertaken and reaffirmed by the parties, increases the likelihood of more flagrant
violations in the future, and poisons the prospects for an eventual solution to the conflict.

95. The accountability record to date of both sides should give the Council cause for deep
concern.  The Special Rapporteur has been requesting an invitation to visit the Occupied

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Palestinian Territory since June 2006.  In that year, the Palestinian Authority issued an invitation
but Israel has not done so, despite a series of follow-ups.  Specific incidents raised in the context
of communications from the Special Rapporteur addressed to Israel have generally drawn either
no response or an unsatisfactory one.

96. The responses at the national level to calls for accountability have also been disappointing.
Hamas, for its part, has given no indication of its willingness to investigate or respond to
allegations directed at it.  Israel has announced several inquiries into specific incidents but these
are being undertaken by the military authorities themselves, and the track record of the many such
inquiries launched in the past is consistently problematic.  During the conflict, Israel refused entry
to Gaza to journalists and representatives of international Non-governmental Organizations
seeking to monitor the conduct of hostilities.  At the end of the invasion, the Prime Minister of
Israel, Ehud Olmert, was widely quoted as having promised to provide “state protection” to
military personnel who might face foreign war crimes prosecutions, starting that Israel would
assist them on that front and defend them.  Foreign prosecutions would, however, be both
unnecessary and unsustainable if Israel were to honour its obligations to undertake credible
investigations and, where appropriate, undertake domestic prosecutions.

97. Several issues of concern that need thorough investigation were brought to the attention of
the Special Rapporteur. These include, inter alia, violations of the principles of conduct of
hostilities, the targeting of Palestinian police and members of the Hamas political wing not taking
part in hostilities, and the questionable use of certain weapons in densely populated areas,
including white phosphorous shells, 155 mm shells and flechette shells.  He is also concerned by
credible reports of extrajudicial executions of Palestinians attributed to Hamas security forces
during the conflict.

98. The above developments highlight the imperative need for the Israeli authorities and those
of Hamas to cooperate fully with international endeavours to establish accountability in relation to
the conflict.  Recognition of such accountability should also include facilitating a visit by the
appropriate special rapporteurs.

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IV.  RECOMMENDATIONS

99. The recommendations formulated by the mandates whose submissions are included
above have been compiled and merged in the section below.

100. The protection of civilians requires immediate action by all parties and the
international community.

101. All parties to the conflict should cease all actions violating international human rights
and humanitarian law. In particular, the occupying Power should:
(a) End the blockade on Gaza negatively affecting civilians;
(b) Allow unimpeded and safe passage and access to Gaza of humanitarian assistance,
including food aid;
(c) Allow the unrestricted imports of medical supplies, foodstuffs and agricultural inputs,
fuel and construction materials;
(d) Grant prompt permission for patients with medical referrals for treatment outside
Gaza, especially for expectant and nursing mothers;
(e) Ensure the free and unimpeded movement of civilians between Gaza and other parts
of the Occupied Palestinian Territory.

102. All parties should establish accountability mechanisms providing for law-based,
independent, impartial, transparent and accessible investigations of alleged breaches of
international human rights and humanitarian law in accordance with their respective
obligations. Such investigations must hold perpetrators to account and provide redress to
victims where violations are found to have occurred. Investigations should address, inter alia
the following issues:
(a) Violations of the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution:  a
significant number of incidents have occurred where the circumstances and the large
number of civilians killed in a single attack raise prima facie concerns that the
attacks were carried out without respect for these principles;
(b) Targeting of Palestinian civilian police and members of the Hamas political wing:
Israel is accused of having intentionally targeted civilians and civilian objects
considered connected to Hamas, but not taking direct part in hostilities;

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(c) Use of human shields and placing civilians at risk:  there are credible reports of both
Israel and Hamas co-locating military targets near civilians and civilian objects.
There are specific reports that Hamas fired rockets and conducted other military
offensives from residential areas, and that Israeli soldiers took sniper positions from
within Palestinian homes, endangering the lives of residents;
(d) Extrajudicial executions by Hamas of Palestinian civilians;
(e) Unlawful use of incendiary weapons (white phosphorous artillery shells):  the use of
white phosphorous during a military offensive may be permissible where it is
intended to provide cover for troop movements.  There are, however, reports that
Israel used such weapons in densely populated civilian areas, with severe
consequences for residents. Unlawful use of artillery shells (155 mm):  there is
reliable evidence that artillery shells, which can have a casualty radius of up to 300
metres, were also used in densely populated civilian areas. Unlawful use of flechettes
(4 cm darts):  Israel is reported to have used 120 mm shells packed with flechettes in
populated residential areas;
(f) Attacks on medical personnel and ambulances as well as hospitals and denial of
medical treatment and access to treatment offered by the ICRC and the Palestinian
Red Crescent Society;
(g) Attacks on schools;
(h) Destruction of vital civilian infrastructure;
(i) Interference with the provision of humanitarian aid.

103. All parties must implement their obligations to respect, protect and fulfil human
rights, including, where necessary, by taking any measures needed to:
(a) Ensuring the protection of medical workers and facilities and facilitate rehabilitation
for seriously wounded patients, as well as psychosocial health support and treatment,
especially for children and youth;
(b) Enable the immediate resumption of regular educational activities, make schools
zones of peace and ensure that schools are protected from military attacks and from
seizure or use as centres for recruitment;66
(c) Promote education as a means to reduce psychosocial stress and build the conditions
for lasting peace;

66
See also the “Minimum standards for education in emergencies, chronic crises and early reconstruction,” published
by the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies in 2004.

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(d) Facilitate the prompt repair of greenhouses, farms and centres of food production;
(e) Enable the repair of water and pumping stations;
(f) Enable the import of reconstruction materials needed to build or repair vital
infrastructure and housing, and facilitate the full reintegration in dignity and security
of the recently displaced (without prejudice to the right of return of Palestinian
refugees);
(g) Ensure access to liquidity and financial and other resources needed so that people
may resume normal livelihoods;
(h) Take carefully into account the needs of particular groups, including children,
women, persons with disabilities, refugees and those displaced by the recent violence.

104. United Nations entities should continue to assess the needs of the Palestinian people
with a view to contributing to the wide-scale reconstruction efforts of the international
community in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including by continuing its damage
assessment by compiling satellite imagery and other detailed data on destruction in Gaza.

105. The international community should actively promote the implementation of the
decisions, resolutions and recommendations of the Security Council, the International Court
of Justice and the United Nations human rights mechanisms, including treaty bodies and
special procedures. In this respect, the mandate-holders recall the obligation of States to
cooperate to bring to an end through lawful means to any serious breach of an obligation
arising from a peremptory norm of general international law.  They also recall the obligation
of all States to ensure respect for the provisions of international humanitarian law.

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Annex*
Special report on Gaza and southern Israel prepared by the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict

1. From the launch of “Operation Cast Lead” on 27 December 2008 until the ceasefire of 17
January 2009, the extensive Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) led air and ground operations within
Gaza 1,440 people were reported killed, including at least 314 children, as verified by the
inter-agency working group, and 5,380 injured, including 1,872 children; up to 200,000 people,
including 112,000 children, displaced and movement for the majority of the population
severely restricted.  In the closely built-up areas of Gaza it became increasingly difficult to
obtain accurate and updated information. At times during the 22 days of bombardment,
international and local media broadcasts were the only information available to humanitarian
or human rights agencies. In periods when there was a lull in air or ground attacks, there were
some opportunities for staff of human rights agencies to verify information being received.
Since the ceasefire, capacity to verify information has improved and this report is compiled
from reliable reports provided by the inter-agency Working Group member organisations. In
Southern Israel it is reported that 3 Israelis were killed and182 people injured, although
specific information on children is currently unavailable.

2. Civilian targets, particularly homes and their occupants appear to have taken the brunt of the
attacks, but schools and medical facilities have also been hit. This is despite the fact that, in the
case of UNWRA schools, GPS coordinates were provided to the IDF by UNWRA.

3. The intensity of Operation Cast Lead has resulted in many psychosocial difficulties for
children; so much so that UNICEF has made psycho-social support one of its emergency
priorities in Gaza.  This is also true in southern Israel, where the days of conflict resulted in a
high incidence of psycho-social complaints on the part of children there.

Children killed and injured

4. 56 percent of the 1.5 million population, of Gaza, are under the age of 18 years; the latest
conflict and preceding 18 months of almost total blockade has had a massive impact on a

*
Owing to time constraints, the annex is circulated as received.
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generation of young people.  The Palestinian Authority (PA) Ministry of Health (MoH) reports
that at least 431 Palestinian children have been killed since 27 December 2008; independent
monitors from the inter-agency working group have verified 314 cases of children killed to
date.   Work continues to verify final numbers.

5. Many children have been injured during the period of fighting and the PA MoH reports 1,855
children injured while independent monitors report at least 860 children have sustained
injuries.  Handicap International estimates that up to 50 percent of people injured have
sustained severe injuries that, without proper rehabilitation, could result in permanent
disability.

6. During this period, the Magen David Adom, the national emergency medical, disaster,
ambulance and blood bank service, reported that three Israelis were killed in Southern Israel
and 182 people were injured by rocket fire from Gaza. The Inter-agency working group
(working group) have been unable to verify this.  The lack of greater casualties is most likely
attributable to a very effective program of security awareness training in schools and an early
warning system by the Israeli authorities.

7. Violations were reported on a daily basis, too numerous to list: below are just a few examples
of the hundreds of incidents that have been documented and verified by the working group:

8. On 3 January, during an IDF operation in Gaza City at 6.30 AM a tank shell landed near a
family’s house; a father and his two young sons, both aged under 11 years, emerged to survey
the situation.   As they exited their home, IDF soldiers shot and killed them (at the entrance to
their house), with the daughter witnessing.  The IDF ordered the mother and daughter to leave
the house, refusing the request of the girl to move the bodies. Bulldozers commenced
destroying the house with the woman and child still inside; as they exited from the house the
woman sustained a broken hip. The mother and child then watched as their home was
destroyed; rubble and bodies being bulldozed together. Days later, the child was still in shock
and only moving her eyes; the mother has lost the ability to speak

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9. On 7 January, after several days of requesting safe passage to the above-mentioned area of
Gaza city, during a three-hour lull in  hostilities, an ICRC/Palestinian Red Crescent Society67
medical team was allowed on foot (without ambulances) into the closed military area to
evacuate any remaining survivors. According to the ICRC, in one house, the team found four
small children next to their dead mothers who were too weak to stand up on their own.  Due to
the limited time allowed, the ICRC/PRCS team was not able to reach all houses in the area. In
all, ICRC/PRCS evacuated by donkey cart 30 Palestinians including 18 wounded.  The IDF
restricted further access to the area, prompting the ICRC to issue a public statement
demanding urgent access and charging the Israeli army with failing to assist wounded
Palestinians.

10. On 15 January, as IDF tanks moved into Tal Al Hawa, south-west of Gaza City, families
moved from their apartments to the ground floor of the building, bringing bags or personal
belongings with them. IDF soldiers entered the building. A number of young people had their
wrists tied and eyes covered and were ordered to stand aside. Other children and older women
were made to stand on the other side of the room.  One of the boys (aged 11 years) was told to
open the bags one by one; one of the bags had a lock which a soldier shot at as the child
struggled with it, although the boy was uninjured. The boy was then made to accompany the
IDF for a number of hours during a period of intense operations. As the group of soldiers
moved through the town the boy was made to walk in front. When they entered the building of
the Palestinian Red Crescent Society the 11 year old boy was made to enter first, in front of
the soldiers.  Later while moving through the town the IDF met with resistance and were shot
at, the boy remained in front of the group. On arrival at the Al Quds Hospital the boy was at
the front but they released him at the entrance to the hospital. This appears to be in direct
contravention to a 2005 Israeli High Court ruling on the illegality of the use of human shields
and a violation of international law.

67
The Palestinian Red Crescent Society is the Red Crescent Movement in Gaza and is an
internationally recognized organization with medical functions.  It is the operational partner of the
International

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11. There have also been allegations of Hamas effectively using civilians as human shields. In
addition there have been reports of Hamas firing from densely populated places and near
protected areas.  The working group is currently investigating these reports.

12. On Monday 29 December 2008, at about 1:00am, an IDF missile struck Imad Aqel Mosque in
the centre of the densely crowded Jabalia camp, damaging the surrounding houses. A family
house was hit, and five sisters aged 4 - 17 years were killed in their sleep when their bedroom
was completely destroyed. Four children, aged 2 – 16 years, were injured in the same attack.

13. On 4 January, IIDF foot-soldiers moved members of one extended family, from different
houses, into a single residence, ordering them to stay inside. There were over 100 Palestinian
civilian family members in the house.  Approximately twenty-four hours later, IDF forces
shelled the home, killing twenty-three, including nine children aged 8 months - 17 years, and
seven women. Those who survived and were able walked two kilometres to Salah Ed Din road
before being transported to the hospital. An additional seven members of the same family,
including three children, were killed in the same area in separate incidents during the military
operation.

14. On 28 December 2008, one family was sitting around a fire in farmland near their home in al-
Zaitun village. The head of household asked his 7 year old daughter to fetch tea in their home
and, as soon as the girl entered the house, it was hit by a missile and reduced to rubble. Family
members outside all sustained shrapnel wounds and were transferred to Al-Shifa hospital to be
treated for broken bones, cuts and bruises. The young girl’s body was found only the next
morning, when rescue workers finished clearing the rubble.

15. On 2 January 2009, one 8-year-old boy, his brother (11), and a member of the extended family
(11) went to pick some sugar cane from an adjacent property in Al-Qarara. North of Khan
Younis, in southern Gaza.  Upon returning from the field, they were struck by a missile fired
from an Israeli drone aircraft. Two of the boys died at the scene, while the third boy died on
the way to hospital.

16. On 3 January 2009, Israeli soldiers entered a family house in the Zeitoun neighbourhood of
Gaza city. Standing at the doorstep, they asked the male head of the household to come out

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and shot him dead, without warning, while he was holding his ID, hands raised up in the air,
and then started to fire indiscriminately and without warning into the room where the rest of
the family was huddled together. The eldest son was shouting in vain the word “children” in
Hebrew to warn the soldiers. The shooting did not stop until everyone was lying on the floor.
The mother and four of the brothers, aged 2 - 12 years, had been wounded, one of them, aged
four, fatally.

17. On 18 January, the IDF fired artillery shells that hit a house located on Salah Ad-Din Street in
Jabalia Refugee Camp. The shelling killed 3 children, aged 14 - 17 years, and injured two
others from the same family.
Alleged use of white phosphorous weapons in civilians areas by the Israel Defense Forces

18. There have been allegations of white phosphorous being used during the IDF attacks in Gaza.
The use of weapons is governed by the general principles on the conduct of hostilities, ie. the
principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution, as outlined in the legal framework
section. In addition, although not specifically banned in any treaty, the use of incendiary
weapons is limited by Protocol III68 of the 1980 Geneva Convention.69

19. The following are two reports on incidents that have been verified:
In Jabalia, on 10 January 2009, white phosphorous shells hit a family house which is located west
of the (former) Civil Administration building. Two children were seriously injured from burns
(two 16 year old boys). The first boy is in Shaifa Hospital and the other who is suffering from
third degree burns has been transferred to a hospital in Egypt.

68
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to
be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects of 10 October 1980.
69
Israel did not ratify the Third Protocol but its military manuals reflect restrictions on white phosphorus use (A 1998
Israeli military manual states: “Incendiary arms are not banned. Nevertheless, because of their wide range of cover,
this protocol of the CCW is meant to protect civilians and forbids making a population center a target for an
incendiary weapon attack. Furthermore, it is forbidden to attack a military objective situated within a population
center employing incendiary weapons. The protocol does not ban the use of these arms during combat (for instance, in
flushing out bunkers).”

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20. At 6:30am 18 January 2009, the IDF fired several shells – some of which appeared to be white
phosphorus– which landed in and around the UNRWA Beit Lahia Elem School that sheltered
displaced civilians. One shell struck a classroom, where civilians were sheltered. The shell
broke through the roof and exploded on the ground, spreading its shrapnel into classrooms.
Two children (5 and 7) were killed and their mother was injured. Total number of injuries
from this incident was 14.   Four of the injured indicated phosphorous burns (including one
child) UNWRA has stated that they have evidence of white phosphorous having being fired
into their installations, including the UNWRA school in Beit Lahia.  This is also supported by
video footage of phosphorous shells being used70.

21. The aftermath of the conflict has left many risks for children in the form of unexploded
ordinance, small arms and possible contaminated shrapnel which has already resulted in deaths
to children. On 20 January two children were killed by unexploded ordinance in Az-Zaitoun,
in the eastern part of Gaza City.  The boy (10) and girl (11) were playing in an area from
which the IDF had recently withdrawn.

Attacks on schools and health facilities

22. Seven Ministry of Education schools were destroyed and 157 schools were damaged by air
strikes and related bombardment in Gaza, in addition damage to 36 UNWRA schools.  In an
area where many Gazan schools already operate a double shift system, the provision of
education to children will be under exceptional strain.

23. On 6 January 2009, three shells landed outside the UNRWA Jabalia Prep C Boys School,
resulting in at least 37 fatalities, including 14 children (three aged 10, three aged 13, three
aged 15 and one each of 3, 11,14, 16 and 17 years of age).  There were at least 55 injuries
(including 15 children) of which 15 are reported to be in critical condition. Further
investigation is required to determine the exact location of where children were injured and
killed. The school was being used as a shelter for people fleeing hostilities.

70
Statement from the Times: The Israeli army has, however, launched an internal inquiry into whether white
phosphorus was used in some cases in built-up areas, having eventually admitted that it did use the incendiary
substance, which is not illegal as a battlefield smokescreen but is banned from being used in civilian areas. Camera
footage from one such attack shows what appears to be white phosphorous raining down on a UN school in Beit
Lahiya, where Red Crescent ambulances and their crews were stationed.

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24. In the same period, two schools in Ashkelon, southern Israel were damaged by rocket fire
from Gaza.  One “Grad” rocket hit the Tzvia school, a religious girl’s school and another hit at
the entrance to the Newe Dkalim school.  Due to preparations made in both schools there were
no casualties.

25. During the fighting, damage was reported in 14 of the 27 hospitals in Gaza and at least 38
clinics were damaged by IDF fire. Fata and Al-Wafa rehabilitation hospitals, managed by
NGOs, are the only rehabilitation hospitals in Gaza and both were severely damaged.
Additionally eight UNRWA health centres sustained light damage.  Of the 148 ambulances in
Gaza, at least 29 have been damaged or destroyed. Two ambulance stations (Gaza and Jabalia)
were also destroyed.

26. Al-Quds Palestinian Red Crescent Society Hospital in south Gaza City, was hit by direct IDF
fire. Soldiers surrounded the hospital during the early hours of 15 January and opened fire on
the hospital compound. The administrative building and pharmacy adjacent to the hospital
were hit and caught fire. Fearing an imminent explosion or the spread of the fire, hospital
authorities evacuated all patients to the hospital's ground floor and prepared for a complete
evacuation. At least 50 patients, 20 of whom were confined to their beds, waited several hours
to be evacuated. Fire-fighters and ambulances were prevented from evacuating the patients for
about five hours.  Between 27 December and 19 January, 16 health personnel were reported to
have been killed while on duty, and an additional 22 injured.

Denial of humanitarian access

27. The 20-month blockade of Gaza had already resulted in a scarcity of many goods and an
insufficiency of basic support services. This has impacted upon children in the decreased
availability of nourishing foods, and the compromised ability to provide essential services
such as health and education.  The blockage of basic provisions has not changed since the
crisis and continues to limit not only the normal development of children but now recovery
from the immense impact of the 22-day conflict.

28. Approximately 91 percent of Gaza’s population — some 1,275,300 people including 714,168
children — are now dependent on food assistance.  Despite the severity of the attacks and the

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immense humanitarian need, there have been no significant changes to access restrictions in
Gaza prior to that of 26 December 2008. From 27 December to 21 January 2009, the total
number of trucks that entered was an average 95 per day through Kerem Shalom and 56
through Karni, for a total average of 151 per day.  Aid experts cite that a minimum of 400
trucks per day are needed to satisfy critical humanitarian needs in Gaza, while emergency
reconstruction efforts would necessitate at least 1,500 trucks per day.

29. Without construction materials being allowed into Gaza there can be no significant recovery
for the communities.  The IDF continues to block the delivery of pipes and fittings, which is
having a deleterious impact on the access to safe drinking water.  On 25 January UNICEF was
informed that a solar refrigerator for vaccines destined for North Gaza was denied entry; this is
having a direct impact on children and pregnant women who are unable to receive vaccination
at their local Primary Health Clinic.

30. An estimated 3,300 babies were born during the conflict, during which there were reports of
premature labour and delivery due to the lack of access to healthcare. Also, primary health
care services were reported to have declined by about 90 percent, and many programmes such
as vaccination schemes and neonatal care stopped completely for significant periods.

31. Water, sewer, electricity and education infrastructure and services were also extensively
damaged and interrupted; almost certainly compounding obstacles to recovery and
rehabilitation for displaced children and their families. For example, at the height of the
conflict, nearly all of Gaza's population --including 793,520 children were without electricity,
and at any given time during the conflict, some 500,000 people were without water.  Around
30,000 babies — or three quarters of Gaza’s infants under 6 months of age — are not
exclusively breastfed, exposing them to a high risk of infection or malnutrition from using
breast milk substitutes prepared with potentially contaminated water.

32. At least 2,200,000 litres of sewage have leaked out of Gaza’s waste water system due to
damage from shelling, affecting at least 91,727 people, including 51,367 children, this now
poses serious health risks, and the impact on children has the potential to be significant.

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33. Until the Government of Israel allows an increased range of supplies into Gaza, including
construction materials, there can be no meaningful recovery for the children of Gaza.  School
and health facilities have been badly affected by the attacks. The education system was already
under severe strain and now an increased number of schools are without adequate resources to
provide education for children. In addition to construction materials, schools need paper for
text books, school stationary supplies, recreation and sports kits – all of which have been
denied access by the IDF since the end of the 22-day conflict.

Displacement

34. It has been estimated that 200,000 people were displaced, among them 112,000 children, at
some point during the conflict. At the peak of displacement on 17 January, UNRWA was
accommodating, 50,896 displaced persons in 50 UNRWA shelters. As of 25 January 2009,
510 people (88 families) remained housed in UNRWA run emergency shelters in community
based organisation and of the areas so far surveyed 66,000 people are living with host families
for a total of 66,510 people.

35. For example, on 04 January 2009 at 15.00hrs, fighting between militants and the IDF in Al
Zatioun resulted in approximately 5,000 persons fleeing their houses and taking refuge into
another area.  In another incident, on 05 January 2009 at 06:00 hrs, IDF armoured vehicles
advanced into the Customs Junction in Beit Hanoun and opened fire repeatedly into the nearby
neighbourhoods. About 80 households were forced to evacuate their homes, owing to the IDF
offensive, and take refuge in schools which UNRWA had opened to shelter them. Among
them were about 150 children. Later, Israeli troops advanced into the aforementioned area and
destroyed approximately 20 houses.

36. The situation for many families is now extremely difficult, with at least 4,100 residential
structures destroyed and another 17,000 severely damaged; forcing many of the residents,
among them thousands of children, to seek shelter elsewhere. The long term impact on
children of being homeless increases their vulnerability and decreases their capacity to recover
from the ordeal of the 22 days of attacks.

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Arrests and detention

37. Reports have been received that children under the age of 18 years have been arrested for
security offences along with adults by Israeli security forces in Gaza during the course of
Operation Cast Lead.  To date the working group has not been possible to verify this.

38. During the period of attacks in Gaza, lawyers have observed that the number of children
arrested in the West Bank increased and the number of children brought to the Israeli Military
Courts in pre-trial hearings in the first two weeks of January was twice as high as in the same
period in 2008.  During the first two weeks of January alone, DCI-Palestine’s legal department
received 10 new cases of children for legal representation in the Military Courts compared
with a monthly average of 10-15 new cases. Out of these 10 cases, eight were arrested from
the street or during demonstrations against the Gaza attacks. DCI-Palestine has not yet been
able to take statements from the children nor confirm if they were actively participating in
demonstrations.

39. From 19 – 29 January, six cases of children aged 12-13 arrested for throwing stones at the
Wall or in demonstrations, and taken to the Israeli Military Courts have been recorded.
Lawyers were unable to obtain their release. These six children are awaiting trial and are likely
to be sentenced and imprisoned.  Under Israeli Military Order 378, stone-throwing carries a
maximum sentence of 20 years, for adults and children. However, children usually serve 3-6
months in prison for throwing stones.

- - - - -

A Modest Proposal: Why Hamas May Move Towards a Settlement with Israel

More than two months after the unilateral ceasefires in the Gaza War, there has been little progress in discussions on Israel and Palestine. Not only have unity talks between Fatah and Hamas failed to reach a conclusion, but the Israeli-Hamas talks on a prisoner exchange have also been fruitless.

So what's the hold-up? Self-confidence. Hamas self-confidence.

According to all measurements, Hamas's popularity has been increasing, even in the West Bank, since the end of the war. Surviving the border blockade of Gaza and the heavy bombardments of Operation Cast Lead Hamas has strengthened its position in Gaza, as it has put out a constant anti-Fatah rhetoric.

In the unity talks to establish the pre-conditions for an election to form a unity government, the Palestinian Authority (dominated by Fatah) has been insisting on the principles of the Quartet of the US/UN/EU/Russia. These call for Hamas to renounce terrorism, recognise Israel, and abide by the 2005 agreement between Tel Aviv and the PA. Hamas does not and cannot accept this for the time being.

Despite its stronger position, Hamas is walking on a thin and fragile tightrope: it must either accept the Quartet's conditions and work in partnership with Fatah, or it will be excluded from the political arena and be increasingly marginalised. If the Obama Administration's regional policies move the new Israeli Government, because of deepening economic crisis or a resurgence in perception of Israeli "security" in US domestic politics, Hamas can lose everything it has now.

Hamas is putting its bargaining power on the line. It may get more concessions from Israel at the behest of the US over the course of time. However, even this will never allow Hamas to sustain its uncompromising stance against recognition of Israel and acceptance of the 2005 agreements.

What does this mean? Hamas officials, who are aware of this dilemma, will not insist on political principles that can never be fulfilled. As they gain more of a role in a Palestinian Government, encouraged by their showing in the next elections, they are going to recognize Israel.

This will probably take years. At first, a long-term truce (hudna) based on pre-1967 borders and some economic, political, environmental, and security cooperation will be established. That in turn may establish the platform for a long-standing peace agreement in the following years.

Those who are sceptical should look back to early 2006, just before Hamas's triumph in the Gaza elections. On 4 March, Hamas leader Moussa Abu Marzouk stated that recognition of Israel would be a rejection of the rights of Palestinians, and other officials claimed during the election campaign that Fatah's 16 years of peace talks with Israel were a waste of time. However, another top official, Mahmoud al-Zahar told CNN in January that a long-term truce was possible if Israel withdrew to pre-1967 borders and released Palestinian prisoners. T

Three years later, Hamas spokesman Ayman Taha has said that the organization is unwilling to recognize Israel and to accept the agreements signed by the PA. Yet, as it manoeuvres in negotiations in Cairo and with Tel Aviv, Hamas has to consider if that position will jeopardise its political future.

In 2006, the US would not recognise Hamas' victory in Gazan elections because it believed that the organisation would be reinforced in its refusal to accept any relationship with Israel. Three years later, Hamas can defy this prediction:  establishing and consolidating its gains in a Palestinian Parliament and possibly a Presidency, the Gazan leadership could decide to come in from the political cold. The process would take time and careful language, but acceptance of the Quartet's conditions and a unity government in Palestine are possible. And so, eventually, is a regional peace based on pre-1967 borders with Israel.

Video and Text: Obama News Conference (24 March)

See Also: John Matlin on "Obama and the US Economy"

"If the Washington press corps successfully links Obama with the privileged in American society and nails him as unable to curb the worst excesses of Wall Street, his Presidency may descend into the disaster that few predicted and fewer, except died-in-the-wool Republicans, wanted."

CNN Summary: "Obama defends his budget as essential to recovery"



PRESIDENT OBAMA: Hello, everybody. Please have a seat.

Good evening. Now, before I take questions from the correspondents, I want to give everyone who’s watching tonight an update on the steps we’re taking to move this economy from recession to recovery, and ultimately to prosperity.

Now, it’s important to remember that this crisis didn’t happen overnight and it didn’t result from any one action or decision. It took many years and many failures to lead us here. And it will take many months and many different solutions to lead us out. There are no quick fixes, and there are no silver bullets.

That’s why we’ve put in place a comprehensive strategy designed to attack this crisis on all fronts. It’s a strategy to create jobs, to help responsible homeowners, to restart lending, and to grow our economy over the long term. And we’re beginning to see signs of progress.

The first step we took was to pass a recovery plan to jump-start job creation and put money in people’s pockets. And this plan’s already saved the jobs of teachers and police officers. It’s creating construction jobs to rebuild roads and bridges. And yesterday I met with a man whose company is reopening a factory outside of Pittsburgh that’s rehiring workers to build some of the most energy-efficient windows in the world.

And this plan will provide a tax cut to 95 percent of all working families that will appear in people’s paychecks by April 1st.

The second step we took was to launch a plan to stabilize the housing market and help responsible homeowners stay in their homes. This plan’s one reason that mortgage interest rates are now at near- historic lows.

We’ve already seen a jump in refinancings of mortgages as homeowners take advantage of lower rates. And every American should know that up to 40 percent of all mortgages are now eligible for refinancing. This is the equivalent of another tax cut, and we’re also beginning to see signs of increased sales and stabilizing home prices for the first time in a very long time.

The third part of our strategy is to restart the flow of credit to families and businesses. To that end, we’ve launched a program designed to support the markets for more affordable auto loans, student loans and small-business loans -- a program that’s already securitized more of this lending in the last week than in the last four months combined.

Yesterday, Secretary Geithner announced a new plan that will partner government resources with private investment to buy up the assets that are preventing our banks from lending money. And we will continue to do whatever is necessary in the weeks ahead to ensure the banks Americans depend on have the money they need to lend, even if the economy gets worse.

Finally, the most critical part of our strategy is to ensure that we do not return to an economic cycle of bubble and bust in this country. We know that an economy built on reckless speculation, inflated home prices and maxed-out credit cards does not create lasting wealth. It creates the illusion of prosperity, and it’s endangered us all.

The budget I submitted to Congress will build our economic recovery on a stronger foundation so that we don’t face another crisis like this 10 or 20 years from now. We invest in the renewable sources of energy that will lead to new jobs, new businesses and less dependence on foreign oil. We invest in our schools and our teachers, so that our children have the skills they need to compete with any workers in the world.

We invest in reform that will bring down the cost of health care for families, businesses and our government.

And in this budget, we have -- we have to make the tough choices necessary to cut our deficit in half by the end of my first term, even under the most pessimistic estimates.

At the end of the day, the best way to bring our deficit down in the long run is not with a budget that continues the very same policies that have led us to a narrow prosperity and massive debt. It’s with a budget that leads to broad economic growth by moving from an era of borrow-and-spend to one where we save and invest.

And that’s why clean-energy jobs and businesses will do -- all across America. That’s what a highly skilled workforce can do all across America. That’s what an efficient health-care system that controls costs and entitlements like Medicare and Medicaid will do.

That’s why this budget is inseparable from this recovery, because it is what lays the foundation for a secure and lasting prosperity.

The road to that prosperity is still long, and we will hit our share of bumps and setbacks before it ends. But we must remember that we can get there if we travel that road as one nation, as one people.

You know, there was a lot of outrage and finger-pointing last week, and much of it is is understandable. I’m as angry as anybody about those bonuses that went to some of the very same individuals who brought our financial system to its knees, partly because it’s yet another symptom of the culture that led us to this point.

But one of the most important lessons to learn from this crisis is that our economy only works if we recognize that we’re all in this together, that we all have responsibilities to each other and to our country.

Bankers and executives on Wall Street need to realize that enriching themselves on the taxpayer’s dime is inexcusable, that the days of outsize rewards and reckless speculation that puts us all at risk have to be over. At the same time, the rest of us can’t afford to demonize every investor or entrepreneur who seeks to make a profit. That drive is what has always fueled our prosperity, and it is what will ultimately get these banks lending and our economy moving once more.

We’ll recover from this recession, but it will take time; it will take patience; and it will take an understanding that when we all work together, when each of us looks beyond our own short-term interest to the wider set of obligations we have towards each other, that’s when we succeed. That’s when we prosper. And that’s what is needed right now.

So let’s look towards the future with a renewed sense of common purpose, a renewed determination, and, most importantly, renewed confidence that a better day will come.

All right. With that, let me take some questions. And I’ve got a list here; let’s start off with Jennifer Loven, AP.

QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. President.

Your Treasury secretary and the Fed chair have been -- were on Capitol Hill today, asking for this new authority that you want to regulate big, complex financial institutions. But given the problems that the financial bailout program has had so far -- banks not wanting to talk about how they’re spending the money, the AIG bonuses that you mentioned -- why do you think the public should sign on for another new, sweeping authority for the government to take over companies, essentially?

PRESIDENT OBAMA: Well, keep in mind that it is precisely because of the lack of this authority that the AIG situation has gotten worse. Now, understand that AIG’s not a bank, it’s an insurance company. If it were a bank and it had effectively collapsed, then the FDIC could step in, as it does with a whole host of banks -- as it did with IndyMac -- and in a structured way renegotiate contracts, get rid of bad assets, strengthen capital requirements, resell it on the private marketplace.

So we’ve got a regular mechanism whereby we deal with FDIC-insured banks. We don’t have that same capacity with an institution like AIG, and that’s part of the reason why it has proved so problematic. I think a lot of people understandably say: Well, if we’re putting all this money in there, and if it’s such a big systemic risk to allow AIG to liquidate, why is it that we can’t restructure some of these contracts? Why can’t we do some of the things that need to be done in a more orderly way? And the reason is -- is because we have not obtained this authority.

We should have obtained it much earlier, so that any institution that poses a systemic risk that could bring down the financial system we can handle, and we can do it in an orderly fashion that quarantines it from other institutions. We don’t have that power right now. That’s what Secretary Geithner was talking about.

And I think that there’s going to be strong support from the American people and from Congress to provide that authority so that we don’t find ourselves in a situation where we’ve got to choose between either allowing an enormous institution like AIG, which is not just insuring other banks but is also insuring pension funds and potentially putting people’s 401(k)s at risk if it goes under -- that’s one choice -- and then the other choice is just to allow them to take taxpayer money without the kind of conditions that we’d like to see on it. So that’s why I think the authority’s so important.

QUESTION: But why should the public trust the government to handle that authority well?

PRESIDENT OBAMA: Well, as I said before, if you look at how the FDIC has handled a situation like IndyBank, for example, it actually does these kinds of resolutions effectively when it’s got the tools to do it.

We don’t have the tools right now.

Okay. Chuck Todd.

QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. President. Some have compared this financial crisis to a war, and in times of war, past presidents have called for some form of sacrifice. Some of your programs, whether for Main Street or Wall Street, have actually cushioned the blow for those that were irresponsible during this -- during this economic period of prosperity or supposed prosperity that you were talking about.

Why, given this new era of responsibility that you’re asking for, why haven’t you asked for something specific that the public should be sacrificing to participate in this economic recovery?

PRESIDENT OBAMA: Well, let me -- let me take that question in a couple -- couple of phases. First of all, it’s not true that we have not asked sacrifice from people who are getting taxpayer money. We have imposed some very stiff conditions. The only problem that we’ve had so far are contracts that were put in place before we took over.

But moving forward, anybody -- any bank, for example, that is receiving capital from the taxpayers is going to have to have some very strict conditions in terms of how it pays out its executives, how it pays out dividends, how it’s reporting its lending practices. So we want to make sure that there’s some stiff conditions in place.

With respect to the American people, I think folks are sacrificing left and right. They -- you’ve got a lot of parents who are cutting back on everything to make sure that their kids can still go to college. You’ve got workers who are deciding to cut an entire day and entire day’s worth of pay so that their fellow co-workers aren’t laid off. I think that across the board people are making adjustments, large and small, to accommodate the fact that we’re in very difficult times right now.

What I’ve said here in Washington is that we’ve got to make some tough choices. We got to make some tough budgetary choices. What we can’t do, though, is sacrifice long-term growth investments that are critical to the future. And that’s why my budget focuses on health care, energy, education -- the kinds of things that can build a foundation for long-term economic growth as opposed to the fleeting prosperity that we’ve seen over the last several years. I mean, when you have an economy in which the majority of growth is coming from the financial sector -- when AIG selling a derivative is counted as an increase in the gross domedic -- domestic product, then that’s not a model for sustainable economic growth.

And what we have to do is invest in those things that will allow the American people’s capacity for ingenuity and innovation, their ability to take risks but make sure that those risks are grounded in good products and good services that they believe they can market to the rest of the country, that those models of economic growth are what we’re promoting, and that’s what I think our budget does.

QUESTION: But you don’t think there should be a specific call to action that you want the American -- I mean, this is -- you’ve described this as an economic crisis like nothing we have seen since the Great Depression.

PRESIDENT OBAMA: Well, as I said, the American people are making a host of sacrifices in their individual lives. We are going through an extraordinary crisis, but we believe that taken -- if you take the steps that we’ve already taken with respect to housing, with respect to small businesses, if you look at what we’re doing in terms of increasing liquidity in the financial system, that the steps that we’re taking can actually stabilize the economy and get it moving again.

What I’m looking from the American people to do is that they are going to be doing what they’ve always done, which is working hard, looking after their families, making sure that despite the economic hard times that they’re still contributing to their community, that they’re still participating in volunteer activities, that they are paying attention to the debates that are going on in Washington.

And the budgets that we’re putting forward and some of the decisions that we’re having to make are going to be tough decisions, and we’re going to need the support of the American people, and that’s part of why what I’ve tried to do is to be out front as much as possible, explaining in very clear terms exactly what we’re doing.

Jake?

QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. President. Right now on Capitol Hill, Senate Democrats are writing a budget, and according to press accounts and their own statements, they’re not including the middle-class tax cut that you include in the stimulus. They’re talking about phasing that out. They’re not including the cap-and-trade that you have in your budget, and they’re not including other measures.

I know when you outlined your four priorities over the weekend, a number of these things were not in there. Will you sign a budget if it does not contain a middle-class tax cut, does not contain cap-and- trade?

PRESIDENT OBAMA: Well, I’ve emphasized repeatedly what I expect out of this budget. I expect that there’s serious efforts at health care reform, and that we are driving down costs for families and businesses, and ultimately for the federal and state governments that are going to be broke if we continue on the current path.

I’ve said that we’ve got to have a serious energy policy that frees ourselves from dependence on foreign oil and makes clean energy the profitable kind of energy. We’ve got to invest in education, K through 12 and beyond, to upgrade the skills of the American worker so we can compete in -- in the international economy. And I’ve said that we’ve got to start driving our deficit numbers down.

Now, we never expected, when we printed out our budget, that they would simply Xerox it and vote on it. We assume that it has to go through the legislative process. I have not yet seen the final product coming out of the Senate or the House, and we’re in constant conversations with them. I am confident that the budget we put forward will have those principles in place.

When it comes to the middle-class tax cut, we already had that in the recovery. We know that that’s going to be in place for at least the next two years. We had identified a specific way to pay for it. If Congress has better ideas in terms of how to pay for it, then we’re happy to listen.

When it comes to cap-and-trade, the broader principle is that we’ve got to move to a new energy era. And that means moving away from polluting energy sources towards cleaner energy sources.

That is a potential engine for economic growth.

I think cap-and-trade is the best way, from my perspective, to achieve some of those gains, because what it does is it starts pricing the pollution that’s being sent into the atmosphere.

The way it’s structured, it has to take into account regional differences. It has to protect consumers from huge spikes in electricity prices. So there are a -- a lot of technical issues that are going to have to be sorted through.

Our point in the budget is, let’s get started now. We can’t wait. And my expectation is that the energy committees, or other relevant committees in both the House and the Senate, are going to be moving forward a strong energy package. It’ll be authorized. We’ll get it done. And I will sign it. Okay?

QUESTION: So is that a yes, sir? You’re willing to sign a budget that doesn’t have those two provisions?

PRESIDENT OBAMA: No; I -- what I said was -- is I haven’t seen yet what provisions are in there. The bottom line is -- is that I want to see health care, energy, education and serious efforts to reduce our budget deficit.

And there are going to be a lot of details that are still being worked out. But I have confidence that we’re going to be able to get a budget done that’s reflective of what needs to happen in order to make sure that America grows. Okay?

Chip Reid.

QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. President.

At both of your town hall meetings in California last week, you said, quote, ”I didn’t run for president to pass on our problems to the next generation.”

But under your budget, the debt will increase $7 trillion over the next 10 years. The Congressional Budget Office says $9.3 trillion. And today on Capitol Hill, some Republicans called your budget, with all the spending on health care, education and environment, the most irresponsible budget in American history.

Isn’t that kind of debt exactly what you were talking about when you said passing on our problems to the next generation?

PRESIDENT OBAMA: First of all, I suspect that some of those Republican critics have a short memory, because as I recall, I’m inheriting a $1.3 trillion deficit, annual deficit, from them. That would be point number one.

Point number two. Both under our estimates and under the CBO estimates, both -- the most conservative estimates out there, we drive down the deficit over the first five years of our budget. The deficit is cut in half. And folks aren’t disputing that.

Where the dispute comes in is what happens in a whole bunch of out years. And the main difference between the budget that we presented and the budget that came out of Congressional Budget Office is assumptions about growth.

They’re assuming a growth rate of 2.2. We’re assuming a growth rate of 2.6. Those small differences end up adding up to a lot of money. Our assumptions are perfectly consistent with what blue chip forecasters out there are saying.

Now, none of us know exactly what’s going to happen six or eight or 10 years from now. Here’s what I do know: If we don’t tackle energy, if we don’t improve our education system, if we don’t drive down the costs of health care, if we’re not making serious investments in science and technology and our infrastructure, then we won’t grow 2.6 percent; we won’t grow 2.2 percent. We won’t grow.

And so what we’ve said is let’s make the investments that ensure that we meet our growth targets, that put us on a pathway to growth, as opposed to a situation in which we’re not making those investments and we still have trillion-dollar deficits.

And there’s a interesting reason why some of these critics haven’t put out their own budget. I mean, we haven’t seen an alternative budget out of them. And the reason is because they know that, in fact, the biggest driver of long-term deficits are the huge health care costs that we’ve got out here that we’re going to have to tackle.

And we -- that if we don’t deal with some of the structural problems in our deficit, ones that were here long before I got here, then we’re going to continue to see some of the problems in those out years.

And so what we’re trying to emphasize is let’s make sure that we’re making the investments that we need to grow, to meet those growth targets. At the same time, we’re still reducing the deficit by a couple of trillion dollars. We are cutting out wasteful spending in areas like Medicare. We’re -- we’re changing procurement practices when it comes to the Pentagon budget. We are looking at social- service programs and education programs that don’t work and eliminate them. And we will continue to go line-by-line through this budget, and where we find programs that don’t work we will eliminate them.

But it is -- it is going to be a(n) impossible task for us to balance our budget if we’re not taking on rising health care costs. And it’s going to be an impossible task to balance our budget or even approximate it if we are not boosting our growth rates. And -- and that’s why our budget focuses on the investments we need to make that happen.

QUESTION: But even under your budget -- as you said, over the next four or five years, you’re going to cut the deficit in half. Then, after that, six years in a row it goes up, up, up.

If you’re making all these long-term structural cuts --

PRESIDENT OBAMA: Right.

QUESTION: -- why does it continue to go up in the out years?

PRESIDENT OBAMA: Well, look. It is going to take a whole host of adjustments, and we couldn’t reflect all of those adjustments in this budget. Let me give you an example. There’s been a lot of talk about entitlements and Medicare and Medicaid. The biggest problem we have long term is Medicare and Medicaid, but whatever reforms we initiate on that front -- and we’re very serious about working on a bipartisan basis to reduce those deficits -- or reduce those costs -- you’re not going to see those savings reflected until much later.

And so a -- a budget is a snapshot of what we can get done right now, understanding that eight, 10 years from now we will have had a whole series of new budgets. And we’re going to have to make additional adjustments. And once we get out of this current economic crisis, then it’s going to be absolutely important for us to take another look and say, ”Are we growing as fast as we need to grow? Are there further cuts that we need to make? What other adjustments are -- is it going to take for us to have a sustainable budget level?”

But keep in mind -- just to give one other example, as a percentage of gross domestic product, we are reducing non-Defense discretionary spending to its lowest level since the ’60s -- lower than it was under Reagan, lower than it was under Clinton, lower than it was under Bush or both Bushes.

And so if we’re growing, if we are doing what’s necessary to create new businesses and to expand the economy, and we are making sure that we’re eliminating some of these programs that aren’t working, then over time that gap can close.

But I’m -- look, I’m not going to lie to you. It is tough. As I said, that’s why the critics tend to criticize, but they don’t offer an alternative budget, because even if we were not doing health care, we were not doing energy, we were not doing education, they’d still have a whole bunch of problems in those out years, according to CBO projections. The only difference would -- is that we will not have invested in what’s necessary to make this economy grow.

Is Lourdes here, from Univision? (Let’s see ?).

QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. President. Today your administration presented a plan to help curb the violence in Mexico and also to control any or prevent any spillover of the violence into the United States. Do you consider the situation now a national security threat?

And do you believe that it could require sending national troops to the border? Governor Perry of Texas has said that you still need more troops and more agents. How do you respond to that?

PRESIDENT OBAMA: Well, first of all let’s focus on what we did today. It’s very significant. We are sending millions of dollars in additional equipment to provide more effective surveillance. We are providing hundreds of additional personnel that can help control the border, deal with customs issues. We are coordinating very effectively with the Mexican government and President Calderon, who has taken on a(n) extraordinarily difficult task dealing with these drug cartels that have gotten completely out of hand.

And so the steps that we’ve taken are designed to make sure that the border communities in the United States are protected and you’re not seeing a spillover of violence, and that we are helping the Mexican government deal with a very challenging situation.

Now, we are going to continue to monitor the situation. And if the steps that we’ve taken do not get the job done, then we will do more.

One last point that I want to make about this. As I said, President Calderon has been very courageous in taking on these drug cartels.

We’ve got to also take some steps. Even as he is doing more to deal with the drug cartels sending drugs into the United States, we need to do more to make sure that illegal guns and cash aren’t flowing back to these cartels. That’s part of what’s financing their operations. That’s part of what’s arming them. That’s what makes them so dangerous. And this is something that we take very seriously, and we’re going to continue to work on diligently in the months to come.

Kevin Baron, Stars and Stripes. Is Kevin here? There you go.

QUESTION: Mr. President, where do you plan to find savings in the Defense and Veterans Administration’s budgets when so many items that seem destined for the chopping block are politically untenable, perhaps?

PRESIDENT OBAMA: I’m sorry, so many?

QUESTION: When so many items that may be destined for the chopping block seem politically untenable, from major weapons systems -- as you mentioned, procurement -- to wounded warrior care costs, or increased operations on Afghanistan, or the size of the military itself.

PRESIDENT OBAMA: Well, a couple of -- a couple of points I want to make.

The budget that we’ve put forward reflects the largest increase in veterans funding in 30 years. That’s the right thing to do. Chuck asked earlier about sacrifices. I -- I don’t think anybody doubts the extraordinary sacrifices that men and women in uniform have already made. And when they come home, then they have earned the benefits that they receive.

And unfortunately, over the last several years, all too often the VA has been under-resourced when it comes to dealing with things like post-traumatic stress disorder or traumatic brain injury, dealing with some of the backlogs in admission to VA hospitals.

So there are a whole host of veterans’ issues that I think every American wants to see properly funded, and that’s what’s reflected in our budget. Where the savings should come in -- and I’ve been working with Secretary Gates on this and will be detailing it more in the weeks to come -- is how do we reform our procurement system so that it keeps America safe and we’re not wasting taxpayer dollars? And there is uniform acknowledgment that the procurement system right now doesn’t work. That’s not just my opinion; that’s John McCain’s opinion; that’s Carl Levin’s opinion.

There are a whole host of people who are students of the procurement process that will say if you’ve got a whole range of billion-dollar, multi-billion-dollar systems that are -- where we’re seeing cost overruns of 30 percent or 40 percent or 50 percent, and then still don’t perform the way they’re supposed to or are providing our troops with the kinds of tools that they need to succeed on their missions, then we’ve got a problem.

Now, I think everybody in this town knows that the politics of changing procurement is tough, because, you know, lobbyists are very active in this area. You know, contractors are very good at dispersing the jobs in plants in the Defense Department widely.

And so what we have to do is to go through this process very carefully, be more disciplined than we’ve been in the last several years. As I’ve said, we’ve already identified, potentially, $40 billion in savings, just by some of the procurement reforms that are pretty apparent to a lot of -- a lot of critics out there. And we are going to continue to find savings in a way that allows us to put the resources where they’re needed but to make sure that we’re not simply fattening defense contractors.

One last point. In order for us to get a handle on these costs, it’s also important that we are honest in what these costs are. And that’s why it was so important for us to acknowledge the true costs of the Iraq war and the Afghan war, because if -- if those costs are somehow off the books and we’re not thinking about them, then it’s hard for us to make some of the tough choices that need to be made.

Okay. Ed Henry. Where’s Ed? There he is.

QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. President. You spoke again at the top about your anger about AIG. You’ve been saying that for days now. But why is it that it seems Andrew Cuomo seems to be, in New York, getting more actual action on it? And when you and Secretary Geithner first learned about this, 10 days, two weeks ago, you didn’t go public immediately with that outrage. You waited a few days, and then you went public after you realized Secretary Geithner really had no legal avenue to stop it.

And more broadly -- I just want to follow up on Chip and Jake -- you’ve been very critical of President Bush doubling the national debt. And to be fair, it’s not just Republicans hitting you. Democrat Kent Conrad, as you know, said, quote, ”When I look at this budget, I see the debt doubling again.” You keep saying that you’ve inherited a big fiscal mess. Do you worry, though, that your daughters, not to mention the next president, will be inheriting an even bigger fiscal mess if the spending goes out of control?

PRESIDENT OBAMA: Of course I do, Ed, which is why we’re doing everything we can to reduce that deficit. Look, if this were easy, then we would have already had it done and the budget would have been voted on and everybody could go home. This is hard. And the reason it’s hard is because we’ve accumulated a structural deficit that’s going to take a long time, and we’re not going to be able to do it next year or the year after or three years from now.

What we have to do is bend the curve on these deficit projections, and the best way for us to do that is to reduce health care costs. That’s not just my opinion; that’s the opinion of almost every single person who has looked at our long-term fiscal situation.

Now, how do we -- how are we going to reduce health care costs? Because the problem is not just in government-run programs, the problem is in the private sector as well. It’s experienced by families. It’s experienced by businesses. And so what we’ve said is, look, let’s invest in health information technologies, let’s invest in preventive care, let’s invest in mechanisms that look at who’s doing a better job controlling costs while producing good-quality outcomes in various states, and let’s reimburse on the basis of improved quality as opposed to simply how many procedures you’re doing. Let’s do a whole host of things, some of which cost money on the front end but offer the prospect of reducing costs on the back end.

Now, the alternative is to stand pat, and to simply say we are just going to not invest in health care; we’re not going to take on energy, we’ll wait until the next time that gas gets to $4 a gallon; we will not improve our schools, and we’ll allow China or India or other countries to lap our young people in terms of their performance; we will settle on lower growth rates, and we will continue to contract both as an economy and our ability to -- to provide a better life for our kids.

That I don’t think is the better option.

Now, have -- am I completely satisfied with all the work that needs to be done on deficits? No. That’s why I convened a fiscal responsibility summit, started in this room, to start looking at entitlements and to start looking at the big drivers of costs over the long term. Not all of those are reflected in our budget, partly because the savings we anticipate would be coming in years outside of the 10-year budget cycle that we’re talking about. Okay?

QUESTION: So on AIG, why did you wait -- why did you wait days to come out and express that outrage?

PRESIDENT OBAMA: I --

QUESTION: It seems like the action is coming out of New York in the attorney general’s office. It took you days to come public with Secretary Geithner and say, look, we’re outraged. Why did it take so long?

PRESIDENT OBAMA: Well, it took us a couple of days because I like to know what I’m talking about before I speak. (Laughter.) All right?

QUESTION: Secretary Geithner alluded --

PRESIDENT OBAMA: Major?

QUESTION: (Off mike.)

PRESIDENT OBAMA: Yeah.

QUESTION: Good evening, Mr. President. Thank you. Taking this economic debate a bit globally, senior Chinese officials have publicly expressed an interest in an international currency. This is described by Chinese specialists as a sign that they are less confident than they used to be in the value and the reliability of the U.S. dollar. European countries have resisted your calls to spend more on economic stimulus.

I wonder, sir, as a candidate who ran concerned about the image of the United States globally, how comfortable you are with the Chinese government, run by communists, less confident than they used to be in the U.S. dollar, and European governments, some of the center-left, some of them socialist, who say you’re asking them to spend too much?

PRESIDENT OBAMA: Well, first of all, I haven’t asked them to do anything. What I’ve suggested is -- is that all of us are going to have to take steps in order to lift the economy. We don’t want a situation in which some countries are making extraordinary efforts and other countries aren’t, with the hope that somehow the countries that are making those important steps lift everybody up.

And so somebody’s got to take leadership. It’s not just me, by the way. I was with Kevin Rudd, prime minister of Australia, today, who was very forceful in suggesting that countries around the world, those with the capacity to do so, take the steps that are needed to fill this enormous hole in global demand. Gordon Brown, when he came to visit me, said the exact same thing.

So the goal at the G-20 summit, I think, is to do a couple of things. Number one, say to all countries: Let’s do what’s necessary in order to create jobs and to get the economy moving again. Let’s avoid steps that could result in protectionism, that would further contract global trade. Let’s focus on how are we going to move our regulatory process forward in order so that we do not see the kinds of systemic breakdowns that we’ve already seen.

And that -- that means not just dealing with banks, but also some of the other financial flows that are out here that are currently unregulated. We’ve got to update regulations that date back to the 1930s, and we’re going to have to do some coordination with other countries in order to accomplish that.

As far as confidence in the U.S. economy or the dollar, I would just point out that the dollar is extraordinarily strong right now. And the reason the dollar is strong right now is because investors consider the United States the strongest economy in the world, with the most stable political system in the world.

So you don’t have to take my word for it. I think that there is a great deal of confidence that ultimately, although we are going through a rough patch, that the prospects for the world economy are very, very strong.

And -- and last point I would make in terms of changing America’s image in the world, Garrett, I -- you know, I haven’t looked at the latest polling around the world, but I think the -- it’s -- I think it’s fair to say that the response that people have had to our administration and the steps we have taken are ones that are restoring a sense of confidence and the ability of the United States to assert global leadership.

QUESTION: Is there a need --

PRESIDENT OBAMA: That will just strengthen -- excuse me?

QUESTION: Is there a need for a global currency?

PRESIDENT OBAMA: I don’t believe that there’s a need for a global currency.

Mike Allen, Politico. Hi, Mike.

QUESTION: Mr. President, are you -- (takes mic) -- thank you. Thank you, Mr. President. Are you reconsidering your plan to cut the interest-rate deduction for mortgages and for charities? And do you regret having proposed that in the first place?

PRESIDENT OBAMA: No, I think it’s -- I think it’s the right thing to do.

Where we’ve got to make some difficult choices -- here’s what we did with respect to tax policy. What we said was that over the last decade, the average worker, the average family have seen their wages and incomes flat. Even at times where supposedly we were in the middle of an economic boom, as a practical matter their incomes didn’t go up. And so (what/well ?) we said -- let’s give them a tax cut. Let’s give them some relief, some help -- 95 percent of American families.

Now, for the top 5 percent, they’re the ones who typically saw huge gains in their income. I -- I fall in that category. And what we’ve said is, for those folks, let’s not renew the Bush tax cuts. So let’s go back to the rates that existed back in -- during the Clinton era, when wealthy people were still wealthy and doing just fine. And let’s look at the level at which people can itemize their deductions.

And what we’ve said is let’s go back to the rate that existed under Ronald Reagan.

People are still going to be able to make charitable contributions. It just means if you give $100 and you’re in this tax bracket, at a certain point, instead of being able to write off 36 (percent) or 39 percent, you’re writing off 28 percent. Now, if it’s really a charitable contribution, I’m assuming that that shouldn’t be the determining factor as to whether you’re giving that hundred dollars to the homeless shelter down the street.

And so this provision would effect about 1 percent of the American people. They would still get deductions. It’s just that they wouldn’t be able to write off 39 percent. In that sense, what it would do is it would equalize. When I give $100, I get the same amount of deduction as when some -- a bus driver who’s making $50,000 a year or $40,000 a year gives that same hundred dollars. Right now, he gets 28 percent -- he gets to write off 28 percent, I get to write off 39 percent. I don’t think that’s fair.

So I think this was a good idea. I think it is a realistic way for us to raise some revenue from people who benefitted enormously over the last several years. It’s not going to cripple them.

They’ll still be well-to-do. And, you know, ultimately if we’re going to tackle the serious problems that we’ve got, then in some cases those who are more fortunate are going to have to pay a little bit more.

QUESTION: It’s not the well-to-do people; it’s the charities. Given what you’ve just said --

PRESIDENT OBAMA: Yeah.

QUESTION: -- are you confident that charities are wrong when they contend that this would discourage giving?

PRESIDENT OBAMA: Yes. I am. I mean, if you look at the evidence -- there’s very little evidence that this has a significant impact on charitable giving. I’ll tell you what has a significant impact on charitable giving is a financial crisis and an economy that’s contracting. And so the most important thing that I can do for charitable giving is to fix the economy, to get banks lending again, to get businesses opening their doors again, to get people back to work again. Then I think charities will do just fine.

Kevin Chappell. Hi, Kevin.

QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. President. A recent report found that as a result of the economic downturn, one in 50 children are now homeless in America. With shelters at full capacity, tent cities are sprouting up across the country.

In passing your stimulus package, you said that help was on the way, but what would you say to these families, especially children, who are sleeping under bridges and in tents across the country?

PRESIDENT OBAMA: Well, the first thing I’d say is that I’m heartbroken that any child in America is homeless.

And the most important thing that I can do on their behalf is to make sure their parents have a job. And that’s why the recovery package said, as a first priority, how are we going to save or create 3.5 million jobs? How can we prevent layoffs for teachers and police officers? How can we make sure that we are investing in the infrastructure for the future that can put people back to work right away? How do we make sure that when people do lose their jobs, that their unemployment insurance is extended, that they can keep their health care?

So there are a whole host of steps that we’ve done to provide a cushion for folks who have fallen on very hard times and to try to spur immediate projects that can put people back to work.

Now, in the meantime, we’ve got to work very closely with the states to monitor and to help people who are still falling through the cracks.

And, you know, the homeless problem was bad even when the economy was good. Part of the change in attitudes that I want to see here in Washington and all across the country is a belief that it is not acceptable for children and families to be without a roof over their heads in a country as wealthy as ours. And so we’re going to be initiating a range of programs as well to deal with homelessness.

One area in particular I want to focus on is the issue of veterans. The rate of homelessness among veterans is much, much higher than for non-veteran populations.

And so we’ve got -- a number of the increases that we’re looking for in our budget on veterans funding directly addresses the issue of homeless veterans. That, I think, can provide some real help.

Ann Compton. Hey, Ann.

QUESTION: Sir. (Soft laughter.)

PRESIDENT OBAMA: You sound surprised. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: I am surprised! (Chuckles.) Could I ask you about race?

PRESIDENT OBAMA: You may.

QUESTION: Yours is a rather historic presidency, and I’m just wondering whether in any of the policy debates that you’ve had within the White House, the issue of race has come up, or whether it has in the way you feel you’ve been perceived by other leaders or by the American people. Or have the last 64 days been a relatively color- blind time?

PRESIDENT OBAMA: I -- I think that the last 64 days has been dominated by me trying to figure out how we’re going to fix the economy, and that’s -- affects black, brown and white. And you know, obviously, at the Inauguration I think that there was justifiable pride on the part of the country that we had taken a step to move us beyond some of the searing legacies of racial discrimination in this country, but that lasted about a day. And you know, right now the American people are judging me exactly the way I should be judged, and that is, are we taking the steps to improve liquidity in the financial markets, create jobs, get businesses to reopen, keep America safe?

And that’s what I’ve been spending my time thinking about.

Okay. Jon Ward, Washington Times. Where’s Jon?

QUESTION: Right here, sir.

PRESIDENT OBAMA: There you go.

QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. President.

In your remarks on stem-cell research earlier this month, you talked about a majority consensus in determining whether or not this is the right thing to do, to federally fund embryonic stem-cell research. I’m just wondering, though, how much you personally wrestled with the morality or ethics of federally funding this kind of research, especially given the fact that science so far has shown a lot of progress with adult stem cells but not a lot with embryonic?

PRESIDENT OBAMA: Okay. No, I -- I think it’s a -- I think it’s a legitimate question.

I -- I wrestle with these issues every day. As I mentioned to -- I think in an interview a couple of days ago, by the time an issue reaches my desk, it’s a hard issue. If it was an easy issue, somebody else would have solved it and it wouldn’t have reached me.

Look, I believe that it is very important for us to have strong moral guidelines, ethical guidelines, when it comes to stem-cell research or anything that touches on, you know, the issues of possible cloning or issues related to, you know, the human life sciences.

I think those issues are all critical, and I’ve said so before. I wrestle with it on stem cell; I wrestle with it on issues like abortion.

I think that the guidelines that we provided meet that ethical test. What we have said is that for embryos that are typically about to be discarded, for us to be able to use those in order to find cures for Parkinson’s or for Alzheimer’s or for, you know, all sorts of other debilitating diseases, juvenile diabetes, that -- that it is the right thing to do. And that’s not just my opinion. That is the opinion of a number of people who are also against abortion.

Now, I am glad to see progress is being made in adult stem cells. And if the science determines that we can completely avoid a set of ethical questions or political disputes, then that’s great. I have -- I have no investment in causing controversy. I’m happy to avoid it if that’s where the science leads us.

But what I don’t want to do is predetermine this based on a very rigid ideological approach. And that’s what I think is reflected in the executive order that I signed.

QUESTION: I meant to ask as a follow-up, though, do you think that scientific consensus is enough to tell us what we can and cannot do?

PRESIDENT OBAMA: No. I think there’s always an ethical and a moral element that has to be -- be a part of this. And so, as I said, I don’t take decisions like this lightly. They’re ones that I take seriously. And -- and I respect people who have different opinions on this issue.

But I think that this was the right thing to do and the ethical thing to do. And as I said before, my hope is, is that we can find a mechanism ultimately to cure these diseases in a way that gains a hundred percent consensus. And we certainty haven’t achieved that yet. But I think on balance this was the right step to take.

STAFF: Last question.

PRESIDENT OBAMA: Okay. Stephen Collinson, AFP.

QUESTION: Mr. President, you came to office pledging to work for peace between Israel and the Palestinians.

PRESIDENT OBAMA: Yeah.

QUESTION: How realistic do you think those are hopes are now, given the likelihood of a prime minister who’s not fully signed up to a two- state solution and a foreign minister who’s been accused of insulting Arabs?

PRESIDENT OBAMA: It’s not easier than it was, but I think it’s just as necessary. We don’t yet know what the Israeli government is going to look like. And we don’t yet know what the future shape of Palestinian leadership is going to be comprised of.

What we do know is this; that the status quo is unsustainable. That it is critical for us to advance a two-state solution where Israelis and Palestinians can live side by side in their own states with peace and security. And by assigning George Mitchell the task of working as special envoy, what we’ve signaled is that we’re going to be serious from day one in trying to move the parties in a direction that acknowledges that reality. How effective these negotiations may be, I think we’re going to have to wait and see.

But, you know, we were here for Saint Patrick’s Day, and you’ll recall that we had what had been previously sworn enemies celebrating here in this very room; you know, leaders from the two sides in Northern Ireland that, you know, a couple of decades ago or even a decade ago people would have said could never achieve peace. And here they were, jointly appearing and talking about their commitment, even in the face of violent provocation.

And what that tells me is that if you stick to it, if you are persistent, then -- then these problems can be dealt with.

That whole philosophy of persistence, by the way, is one that I’m going to be emphasizing again and again in the months and years to come, as long as I am in this office. I’m a big believer in persistence. I think that when it comes to domestic affairs, if we keep on working at it, if we acknowledge that we make mistakes sometimes and that we don’t always have the right answer, and we’re inheriting very knotty problems, that we can pass health care, we can find better solutions to our energy challenges, we can teach our children more effectively, we can deal with a very real budget crisis that is not fully dealt with in my -- in my budget at this point, but makes progress.

I think when it comes to the banking system, you know, it was just a few days ago or weeks ago where people were certain that Secretary Geithner couldn’t deliver a plan. Today, the headlines all look like, well, all right, there’s a plan.

And I’m sure there’ll be more criticism and we’ll have to make more adjustments, but we’re moving in the right direction.

When it comes to Iran, you know, we did a video sending a message to the Iranian people and the leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran. And some people said, ”Well, they did not immediately say they were eliminating nuclear weapons and stop funding terrorism.” Well, we didn’t expect that. We expect that we’re going to make steady progress on this front.

We haven’t immediately eliminated the influence of lobbyists in Washington. We have not immediately eliminated wasteful pork projects. And we’re not immediately going to get Middle East peace. We’ve been in office now a little over 60 days.

What I am confident about is that we’re moving in the right direction, and that the decisions we’re making are based on, how are we going to get this economy moving? How are we going to put Americans back to work? How are we going to make sure that our people are safe? And how are we going to create not just prosperity here but work with other countries for global peace and prosperity?

And we are going to stay with it as long as I'm in this office, and I think that -- you look back four years from now, I think, hopefully, people will judge that body of work and say, "This is a big ocean liner. It's not a speedboat. It doesn't turn around immediately. But we're in a better -- better place because of the decisions that we made."

All right? Thank you, everybody.