A Modest Proposal: Why Hamas May Move Towards a Settlement with Israel

More than two months after the unilateral ceasefires in the Gaza War, there has been little progress in discussions on Israel and Palestine. Not only have unity talks between Fatah and Hamas failed to reach a conclusion, but the Israeli-Hamas talks on a prisoner exchange have also been fruitless.

So what's the hold-up? Self-confidence. Hamas self-confidence.

According to all measurements, Hamas's popularity has been increasing, even in the West Bank, since the end of the war. Surviving the border blockade of Gaza and the heavy bombardments of Operation Cast Lead Hamas has strengthened its position in Gaza, as it has put out a constant anti-Fatah rhetoric.

In the unity talks to establish the pre-conditions for an election to form a unity government, the Palestinian Authority (dominated by Fatah) has been insisting on the principles of the Quartet of the US/UN/EU/Russia. These call for Hamas to renounce terrorism, recognise Israel, and abide by the 2005 agreement between Tel Aviv and the PA. Hamas does not and cannot accept this for the time being.

Despite its stronger position, Hamas is walking on a thin and fragile tightrope: it must either accept the Quartet's conditions and work in partnership with Fatah, or it will be excluded from the political arena and be increasingly marginalised. If the Obama Administration's regional policies move the new Israeli Government, because of deepening economic crisis or a resurgence in perception of Israeli "security" in US domestic politics, Hamas can lose everything it has now.

Hamas is putting its bargaining power on the line. It may get more concessions from Israel at the behest of the US over the course of time. However, even this will never allow Hamas to sustain its uncompromising stance against recognition of Israel and acceptance of the 2005 agreements.

What does this mean? Hamas officials, who are aware of this dilemma, will not insist on political principles that can never be fulfilled. As they gain more of a role in a Palestinian Government, encouraged by their showing in the next elections, they are going to recognize Israel.

This will probably take years. At first, a long-term truce (hudna) based on pre-1967 borders and some economic, political, environmental, and security cooperation will be established. That in turn may establish the platform for a long-standing peace agreement in the following years.

Those who are sceptical should look back to early 2006, just before Hamas's triumph in the Gaza elections. On 4 March, Hamas leader Moussa Abu Marzouk stated that recognition of Israel would be a rejection of the rights of Palestinians, and other officials claimed during the election campaign that Fatah's 16 years of peace talks with Israel were a waste of time. However, another top official, Mahmoud al-Zahar told CNN in January that a long-term truce was possible if Israel withdrew to pre-1967 borders and released Palestinian prisoners. T

Three years later, Hamas spokesman Ayman Taha has said that the organization is unwilling to recognize Israel and to accept the agreements signed by the PA. Yet, as it manoeuvres in negotiations in Cairo and with Tel Aviv, Hamas has to consider if that position will jeopardise its political future.

In 2006, the US would not recognise Hamas' victory in Gazan elections because it believed that the organisation would be reinforced in its refusal to accept any relationship with Israel. Three years later, Hamas can defy this prediction:  establishing and consolidating its gains in a Palestinian Parliament and possibly a Presidency, the Gazan leadership could decide to come in from the political cold. The process would take time and careful language, but acceptance of the Quartet's conditions and a unity government in Palestine are possible. And so, eventually, is a regional peace based on pre-1967 borders with Israel.

Comments

[don mac namara]

The flow of language and syntax in the last paragraph in the atricle make for difficult reading of an erstwhile well constructed and comprehensive piece.
Perhaps you could clarify your meaning , for it has many implications.
This comment is neither intended to be offensive nor patronizing.
I just seek to establish the full meaning of the train of thought , which has eluded me despite returning to the article many times.
Don

[Ali Yenidunya]

Dear Don,

Thank you very much for your kind attitude. Let me, briefly, put my arguments in line:

- It is Hamas's (externally increased) self-confidence that keeps the brain team from working for a speedy negotiation. The reasons behind this long process are the 'successful' survival in a cage and the very continuing existence (and increasing popularity) of Hamas.

- Although Hamas's rhetoric towards Israel remains highly critical including statements ruling out any recognition of Israel, it is not sustainable in the long-term. Indeed, Hamas team is absolutely aware of this fact and that is why they do often give statements that recognition of Israel was not possible in order to keep the rhetoric warm. However, we also should not ignore that it is not just because Hamas officials want to keep the main difference between themselves and Fatah warm on purpose but also because the perception of Hamas in the minds of Palestinians (esp Gazans) is not that easy to be de-constructed (esp when Hamas has been perceived as 'victorious' after the recent operation). It is Hamas that has been claiming that Fatah's peace talks with Israel are just a waste of time. So, it is not that easy to change the flow of the river.

- Declaring that a hudna based on pre-1967 borders is possible between parties already signs a slightly change from 1988 rhetoric. It is not the total destruction of Israel anymore; but acceptance of a living side by side without recognition. Therefore, nothing remains same.

- The question of how long this rhetoric against Israel is sustainable depends highly on the Obama Administration's regional policies but the latter is also directly dependent on the Administration's 'success' both in financial crisis and in security perception of the US. If the US is perceived as 'successful' then its regoinal policies will be shaped on a two-state solution which will bring pressure both on Israel and on Hamas. At the end of the day, Hamas is going to recognize Israel.

- If the US can not focus on the Middle East and if Obama fails, then Israel will have a relatively wider impact zone and Hamas's bargaining power will be diminished to a marginalized degree. As I said, the external conditions preventing Hamas from negotiating with Fatah on Quartet's principles may be strong but HAMAS's WILLINGNESS MUST BE QUESTIONED HERE. How much does Hamas officials want the unity government with heart? They should see the other side of the coin and understand what could happen if there will be no Obama above Israel and Fatah. Instead of waiting for more posts in a possible unity government with Fatah by assuming that every passing second would be in favor of themselves, Hamas should take an initiative. It may be too late for a single Palestinian government. That is the main point of this piece.

[don mac namara]

Dear Ali,
Thank you for taking the trouble for chronicling and contextualizing your argument .
You have touched on all the issues which present themselves at this remove; the internecine Hamas - Fatah conflict and the power play between them .
Whether Obama comes out of his own economic woes with sufficient energy and credibility is also undetermined
Whether Hamas are using the denial of Israel as a tactic to ensure that their own final position is not over diluted in settlement talks is equally unknowable= but guessable

The recognition of Israel by Hamas is only a matter of time ; they can not operate without acceding to the terms of the quartet - this is a political ruse ; it seems to make them appear more uncontaminated by the west or bullied by Israel- and also serves to suggest that they are more "Islamic " to the fundamentalists.
Which brings us to the Iran / Israeli situation now that Obama is making different overtures to Iran; overtures which would at this juncture suggest that the US would not abide an Israeli preemptive strike on the Iranian nuclear installations.
The determination of the settlements have not been touched on.; the separation wall is another , and then the right of return and the final borders ( which had been alluded to )
I shall read your column with interest.
You may have read my comments to posts elsewhere on Enduring America.
You may not like what you read .

I am a retired doctor who served on 6 tours of duty with the Irish army in UNIFIL.
We may differ on everything and yet we may find a lot of common ground .
One develops a certain mind -set as a peace keeping doctor- unfortunate , but inevitable ; I know this from my colleagues in UNIFIL over a 18 year period.

Thank you again for taklng the trouble to clarify the subtle points in your article which had hitherto eluded me ,
Don