Burying Gaza: How Israel's Military Put Away the Oranim Revelations

Related Post: The Israeli Military and Gaza’s Civilians - Returning to The Oranim Transcripts

I was working yesternoon afternoon when the news came through, via the Jerusalem Post, that the Israeli military had categorically dismissed accounts --- all but two from the graduates of military course at Oranim College ---of the abuse and killing of civilians in the Gaza War.

I was struck by how quickly the Israel Defense Forces threw out the claims, noted by nine Israeli human rights groups: ""The speedy closing of the investigation immediately raises suspicions that the very opening of this investigation was merely the army's attempt to wipe its hands of all blame for illegal activity during Operation Cast Lead."

Even more blatant, however, was the disconnect between the military's "findings" and the actual statements of the Oranim soldiers.

For example, the Post noted the IDF's conclusion report on "Aviv", who "claimed to have known of a soldier who had been given orders to fire at an elderly Palestinian woman. During his interrogation, Aviv admitted he had never witnessed such an incident and that he'd based his statement on a rumor he had heard."

In fact, it is unclear from the original testimony "Aviv" never claimed in his testimony, reprinted in the Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz and on this website, whether he witnessed the order by a company commander to a sniper squad to kill the woman, who was walking in a prohibited area. It is clear, however, that he was under orders to use deadly force to ensure "that we wouldn’t get hurt and they wouldn’t fire on us":

[We were] to go into a house. We were supposed to go in with an armored personnel carrier..., to burst through the lower door, to start shooting inside....From above they said it was permissible, because anyone who remained in the sector and inside Gaza City was in effect condemned, a terrorist, because they hadn’t fled.

Significantly (and unnoted in the Post article, "Zvi" follows the testimony of "Aviv" with the clarification that this was "force protection" and not the deliberate murder of civilians:

Aviv’s descriptions are accurate, but it’s possible to understand where this is coming from. And that woman, you don’t know whether she’s … She wasn’t supposed to be there, because there were announcements and there were bombings. Logic says she shouldn’t be there. The way you describe it, as murder in cold blood, that isn’t right.

Put bluntly, the Israeli military invaded one of the most densely-populated areas in the world and marked off parts of it as "prohibited", with shoot-to-kill orders against anyone who trespassed. The Israeli military could have stated this: inevitably civilians were going to die in a war.

Even this, however, could not be admitted. Instead, the Oranim testimony had to be discredited: "A claim made by a different soldier, Ram, who had supposedly been ordered to open fire at a woman and two children, was also found by the probe to be false."

This was a blatant distortion of the testimony of "Ram", who made clear that it was not he but a sharpshooter who killed the woman and children after a breakdown in communication:

There was a house with a family inside. Entry was relatively calm. We didn’t open fire, we just yelled at everyone to come down. We put them in a room and then left the house and entered it from a different lot. A few days after we went in, there was an order to release the family. They had set up positions upstairs. There was a sharpshooters’ position on the roof. The platoon commander let the family go and told them to go to the right. One mother and her two children didn’t understand and went to the left, but they forgot to tell the sharpshooter on the roof they had let them go, and it was was okay and he should hold his fire and he … he did what he was supposed to, like he was following his orders.

In the Gaza War of public opinion, Israel's effort was to ensure that it always held the higher moral ground. That, however, is difficult when Israel and not Hamas had overwhelming force, and that force --- inevitably --- was being used against civilians. In recent weeks, reports by bodies such as the United Nations and Human Rights Watch had detailed the humanitarian costs, but the Oranim revelations were even more damaging. They came from within Israeli ranks.

So Tel Aviv had to step up its "information" campaign. Reporters were summoned to a briefing by an armoured unit commander, Colonel Roi Elkabets, to give "examples of what he said were the dilemmas they faced". Ethan Bronner of The New York Times wrote accordingly, "Officers are stepping forward, some at the urging of the top command, others on their own, offering numerous accounts of having held their fire out of concern for civilians, helping Palestinians in need and punishing improper soldier behavior".

And the campaign, far more effectively than the military invasion of Gaza, worked. Today's British and American media faithfully cite the IDF's findings on Oranim, "The Israeli military on Monday rejected allegations that its soldiers committed atrocities against Palestinians in Gaza" (CNN); "Brig. Gen. Avichai Mendelblit, the IDF's advocate general, found no evidence to support the most serious accusations, including alleged instances in which civilians were shot without cause" (Washington Post); "The military police found that the crucial components of their descriptions were based on hearsay and not supported by specific personal knowledge" (New York Times).

None of those reporters referred to the original Oranim transcripts.

War is about winning, not about the truth. So one can set aside last week's commentary by Larry Derfner, ironically in the same Jerusalem Post that moved quickly to put the military's "findings2:

We can refuse to think about this, we can tell ourselves that Oranim is a hotbed of left-wingers, we can bury this so the anti-Semites and The Hague don't use it against us. Or we can admit the truth and decide that we have to change.

We can be loyal to Israel's image. Or we can be loyal to our sons.

The Afghanistan Effect: US-Iran Talks Today?

CNN has a wonderfully naive story this morning, based on the public position of the US Secretary of State, "Clinton doesn't rule out Iran talks at Afghanistan conference". It puts out Hillary Clinton's statement, as more than 80 countries gather at The Hague for discussions:

I believe that there will be an opening by this conference that will enable all the countries, including Iran, to come forward. The fact that they accepted the invitation to come suggests that they believe there is a role for them to play, and we're looking forward to hearing more about that.

The wonderful naiveté is in CNN's assumption that direct US-Iran talks would be at high level:

Clinton said she has "no plans" to meet with Deputy Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Mehdi Akoundzadeh, who is attending the conference. But she left open the possibility, saying she would not predict how the discussions would flow.

As anyone who has braved such an event probably knows, most of the substantive negotiations occur away from the conference table amongst the teams of supporting officials who accompany Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers. Indeed, that was the pattern of US-Iran talks on Afghanistan after 9-11 until spring 2003, when they were broken by the Bush Administration in favour of thoughts of regime change in Tehran.

(CNN's innocent re-telling of the US-Iran relationship puts it this way: "Clinton noted Iran's history of cooperating with the United States on Afghanistan since the U.S. invasion in 2001. In 2003, U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad held talks with Iranian officials in Geneva, Switzerland, about how the two countries could work together.")

CNN also seems to have no knowledge that these US-Iran talks, as we wrote on Sunday, have already resumed in places like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting in Moscow.

Those looking for real signals on what may come should note Iran's careful consderation of the level of representation at the conference. Tehran has not sent its Foreign Minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, withholding the open declaration of high-level equality in interchange. Even more importantly, the Iranian representative to the Shanghai talks --- the same Mohammad Mehdi Akoundzadeh who will be at The Hague --- has put down a marker on the US military approach:

The presence of foreign troops cannot bring peace and stability for Afghanistan. It encourages radicalism.

Politically Akounzadeh is making clear that Iran does not want the US, and US-Iran talks at the centre of the Afghanistan process:

Resolving ongoing problems in Afghanistan will be possible through regional partnership and Islamic Republic of Iran supports this stance....He said that the Americans have linked Afghan issue to their own internal problems, considering Afghanistan from an American angle, while this policy and strategy has never been successful, rather it has increased problems in Afghanistan and the region.

Instead, Iran will be seeking in any talks to make Washington one of a number of players in an Afghanistan solution, rather than the leader of the pack.

Pakistan: Attack on Lahore Police Station Kills Up to 60

Latest Post: Mehsud Claims Responsibility for Lahore Attack; 18 Dead

UPDATE (3:10 p.m. BST/7:10 p.m. Lahore): Dawn is quoting Pakistani security sources that eight attackers were killed, including two who blew themselves up, and six detained. Geo News is saying four attackers killed and four detained, with eight policemen "martyred" and 95 wounded. Military spokesman is also telling CNN eight security personnel killed; previous statement of 30 people killed is being blamed on "wrong information".

UPDATE (12:30 p.m. BST/4:30 p.m. Lahore): There is still confusion in press accounts. The Pakistan newspaper Dawn is reporting, "The police have overpowered the gunmen and the operation has concluded", but "official confirmations of the development are...awaited". It puts the death toll at "only" 13 although "it is likely to rise".

Al Jazeera is reporting up to 50 dead, with security sources saying at least four gunmen killed and six seized. The Daily Telegraph in Britain is citing reports of 60 dead from Pakistani television stations, with police statements of 92 wounded. About 25 gunmen were involved in the attack.

UPDATE (12.15pm BST/4.15pm Lahore): Reports suggest that Pakistani security forces have retaken the training centre, arresting at least one suspect. CNN says that at least 10 are dead, with local media reporting the number of dead as high as 25. The BBC, however, says there could be 40 dead.

Morning Update: A gun battle is continuing in Lahore between Pakistani security forces and attackers who invaded a police training centre Monday, throwing grenades and firing at officers taking morning roll call.

The attack killed 20 and wounded 25. Pakistani Rangers and police, supported by the Army and helicopters, have taken up positions around the centre.

Enduring America Special: If It's Sunday, It Must Be Mr Obama's War

Sunday morning is special in US politics. It's the time when Administrations can sell their policies on political talk shows (and, in due course, when opponents can have a shot at the President and his advisors).

Yesterday the Obama Administration put on a full-court press for its Pakistan-Afghanistan strategy. The President went on Face the Nation on CBS --- we've got the video and transcript. We also have the full text for General David Petraeus and US special envoy Richard Holbrooke with CNN and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates with Fox News. And, as a global economy bonus, there is today's Obama interview with the Financial Times.

We'll offer a full analysis later, but for now have a look at how Mr Obama's War is being laid out for the US public.

Mr Obama's War for/on Pakistan-Afghanistan: Holes in the Middle

Related Post: Mr Biden’s War? An Afghanistan-Pakistan Strategy from 2007
Related Post: Two-Step Analysis of Mr Obama’s War Plan: Step Two in Afghanistan
Related Post: Two-Step Analysis of Mr Obama’s War Plan: Step One in Pakistan

Eighteen hours since Barack Obama laid out the strategy by which the United States will defeat Al Qa'eda and "terrorists" in Afghanistan, 24 hours after we projected both the Administration's approach and the problems with it, I have to say....

We got it right.

1. BRING ON THE MAGIC

The Administration has given the media two marvellous diversions....the headline of 4000 US trainers and the proclamation that the Administration, focusing on the threat of Al Qa’eda, is moving away from the Bush strategy of 'democracy promotion' in Afghanistan.

Obama did that and more. With the Kennedy-esque elevation of lots of aid and a boost of civilians in US programmes (not a huge boost, given the low levels of participation in the Bush years, but a symbolic "doubling"), combined with the show of military force and the harsh rhetoric against Osama's Men, the President was a masterful salesman.

The buzzword this morning is "consensus". Former Bush Administration official Peter Feaver, arch-colonialist Max Boot, and the caretaker of US power, Robert Kagan, swooned over more US boots on the ground to say, "Unlike his approach to economic matters, on national security Obama is acting in a fairly centrist and responsible manner." Robert Dreyfuss of The Nation, a strident critic of US foreign policy in recent years, thought this was a "work in progress" but it wasn't Bush's work in progress: "President Obama's new strategy for the Afghanistan-Pakistan war isn't Quaker-inspired, but it's not neocon-inspired, either." Daniel Markey of the Council on Foreign Relations told the BBC's PM programme that the Obama Administration had finally matched American resources to US intentions in the fight against Al Qa'eda.

Obama's magician's trick, with the re-production of the post-9/11 battle against bin Laden, was to keep his audience focused on how the US would triumph and divert them from against whom. Afghan and Pakistan populations disappeared before the sweeping invocation of a foreign menace threatening Asian, European, and African cities.

And not only the populations disappeared, so did the "real" political challenges that this US plan faces.

2. PUTTING THE PRESSURE ON PAKISTAN

Somehow the US has to turn the “good” elements in the Pakistani Government against the “rogue” elements in the ISI [Pakistani intelligence].

In case anyone thought Afghanistan was the first priority for Obama, his officials were quick to set the record straight. US envoy Richard Holbrooke laid out the new equation:

We have to deal with the western Pakistan problem....Our superiors would all freely admit that of all the dilemmas and challenges we face, that is going to be the most daunting...because it’s a sovereign country and there is a red line.

Even more striking, however, was the rather blunt re-statement of how the US is going to ensure a "proper" Pakistani Government and campaign against insurgents. Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told CNN, "There are certainly indications" that Pakistani intelligence were supporting Al Qa'eda and its "Taliban" supporters in Pakistan and Afghanistan: "Fundamentally that's one of the things that have to change."

But how does Washington make that change? In the case of Afghanistan, which is not-so-sovereign-a-country, the US can almost openly manoeuvre to push aside President Hamid Karzai. With Pakistan, especially after the symbolism of the recent Long March and memories of the "democratic" martyrdom of Benazir Bhutto, the Obama Administration has to be more careful about imposing an American solution.

Of course, the President made no reference to this specific challenge yesterday. The problem is that this may not be discretion but a general befuddlement over how to move around a weak President Zardari and get the Pakistani military to be "good" and move against not only Al Qa'eda and local groups but also elements within the Islamabad power structure.

3. THE HOLE IN THE MIDDLE

The US doesn’t want to get out of Afghanistan, at least not in the near-future, so it needs a “reliable” political centre to hold together its strategy. And that is precisely what it does not have.

Washington may not have an easy solution, apart from the image of "Al Qa'eda", for the political conundrums in Pakistan. But at least Islamabad is getting attention, albeit through well-placed conversations with the press. Kabul is missing.

In the run-up to the Obama announcement, there had been talk of a political push to move aside President Karzai. That disappeared yesterday. Instead, the President indicated that the US was going to take the battle to the countryside with the vaunted fusion of "hard power" and "soft power" promoted by good liberal interventionists in recent years (the 400+ contributors to the Princeton Project on National Security, take a bow). Beat up the bad guys, train Afghan security, build up the villages, burn down the poppy fields and break up the drugs factories.

It's a big issue, of course, whether that Take It to the Villages strategy is viable. It is equally important to notice the political vacuum behind Obama's supposed comprehensive approach. We're still waiting for more on indications that the US will be talking to a variety of local elements, including "former Taliban".

And I'm waiting for the penny to drop that the Obama Administration may be trying to bypass the central Government in Kabul, the one promoted by the US for 7+ years, because it has no faith in it. That is the real significance of the symbolic fluff that Obama and Co. are moving away from a supposed "democracy promotion" of the Bush years.

4. THE UNMISTAKBLE HEAVINESS OF BREATH-HOLDING

Simon Toner, responding to our posts yesterday, offered the important analysis that Obama and his rhetoric might be implementing a sophisticated strategy in which Washington was not linking "Al Qa'eda" to local Afghan and Pakistani groups but, through the invocation of terrorism, separating it from "insurgents". Doing so, the US could then engage with the variety of local movements to search for political settlements.

In theory, that could be a promising approach. Yet even if it is pursued, I'm holding my breath over the challenge: how will the US be working, not with former/current foes, but with current/former allies? Where is the political centre (location, not ideology) of Kabul and Islamabad in this Obama grand plan?

As good as I am at holding my breath, I'm not sure I can last for the time Washington will take to address that riddle.