Transcript: David Petraeus and Richard Holbrooke on CNN (29 March)

HOST JOHN KING: General Petraeus, let me start with the threshold question for you, how many troops will it take? How long will it be.

PETRAEUS: Well, as you know, John, the president and President Bush before him have set in motion orders for troops that will more than double the number that were on the ground at the beginning of the year. We'll get those on the ground. We'll take a lot of effort with infrastructure, logistics and so forth, start employing those in the months that lie ahead. They'll all be on the ground by the end of the summer and the early fall.

And along the way we'll be doing the assessments. And among those assessments, of course, will be the kinds of questions about force levels, about additional civilians and other resources as well.

KING: General McKiernan, your commander on the ground, had been up-front that he needed even more troops. Why did the president say no?

PETRAEUS: Well, he certainly hasn't said no.

What everyone has said is let's get these forces on the ground. Every request for forces and every recommendation that General McKiernan and I made through this year, this entire year, has been approved. And, as I said, we'll take that forward, do the assessments. And I think it'd be premature to get beyond that right now.

KING: Ambassador Holbrooke, before we get to your challenges in the diplomacy, I want you to take us inside the deliberations about this strategy, because as you know, many Democrats have warned this could be President Obama's Vietnam, that you're sending more troops into an area where you still have huge problems on the Pakistani side of the border -- and we'll talk about that -- with corruption and other issues on the Afghan side of the border. And we'll talk in more detail about that. But take us inside the room when it comes to the risk assessment for this president at this moment.

HOLBROOKE: First of all, John, I served in Vietnam for three and half years, and I'm aware of certain structural similarities. But there's a fundamental difference. The Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese never posed any direct threat to the United States and its homeland. The people we are fighting in Afghanistan, and the people they are sheltering in Western Pakistan pose a direct threat. Those are the men of 9/11, the people who killed Benazir Bhutto. And you can be sure that, as we sit here today, they are planning further attacks on the United States and our allies.

In terms of the deliberation itself, the president shared at least four meetings, by my count, of the full National Security Council -- very unusual, very impressive. He ran the meetings himself. I've been in meetings with presidents since Lyndon Johnson in whose White House I served. And I have never seen a president take charge of a meeting the way President Obama did continually.

In other meetings without the president present, General Jones, his national security adviser, his deputy Tom Donilon, and the senior members of the administration, including Hillary Clinton, Bob Gates and the military command, including my colleague and friend David Petraeus, all had a vigorous debate. The vice president participated heavily. And in these discussions, John, I can assure you, and through you everyone who's watching, that every single option was considered, its pros and cons. A convergence and a consensus was immediate, that we couldn't walk away from the situation, no matter how bad it was and how bad the situation we had inherited was.

Then the issue became what do we do about it? All the options were considered. On the civilian side, we focused on the agricultural sector, which has been neglected. And yet it's an agricultural sector -- country. We focused on creating jobs. On the informational side, Dave Petraeus and I agree that we don't have a strong enough counter- informational program to combat the Taliban and Al Qaida, and so on and so forth down a wide range of issues.

From this review, Dave Petraeus and I are now going to sit down and plot the most serious integration of civilian and military activities that we can -- we have had in our time. We're going to integrate the policy like it's never been done before. And, in fact, Dave and I are now planning a retreat to do just that.

KING: Well, let me -- let me talk about the challenge ahead, because no matter how right or how smart the United States is this time -- and you, obviously, in saying what you just said, Mr. Ambassador, you're criticizing what happened in the previous administration. But I don't to look backwards. For you to succeed, you need partners. And I want to play something that then-Candidate Obama told our Fareed Zakaria back in 2008 about the president of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai -- the president of the United States, now, saying, back then, he didn't have much trust. Let's listen

I'm sorry, we don't have that sound for you. But here is what he said back in 2008. He said: I think the Karzai government has not gotten out of the bunker and helped to organize Afghanistan and government, the judiciary, police forces, in ways that would give people confidence. So there are a lot of problems there.

General, if there are a lot of problems there, have those problems been fixed? Or are you sending more U.S. troops into a country that can't organize and run itself?

PETRAEUS: Well, first of all, it's a comprehensive effort. And among the various lines of operation, if you will, are diplomatic lines that will be spearheaded by the ambassadors in both countries and with Ambassador Holbrooke, of course overseeing that. Among that effort has to be, without question, the strengthening -- the building in some cases -- of the kind of trust, cooperation, coordination that is necessary to deal with the problems that have emerged over the years.

It is no secret that the legitimacy of the Afghan government has been challenged by the corruption and some of the other issues there. President Karzai has appointed corruption committees, has made important starts, appointed some good officials, among them Minister of Interior Atmar. That now needs to be moved forward, as we run up to the elections. And then beyond, of course, it would be very important that we all work together to combat the kinds of issues that we discussed.

KING: You say it needs to be more forward. But Ambassador, I want you in on this point, because you have called corruption a cancer in Afghanistan. President Karzai's been in charge of seven years, first of an interim government, a transitional government. He's been president for four and a half years. If there is a cancer of corruption in Afghanistan, and he has been in charge for seven years, is he not part of the problem?

HOLBROOKE: There isn't any question that the government has corruption at high levels. I've said it as a private citizen, and I'm not going to repudiate anything I said as a private citizen. President Karzai called me right after the president's speech, which he which he watched live on CNN. He said it was a great speech, and he agreed with every word of it. And you will note that the president, for the first time at the presidential level, addressed corruption directly and frontally.

I will be meeting with President Karzai tomorrow in the Hague, in advance of the secretary of state's arrival there for this big international conference. Hillary Clinton will meet with Karzai the following day, the day after tomorrow. We will talk about corruption to him as we have before.

We do think it's a cancer. President Karzai says publicly that he agrees with that. And now it's up to his government to take action. But I would stress to you, John, that there is an election coming up on August 20th, the second election in Afghanistan's history. It's a hugely important election. President -- Secretary Clinton will address that in her remarks on Tuesday. And that election will be a chance for the people to vote on these issues.

KING: General Petraeus, I want you to come with me so we can take a closer look at the source of the issue here. And Ambassador Holbrooke, I believe you can see this on a monitor you have up in New York. This is your range of territory, General. You cover all this. But the problem at the moment is right here. And I want to pull out this border region just a little bit more and bring it over to the center, and pull this out a bit, so people can see what we're looking at.

Now, you believe the problem is as much on this side as on this side. So the U.S. troops are going here into Afghanistan. But many would say you're sending the fire department here, when the fire is here, that Al Qaida and the Taliban are on this side of the border. How confident are you that sending troops here will deal with the problem here in the context of trust? We just talked about trust with President Karzai. Do you trust -- let me ask you a simple question first. Do you tell the Pakistani military the most sensitive U.S. secrets? Or can you not trust that that information will be passed on to their security services and them onto the terrorists?

PETRAEUS: Well, first, let me just say that it's very important that the fire department address the fires that have sprung up in the eastern and southern parts of Afghanistan without question.

PETRAEUS: And then it's critically important that the fire department, if you will, in Pakistan, do the same thing in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.

And if you move this down here, in fact, I just talked to General Kayani and had an update from him on operations that are ongoing in Bajaur and Mohmand, which are part of the Federally Administered Tribal agencies, some of which you have here.

And also in Khyber. They have just launched another operation in Mohmand. Clearly there has to be the establishment of true trust there as well. We discussed that actually this morning.

There is a substantial and significant and sustained commitment that is part of this Af-Pak strategy that was announced on Friday. We've had ups and downs between our countries over the years. We've now got to get on an up and stay on an up with them. And again, working our way forward in that regard has to be critical.

KING: And when you say we need to establish true trust, again, at a time of economic recession at home, when American families are struggling, we have given Pakistan more than $12 billion in recent years in aid and we don't have true trust?

PETRAEUS: Well, we have had ups and downs. Now, it is important to point out that there has been progress in these areas. It's significant to note that for a variety -- through a variety of ways, nine of the top 20 extremist leaders in this area -- let's remember, this is where the al Qaeda and transnational extremists are that have -- that were the ones that launched the 9/11 attacks, of course, and have launched attacks more recently in the U.K., Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and other areas.

So very important to get into this. We have established, as an example, a joint coordination center just here just across the Khyber Pass. That is the kind of building trust that is very important where we're providing the products of intelligence activities and so forth and we see the building with the frontier core, with the other elements of the Pakistani military that are active there, the kind of cooperation and coordination necessary.

I should add that it's also important that this be trilateral. And in fact, as Richard explains frequently, the intelligence services of these two countries, which have had quite a bit enmity between them, they also have to cooperate and we're going to work together, all of us, to try to foster that cooperation as well. KING: And, Ambassador, to that point, how difficult is -- already difficult and incredibly complicated and sensitive diplomacy, how much more difficult is it if you can't be sure that you share a secret, you share some sensitive information with somebody in Pakistan and there is a history of this information being passed on to the security services and then in some cases passed on to the al Qaeda and Taliban?

HOLBROOKE: Well, of course, you're absolutely right, John. It's a huge concern for General Petraeus and me. Leon Panetta made his first trip as director of central intelligence to this region. This is going to be his focus.

We have started a new trilateral process of the leaders of the two countries, Afghanistan and Pakistan, coming to the United States. They came in late February to advise us on the strategic review. Both -- Karzai also praised the president's speech, by the way.

And now we are planning a new session for early May which Leon Panetta, Secretary of Agriculture Tom Vilsack, Vice President Biden, and others will join Secretary Clinton, General Petraeus, and me, and Bob Gates to participate in.

In all of these issues, we have to break down what you just referred to and what the Pakistani foreign minister himself called the trust deficit. You're absolutely right. There is a -- the relationship between Pakistan and the United States is immensely complicated and it isn't quite where it should be.

And the new focus on Pakistan and what General Petraeus just referred to as Af-Pak, Afghanistan-Pakistan, is designed to emphasize the fact that as we move forward, we need to focus as much on Pakistan, but with one key caveat, John. As the foreign minister of Pakistan has said publicly and repeatedly, there cannot be American combat boots, combat troops on the ground in western Pakistan.

So when you talk about fighting the fire on the other side of the border, we are constrained in going after people on that side of the border, even though they are the ones, to a large extent, planning further attacks.

This is the challenge of a uniquely difficult problem. Now we're recommitted to it and General Petraeus and I are shoulder-to-shoulder in this effort.

KING: I want to go to a quick break, but before I do, on this point -- and we'll have much more discussion, but on that key point that you're not allowed -- the Pakistani government says you're not allowed to put people in here.

From time to time we know there have been Special Forces operations in this area. How much of that is for public consumption? And how much of -- do you have the freedom, if you see something right here and you can get to it before the Pakistanis can, would you do it?

PETRAEUS: Well, I think the president made that clear the other day where he talked about consulting with the Pakistanis. But if it ultimately comes to it that we will, if necessary, take action.

Let me caveat that very, very carefully though. And that is that there is no intention for us to be conducting operations in there certainly on the ground, and there is every intention by the Pakistani military and their other forces to conduct those operations.

This is a very proud country. It has existing institutions. Our job is to enable those institutions, to help them develop the kinds of counterinsurgency capabilities that are needed and to help their entire government at large to conduct the kind of comprehensive effort that is necessary well beyond just the military effort, but one that then looks after displaced citizens, that tries to foster local economic development, and there was some of that in the president's speech as well.

KING: Much more to discuss with our two distinguished guests, General Petraeus and Ambassador Holbrooke. We'll be back in a minute. Among the topics, U.S. tensions with Iran. How close is that country to a nuclear weapon?

And of course, we're keeping our eye on the North Dakota where the Red River remains a flooding threat. We'll talk to Senator Kent Conrad, who is assessing the situation in his home state. STATE OF THE UNION will be right back.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

KING: We're discussing the many challenges here with General David Petraeus and Ambassador Richard Holbrooke discussing the many challenges here.

We were just talking, gentlemen, about the problems, the many issues you have to deal with, the tough jobs you have with the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. I want to move, a little bit this way in the neighborhood is Iran.

Admiral Mullen, the chairman of the joint chiefs, was on this program a couple of weeks ago. And I put to him the question, does he agree with international assessments that Iran now has enough fissile material to build a nuclear weapon?

Let's listen to Admiral Mullen.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

KING: Does Iran have enough to make a bomb?

ADMIRAL MIKE MULLEN (USN), CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF: We think they do, quite frankly. And Iran having a nuclear weapon, I've believed, for a long time, is a very, very bad outcome to for the region and the world.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

KING: Now, General, Secretary Gates, the same weekend, said, yes, they may have enough material but he doesn't think they're close to a weapon yet.

What is your assessment of the -- where they are in development of the weapon and what kind of a threat and a complication that makes your efforts in the rest of the very troubled neighborhood?

PETRAEUS: Well, Admiral Mullen clarified what it was that he was saying and he pointed out that there are additional steps required between having enough low-enriched uranium and actually having something that can be weaponized.

You have to highly enrich it. You have to actually do the physical package. You have to have delivery and so forth. The bottom line is that we think it's at least a couple of years away in that regard. It could be more. It could be a little bit less. There are certainly a lot of facts that we don't know about what goes on inside Iran.

KING: And is this -- is this regime being helpful when you deal with Afghanistan and Pakistan or are they trying to undermine what you doing over here, just as the administration -- the previous administration said repeatedly they tried to do what you were trying to solve in Iraq?

PETRAEUS: I think it's probably a mix. We have common objectives with Iran with respect to Afghanistan. They don't want to see the Taliban and the extremists elements that sought sanctuary there before return to running that country, certainly, a Sunni extremist organization, they, of course, being a Shia country.

They want to see a reduction in the flow of the illegal narcotics that has trapped many of their own citizens in addiction and so forth.

So there are common interests here, but there's also a sense, at times, we think, where they would certainly like us to bleed a bit more perhaps. They don't want to make it too easy for us. And certainly, they want to have a degree of influence, some of that legitimate, some perhaps a little less legitimate.

KING: Well, Ambassador Holbrooke, you will be in a meeting in the week ahead, I believe. I know Secretary Clinton will be there, in which Iranian diplomats will be in the room.

It is the highest-level contact in quite some time. What are your guidelines?

Where has the president said, Richard, if this comes up, you're allowed to talk about this. Let's say the Iranians come in and they're in a talkative mood and they want to talk about a lot of things. Where's your red line?

HOLBROOKE: Well, let's just see what happens in the Hague, John. I don't want to -- I don't want to forecast what's going to happen. Red lines? Well, we're not going to eradicate 30 years of bitter disagreements in one meeting.

But I want to be clear here that the United States has been asked repeatedly since January 20th how we feel about Iran participating in meetings on Afghanistan and Pakistan.

And we've given the same answer to everyone. We have no objections. Iran is a neighbor. And as David Petraeus has just said, they have -- we and they have common concerns.

In 2002 they helped stand up the Karzai government. They hate the Taliban and they need stability on their eastern frontier.

On the other hand, we have enormous differences with them on their nuclear program, on Hezbollah, Hamas and many other issues. So this is a work in progress. We also have to be mindful of the interests of our very important friends and allies in the rest of the region.

And so it's a very complicated issue. But the door is open for Iran to participate in international efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. Those must involve all the neighbors, including India, China, Russia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, plus our NATO allies.

So this -- we'll see how it goes.

KING: The vice president (sic) of the United States was a guest on this program two weeks ago. And he said something that caused a bit of a stir over at the White House and around town. I want you to listen.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

KING: Do you believe the president of the United States has made Americans less safe?

FORMER VICE PRESIDENT DICK CHENEY: I do. He is making some choices that, in my mind, will, in fact, raise the risk to the American people of another attack.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

KING: General Petraeus, you served in the Bush administration under Vice President Cheney and President Bush. You're now serving in the Obama administration.

Are the American people less safe because of this new president, as Vice President Cheney says?

PETRAEUS: Well, I wouldn't necessarily agree with that, John. I think that, in fact, there is a good debate going on about the importance of values in all that we do. I think that, if one violates the values that we hold so dear, that we...

KING: You mean torture?

PETRAEUS: ... we jeopardize -- well, in fact, I put out a memorandum to the soldiers in the Multinational Force-Iraq, when I was the commander, because of concern that we may not be taking some of these seriously enough.

As you know, the field manual came out, from the Army, that is used by all of the different services that completely, clearly outlaws torture. So we think for the military, in particular, that can't -- that's a line that can't be crossed.

(CROSSTALK)

KING: So was the line crossed in the Bush administration?

Was the line crossed? Did you do things which you fundamentally thought were wrong and immoral?

PETRAEUS: We certainly did not. Now, there were some incidents that did, and we learned some very hard lessons from Abu Ghraib and other cases. And we believe that we took corrective measures in the wake of that. And that is very, very important.

But it is hugely significant to us to live the values that we hold so dear and that we have fought so hard to protect over the years.

KING: I want to talk through a timeline of Iraq. The American people came to know General David Petraeus as the general who turned around -- and many would accept that statement -- a flawed strategy in Iraq.

I want to go through a timeline. Then-state senator Barack Obama, way back in 2002, said he thought the Iraq war was a fundamental mistake and he opposed it.

And then, as a senator of the United States and a candidate for president, he spoke out quite passionately against the surge strategy. Let's listen.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA: The responsible course of action for the United States, for Iraq and for our troops is to oppose this reckless escalation and to pursue a new policy.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

KING: As president of the United States, shortly after taking office, he was unveiling new Iraq strategy. He called you "brilliant," General Petraeus, and he said this. It sounds a little different.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

OBAMA: Under tough circumstances, the men and women of the United States military had served with honor and succeeded beyond any expectation.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

KING: And then recently, in a 60 minutes interview, he, almost under his breath, said something to the effect of who knew Iraq would be the least of his problems as president of the United States.

He has never publicly -- President Obama has never publicly said, you know what, I was wrong; the surge was the right strategy. Has he told you that?

PETRAEUS: Well, we haven't actually talked about the surge. What we talked about is looking forward. And I think it's very important, actually, at points like this, to take the rearview mirrors off the bus, as we say, and look -- look ahead. That has been the focus.

I think you know that, on the day after the inauguration, the first full day in office, the president sat down with the commander from Iraq by video teleconference, myself in the situation room, the chairman, the secretary of defense, the other members of the national security team and discussed Iraq.

And that's what launched the review of the Iraq policy that eventually culminated in the address at Camp Lejeune, something that General Odierno, Ambassador Crocker and I support, something to which we had substantial input, and we think quite a pragmatic and proper, prudent way forward.

KING: Ambassador Holbrooke, you were a fierce critic of the Bush approach in Iraq. In the political debate about it here in Washington, though, many Democrats will tell you privately, you know what, I was wrong; the surge worked because of David Petraeus and that, you know, President Bush, in the end, and John McCain and Joe Lieberman were right.

Why is that such a hard thing for Democrats to say?

HOLBROOKE: I -- I'm not going to partisanize the discussion here. But I do want to say something about Dave Petraeus, whom I did not know until about three months ago and then fate and destiny put us together as counterparts.

I think the nation owes General Petraeus a debt of gratitude for what he's achieved in Iraq. And I am confident, absolutely confident, having known the entire United States military chain of command from General Westmoreland in Vietnam on, that we now have the best team we possibly could have on the ground, from Admiral Mullen to General Petraeus to the command in Afghanistan.

And I'm proud to work with them. And we all ought to acknowledge what has been achieved.

Now, in regard to the previous comment that you played, by the former vice president of the United States, I need to say -- and I hope I can do this in a spirit of bipartisanship and nonbipartisanship, that I don't have a clue what he's talking about.

We are treating Afghanistan and Pakistan as a single theater. We are going to address it in an integrated way. We are going to give it more resources. And that is where the people planning the next attack on the United States or on our European allies are certainly doing it. So I just do not understand what his comments were referenced to.

KING: All right. We will leave it there. Ambassador Holbrooke being very diplomatic. We'll catch you next campaign season. We'll see if that stays the same.

(LAUGHTER) Ambassador Holbrooke, General Petraeus, on a serious note, you both have very difficult work in the days and weeks ahead and we certainly, as Americans, we wish you very well in that work.

Good luck to both of you. And thanks for coming in this morning.

Transcript: Secretary of Defense Gates on Fox News Sunday (29 March)

HOST CHRIS WALLACE: This week, President Obama took ownership of the war in Afghanistan. Here for an exclusive interview on the new strategy as well as other tough challenges around the world is the Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.

And, Mr. Secretary, welcome back to “FOX News Sunday.”

GATES: Thank you, Chris.

WALLACE: Let’s start with President Obama’s mission statement Friday on the new strategy in Afghanistan. Here it is.



OBAMA: ... that we have a clear and focused goal to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qaida in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

WALLACE: President Bush used to talk about building a flourishing democracy. Has President Obama narrowed our mission and, if so, why? GATES: I think the -- the near-term objectives have been narrowed. I think our long-term objective still would be to see a flourishing democracy in Afghanistan.

But I think what we need to focus on and focus our efforts is making headway in reversing the Taliban’s momentum and strengthening the Afghan army and police, and -- and really going after Al Qaida, as the president said.

WALLACE: Yeah, I’m going to pick up on that. The president said that Al Qaida is actively planning attacks against the U.S. homeland. Does Al Qaida still have that kind of operational capability to plan and pull off those kinds of attacks?

GATES: They certainly have the capability to plan, and in many ways they have metastasized, with elements in North Africa, in the Levant, in the Horn of Africa and elsewhere, and they aren’t necessarily directly controlled from Al Qaida in western Pakistan, but they are trained there. They often get guidance from there and inspiration from there.

So I think they do have those capabilities. They clearly have been inhibited by all the things that have been done over the last six or seven years.

WALLACE: When you say they still have those capabilities to pull off an attack on the U.S. homeland, do you still regard them as a very serious threat?

GATES: I still regard them as a very serious threat, yes.

WALLACE: U.S. commanders in the field wanted more combat troops than the 17,000 that President Obama committed.

Why did he decide against committing all of those additional combat troops? And will there be enough for the kind of counterinsurgency, living among the population, protecting the population, that was so key to the success of the surge in Iraq?

GATES: Well, let me be very clear about this. The president has approved every single soldier that I have requested of him. I have not sent any requests for units or troops to the president so far that he has not approved.

Now, the reality is I’ve been at this a long time, and I don’t think I’ve ever in several decades run into a ground commander who thought he had enough troops. That’s probably true in all of history.

But we have fulfilled all of the requirements that General McKiernan has put down for 2009, and my view is there’s no need to ask for more troops, ask the president to approve more troops, until we see how the troops we -- he already has approved are in there, how they are doing, what the Europeans have done. And we will be reviewing that come the end of the year.

WALLACE: And are there enough for the kind of counterinsurgency tactics -- living in the population, protecting the population -- that we saw so successful in Iraq?

GATES: Well, based on the requirements that have been levied by General McKiernan for 2009, that would be his view, I think.

And the reality is there already are a lot of troops there. This will bring us, when all is said and done, to about 68,000 troops, plus another 35,000 or so Europeans and other partners.

WALLACE: What kind of long-term commitment has the president given you? Has he promised you that he will stay in Afghanistan until the Taliban, in fact, are -- and Al Qaida are defeated?

GATES: He has clearly -- he clearly understands that this is a very tough fight and that we’re in it until we’re successful, that Al Qaida is no longer a threat to the United States, and that -- and that we are in no danger of either Afghanistan or the western part of Pakistan being a base for Al Qaida.

By the same token, I think he’s been clear -- and frankly, it was my view in our discussions -- that we don’t want to just pursue -- settle on this strategy and then pursue it blindly and open-endedly.

And that’s why I felt very strongly that toward the end of the year or about a year from now we need to reevaluate this strategy and see if we’re making progress.

WALLACE: But the strategy is subject to review. The commitment to defeat the Taliban and Al Qaida -- is that subject to review?

GATES: I don’t think so.

WALLACE: That is the commitment.

GATES: Certainly, to defeat Al Qaida and -- and make sure that Afghanistan and western Pakistan are not safe havens for them.

WALLACE: There were reports this week that elements of Pakistani intelligence, the ISI, are providing the Taliban and other extremists with money, supplies, even tips on allied missions against them. One, is it true? And two, if so, can we stop it?

GATES: Well, the way I would answer is to say that we certainly have concerns about the contacts of -- between the Pakistani intelligence service and the -- and some of these groups in the past.

But the reality is the Pakistanis have had contacts with these groups since they were fighting the Soviets 20 or 25 years ago when I first was dealing with the Pakistanis on this, and I must say also helping make sure that some of those same groups got weapons from our safe haven in Pakistan.

But with people like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and the Haghani [Haqqani] network, the Pakistanis have had contacts with these people for a long time, I think partly as a hedge against what might happen in Afghanistan if we were to walk away or whatever. What we need to do is try and help the Pakistanis understand these groups are now an existential threat to them and that we will be there as a steadfast ally for Pakistan, that they can count on us and that they don’t need that hedge.

WALLACE: There’s a NATO summit coming up next week in Europe. Have we given up on the idea of getting our allies to send more combat troops to fight alongside the U.S. in Afghanistan?

GATES: No, we haven’t. And in fact, I think some of our allies will send additional forces there to provide security before the August elections in Afghanistan.

But I think what we’re really interested in for the longer term from our partners and the allies is helping us with this civilian surge in terms of experts in agriculture, and finance, and governance and so on, to help us improve the situation inside Afghanistan, give a sense of forward progress on the part of the Afghan people.

Also, police trainers -- you know, the Caribinieri, the Guardia Seville, these various groups in Europe are really very good paramilitary-type police, and I think they could do a good job in the police training, so those will be probably the principal focus of our requests.

WALLACE: New subject. North Korea says that it will launch a communications satellite sometime in the next few days. They have, in fact, even moved a missile out to the launch pad. Several questions. Why are we so troubled by an activity that the North Koreans say is civilian?

GATES: Well, I think that they’re -- I don’t know anyone at a senior level in the American government who does not believe this technology is intended as a mask for the development of an intercontinental ballistic missile.

WALLACE: Do we believe that they now have the ability to put a nuclear warhead on top of a missile, as the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, General Maples, suggested?

GATES: I think that we believe that that’s their long-term intent. I personally would be skeptical that they have the ability right now to do that.

WALLACE: The commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific, Admiral Keating, says that we are, quote, “fully prepared” to shoot down this missile. Are there any circumstances under which we will do that?

GATES: Well, I think if we had an aberrant missile, one that was headed for Hawaii, that looked like it was headed for Hawaii or something like that, we might consider it. But I don’t think we have any plans to do anything like that at this point.

WALLACE: What if it were headed for the West Coast, for Alaska?

GATES: Well, we -- I don’t think we believe this missile can do that.

WALLACE: And what about the Japanese? Obviously -- would -- they have some of our technology. Do we believe they’re going to -- prepared to shoot this down?

GATES: Well, again, based on what I read in the newspapers, what the Japanese are saying is that the -- if that missile fails, and it looks like it’s going to drop debris on Japan, that they might take some action.

WALLACE: You’re basically discussing this, Mr. Secretary, as if it’s going to happen.

GATES: The launch?

WALLACE: Yeah.

GATES: I think it probably will.

WALLACE: And there’s nothing we can do about it?

GATES: Nope.

WALLACE: And what does that say to you?

GATES: Well, I would say we’re not prepared to do anything about it.

WALLACE: There are reports -- well, let me -- I want to stay with that. What does that say to you about the North Korean regime, that -- that we and the rest of the world can all say that this is -- you know, a provocative act, an unlawful act, and they thumb our noses and we’re not going to do anything about it?

GATES: Well, I think it’s very troubling. The reality is that the six-party talks really have not made any headway any time recently.

There has certainly been no -- if this is Kim Jong-il’s welcoming present to a new president, launching a missile like this and threatening to have a nuclear test, I think it says a lot about the imperviousness of this -- of this regime in North Korea to any kind of diplomatic overtures.

WALLACE: There are reports that the Obama White House has asked you to cut $2 billion from the next budget for missile defense, roughly 20 percent. Is this president less committed? Is he less convinced that this program will work than President Bush was?

GATES: Well, I don’t know about the comparison. I would say -- I would tell you that I have not received any specific requests from the White House in terms of our budget. We’ll be talking about that. We have the top line number.

We receive what we call a pass-back from the Office of Management and Budget, but I considered the suggestions that they made simply those, suggestions. I’ve taken some of them and some of them I haven’t.

WALLACE: But do you regard there is a new skepticism in the part of the White House towards missile defense?

GATES: I think that -- I think one of the things that we need to do is sit down and go through the capabilities that we have, the tests that we’ve been through, and -- and focus on where -- where we need to sustain development, where we need to sustain a commitment to have a capability.

WALLACE: So it sounds like that’s under review.

GATES: I think so.

WALLACE: There are so many trouble spots around the world, but I want to do a lightning round tour of the horizon. I know this is not your thing, Mr. Secretary, but let’s try to do quick questions, quick answers.

Iraq -- do you see any developments so far that might cause you to have to slow down President Obama’s time line to pull out of the major cities by this summer and to get our combat troops out by August of 2010?

GATES: I haven’t seen anything at this point that would lead me to think that there will be a need to change the time lines.

WALLACE: Iran -- you said recently -- you said recently that they are not close to a nuclear weapon. Admiral Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, says that they have enough material to make a bomb. Is there a contradiction there?

GATES: No. What they have is -- is probably enough low-enriched uranium from their centrifuges at Natanz to give them the capacity should they then enrich it more highly to proceed to make a weapon. They don’t have the capability at this point to enrich. We were suspicious they may be building one clandestinely.

We do not believe they are doing enriching beyond a low level at Natanz, and the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] is in there, so we will know if they tried to do that. So I guess the point -- the bridge between what Admiral Mullen said and what I’ve said is they do have enough low-enriched uranium that if they should then proceed to enrich it more highly, they could build a weapon.

WALLACE: You expressed, I think it would be fair to say, extreme skepticism about the ability of diplomacy to alter the behavior of the North Koreans. Do you feel the same way about the Iranians?

GATES: Well, I think -- I think, frankly, from my perspective the opportunity for success is probably more in economic sanctions in both places than it is in diplomacy.

Diplomacy -- perhaps if there is enough economic pressure placed on Iran, diplomacy can provide them an open door through which they can walk if they choose to change their policies, and so I think the two go hand in hand, but I think what gets them to the table is economic sanctions.

WALLACE: A couple of more questions for the lightning round. Mexico -- the Pentagon issued a report in November on the growing drug violence there that said this, “An unstable Mexico could represent a homeland security problem of immense proportions to the United States.”

Mr. Secretary, how likely is that scenario, that the Mexican government loses control of part of the country?

GATES: I don’t think that’s a likely scenario at this point. I think that a lot of the violence is -- is among or between the cartels as they strive for control of certain areas in Mexico.

I think President Calderon has acted with enormous courage and forcefully in sending troops in to try and get control of that situation.

And I think that -- as I think Admiral Blair testified just in the last couple of days, I think that the chances of the Mexican government losing control of some part of their country or becoming a failed state is -- are very low.

WALLACE: In January, White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs gave a one-word answer, “yes,” when asked if this president is going to end the policy of “don’t ask, don’t tell” for gays in the military.

Where does that stand? And why is there currently money in the 2010 budget to keep enforcing that policy?

GATES: Well, it continues to be the law. And any change in the policy would require a change in the law. We will follow the law, whatever it is.

That dialogue, though, has really not progressed very far at this point in the administration. I think the president and I feel like we’ve got a lot on our plates right now, and let’s push that one down the road a little bit.

WALLACE: And finally, and we have just a minute left, President Bush used to talk about the global war on terror. This administration, this White House, seems to steer away from that.

In fact, in his speech on Friday, President Obama talked about a campaign against extremism. Beyond the words, is there a strategic difference between the way these two presidents see the fight?

GATES: I think that they -- they both see Al Qaida as a threat to the United States, Al Qaida and its extremist allies. And I think they both have made clear their determination to go after it.

We have the opportunity now that perhaps we did not have before to apply the kind of resources, both military and civilian, against it and a broader kind of strategy that we did not have before.

WALLACE: But a difference between saying war on terror or campaign against extremism...

GATES: I think that’s people looking for differences where there are none.

WALLACE: Mr. Secretary, I want to thank you so much for coming in. We got through everything. Thank you. Please come back, sir.

GATES: My pleasure. Thank you.

Mr Obama's War for/on Pakistan-Afghanistan: Holes in the Middle

Related Post: Mr Biden’s War? An Afghanistan-Pakistan Strategy from 2007
Related Post: Two-Step Analysis of Mr Obama’s War Plan: Step Two in Afghanistan
Related Post: Two-Step Analysis of Mr Obama’s War Plan: Step One in Pakistan

Eighteen hours since Barack Obama laid out the strategy by which the United States will defeat Al Qa'eda and "terrorists" in Afghanistan, 24 hours after we projected both the Administration's approach and the problems with it, I have to say....

We got it right.

1. BRING ON THE MAGIC

The Administration has given the media two marvellous diversions....the headline of 4000 US trainers and the proclamation that the Administration, focusing on the threat of Al Qa’eda, is moving away from the Bush strategy of 'democracy promotion' in Afghanistan.

Obama did that and more. With the Kennedy-esque elevation of lots of aid and a boost of civilians in US programmes (not a huge boost, given the low levels of participation in the Bush years, but a symbolic "doubling"), combined with the show of military force and the harsh rhetoric against Osama's Men, the President was a masterful salesman.

The buzzword this morning is "consensus". Former Bush Administration official Peter Feaver, arch-colonialist Max Boot, and the caretaker of US power, Robert Kagan, swooned over more US boots on the ground to say, "Unlike his approach to economic matters, on national security Obama is acting in a fairly centrist and responsible manner." Robert Dreyfuss of The Nation, a strident critic of US foreign policy in recent years, thought this was a "work in progress" but it wasn't Bush's work in progress: "President Obama's new strategy for the Afghanistan-Pakistan war isn't Quaker-inspired, but it's not neocon-inspired, either." Daniel Markey of the Council on Foreign Relations told the BBC's PM programme that the Obama Administration had finally matched American resources to US intentions in the fight against Al Qa'eda.

Obama's magician's trick, with the re-production of the post-9/11 battle against bin Laden, was to keep his audience focused on how the US would triumph and divert them from against whom. Afghan and Pakistan populations disappeared before the sweeping invocation of a foreign menace threatening Asian, European, and African cities.

And not only the populations disappeared, so did the "real" political challenges that this US plan faces.

2. PUTTING THE PRESSURE ON PAKISTAN

Somehow the US has to turn the “good” elements in the Pakistani Government against the “rogue” elements in the ISI [Pakistani intelligence].

In case anyone thought Afghanistan was the first priority for Obama, his officials were quick to set the record straight. US envoy Richard Holbrooke laid out the new equation:

We have to deal with the western Pakistan problem....Our superiors would all freely admit that of all the dilemmas and challenges we face, that is going to be the most daunting...because it’s a sovereign country and there is a red line.

Even more striking, however, was the rather blunt re-statement of how the US is going to ensure a "proper" Pakistani Government and campaign against insurgents. Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told CNN, "There are certainly indications" that Pakistani intelligence were supporting Al Qa'eda and its "Taliban" supporters in Pakistan and Afghanistan: "Fundamentally that's one of the things that have to change."

But how does Washington make that change? In the case of Afghanistan, which is not-so-sovereign-a-country, the US can almost openly manoeuvre to push aside President Hamid Karzai. With Pakistan, especially after the symbolism of the recent Long March and memories of the "democratic" martyrdom of Benazir Bhutto, the Obama Administration has to be more careful about imposing an American solution.

Of course, the President made no reference to this specific challenge yesterday. The problem is that this may not be discretion but a general befuddlement over how to move around a weak President Zardari and get the Pakistani military to be "good" and move against not only Al Qa'eda and local groups but also elements within the Islamabad power structure.

3. THE HOLE IN THE MIDDLE

The US doesn’t want to get out of Afghanistan, at least not in the near-future, so it needs a “reliable” political centre to hold together its strategy. And that is precisely what it does not have.

Washington may not have an easy solution, apart from the image of "Al Qa'eda", for the political conundrums in Pakistan. But at least Islamabad is getting attention, albeit through well-placed conversations with the press. Kabul is missing.

In the run-up to the Obama announcement, there had been talk of a political push to move aside President Karzai. That disappeared yesterday. Instead, the President indicated that the US was going to take the battle to the countryside with the vaunted fusion of "hard power" and "soft power" promoted by good liberal interventionists in recent years (the 400+ contributors to the Princeton Project on National Security, take a bow). Beat up the bad guys, train Afghan security, build up the villages, burn down the poppy fields and break up the drugs factories.

It's a big issue, of course, whether that Take It to the Villages strategy is viable. It is equally important to notice the political vacuum behind Obama's supposed comprehensive approach. We're still waiting for more on indications that the US will be talking to a variety of local elements, including "former Taliban".

And I'm waiting for the penny to drop that the Obama Administration may be trying to bypass the central Government in Kabul, the one promoted by the US for 7+ years, because it has no faith in it. That is the real significance of the symbolic fluff that Obama and Co. are moving away from a supposed "democracy promotion" of the Bush years.

4. THE UNMISTAKBLE HEAVINESS OF BREATH-HOLDING

Simon Toner, responding to our posts yesterday, offered the important analysis that Obama and his rhetoric might be implementing a sophisticated strategy in which Washington was not linking "Al Qa'eda" to local Afghan and Pakistani groups but, through the invocation of terrorism, separating it from "insurgents". Doing so, the US could then engage with the variety of local movements to search for political settlements.

In theory, that could be a promising approach. Yet even if it is pursued, I'm holding my breath over the challenge: how will the US be working, not with former/current foes, but with current/former allies? Where is the political centre (location, not ideology) of Kabul and Islamabad in this Obama grand plan?

As good as I am at holding my breath, I'm not sure I can last for the time Washington will take to address that riddle.

Target Iran? This Week's US-Israeli Talks

Related Post: That Obama “Review/Muddle” on Iran

The visit to the US by Israel's top military commander, Lieutenant General Gabi Ashkenazi (pictured), which we noted a few days ago, has received no attention in the mainstream press. There are a couple of teasing indications on the Internet, however, of where the talks may be going.

Iran's Press TV, in the midst of an over-wrought (and misleading) story that "U.S., Israel on the same page on Iran timeline", offers this revelation:

Within days of Mullen's pronouncement of close Israel-U.S. cooperation, his Israeli counterpart, Lt. Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi, was putting it to the test in Washington meetings with Gen. James Jones, President Obama's national security adviser, top Pentagon brass and Dennis Ross, who shapes Iran policy at the State Department.

Subtle differences in the Hebrew and English official accounts of Ashkenazi's meetings were telling.

"Throughout the day, the Chief of Staff met with the National Security Adviser, Gen. James Jones, with whom he discussed professional matters such as Iran's nuclear plans, the security situation along Israel's northern border, weapons smuggling, as well as the situation in the Palestinian Authority and the Gaza Strip after operation 'Cast Lead,' " said the statement put out Monday by Israel for the foreign media.

The Hebrew statement, put out by Israel for domestic consumption, said Iran was the "foremost" issue that Ashkenazi discussed.

I suspect the differences in the two statements are not just presentation. This suggests that US officials are continuing to emphasize that Iran has to be approached as part of a regional evaluation which considers the next steps on the Israel-Palestine situation. So, while Tel Aviv might be pressing for an Iran-first approach --- strengthened sanctions and possibly military action --- Washington will not be "on the same page".

Other reports have suggested that Ashkenazi's failure to see US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is a further snub to Israel. I'm doubtful about this, as James Jones, heading the National Security Council, would be setting out the US inter-departmental view, and Ashkenazi is also seeing the key State Department official, Dennis Ross.

Instead this report, again from Press TV, is telling if true:

Ashkenazi reportedly outlined for Ross contingencies under which Israel could attack Iran, reiterating it was not on the table for now. Coincidentally, a paper from the [US] Center for Strategic and International Studies published this week said that such an attack was doable, if difficult, both through an air attack and by long-range missiles.

The report, by Abdullah Toukan, said that such an attack would "give rise to regional instability and conflict as well as terrorism."

Such a consequence clearly worried Mullen, too, even though it is not on the immediate horizon.

“What I worry about in terms of an attack on Iran is in addition to the immediate effect, the effect of the attack -- it’s the unintended consequences. It’s the further destabilization in the region," Mullen said. "It’s how they would respond. We have lots of Americans who live in that region who are under the threat envelope right now."

In short, Ashkenazi may have put Israel's case for a focus on Tehran ahead of other Middle Eastern issues but, with the Israeli Government in transition, the immediate approach is not going to be military. Meanwhile, the Obama Administration continues to be in what one might politely call "a review phase" and less politely call "a muddle" over its next steps on Iran.

The US and Pakistan: Bye Bye President Zardari, But Hello to Whom?

Just over 48 hours after the culmination of the Long March, with the Government's restoration of Pakistani Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry, and the story has dropped out of American newspapers. But, of course, this weekend's events were only the beginning of a new, important stage in Pakistani and regional politics.

For many, it is the beginning of hope. Perhaps, after the expression of popular protest, the legal system can be resurrected and placed above personal and party manipulation. Perhaps there can be a scrutiny which would produce a meaningful democracy rather than today's well-connected politician who ascends to the highest office through connections rather than ability and integrity.

In no way do I want to demean that hope, but it moves alongside, and arguably trails behind, more immediate negotiations and manoeuvres after the drama of the last week.

First and foremost, Asif Ali Zardari is effectively Dead President Walking. If this was a showdown for those marching for Chaudhry's restoration, the future of political parties such as the Pakistani Muslim League (N), or a general wish for an ethical politics, it was also Zardari's showdown against his rivals. Trying to maintain a careful balance between the isolation of Nawaz Sharif and the appearance of a Government upholding judicial and political authority, he was putting his case not only in Pakistan but in the US through outlets like The Wall Street Journal.

The problem for the Obama Administration is that Zardari put his battle against Sharif, and indeed Chaudhry, above the battle against insurgency in northwestern Pakistan. An article in The Washington Post, fed by Administration sources, put the case cogently yesterday:

Administration officials are putting the finishing touches on a plan to greatly increase economic and development assistance to Pakistan, and to expand a military partnership considered crucial to striking a mortal blow against al-Qaeda's leadership and breaking the Pakistani-based extremist networks that sustain the war in Afghanistan....But the weakness of Pakistan's elected government -- backed into a corner by weekend demonstrations that left its political opposition strengthened -- has called into question one of the basic pillars of that plan.

The President had thus become secondary to the military commander, General Ashfaq Parvez Kiani, as he met American counterparts and political leaders in Islamabad, Washington, and Kabul.

At the same time, the US had to move carefully. After all, Washington had been instrumental in supporting Zardari's rise to the Presidency when Benazir Bhutto was assassinated and when General Pervez Musharraf became a liability for American plans. Even if the Pakistani military had become the key link for US officials, the appearance of democracy had to be maintained.

The Long March, with all its good intentions, provided a mini-solution for the Obama Administration. Only 24 hours into the march, the US jumped in through talks with Nawaz Sharif and a blunt call to Zardari --- Washington did not want the President to force a showdown with Sharif. By Saturday, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was telling both politicians, "If Pakistan is in such a state of internal political turmoil that U.S. aid can't be used effectively, that's going to limit what can be done and also how successful we are in Afghanistan."

Perhaps more importantly, the Americans appear to have been in close touch with the Pakistani military and security services during the crisis. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, spoke with General Kiani on Friday. The New York Times summarised, "One encouraging sign for Washington was the role played in the crisis by the army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, who let Mr. Zardari know that he could not rely on soldiers to confront the protesters who were threatening to descend on Islamabad."

We may never know exactly who, if anyone, gave orders to the security forces who let the convoy of Nawaz Sharif slip easily through the cordon of his house arrest, providing support to the growing demonstrations and forcing Zardari's hand. We may never know exactly what was said between the President, Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gillani, and General Kiani at the Sunday morning meeting that conceded the restoration of Chaudhry.

Even murkier, however, is the next step in the relationship between Zardari, his political rivals, his military, and the American sponsors. Even if there is no way back for the President, there is no easy solution to fit Washington's plans. The accession of Nawaz Sharif to power is still an uncomfortable prospect for the US, which has long considered him too close to "conservative" (read that in a political and religious sense) forces in Pakistan and the region. Indeed, Saudi Arabia's backing of Sharif poses the prospect of a battle between Washington and Riyadh for influence over the next steps in both Islamabad and Kabul.

As US envoy Richard Holbrooke bluntly said Monday, the immediate resolution of the Long March "bodes better than the alternative outcome" of disorder and collapse of the Government but "the underlying problem still exists". Having failed to get "stability" with Musharraf, having failed with Zardari, it is not hope that moves Washington but this question:

Who or what can come next?