Mr Obama's War for/on Pakistan-Afghanistan: Holes in the Middle

Related Post: Mr Biden’s War? An Afghanistan-Pakistan Strategy from 2007
Related Post: Two-Step Analysis of Mr Obama’s War Plan: Step Two in Afghanistan
Related Post: Two-Step Analysis of Mr Obama’s War Plan: Step One in Pakistan

Eighteen hours since Barack Obama laid out the strategy by which the United States will defeat Al Qa'eda and "terrorists" in Afghanistan, 24 hours after we projected both the Administration's approach and the problems with it, I have to say....

We got it right.

1. BRING ON THE MAGIC

The Administration has given the media two marvellous diversions....the headline of 4000 US trainers and the proclamation that the Administration, focusing on the threat of Al Qa’eda, is moving away from the Bush strategy of 'democracy promotion' in Afghanistan.

Obama did that and more. With the Kennedy-esque elevation of lots of aid and a boost of civilians in US programmes (not a huge boost, given the low levels of participation in the Bush years, but a symbolic "doubling"), combined with the show of military force and the harsh rhetoric against Osama's Men, the President was a masterful salesman.

The buzzword this morning is "consensus". Former Bush Administration official Peter Feaver, arch-colonialist Max Boot, and the caretaker of US power, Robert Kagan, swooned over more US boots on the ground to say, "Unlike his approach to economic matters, on national security Obama is acting in a fairly centrist and responsible manner." Robert Dreyfuss of The Nation, a strident critic of US foreign policy in recent years, thought this was a "work in progress" but it wasn't Bush's work in progress: "President Obama's new strategy for the Afghanistan-Pakistan war isn't Quaker-inspired, but it's not neocon-inspired, either." Daniel Markey of the Council on Foreign Relations told the BBC's PM programme that the Obama Administration had finally matched American resources to US intentions in the fight against Al Qa'eda.

Obama's magician's trick, with the re-production of the post-9/11 battle against bin Laden, was to keep his audience focused on how the US would triumph and divert them from against whom. Afghan and Pakistan populations disappeared before the sweeping invocation of a foreign menace threatening Asian, European, and African cities.

And not only the populations disappeared, so did the "real" political challenges that this US plan faces.

2. PUTTING THE PRESSURE ON PAKISTAN

Somehow the US has to turn the “good” elements in the Pakistani Government against the “rogue” elements in the ISI [Pakistani intelligence].

In case anyone thought Afghanistan was the first priority for Obama, his officials were quick to set the record straight. US envoy Richard Holbrooke laid out the new equation:

We have to deal with the western Pakistan problem....Our superiors would all freely admit that of all the dilemmas and challenges we face, that is going to be the most daunting...because it’s a sovereign country and there is a red line.

Even more striking, however, was the rather blunt re-statement of how the US is going to ensure a "proper" Pakistani Government and campaign against insurgents. Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told CNN, "There are certainly indications" that Pakistani intelligence were supporting Al Qa'eda and its "Taliban" supporters in Pakistan and Afghanistan: "Fundamentally that's one of the things that have to change."

But how does Washington make that change? In the case of Afghanistan, which is not-so-sovereign-a-country, the US can almost openly manoeuvre to push aside President Hamid Karzai. With Pakistan, especially after the symbolism of the recent Long March and memories of the "democratic" martyrdom of Benazir Bhutto, the Obama Administration has to be more careful about imposing an American solution.

Of course, the President made no reference to this specific challenge yesterday. The problem is that this may not be discretion but a general befuddlement over how to move around a weak President Zardari and get the Pakistani military to be "good" and move against not only Al Qa'eda and local groups but also elements within the Islamabad power structure.

3. THE HOLE IN THE MIDDLE

The US doesn’t want to get out of Afghanistan, at least not in the near-future, so it needs a “reliable” political centre to hold together its strategy. And that is precisely what it does not have.

Washington may not have an easy solution, apart from the image of "Al Qa'eda", for the political conundrums in Pakistan. But at least Islamabad is getting attention, albeit through well-placed conversations with the press. Kabul is missing.

In the run-up to the Obama announcement, there had been talk of a political push to move aside President Karzai. That disappeared yesterday. Instead, the President indicated that the US was going to take the battle to the countryside with the vaunted fusion of "hard power" and "soft power" promoted by good liberal interventionists in recent years (the 400+ contributors to the Princeton Project on National Security, take a bow). Beat up the bad guys, train Afghan security, build up the villages, burn down the poppy fields and break up the drugs factories.

It's a big issue, of course, whether that Take It to the Villages strategy is viable. It is equally important to notice the political vacuum behind Obama's supposed comprehensive approach. We're still waiting for more on indications that the US will be talking to a variety of local elements, including "former Taliban".

And I'm waiting for the penny to drop that the Obama Administration may be trying to bypass the central Government in Kabul, the one promoted by the US for 7+ years, because it has no faith in it. That is the real significance of the symbolic fluff that Obama and Co. are moving away from a supposed "democracy promotion" of the Bush years.

4. THE UNMISTAKBLE HEAVINESS OF BREATH-HOLDING

Simon Toner, responding to our posts yesterday, offered the important analysis that Obama and his rhetoric might be implementing a sophisticated strategy in which Washington was not linking "Al Qa'eda" to local Afghan and Pakistani groups but, through the invocation of terrorism, separating it from "insurgents". Doing so, the US could then engage with the variety of local movements to search for political settlements.

In theory, that could be a promising approach. Yet even if it is pursued, I'm holding my breath over the challenge: how will the US be working, not with former/current foes, but with current/former allies? Where is the political centre (location, not ideology) of Kabul and Islamabad in this Obama grand plan?

As good as I am at holding my breath, I'm not sure I can last for the time Washington will take to address that riddle.

Target Iran? Israeli Military Chief in Washington For Talks

Here's a story that has set a few tongues wagging and minds racing on the Internet.

The Chief of Staff of the Israeli Military, General Gabi Ashkenazi (pictured), is spending five days in Washington. He's not only seeing the sights but also chatting with National Security Advisor Gen. James L. Jones, special State Department advisor Dennis Ross (still officially concerned with "Southwest Asia and the Gulf"), and military commanders.

Iran's Press TV is a bit over-the-top with its proclamation of "simmering talks of war", but the attention to Tehran, rather than other Middle Eastern issues, is more than justified. While interchanges between Israeli and American military leaders, as part of Tel Aviv's special relationship with the US, are commonplace, the presence of Ross at the discussions is significant. So is the timing.

Israeli diplomats are putting out the story that incoming Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will be putting Iran --- not Palestine, not discussions with Syria, but confrontation with Tehran --- as the first priority before the US. This is not surprising, given Netanyahu's pronouncements over the last decade, let alone during the recent electoral campaign, but the willingness of Israeli officials to state this clearly is striking.

For example, one diplomat has revealed that Netanyahu told US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in Israel earlier this month, "[Iran] was the be all and end all....If [Washington] wants anything to move on the Palestinian front, we need to take head [sic] on the Iranian threat, diplomatically, with sanctions, and beyond that." (emphasis added)

Clinton allegedly replied, "I am aware of that."

Israeli pressure for a specific move won't come until after the Iranian elections in June, and of course Netanyahu still has to put together a workable coalition in Tel Aviv. Instead, the immediate impact of the Israeli moves, symbolised by Ashkenazi's visit to Washington, may be to limit any American "engagement" with Iran.

"There was one positive coming out of her decision to come here," the Israeli diplomat said. "To make sure everyone realizes that a) she is into this topic, b) that the Obama administration will not let it drop in the priorities list."

An Israeli diplomat offered this spin, either as a reflection of Clinton's attitude or as attempt to box her in: "There was one positive coming out of her decision to come here. To make sure everyone realizes that a) she is into this topic, b) that the Obama administration will not let it drop in the priorities list."

The diplomat continued, "As for substance, there is no [American] policy, which is more or less in a mild way, something she admitted....The Obama administration is in an exploration phase....There is nothing new here. The players are the same. The plot is the same. The solutions are the same."

Of course, the Obama Administration is unlikely to be enthusiastic about the "and beyond that" part of Netanyahu's message to Clinton. This isn't 2003 when the US Government, flush from "victory" in Iraq, could envisage regime change in Tehran as a short- to medium-term opportunity. With Iran now in a position to be useful, if not vital, to Washington on the priority issue of Afghanistan, any ratcheting-up of pressure on Tehran could be counter-productive.

Paradoxically, however, that only ensures that the Israeli Government and supporters will press harder --- even in the absence of a Government in Tel Aviv --- for the "right" US line. This, in part, is why the campaign to block Charles Freeman as head of the National Intelligence Council was so vicious and so symbolic. The next target may well be Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair, who is taking the "wrong" line on Tehran with his (accurate) presentation of the US intelligence community's assessment that Iran is not close to The Bomb.

(Robert Dreyfuss draws the far different conclusion: "Here's the reality behind the Freeman debacle: Already worried over Team Obama, suffering the after-effects of the Gaza debacle, and about to be burdened with the Netanyahu-Lieberman problem, the Israel lobby is undoubtedly running scared. They succeeded in knocking off Freeman, but the true test of their strength is yet to come.")