Engagement with Iran (Postscript): Did US Tell Israeli General to Take a Hike?

Related Post: Engagement with Iran - A Hopeful US Approach
Related Post: Engagement - And There's Hope on the Iranian Side As Well....

A story from Israel's YNet News on Monday raises the prospect of a Washington rebuff to Israel on how to approach Iran.

The article begins with a statement of the Israeli hopes for a hard line towards Tehran: "IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant-General Gabi Ashkenazi (pictured), who is on an official visit to the United States, told his American colleagues Monday that the Iranian threat could still be handled via sanctions, but stressed that an Israeli military strike was a "serious" option."

It soon becomes clear, however, that Ashkenazi was told to put his airplanes away by US National Security Advisor James Jones, Dennis Ross, the State Department special advisor on Iran, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff: "[Ashkenazi] did note that economic sanctions on Iran remain the preferable option at this time."

Even more interesting is this note, which I don't think was picked up in the American press: "Later Monday evening, Ashkenazi decided to cut his visit to the US short, in order to attend the government's meeting Tuesday on the prisoner exchange deal meant to secure the release of kidnapped IDF soldier Gilad Shalit."

Yeah, right. Ashkenazi is far from a central figure in the political talks with Hamas on Shalit. What is more likely is that, having originally scheduled a five-day stay in the US, the General saw that Tel Aviv's agenda was going nowhere. That interpretation is given even more substance by this denial, which still raises a smile:

IDF Spokesman Brigadier-General Avi Benayahu said that "the decision stemmed from his desire to attend meetings regarding Shalit's retrieval, but it is not to be taken as a reflection of any possible outcome of the negotiations."

Washington's rejection of Ashkenazi's approach is solely on the military side of the Iran question. What remains to be seen is whether, after Hillary Clinton and Dennis Ross floated the idea of a harder diplomatic line with Iran during the Clinton wide ride in the Middle East earlier this month, others in the Administration --- possibly eclipsing Clinton and Ross --- are also going to rebuff Tel Aviv's insistence on tougher economic sanctions.

A Modest Proposal to Engage Iran

Amidst all the bluster and misinformation surrounding the issue of US-Iranian relations, a clear, concise proposal is always striking. Replying to his fellow Foreign Policy blogger Dan Drezner, who failed to distinguish between a nuclear energy programme and a nuclear weapons programme, Stephen Walt offered this suggestion:

A realistic approach to Iran's nuclear program

At this point I don't think it is possible to persuade Iran to give up full control of the nuclear fuel cycle. They've committed a lot of money and prestige to acquiring this capacity, the program is popular domestically, and it is legal within the confines of the NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty]. So if our bottom line is for them to abandon enrichment, etc., we're almost certainly going to fail.

Our goal, instead, should be to convince Iran that it is better off not developing nuclear weapons, because that’s the issue we really care about.

This means not enriching uranium to weapons grade, not reprocessing spent reactor fuel to extract bomb-making material, and not building or testing an actual device. Obviously, Iran would have to agree to sufficiently thorough inspections to ensure compliance.

I don’t know if it's possible to achieve this goal, but here's how I'd try.

First and foremost, the United States has to take the threat of military force and regime change off the table. Why? Because that's the main reason why Iran might like a nuclear deterrent in the first place. From Tehran's perspective, they have three nuclear powers in their neighborhood (Pakistan, India, and Israel), and U.S. troops on two sides (in Iraq and Afghanistan). U.S. naval forces patrol the Iranian Sea and Persian Gulf, and it is the stated policy of the U.S. government -- the world's strongest military power -- to seek the removal of the current Iranian regime. Indeed, we are reportedly engaged in various covert operations there already. Iranians can see that Saddam Hussein is dead and buried but Kim Jong Il is not, and they know one of the reasons why. They also know that Muammar al-Qaddafi agreed to give up his own WMD programs only after the Bush administration agreed not to try to overthrow him. Under these circumstances, it would be surprising if Iran wasn't interested in its own deterrent.

This means that the Obama administration's likely approach ("bigger carrots and bigger sticks," as outlined by special envoy Dennis Ross) is wrong-headed. We may need to think up different inducements, but bigger sticks (e.g., stronger sanctions) sends the wrong message, and repeated statements that military force is still "on the table" only gives Tehran additional incentive to master the full fuel cycle and then proceed to weaponize. If we are serious about diplomacy (and not simply looking for a pretext to use force later), Step 1 has to be reducing Iran's perceived need for a deterrent capability of its own. And as a number of Iran experts have already argued, the best way to do that is to pursue a comprehensive settlement of the key security issues that presently divide us.

Second, we need to explain to Iran that possessing a known nuclear weapons capability is not without its own costs and risks. Today, if a terrorist group somehow obtained a nuclear weapon and then used it, we would not suspect Iran of having provided it and they would face little risk of retaliation. Why not? Because we know they don’t have any weapons right now. But imagine how we might react a decade hence, if we knew that Iran had built a few nuclear weapons and some terrorist group whose agenda was somewhat similar to Iran's managed to explode a bomb somewhere in the world, or even on American soil? Under those terrible circumstances, Tehran would have to worry a lot about U.S. retaliation, even if it had nothing whatsoever to do with the attack. Nuclear forensics is hardly perfect (or so my physicist colleagues tell me) and the United States has been known to shoot first and ask questions later in the past. (I'd remind Iranian officials that former Deputy Sec/Def Paul Wolfowitz recommended attacking Iraq less than a week after 9/11, and we eventually did invade that country, even though it had no WMD and had nothing to do with al Qaeda's attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon). So Iran should not be confident that we'd act with precision and restraint in the aftermath of a nuclear terrorist attack, and that concern ought to give them pause about whether joining the nuclear weapons club is a net plus.

I'd also point out to them that acquiring nuclear weapons will encourage other states in the Middle East to follow suit. Given that Iran has a lot more latent power potential than its neighbors in the Gulf, it should prefer to confine the competition there to the conventional realm, where its larger population and considerable economic potential will inevitably give it considerable influence.

Thus, from a purely realist perspective, Iran might actually be better off with the "Japan option": possessing the latent capability to build nuclear weapons if circumstances required, but avoiding the costs and risks by refraining from exercising that option. If we want to convince Tehran to forego nuclear weapons, therefore, our diplomatic efforts ought to focus on explaining this situation to our Iranian counterparts, instead of merely brandishing bigger sticks or waving bigger carrots.

It is impossible to know if this strategy would work, but it is worth remembering that as far as we know, Iran has no nuclear weapons program today. Iran has signaled on several occasions since 9/11 that it was interested in a negotiated settlement with the United States. There have also been several other moments when the two states managed to cooperate in more limited ways. And if diplomacy doesn't succeed, the United States and its allies in the region can always fall back on deterrence. By saying that the United States should "non-violently" prepare for an Iranian nuclear weapons capability, I take it that Drezner recognizes that preventive war won't solve this problem and could easily make a lot of other problems worse. We've deterred bigger and tougher adversaries in the past, and while I'd strongly prefer that Iran decide not to become a nuclear weapons state, I'm not going to panic if it does cross that line at some point down the road. And neither should anyone else.

That Obama "Review/Muddle" on Iran

Related Post: Target Iran? This Week’s US-Israeli Talks

Moments ago, in a post on the US-Israeli talks this week on Iran, we suggested that "review" and "muddle" might mean the same thing in the current policy process of the Obama Adminstration.

The BBC lends weight to this possibility, ironically, in a story headlined, "US policy towards Iran shaping up". The story begins with the revelation, "The Obama administration is finalising its policy for engaging Iran. The approach is likely to involve a combination of small steps to initiate contact between the two countries and may include an overture in the form of a letter to Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, according to Western diplomats and senior US officials."

Read further, however, and this "engagement" is by no means certain. The first difficulty comes in the timing of the initiative:

A senior Western diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity, told reporters that he expected the letter to be sent to Mr Khamenei before the Iranian elections this summer, although Washington's allies would prefer this step to be taken after the vote, to avoid influencing the election.

More importantly, it is unclear what place a letter --- if it is being considered --- would have in an overall US approach to Tehran and even who is making that determination. The BBC story says, "US officials insist that no final decisions have been made and no announcements are expected for at least another 10 days while Dennis Ross - the top official in charge of reviewing US policy towards Iran - conducts an assessment."
Ross, however, is only one cook stirring the broth. Any assessment has to make its way to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the Pentagon, the National Security Council, and of course the White House.

So there may be the drama of a proposed letter but there is still no clarity on what exactly is happening between Washington and the fist, clenched or unclenched, of Tehran.

Target Iran? Israeli Military Chief in Washington For Talks

Here's a story that has set a few tongues wagging and minds racing on the Internet.

The Chief of Staff of the Israeli Military, General Gabi Ashkenazi (pictured), is spending five days in Washington. He's not only seeing the sights but also chatting with National Security Advisor Gen. James L. Jones, special State Department advisor Dennis Ross (still officially concerned with "Southwest Asia and the Gulf"), and military commanders.

Iran's Press TV is a bit over-the-top with its proclamation of "simmering talks of war", but the attention to Tehran, rather than other Middle Eastern issues, is more than justified. While interchanges between Israeli and American military leaders, as part of Tel Aviv's special relationship with the US, are commonplace, the presence of Ross at the discussions is significant. So is the timing.

Israeli diplomats are putting out the story that incoming Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will be putting Iran --- not Palestine, not discussions with Syria, but confrontation with Tehran --- as the first priority before the US. This is not surprising, given Netanyahu's pronouncements over the last decade, let alone during the recent electoral campaign, but the willingness of Israeli officials to state this clearly is striking.

For example, one diplomat has revealed that Netanyahu told US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in Israel earlier this month, "[Iran] was the be all and end all....If [Washington] wants anything to move on the Palestinian front, we need to take head [sic] on the Iranian threat, diplomatically, with sanctions, and beyond that." (emphasis added)

Clinton allegedly replied, "I am aware of that."

Israeli pressure for a specific move won't come until after the Iranian elections in June, and of course Netanyahu still has to put together a workable coalition in Tel Aviv. Instead, the immediate impact of the Israeli moves, symbolised by Ashkenazi's visit to Washington, may be to limit any American "engagement" with Iran.

"There was one positive coming out of her decision to come here," the Israeli diplomat said. "To make sure everyone realizes that a) she is into this topic, b) that the Obama administration will not let it drop in the priorities list."

An Israeli diplomat offered this spin, either as a reflection of Clinton's attitude or as attempt to box her in: "There was one positive coming out of her decision to come here. To make sure everyone realizes that a) she is into this topic, b) that the Obama administration will not let it drop in the priorities list."

The diplomat continued, "As for substance, there is no [American] policy, which is more or less in a mild way, something she admitted....The Obama administration is in an exploration phase....There is nothing new here. The players are the same. The plot is the same. The solutions are the same."

Of course, the Obama Administration is unlikely to be enthusiastic about the "and beyond that" part of Netanyahu's message to Clinton. This isn't 2003 when the US Government, flush from "victory" in Iraq, could envisage regime change in Tehran as a short- to medium-term opportunity. With Iran now in a position to be useful, if not vital, to Washington on the priority issue of Afghanistan, any ratcheting-up of pressure on Tehran could be counter-productive.

Paradoxically, however, that only ensures that the Israeli Government and supporters will press harder --- even in the absence of a Government in Tel Aviv --- for the "right" US line. This, in part, is why the campaign to block Charles Freeman as head of the National Intelligence Council was so vicious and so symbolic. The next target may well be Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair, who is taking the "wrong" line on Tehran with his (accurate) presentation of the US intelligence community's assessment that Iran is not close to The Bomb.

(Robert Dreyfuss draws the far different conclusion: "Here's the reality behind the Freeman debacle: Already worried over Team Obama, suffering the after-effects of the Gaza debacle, and about to be burdened with the Netanyahu-Lieberman problem, the Israel lobby is undoubtedly running scared. They succeeded in knocking off Freeman, but the true test of their strength is yet to come.")

Engaging Iran: The Obama Administration, A Think Tank, and An Israel-First Policy?

Last week the Washington Institute for Near East Policy released its latest report on Iran, "Preventing a Cascade of Instability: U.S. Engagement to Check Iranian Nuclear Progress" . At its heart is a wonderful if dangerous (and unacknowledeged) tension. The influential think-tank thunders:

An Iran on the brink of possessing, or actually possessing, nuclear weapons would create a multitude of problems in the Middle East. Not only would the United States have to deter and contain an emboldened Iran, it could also have to forestall a cascade of destabilizing reactions by other states, whether they were to accommodate Iran, attack it, or match its capabilities. Preventing Iran’s acquisition or development of a military nuclear capability is therefore a vital national priority.

Yet, in the next breath, WINEP declares that the purpose of blocking Iran's "nuclear progress" (not "nuclear weapons" but "progress" towards any nuclear energy capability) is not defensive but ensure Washington remakes the region in its desired image:

Confronting the Iran nuclear program also offers other opportunities to advance U.S. interests: to demonstrate U.S. commitment to multilateral diplomacy, to deepen U.S. relationships with its Middle East friends, and to strengthen the global nonproliferation regime.

To do this, the report advocates a two-stage process. The Obama Administration can initially pursue diplomacy, but "time is short if diplomatic engagement is to have a chance of success":

If the international community appears unable to stop Iran’s nuclear progress, Israel may decide to act unilaterally. Whatever Americans may think, Israeli leaders seem convinced that at least for now, they have a military option....Israel...may feel compelled to act before the option disappears.

Thus, the US has to "use deterrence as an instrument of dissuasion", in other words, give a lot of weapons to Arab states and Tel Aviv: "The enhancement of the modern missile defenses already being deployed in Israel and purchased by several GCC states may introduce uncertainty into the minds of Iranian leaders about the military utility of Iran’s nuclear and missile programs." It also should "use the risk of cascading instability to produce more action now", which is none-too-subtle coding for more aggressive economic sanctions.

So, does this have any significance for policy inside the Obama Administration, rather than advice outside it? WINEP has received attention because, up to early 2009, its leadership and task forces included Obama officials such as Dennis Ross (now envoy for Southwest Asia and "the Gulf") and Susan Rice (Ambassador to the United Nations). This current report draws upon a June 2008 predecessor, signed by Ross and Rice, "Strengthening the Partnership: How to Deepen U.S.-Israel Cooperation on the Iranian Nuclear Challenge".

Yet, in that context, there is an important between the 2008 and 2009 WINEP approaches, one which may or may not point to the rapid-fire diplomacy of Obama's "engagement" and Hillary Clinton's wild ride across the Middle East last week. The earlier report advocated many of the measures in its 2009 successor, but this was founded on an important starting premise:

"That the president initiate, with the prime minister of Israel, a high-level dialogue on the most urgent security matters on our strategic agenda so as to ensure that common threat perceptions and
common interests translate into policies that are as coordinated as possible."

This dialogue would not be begun by the leaders of the US and Israel or their highest-level representatives --- this might be politically sensitive --- but by "one or two...aides...among the most trusted advisors to the president and prime minister --- officials or emissaries empowered to engage in all manner of discussion with the utmost creativity and maximum discretion."

"Preventing a Cascade of Instability" offers no such recommendation. So, has the starting point of an Iran policy based on discussions with Tel Aviv been dropped, by WINEP or --- more importantly --- the Obama Administration? Or, through an official such as Dennis Ross, has it simply been smuggled in quietly, pending the arrival of a new Israeli Government?