Transcript: Secretary of Defense Gates on Fox News Sunday (29 March)

HOST CHRIS WALLACE: This week, President Obama took ownership of the war in Afghanistan. Here for an exclusive interview on the new strategy as well as other tough challenges around the world is the Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.

And, Mr. Secretary, welcome back to “FOX News Sunday.”

GATES: Thank you, Chris.

WALLACE: Let’s start with President Obama’s mission statement Friday on the new strategy in Afghanistan. Here it is.



OBAMA: ... that we have a clear and focused goal to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qaida in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

WALLACE: President Bush used to talk about building a flourishing democracy. Has President Obama narrowed our mission and, if so, why? GATES: I think the -- the near-term objectives have been narrowed. I think our long-term objective still would be to see a flourishing democracy in Afghanistan.

But I think what we need to focus on and focus our efforts is making headway in reversing the Taliban’s momentum and strengthening the Afghan army and police, and -- and really going after Al Qaida, as the president said.

WALLACE: Yeah, I’m going to pick up on that. The president said that Al Qaida is actively planning attacks against the U.S. homeland. Does Al Qaida still have that kind of operational capability to plan and pull off those kinds of attacks?

GATES: They certainly have the capability to plan, and in many ways they have metastasized, with elements in North Africa, in the Levant, in the Horn of Africa and elsewhere, and they aren’t necessarily directly controlled from Al Qaida in western Pakistan, but they are trained there. They often get guidance from there and inspiration from there.

So I think they do have those capabilities. They clearly have been inhibited by all the things that have been done over the last six or seven years.

WALLACE: When you say they still have those capabilities to pull off an attack on the U.S. homeland, do you still regard them as a very serious threat?

GATES: I still regard them as a very serious threat, yes.

WALLACE: U.S. commanders in the field wanted more combat troops than the 17,000 that President Obama committed.

Why did he decide against committing all of those additional combat troops? And will there be enough for the kind of counterinsurgency, living among the population, protecting the population, that was so key to the success of the surge in Iraq?

GATES: Well, let me be very clear about this. The president has approved every single soldier that I have requested of him. I have not sent any requests for units or troops to the president so far that he has not approved.

Now, the reality is I’ve been at this a long time, and I don’t think I’ve ever in several decades run into a ground commander who thought he had enough troops. That’s probably true in all of history.

But we have fulfilled all of the requirements that General McKiernan has put down for 2009, and my view is there’s no need to ask for more troops, ask the president to approve more troops, until we see how the troops we -- he already has approved are in there, how they are doing, what the Europeans have done. And we will be reviewing that come the end of the year.

WALLACE: And are there enough for the kind of counterinsurgency tactics -- living in the population, protecting the population -- that we saw so successful in Iraq?

GATES: Well, based on the requirements that have been levied by General McKiernan for 2009, that would be his view, I think.

And the reality is there already are a lot of troops there. This will bring us, when all is said and done, to about 68,000 troops, plus another 35,000 or so Europeans and other partners.

WALLACE: What kind of long-term commitment has the president given you? Has he promised you that he will stay in Afghanistan until the Taliban, in fact, are -- and Al Qaida are defeated?

GATES: He has clearly -- he clearly understands that this is a very tough fight and that we’re in it until we’re successful, that Al Qaida is no longer a threat to the United States, and that -- and that we are in no danger of either Afghanistan or the western part of Pakistan being a base for Al Qaida.

By the same token, I think he’s been clear -- and frankly, it was my view in our discussions -- that we don’t want to just pursue -- settle on this strategy and then pursue it blindly and open-endedly.

And that’s why I felt very strongly that toward the end of the year or about a year from now we need to reevaluate this strategy and see if we’re making progress.

WALLACE: But the strategy is subject to review. The commitment to defeat the Taliban and Al Qaida -- is that subject to review?

GATES: I don’t think so.

WALLACE: That is the commitment.

GATES: Certainly, to defeat Al Qaida and -- and make sure that Afghanistan and western Pakistan are not safe havens for them.

WALLACE: There were reports this week that elements of Pakistani intelligence, the ISI, are providing the Taliban and other extremists with money, supplies, even tips on allied missions against them. One, is it true? And two, if so, can we stop it?

GATES: Well, the way I would answer is to say that we certainly have concerns about the contacts of -- between the Pakistani intelligence service and the -- and some of these groups in the past.

But the reality is the Pakistanis have had contacts with these groups since they were fighting the Soviets 20 or 25 years ago when I first was dealing with the Pakistanis on this, and I must say also helping make sure that some of those same groups got weapons from our safe haven in Pakistan.

But with people like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and the Haghani [Haqqani] network, the Pakistanis have had contacts with these people for a long time, I think partly as a hedge against what might happen in Afghanistan if we were to walk away or whatever. What we need to do is try and help the Pakistanis understand these groups are now an existential threat to them and that we will be there as a steadfast ally for Pakistan, that they can count on us and that they don’t need that hedge.

WALLACE: There’s a NATO summit coming up next week in Europe. Have we given up on the idea of getting our allies to send more combat troops to fight alongside the U.S. in Afghanistan?

GATES: No, we haven’t. And in fact, I think some of our allies will send additional forces there to provide security before the August elections in Afghanistan.

But I think what we’re really interested in for the longer term from our partners and the allies is helping us with this civilian surge in terms of experts in agriculture, and finance, and governance and so on, to help us improve the situation inside Afghanistan, give a sense of forward progress on the part of the Afghan people.

Also, police trainers -- you know, the Caribinieri, the Guardia Seville, these various groups in Europe are really very good paramilitary-type police, and I think they could do a good job in the police training, so those will be probably the principal focus of our requests.

WALLACE: New subject. North Korea says that it will launch a communications satellite sometime in the next few days. They have, in fact, even moved a missile out to the launch pad. Several questions. Why are we so troubled by an activity that the North Koreans say is civilian?

GATES: Well, I think that they’re -- I don’t know anyone at a senior level in the American government who does not believe this technology is intended as a mask for the development of an intercontinental ballistic missile.

WALLACE: Do we believe that they now have the ability to put a nuclear warhead on top of a missile, as the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, General Maples, suggested?

GATES: I think that we believe that that’s their long-term intent. I personally would be skeptical that they have the ability right now to do that.

WALLACE: The commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific, Admiral Keating, says that we are, quote, “fully prepared” to shoot down this missile. Are there any circumstances under which we will do that?

GATES: Well, I think if we had an aberrant missile, one that was headed for Hawaii, that looked like it was headed for Hawaii or something like that, we might consider it. But I don’t think we have any plans to do anything like that at this point.

WALLACE: What if it were headed for the West Coast, for Alaska?

GATES: Well, we -- I don’t think we believe this missile can do that.

WALLACE: And what about the Japanese? Obviously -- would -- they have some of our technology. Do we believe they’re going to -- prepared to shoot this down?

GATES: Well, again, based on what I read in the newspapers, what the Japanese are saying is that the -- if that missile fails, and it looks like it’s going to drop debris on Japan, that they might take some action.

WALLACE: You’re basically discussing this, Mr. Secretary, as if it’s going to happen.

GATES: The launch?

WALLACE: Yeah.

GATES: I think it probably will.

WALLACE: And there’s nothing we can do about it?

GATES: Nope.

WALLACE: And what does that say to you?

GATES: Well, I would say we’re not prepared to do anything about it.

WALLACE: There are reports -- well, let me -- I want to stay with that. What does that say to you about the North Korean regime, that -- that we and the rest of the world can all say that this is -- you know, a provocative act, an unlawful act, and they thumb our noses and we’re not going to do anything about it?

GATES: Well, I think it’s very troubling. The reality is that the six-party talks really have not made any headway any time recently.

There has certainly been no -- if this is Kim Jong-il’s welcoming present to a new president, launching a missile like this and threatening to have a nuclear test, I think it says a lot about the imperviousness of this -- of this regime in North Korea to any kind of diplomatic overtures.

WALLACE: There are reports that the Obama White House has asked you to cut $2 billion from the next budget for missile defense, roughly 20 percent. Is this president less committed? Is he less convinced that this program will work than President Bush was?

GATES: Well, I don’t know about the comparison. I would say -- I would tell you that I have not received any specific requests from the White House in terms of our budget. We’ll be talking about that. We have the top line number.

We receive what we call a pass-back from the Office of Management and Budget, but I considered the suggestions that they made simply those, suggestions. I’ve taken some of them and some of them I haven’t.

WALLACE: But do you regard there is a new skepticism in the part of the White House towards missile defense?

GATES: I think that -- I think one of the things that we need to do is sit down and go through the capabilities that we have, the tests that we’ve been through, and -- and focus on where -- where we need to sustain development, where we need to sustain a commitment to have a capability.

WALLACE: So it sounds like that’s under review.

GATES: I think so.

WALLACE: There are so many trouble spots around the world, but I want to do a lightning round tour of the horizon. I know this is not your thing, Mr. Secretary, but let’s try to do quick questions, quick answers.

Iraq -- do you see any developments so far that might cause you to have to slow down President Obama’s time line to pull out of the major cities by this summer and to get our combat troops out by August of 2010?

GATES: I haven’t seen anything at this point that would lead me to think that there will be a need to change the time lines.

WALLACE: Iran -- you said recently -- you said recently that they are not close to a nuclear weapon. Admiral Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, says that they have enough material to make a bomb. Is there a contradiction there?

GATES: No. What they have is -- is probably enough low-enriched uranium from their centrifuges at Natanz to give them the capacity should they then enrich it more highly to proceed to make a weapon. They don’t have the capability at this point to enrich. We were suspicious they may be building one clandestinely.

We do not believe they are doing enriching beyond a low level at Natanz, and the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] is in there, so we will know if they tried to do that. So I guess the point -- the bridge between what Admiral Mullen said and what I’ve said is they do have enough low-enriched uranium that if they should then proceed to enrich it more highly, they could build a weapon.

WALLACE: You expressed, I think it would be fair to say, extreme skepticism about the ability of diplomacy to alter the behavior of the North Koreans. Do you feel the same way about the Iranians?

GATES: Well, I think -- I think, frankly, from my perspective the opportunity for success is probably more in economic sanctions in both places than it is in diplomacy.

Diplomacy -- perhaps if there is enough economic pressure placed on Iran, diplomacy can provide them an open door through which they can walk if they choose to change their policies, and so I think the two go hand in hand, but I think what gets them to the table is economic sanctions.

WALLACE: A couple of more questions for the lightning round. Mexico -- the Pentagon issued a report in November on the growing drug violence there that said this, “An unstable Mexico could represent a homeland security problem of immense proportions to the United States.”

Mr. Secretary, how likely is that scenario, that the Mexican government loses control of part of the country?

GATES: I don’t think that’s a likely scenario at this point. I think that a lot of the violence is -- is among or between the cartels as they strive for control of certain areas in Mexico.

I think President Calderon has acted with enormous courage and forcefully in sending troops in to try and get control of that situation.

And I think that -- as I think Admiral Blair testified just in the last couple of days, I think that the chances of the Mexican government losing control of some part of their country or becoming a failed state is -- are very low.

WALLACE: In January, White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs gave a one-word answer, “yes,” when asked if this president is going to end the policy of “don’t ask, don’t tell” for gays in the military.

Where does that stand? And why is there currently money in the 2010 budget to keep enforcing that policy?

GATES: Well, it continues to be the law. And any change in the policy would require a change in the law. We will follow the law, whatever it is.

That dialogue, though, has really not progressed very far at this point in the administration. I think the president and I feel like we’ve got a lot on our plates right now, and let’s push that one down the road a little bit.

WALLACE: And finally, and we have just a minute left, President Bush used to talk about the global war on terror. This administration, this White House, seems to steer away from that.

In fact, in his speech on Friday, President Obama talked about a campaign against extremism. Beyond the words, is there a strategic difference between the way these two presidents see the fight?

GATES: I think that they -- they both see Al Qaida as a threat to the United States, Al Qaida and its extremist allies. And I think they both have made clear their determination to go after it.

We have the opportunity now that perhaps we did not have before to apply the kind of resources, both military and civilian, against it and a broader kind of strategy that we did not have before.

WALLACE: But a difference between saying war on terror or campaign against extremism...

GATES: I think that’s people looking for differences where there are none.

WALLACE: Mr. Secretary, I want to thank you so much for coming in. We got through everything. Thank you. Please come back, sir.

GATES: My pleasure. Thank you.

Engaging Iran: Khatami in Australia, Calls for New Approach on Afghanistan

Geographically (but not politically) far away from the main arenas of US-Iranian relations, former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami (pictured) is touring Australia.

Speaking on Tuesday, Khatami's initial focus was the promotion of "global dialogue", the concept that he launched more than a decade ago in response to the notion of a "clash of civilizations". (Irfan Yusuf offers an interesting account.) He offered a general connection with the recent development in US-Iran relations, ""Let us not be worried about the big number of elusive politicians who are not yet prepared for dialogue. In an atmosphere of dialogue, neither side considers themselves as being in a position of power and would not speak from an upper position.

Khatami did address more specific matters, notably military intervention in Afghanistan.

Suggesting that Iran was pursuing a constructive approach to its neighbour through non-military programmes, he then urged Australia and other countries to withdraw their forces, as they were hindering rather than helping any solution:

A man who was very ugly, or a woman, I don't know, anyway someone, male or female, who was very ugly, cuddled a baby. Though he was cuddling the baby and saying nice things to the baby but the baby was more and more getting furious and crying. Someone came and told him, 'just leave the baby alone and he will be quiet. Your face is the real cause of this'.

So we see that some troops are coming all the way from the other side of the world there, in order to establish peace and security there. We tell them to just leave them alone, they would not cry any more.

Khatami faced challenging questions from the audience on human rights and Iran's position on Israel. The ABC News account cryptically notes, "Each question was handled delicately and with a determination not to inflame tensions," but a Brisbane newspaper provides Khatami's response: ""The ... Iranian nation has always looked forward to co-existing with different nations around the world."

Khatami also took on the nuclear question with a general reference to Iran and Israel, telling The Age:

If there is a real concern about proliferation, we have to tackle the problem of these countries right now having nuclear arms in the region, not putting pressure on a country that doesn't have such intention and there is no strategy of having nuclear weapons.

(Hat tip to Jinjirrie for the leads on this story.)

Iran Responds to Obama New Year Message

Related Post: Three Degrees Of Engagement - The Obama Message To Iran

Earlier today, we projected a three-step process to interpret the course of "engagement" raised by President Obama's message to the Iranian people and leaders. Specifically, we cautioned:

"Obama’s message raises the prospect of a genuine negotiation, yet the pointed challenge to Iranian leaders to show that they are peaceful also indicates that Washington wants the higher ground from the start of talks. In itself, that general position is to be expected. It is also to be expected, however, that Iran will portray itself as the peaceful party and ask the US to mend its past ways.

Well, Step 2 --- Iran Responds --- is following that script exactly:

Aliakbar Javanfekr, an aide to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, said Iran welcomed "the interest of the American government to settle differences".

But he said that the US government "should realise its previous mistakes and make an effort to amend them".

Meanwhile, Iranian energy minister, Parviz Fattah, was telling the World Water Forum that Tehran would "finish and operate" the Bushehr nuclear plant by the end of the year: "Iran has chosen a direction for achieving peaceful nuclear energy. We have mainly reached this aim."

All very expected: on the one hand, Iran is welcoming the prospect of talks with the US. On the other hand, it is setting out clear lines that it does not want crossed --- specifically, Iranian sovereignty over a nuclear energy programme.

So, within 24 hours, on to Step 3: "What is important is that Washington does not follow Obama’s message by trying to box Iran in on issues such as the nuclear programme, Israel-Palestine, Lebanon, and general relations with the Arab world."

A Modest Proposal to Engage Iran

Amidst all the bluster and misinformation surrounding the issue of US-Iranian relations, a clear, concise proposal is always striking. Replying to his fellow Foreign Policy blogger Dan Drezner, who failed to distinguish between a nuclear energy programme and a nuclear weapons programme, Stephen Walt offered this suggestion:

A realistic approach to Iran's nuclear program

At this point I don't think it is possible to persuade Iran to give up full control of the nuclear fuel cycle. They've committed a lot of money and prestige to acquiring this capacity, the program is popular domestically, and it is legal within the confines of the NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty]. So if our bottom line is for them to abandon enrichment, etc., we're almost certainly going to fail.

Our goal, instead, should be to convince Iran that it is better off not developing nuclear weapons, because that’s the issue we really care about.

This means not enriching uranium to weapons grade, not reprocessing spent reactor fuel to extract bomb-making material, and not building or testing an actual device. Obviously, Iran would have to agree to sufficiently thorough inspections to ensure compliance.

I don’t know if it's possible to achieve this goal, but here's how I'd try.

First and foremost, the United States has to take the threat of military force and regime change off the table. Why? Because that's the main reason why Iran might like a nuclear deterrent in the first place. From Tehran's perspective, they have three nuclear powers in their neighborhood (Pakistan, India, and Israel), and U.S. troops on two sides (in Iraq and Afghanistan). U.S. naval forces patrol the Iranian Sea and Persian Gulf, and it is the stated policy of the U.S. government -- the world's strongest military power -- to seek the removal of the current Iranian regime. Indeed, we are reportedly engaged in various covert operations there already. Iranians can see that Saddam Hussein is dead and buried but Kim Jong Il is not, and they know one of the reasons why. They also know that Muammar al-Qaddafi agreed to give up his own WMD programs only after the Bush administration agreed not to try to overthrow him. Under these circumstances, it would be surprising if Iran wasn't interested in its own deterrent.

This means that the Obama administration's likely approach ("bigger carrots and bigger sticks," as outlined by special envoy Dennis Ross) is wrong-headed. We may need to think up different inducements, but bigger sticks (e.g., stronger sanctions) sends the wrong message, and repeated statements that military force is still "on the table" only gives Tehran additional incentive to master the full fuel cycle and then proceed to weaponize. If we are serious about diplomacy (and not simply looking for a pretext to use force later), Step 1 has to be reducing Iran's perceived need for a deterrent capability of its own. And as a number of Iran experts have already argued, the best way to do that is to pursue a comprehensive settlement of the key security issues that presently divide us.

Second, we need to explain to Iran that possessing a known nuclear weapons capability is not without its own costs and risks. Today, if a terrorist group somehow obtained a nuclear weapon and then used it, we would not suspect Iran of having provided it and they would face little risk of retaliation. Why not? Because we know they don’t have any weapons right now. But imagine how we might react a decade hence, if we knew that Iran had built a few nuclear weapons and some terrorist group whose agenda was somewhat similar to Iran's managed to explode a bomb somewhere in the world, or even on American soil? Under those terrible circumstances, Tehran would have to worry a lot about U.S. retaliation, even if it had nothing whatsoever to do with the attack. Nuclear forensics is hardly perfect (or so my physicist colleagues tell me) and the United States has been known to shoot first and ask questions later in the past. (I'd remind Iranian officials that former Deputy Sec/Def Paul Wolfowitz recommended attacking Iraq less than a week after 9/11, and we eventually did invade that country, even though it had no WMD and had nothing to do with al Qaeda's attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon). So Iran should not be confident that we'd act with precision and restraint in the aftermath of a nuclear terrorist attack, and that concern ought to give them pause about whether joining the nuclear weapons club is a net plus.

I'd also point out to them that acquiring nuclear weapons will encourage other states in the Middle East to follow suit. Given that Iran has a lot more latent power potential than its neighbors in the Gulf, it should prefer to confine the competition there to the conventional realm, where its larger population and considerable economic potential will inevitably give it considerable influence.

Thus, from a purely realist perspective, Iran might actually be better off with the "Japan option": possessing the latent capability to build nuclear weapons if circumstances required, but avoiding the costs and risks by refraining from exercising that option. If we want to convince Tehran to forego nuclear weapons, therefore, our diplomatic efforts ought to focus on explaining this situation to our Iranian counterparts, instead of merely brandishing bigger sticks or waving bigger carrots.

It is impossible to know if this strategy would work, but it is worth remembering that as far as we know, Iran has no nuclear weapons program today. Iran has signaled on several occasions since 9/11 that it was interested in a negotiated settlement with the United States. There have also been several other moments when the two states managed to cooperate in more limited ways. And if diplomacy doesn't succeed, the United States and its allies in the region can always fall back on deterrence. By saying that the United States should "non-violently" prepare for an Iranian nuclear weapons capability, I take it that Drezner recognizes that preventive war won't solve this problem and could easily make a lot of other problems worse. We've deterred bigger and tougher adversaries in the past, and while I'd strongly prefer that Iran decide not to become a nuclear weapons state, I'm not going to panic if it does cross that line at some point down the road. And neither should anyone else.

Coming Next in the Intelligence-Policy Battle: Iran's Uranium

Related Post: How Israel Limits US Foreign Policy
Related Post: Charles Freeman’s Letter Withdrawing His Nomination
Related Post: Charles Freeman’s Speech on the Middle East and Israel


The Director of National Intelligence, Dennis Blair (pictured) ---- on the same day that the Obama Administration had to withdraw the nomination of Charles Freeman as Chair of the National Intelligence Council --- has just set the scene for another political battle in Washington.

Blair told the Senate Armed Services Committee yesterday:

The overall situation -- and the intelligence community agrees on this -- [is] that Iran has not decided to press forward . . . to have a nuclear weapon on top of a ballistic missile. Our current estimate is that the minimum time at which Iran could technically produce the amount of highly enriched uranium for a single weapon is 2010 to 2015.

Blair's assertion that Israel was envisaging a "worst-case scenario" about Iranian plans for nuclear energy was echoed by the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General Michael Maples, "The Israelis are far more concerned about [the Iranian programme]."

With his testimony, Blair is both reinforcing and clarifying his statements, made to Congress in January, about Iran's nuclear capabilities. On that occasion, he hedged on the clear statement by the US intelligence services that it had no evidence that Iran had resumed an nuclear weapons programme, which Washington claimed had been started but suspended in 2003.

This time, Blair made no qualifications. So don't be surprised if, after the forced withdrawal of Charles Freeman's nomination, there is another battle between between Congress and the US intelligence services.

The Obama Administration lost Round One (some would say "caved in"). Does it dare lose Round Two?