Concerns Over Mr Obama's War in Pakistan: Will It Assist the Insurgency?

Most of the US media are still caught up in euphoria over the proposed Obama strategy on Afghanistan and Pakistan, concentrating on the headlines of expanded US military presence, aid, and civilian participation instead of considering how local groups and communities will responded to an increased American intervention.

Once again, Gareth Porter --- who chronicled the internal Obama Administration debates over the strategy --- offers a different perspective. Writing for Inter Press Service, He lays out the concerns of those who think that expanded US strikes on northwest Pakistan will enhance, rather than diminish, the position of Al Qa'eda and local insurgents.

Some Strategists Cast Doubt on Afghan War Rationale

The argument for deeper U.S. military commitment to the Afghan War invoked by President Barack Obama in his first major policy statement on Afghanistan and Pakistan Friday - that al Qaeda must be denied a safe haven in Afghanistan - has been not been subjected to public debate in Washington.

A few influential strategists here have been arguing, however, that this official rationale misstates the al Qaeda problem and ignores the serious risk that an escalating U.S. war poses to Pakistan.

Those strategists doubt that al Qaeda would seek to move into Afghanistan as long as they are ensconced in Pakistan and argue that escalating U.S. drone airstrikes or Special Operations raids on Taliban targets in Pakistan will actually strengthen radical jihadi groups in the country and weaken the Pakistani government’s ability to resist them.

The first military strategist to go on record with such a dissenting view on Afghanistan and Pakistan was Col. T. X. Hammes, a retired Marine officer and author of the 2004 book "The Sling and the Stone", which argued that the U.S. military faces a new type of warfare which it would continue to lose if it did not radically reorient its thinking. He became more widely known as one of the first military officers to call in September 2006 for Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s resignation over failures in Iraq.

Col. Hammes dissected the rationale for the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan in an article last September on the website of the "Small Wars Journal", which specialises in counterinsurgency issues. He questioned the argument that Afghanistan had to be stabilised in order to deny al Qaeda a terrorist base there, because, "Unfortunately, al Qaeda has moved its forces and its bases into Pakistan."

Hammes suggested that the Afghan War might actually undermine the tenuous stability of a Pakistani regime, thus making the al Qaeda threat far more serious. He complained that "neither candidate has even commented on how our actions [in Afghanistan] may be feeding Pakistan’s instability."

Hammes, who has since joined the Institute for Defence Analysis, a Pentagon contractor, declined to comment on the Obama administration’s rationale for the Afghan War for this article.

Kenneth Pollack, the director of research at the Saban Centre for Middle East Policy of the Brookings Institution, has also expressed doubt about the official argument for escalation in Afghanistan. Pollack’s 2002 book, "The Threatening Storm," was important in persuading opinion-makers in Washington to support the Bush administration’s use of U.S. military force against the Saddam Hussein regime, and he remains an enthusiastic supporter of the U.S. military presence in Iraq.

But at a Brookings forum Dec. 16, Pollack expressed serious doubts about the strategic rationale for committing the U.S. military to Afghanistan. Contrasting the case for war in Afghanistan with the one for war in Iraq in 2003, he said, it is "much harder to see the tie between Afghanistan and our vital interests."

Like Hammes, Pollack argued that it is Pakistan, where al Qaeda’s leadership has flourished since being ejected from Afghanistan, which could clearly affect those vital interests. And additional U.S. troops in Afghanistan, Pollack pointed out, "are not going to solve the problems of Pakistan."

Responding to a question about the possibility of U.S. attacks against Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan paralleling the U.S. efforts during the Vietnam War to clean out the Communist "sanctuaries" in Cambodia, Pollack expressed concern about that possibility. "The more we put the troops into Afghanistan," said Pollack, "the more we are tempted to mount cross-border operations into Pakistan, exactly as we did in Vietnam."

Pollack cast doubt on the use of either drone bombing attacks or Special Operations commando raids into Pakistan as an approach to dealing with the Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan. "The only way to do it is to mount a full-scale counterinsurgency campaign," said Pollack, "which seems unlikely in the case of Pakistan."

The concern raised by Hammes and Pollack about the war in Afghanistan spilling over into Pakistan paralleled concerns in the U.S. intelligence community about the effect on Pakistan of commando raids by U.S. Special Operations forces based in Afghanistan against targets inside Pakistan. In mid-August 2008, the National Intelligence Council presented to the White House the consensus view of the intelligence community that such Special Forces raids, which were then under consideration, could threaten the unity of the Pakistani military if continued long enough, as IPS reported Sep. 9.

Despite that warning, a commando raid was carried out on a target in South Waziristan Sep. 3, reportedly killing as many as 20 people, mostly apparently civilians. A Pentagon official told Army Times reporter Sean D. Naylor that the raid was in response to cross-border activities by Taliban allies with the complicity of the Pakistani military’s Frontier Corps.

Although that raid was supposed to be the beginning of a longer campaign, it was halted because of the virulence of the political backlash in Pakistan that followed, according to Naylor’s Sep. 29 report. The raid represented "a strategic miscalculation," one U.S. official told Naylor. "We did not fully appreciate the vehemence of the Pakistani response."

The Pakistani military sent a strong message to Washington by demonstrating that they were willing to close down U.S. supply routes through the Khyber Pass talking about shooting at U.S. helicopters.

The commando raids were put on hold for the time being, but the issue of resuming them was part of the Obama administration’s policy review. That aspect of the review has not been revealed.

Meanwhile airstrikes by drone aircraft in Pakistan have sharply increased in recent months, increasingly targeting Pashtun allies of the Taliban.

Last week, apparently anticipating one result of the policy review, the New York Times reported Obama and his national security advisers were considering expanding the strikes by drone aircraft from the Tribal areas of Northwest Pakistan to Quetta, Baluchistan, where top Taliban leaders are known to be located.

But Daniel Byman, a former CIA analyst and counter-terrorism policy specialist at Georgetown University, who has been research director on the Middle East at the RAND corporation, told the Times that, if drone attacks were expanded as is now being contemplated, al Qaeda and other jihadist organisations might move "farther and farther into Pakistan, into cities".

Byman believes that would risk "weakening the government we want to bolster", which he says is "already to some degree a house of cards." The Times report suggested that some officials in the administration agree with Byman’s assessment.

The drone strikes are admitted by U.S. officials to be so unpopular with the Pakistani public that no Pakistani government can afford to appear to tolerate them, the Times reported.

But such dissenting views as those voiced by Hammes, Pollack and Byman are unknown on Capital Hill. At a hearing on Afghanistan before a subcommittee of the House Government Operations Committee Thursday, the four witnesses were all enthusiastic supporters of escalation, and the argument that U.S. troops must fight to prevent al Qaeda from getting a new sanctuary in Afghanistan never even came up for discussion.

The Freeman Case and US Foreign Policy: Don't Say "Israel". Or "Lobby".

Two days after the withdrawal of the nomination of Charles Freeman as head of the National Intelligence Council, primarily because of his views on the Middle East and specifically the Israel-Palestine situation, the unspeakable is being spoken:

Was it the "Israel lobby" that bumped him off?

And as breath-taking as that question might appear, even more breath-taking are the evasions to tuck that question back in a box in a very dark place.

To be fair, both The New York Times and The Washington Post offer consideration of the reasons for Freeman's demise. In the Times, Mark Mazzetti and Helene Cooper assert, "Israel Stance Was Undoing of Nominee for Intelligence Post" while Walter Pincus in the Post notes "a debate over whether powerful pro-Israel lobbying interests are exercising outsize influence over who serves in the Obama administration".

Even in these stories, there is some tiptoeing. Pincus, for example, says, "a handful of pro-Israeli bloggers and employees of other organizations worked behind the scenes" against Freeman. Anyone paying even cursory attention to blogs, Internet chatter, and the pages of key journals like the Weekly Standard and The New Republic from mid-February, just before Freeman's nomination was public, knows that this was a very large handful.

Pincus also offers the official disclaimer of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) that it "took no position on this matter and did not lobby the Hill on it," before letting us in on the open secret: AIPPAC spokesman Josh Block "responded to reporters' questions and provided critical material about Freeman, albeit always on background, meaning his comments could not be attributed to him".

If Pincus was being direct, he would note that this was precisely the strategy of the Dump Freeman campaign: if AIPAC and other pro-Israeli lobbyists were seen as openly sabotaging the nominee, they would have been accused of political intervention. Instead, with "private" bloggers and editorial-page scribblers cherry-picking from Freeman's career, notably his 1999 e-mail on Tiananmen Square, distorting his remarks about the Middle East, and on occasion labelling one of his supporters as a "pederast", the Congressmen who eventually took Freeman down could see they were merely reflecting the legitimate concerns of individual constituents.

Mazzetti and Cooper are much better in reporting the developments without hesitation:

The lobbying campaign against Mr. Freeman included telephone calls to the White House from prominent lawmakers, including Senator Charles E. Schumer, the New York Democrat. It appears to have been kicked off three weeks ago in a blog post by Steven J. Rosen, a former top official of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, a pro-Israel lobbying group.

On the Middle East, Mr. Rosen wrote, Mr. Freeman’s views are “what you would expect in the Saudi Foreign Ministry,” rather than from someone who would become essentially the government’s top intelligence analyst....

Pro-Israel groups weighed in with lower-ranking White House officials. The Zionist Organization of America sent out an “action alert” urging members to ask Congress for an investigation of Mr. Freeman’s “past and current activities on behalf of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.”

Unfortunately, such revelations raise the uncomfortable prospect that any Government nominee holding views that are unacceptable to staunch supporters of Israeli policy will be blacklisted. So some of the gatekeepers of Washington knowledge are furiously trying to sweep the story away.

Foreign Policy blogger David Rothkopf, motivated primarily by hatred of Stephen Walt, the leading proponent of the "Israel Lobby" thesis, snaps:

My problem comes with the implication that those who support Israel are necessarily twisted by dual loyalties into positions that undermine the interests of the United States.

Walt made no such implication in his analysis, which we posted earlier today. There was no reference to "dual loyalties", with its insinuation of un-American activity; rather, Walt contended that those opposing Freeman equated US interests with "unconditional support" of Tel Aviv. This, he argued, would cause "further erosion in America’s position in the Middle East, and more troubles for Israel as well" (an argument that Freeman has also made).

Of course, one can challenge Walt's contention that a detachment of US policy from its current backing of Israel would be beneficial to American interests. This, however, is not the aim of Rothkopf's distortion. It is a double distraction, both from meaningful consideration of the attack politics in the Freeman case and from a wider analysis of the US-Israeli relationship.

Still, for chutzpah, Rothkopf is outdone by his Foreign Policy colleague, Dan Drezner. Drezner flees from reality by making up motives for Freeman: "He was not all that eager to re-enter government life." To be blunt, Chaz wasn't tough enough; in fact, he wasn't even as tough as a girl: "If Hillary Clinton had been in the same situation as Freeman, there's no way in hell that she withdraws her name."

So there you have it. No need to worry that this incident, with all its real (rather than Rothkopf-ian) implications for US foreign policy and intelligence, has anything to do with the manoeuvrings of those opposed to any interrogation of the American position on Israel.

It's all down to Stephen Walt's lack of scruples and Charles Freeman's lack of cojones.

The US, Israel, and Charles Freeman: "A Chilling Effect" on Foreign Policy

One of the sharpest, strongest reactions to the withdrawal of the nomination of Charles Freeman (pictured) as head of the US National Intelligence Council has come from Stephen Walt in his blog on the Foreign Policy website. I generally share his views, but a reader offers further useful critique: "All good points, but a bit polemical. You know how this game works: I don't think Walt does Freeman any favours by framing the appointment as a victory over Zionists or as a balance to [the appointment of the State Department's Dennis] Ross. It would have been better to explain why Freeman was a worthy choice in the first place with his other experience and ability."

On Chas Freeman's withdrawal
STEPHEN WALT

First, for all of you out there who may have questioned whether there was a powerful "Israel lobby," or who admitted that it existed but didn't think it had much influence, or who thought that the real problem was some supposedly all-powerful "Saudi lobby," think again.

Second, this incident does not speak well for Barack Obama's principles, or even his political instincts. It is one thing to pander to various special interest groups while you're running for office -- everyone expects that sort of thing -- but it's another thing to let a group of bullies push you around in the first fifty days of your administration. But as Ben Smith noted in Politico, it's entirely consistent with most of Obama's behavior on this issue.

The decision to toss Freeman over the side tells the lobby (and others) that it doesn't have to worry about Barack getting tough with [past and future Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu, or even that he’s willing to fight hard for his own people. Although AIPAC [American-Israeli Political Action Committee] has issued a pro forma denial that it had anything to do with it, well-placed friends in Washington have told me that it leaned hard on some key senators behind-the-scenes and is now bragging that Obama is a "pushover." Bottom line: Caving on Freeman was a blunder that could come back to haunt any subsequent effort to address the deteriorating situation in the region.

Third, and related to my second point, this incident reinforces my suspicion that the Democratic Party is in fact a party of wimps. I'm not talking about Congress, which has been in thrall to the lobby for decades, but about the new team in the Executive Branch. Don't they understand that you have to start your term in office by making it clear that people will pay a price if they cross you? Barack Obama won an historic election and has a clear mandate for change -- and that includes rethinking our failed Middle East policy -- and yet he wouldn't defend an appointment that didn't even require Senate confirmation. Why? See point No.1 above.

Of course, it's possible that I'm wrong here, and that Obama's team was actually being clever. Freeman's critics had to expend a lot of ammunition to kill a single appointment to what is ultimately not a direct policy-making position, and they undoubtedly ticked off a lot of people by doing so. When the real policy fights begin -- over the actual content of the NIEs [National Intelligence Estimates], over attacking Iran, and over the peace process itself -- they aren't likely to get much sympathy from [Director of National Intelligence Dennis] Blair and it is least conceivable that Obama will turn to them and say, "look, I gave you one early on, but now I'm going to do what's right for America." I don't really believe that will happen, but I'll be delighted if Obama proves me wrong.

Fourth, the worst aspect of the Freeman affair is the likelihood of a chilling effect on discourse in Washington, at precisely the time when we badly need a more open and wide-ranging discussion of our Middle East policy. As I noted earlier, this was one of the main reasons why the lobby went after Freeman so vehemently; in an era where more and more people are questioning Israel's behavior and questioning the merits of unconditional U.S. support, its hardline defenders felt they simply had to reinforce the de facto ban on honest discourse inside the Beltway. After forty-plus years of occupation, two wars in Lebanon, and the latest pummeling of Gaza, (not to mention [Israeli Prime Minister] Ehud Olmert's own comparison of Israel with South Africa), defenders of the "special relationship" can't win on facts and logic anymore. So they have to rely on raw political muscle and the silencing or marginalization of those with whom they disagree. In the short term, Freeman's fate is intended to send the message that if you want to move up in Washington, you had better make damn sure that nobody even suspects you might be an independent thinker on these issues.

This outcome is bad for everyone, including Israel. It means that policy debates in the United States will continue to be narrower than in other countries (including Israel itself), public discourse will be equally biased, and a lot of self-censorship will go on. America's Middle East policy will remain stuck in the same familiar rut, and even a well-intentioned individual like George Mitchell won't be able to bring the full weight of our influence to bear. At a time when Israel badly needs honest advice, nobody in Washington is going to offer it, lest they face the wrath of the same foolish ideologues who targeted Freeman. The likely result is further erosion in America's position in the Middle East, and more troubles for Israel as well.

Yet to those who defended Freeman’s appointment and challenged the lobby's smear campaign, I offer a fifth observation: do not lose heart. The silver lining in this sorry episode is that it was abundantly clear to everyone what was going on and who was behind it. In the past, the lobby was able to derail appointments quietly -- even pre-emptively -- but this fight took place in broad daylight. And Steve Rosen [of AIPAC], one of Freeman's chief tormentors, once admitted: "a lobby is like a night flower. It thrives in the dark and dies in the sun." Slowly, the light is dawning and the lobby's negative influence is becoming more and more apparent, even if relatively few people have the guts to say so out loud.  But history will not be kind to the likes of [Senator] Charles Schumer, Jonathan Chait [of the New Republic], Steve Rosen et al, whose hidebound views are unintentionally undermining both U.S. and Israeli security.

Last but not least, I cannot help but be struck by how little confidence Freeman's critics seem to have in Israel itself. Apparently they believe that a country that recently celebrated its 60th birthday, whose per capita income ranks 29th in the world, that has several hundred nuclear weapons, and a military that is able to inflict more than 1,300 deaths on helpless Palestinians in a couple of weeks without much effort will nonetheless be at risk if someone who has criticized some Israeli policies (while defending its existence) were to chair the National Intelligence Council. The sad truth is that these individuals are deathly afraid of honest discourse here in the United States because deep down, they believe Israel cannot survive if it isn't umbilically attached to the United States. The irony is that people like me have more confidence in Israel than they do: I think Israel can survive and prosper if it has a normal relationship with the United States instead of "special" one. Indeed, I think a more normal relationship would be better for both countries. It appears they aren't so sure, and that is why they went after Charles Freeman.

How Israel Limits US Foreign Policy: The Not-so-Curious Case of Charles Freeman

Related Post: Charles Freeman’s Letter Withdrawing His Nomination
Related Post: Charles Freeman’s Speech on the Middle East and Israel (October 2006)
Related Post: Coming Next in the Intelligence-Policy Battle - Iran’s Uranium

For many people, this story will never be known. They will not have heard of the American diplomat, Charles Freeman, or the National Intelligence Council, which he was nominated to lead. The withdrawal of that nomination yesterday will not make CNN Headline News or the front pages of US newspapers.

Make no mistake, however. As a story of how US foreign policy is limited and re-structured --- courtesy of Congress, a network of private groups, and American political culture --- it offers an essential lesson. "Israel" continues to set limits on the "acceptable" in US foreign policy.

Charles Freeman has moved between US Government posts, beginning in the State Department, and influential think tanks for more than 40 years. He was posted in China and China, worked as the lead official for African affairs, and was Ambassador to Saudi Arabia from 1989 to 1992. He moved to the Pentagon in 1993, as Assistant Secretary of Defense. He has been involved with Institute for National Strategic Studies and the United States Institute for Peace and served as President of the Middle East Policy Council.

In short, when it comes to the US and global affairs, Freeman is at the forefront of officials with experience and expertise. So, when he was nominated to lead the National Intelligence Council, a body created in DATE to co-ordinate and assess the intelligence gathered by US agencies, it looked like a shrewd choice.

Only one not-so-problem: for many concerned that Washington maintain the "right" position on Israel, Freeman was on the wrong side of the line. His long service in Arab countries and his work with the Middle East Policy Center, which receives money from the Saudi Government, made him a suspect. So did Freeman's diplomatic and analytic approach, to which you can give the general label of "realism", which did not start from the assumption for US foreign policy of a strategic reliance upon, and a cultural alliance with, Israel in the region.

Within days of the nomination, the chatter against Freeman's selection began on the Internet. It was taken up as a cause by magazines such as the Weekly Standard, looking for a bit of payback after its promotion of the overseas disasters of the Bush years, and the staunchly pro-Israel New Republic.

By the start of March, the campaign was given further legitimacy by a featured opinion piece, written by the New Republic's Jon Chait, in the Washington Post: "The contretemps over Freeman's view of Israel misses the broader problem, which is that he's an ideological fanatic....Realists are the mirror image of neoconservatives in that they are completely blind to the moral dimensions of international politics."

The irony at the heart of the campaign, highlighted by Chait, was that it often did not mention Freeman's position on Arab-Israeli issues. Instead, there was a wild, flailing assault upon "realism", which somehow had become the real danger in US foreign policy, and the highlighting of one incident in Freeman's long career. In 1999, he sent an e-mail to a discussion list about the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre:

[T]he truly unforgivable mistake of the Chinese authorities was the failure to intervene on a timely basis to nip the demonstrations in the bud, rather than -- as would have been both wise and efficacious -- to intervene with force when all other measures had failed to restore domestic tranquility to Beijing and other major urban centers in China.

That judgement may appear cold-blooded, but it is a practical assessment: had the Chinese Government acted at the start of the crisis, it might not have had to put down a very heavy fist when the demonstrations threatened its stability. Fewer lives would have been lost, and political reform could have proceeded with the small but gradual measures being taken by the ruling Communisty Party.

Freeman's analysis does raise serious and troubling issues, particularly when he slipped into his own normative judgement --- "I do not believe it is acceptable for any country to allow the heart of its national capital to be occupied by dissidents intent on disrupting the normal functions of government." The narrow but important point, however, is that the serious and troubling dilemma he highlights has to be confronted. The promotion of human rights confronts the reality that ruling authorities, backed by police and military power, will invoke "order".

The wider point is that Freeman was not nominated for the National Intelligence Council to cast moral judgements. The NIC's function is not to make policy prescriptions but to offer a collaborative assessment of intelligence, thus avoiding disasters such as Iraq 2002/2003, for both short-term and long-term issues. Moral judgement is not, and should not be, in the NIC's remit.

The widest point, however, is that the China incident was always a diversion. Instead, it is that Freeman's position at the NIC threatened an assessment of Middle Eastern issues which did not begin from a founding assumption --- often a very "moral" assumption --- of support for Israel. Assessment might throw up complexities, highlight difficulties of an unchanging course on issues from Palestine to Iran to Syria. It might lead to debate amongst policymakers on those complexities.

There will be no debate, at least drawing upon the analysis of a Freeman-led NIC. Seven Republican members of Congressional committees on intelligence, using the China pretext and the "financial irregularities" of Saudi money behind the Middle East Policy Centre, came out yesterday in opposition to Freeman. The Obama Administration didn't fancy a fight, especially as it could complicate any initiatives that it might pursue now or later in the Middle East, so Director of National Dennis Blair withdrew Freeman's name.

Between 2001 and 2003, many of the State Department's Arabists were pushed out the door because their expertise was an unwelcome hindrance to the Bush Administration's plans on Iraq and the Middle East. The intelligence services saw their information and assessments skewed to fit political agendas, with their agencies taking the blame when the Administration's "intelligence" --- for example, on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction --- was proved wrong. The Obama Administration had tried to promote a revived intelligence community, for example, through the highlighting of Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair and indeed Freeman's selection, and the raising of the State Department's profile (and spirits) under Hillary Clinton.

What it has just learned, if it didn't sense this already, is that such ambitions --- and indeed the policies beyond them --- have to accept the limits set by "Israel".

Coming Next in the Intelligence-Policy Battle: Iran's Uranium

Related Post: How Israel Limits US Foreign Policy
Related Post: Charles Freeman’s Letter Withdrawing His Nomination
Related Post: Charles Freeman’s Speech on the Middle East and Israel


The Director of National Intelligence, Dennis Blair (pictured) ---- on the same day that the Obama Administration had to withdraw the nomination of Charles Freeman as Chair of the National Intelligence Council --- has just set the scene for another political battle in Washington.

Blair told the Senate Armed Services Committee yesterday:

The overall situation -- and the intelligence community agrees on this -- [is] that Iran has not decided to press forward . . . to have a nuclear weapon on top of a ballistic missile. Our current estimate is that the minimum time at which Iran could technically produce the amount of highly enriched uranium for a single weapon is 2010 to 2015.

Blair's assertion that Israel was envisaging a "worst-case scenario" about Iranian plans for nuclear energy was echoed by the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General Michael Maples, "The Israelis are far more concerned about [the Iranian programme]."

With his testimony, Blair is both reinforcing and clarifying his statements, made to Congress in January, about Iran's nuclear capabilities. On that occasion, he hedged on the clear statement by the US intelligence services that it had no evidence that Iran had resumed an nuclear weapons programme, which Washington claimed had been started but suspended in 2003.

This time, Blair made no qualifications. So don't be surprised if, after the forced withdrawal of Charles Freeman's nomination, there is another battle between between Congress and the US intelligence services.

The Obama Administration lost Round One (some would say "caved in"). Does it dare lose Round Two?