The Truth About Mr Obama's Thriving Missile Defense (Futter)

Andrew Futter, a doctoral researcher at the University of Birmingham, writes for EA:

If you listen to conservative defence commentators such as Frank Gaffney Jr., John R Bolton, or Baker Spring, you would be forgiven for thinking that the American effort to protect itself against the threat from ballistic missile attack has suffered a significant recalibration, relegation, and de-emphasis over the last year or so. Indeed even if you listen to much of the analysis from more liberal commentators, you would be excused from believing that at the very least that the US missile defence programme has been "rationalized" and is now more "prudent".

Perhaps this is even what the Obama administration, so hung up on the idea of change, wants us to think. But the reality, I would argue, is quite different. Under Obama the American quest for ballistic missile defence has continued, been strengthened, and looks set to remain at the forefront of US security and non-proliferation policy well into the future.


Much of the confusion over missile defence has been caused by a misunderstanding about Obama’s decision to cancel the Bush Administration’s "third site" plan for missile defence in Europe, and some of the blame for this must rest with the President himself. By focusing attention on the "cancellation" of the plan set for Poland and the Czech Republic, and by making the announcement on the 70th anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Poland, the real reasons for the change of plan, and indeed the specifics of what replaces it, have been largely overlooked (even to some extent by Russia).

A closer reading of the "Phased, Adaptive Approach" (PAA) to BMD in Europe reveals a plan which has the potential to be more comprehensive, to involve more assets, and to become active far quicker than anything entertained by the Bush administration. Although the assets which will begin being deployed in 2011 will focus on short-range missile threats to only a small part of Southeastern Europe, by 2020 the system will involve hundreds of interceptor missiles on land and at sea, and it will have the capacity to protect the whole of Europe and the US against an Iranian long-range missile threat. It is entirely conceivable therefore that the new plan will present a far greater impediment on the road to better and more fruitful relations with Russia, and a substantial commitment to a continuing US role in the defence of Europe.

A similarly close reading of the recently released Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report suggests that the PAA in Europe is destined to become the model for US BMD policy in other parts of the world, notably East Asia and the Greater Middle East, but also potentially in any region of the world w,here the missile threat necessitates. Perhaps most importantly this renewed focus on regional or "theatre" missile defences has occurred because the Obama administration feels that the 30 ground-based interceptor missiles already operational in the US are sufficient to combat the current rogue state long-range missile threat, and not instead of it.

The Review also highlights strengthening and expanding international cooperation on BMD as a fundamental goal of the Obama administration; to this end, significant amounts of money have been requested for joint BMD development programmes with NATO, Japan, and Israel amongst others. Perhaps even more revealing is the fact that the Review makes it clear that the Obama administration will strongly reject any Russian (or Chinese) proposals to link US BMD activities and expansion to arms control (START) or any other strategic discussions (Iran?).

All this suggests that under Obama the BMD programme is alive, well, and indeed thriving, and that there is much evidence suggesting that its importance will increase rather than decrease in the near future. In fact I would suggest we might entering a period --– especially considering the renewed drive and energy behind nuclear disarmament and abolition –-- where missile defences play a greater role in US extended deterrence in Europe, the Middle East and East Asia, replacing the ‘nuclear umbrella’ which has predominated for decades.

Less than eight years after the abrogation of the ABM Treaty, which prohibited strategic defences, and despite what seems to have become "conventional wisdom", it is quite conceivable that we are entering a period where missile defences have become an accepted, normalized and perhaps even integral component of both US and wider international security thinking. It is hard to see this abating.

Comments

[Catherine]

RE: "Although the assets which will begin being deployed in 2011 will focus on short-range missile threats to only a small part of Southeastern Europe, by 2020 the system will involve hundreds of interceptor missiles on land and at sea, and it will have the capacity to protect the whole of Europe and the US against an Iranian long-range missile threat. "

You don't mention where the assets will be deployed. Do you mean in Romania?
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/europe/2010/02/201024173236190795.html

Why aren't the Russians balking more at this right now?

[Andrew]

The Russians also seem to have taken time to realize the extent of the plan - owing partly to the way it was announced - but I think they are starting to understand it better now. In fact they are I think trying to link limitations in the plan to the current START talks which is yet another reason why they are proving so difficult to agree.

As for where the missiles will be placed, some will be at Sea in the Med (also in the Gulf), Poland is scheduled for 2018, bulgaria and romania seem likely to host assets in 2015. Could also be somewhere else in Northern Europe and possibly somewhere like Turkey. Of course its not impossible, but I think unlikely that Russia might offer radar facilities too.

[Catherine]

Andrew,
Thanks for you r reply. RE "Of course its not impossible, but I think unlikely that Russia might offer radar facilities too."

They already did back in 2007. Russia proposed to the Bush administration sharing the radar installation Russia has leased in Gabala, Azerbaijan since 1991 as an attempt to try to head off US plans to install the now-"cancelled" anti-ballistic missile system in Poland and the Czech Republic. I use quotes because as we've know for quite some time, the Obama admin has just repackaged it and changed the installation locations. Your article shows to what extent the plans have actually been expanded.

Bush did not follow up on the offer. The Obama admin. was said to be considering the offer - reissued by Putin - again last July. While the US was looking at the Russian offer as an addition, Moscow was looking at Gabala as a complete alternative to the US plans in the Czech Republic and Poland. Now that the BMD programme is to be greatly expanded, will Russia bring up the idea of sharing radar facilities up again to the US?

[Andrew]

Hi Catherine,
I guess what I mean is the unlikely possibility that such a situation might actually materialise. The US and Russia have been discussing various types of BMD cooperation at least since 1992, and very little progress has made made in this time.

It isn't just technologically that problems exists- though the compatability of US-Russian technologies is a significant barrier, but also politically and strategically. Anti-BMD rhetoric remains a key tool of the governing elites in Russia, and along with 'NATO expansion' is often invoked for largely domestic purposes. On top of this the US and Russians simply don't trust each other - you can see this by the time it has taken to agree the START replacement treaty - which in many senses will simply codify current reality rather than causing any massive changes (Russia's nuclear arsenal has been gradually reducing in numbers because the money isn't there to sustain it).

Strategically Russia, I think, would want a far greater say in where the interceptor missiles are placed - this seems likely to go against the strategic rationale of the new plan for Europe, i.e. sites in Romania, Bulgaria, Poland.

[Steve]

IMHO we will all be better off if we have more defensive and fewer offensive weapons. If we ever hope to eliminate, or nearly eliminate, nukes we will need some way for countries to protect themselves from cheaters. (Recommended reading: Weapons and Hope by Freeman Dyson)

[Andrew]

Steve,

I agree with you - a world full of missile defences is in theory a far better prospect than a world full of nuclear weapons, and indeed with the discussions about removing tactical nuclear weapons from Europe this may well be becoming a more conceivable possibility. I would also argue that the new Europe BMD plan reflects this - it must be at least in part driven by the desire to stop Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt etc from developing nuclear weapons, not to mention providing an added incentive for Israel not to attack Iran. As such with the BMDR plan we could see BMD replacing the traditional nuclear deterrence umbrella.

However there are several issues with this:

(1) BMD technology is still in its infancy - much of the stuff proposed for Europe hasn't been fully tested yet, and even the stuff to be deployed in 2011 (Aegis, SM3) is still relatively immature.

(2) The idea of spreading BMD also raising the question of what do other strategic competitors such as Russia and China do - if their reaction is upgrading and explaning their own nuclear arsenals then we may well find that the reduction of nuclear weapons is made harder.

(3) Increasing BMD increases the utility of rogue or small nations acquiring nuclear weapons if we assume that BMD is being driven at least in part by a desire to retain US 'freedom of action' in insecure regions across the globe.

(4) We could fall into the arms racing track in which it is likely that offense will always trump defence.

Therefore and whilst I agree with you - it will be interesting to see how these dynamics play out in reality.

Thanks for that link I will check it out.