The Truth About Mr Obama's Thriving Missile Defense (Futter)

Andrew Futter, a doctoral researcher at the University of Birmingham, writes for EA:

If you listen to conservative defence commentators such as Frank Gaffney Jr., John R Bolton, or Baker Spring, you would be forgiven for thinking that the American effort to protect itself against the threat from ballistic missile attack has suffered a significant recalibration, relegation, and de-emphasis over the last year or so. Indeed even if you listen to much of the analysis from more liberal commentators, you would be excused from believing that at the very least that the US missile defence programme has been "rationalized" and is now more "prudent".

Perhaps this is even what the Obama administration, so hung up on the idea of change, wants us to think. But the reality, I would argue, is quite different. Under Obama the American quest for ballistic missile defence has continued, been strengthened, and looks set to remain at the forefront of US security and non-proliferation policy well into the future.


Much of the confusion over missile defence has been caused by a misunderstanding about Obama’s decision to cancel the Bush Administration’s "third site" plan for missile defence in Europe, and some of the blame for this must rest with the President himself. By focusing attention on the "cancellation" of the plan set for Poland and the Czech Republic, and by making the announcement on the 70th anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Poland, the real reasons for the change of plan, and indeed the specifics of what replaces it, have been largely overlooked (even to some extent by Russia).

A closer reading of the "Phased, Adaptive Approach" (PAA) to BMD in Europe reveals a plan which has the potential to be more comprehensive, to involve more assets, and to become active far quicker than anything entertained by the Bush administration. Although the assets which will begin being deployed in 2011 will focus on short-range missile threats to only a small part of Southeastern Europe, by 2020 the system will involve hundreds of interceptor missiles on land and at sea, and it will have the capacity to protect the whole of Europe and the US against an Iranian long-range missile threat. It is entirely conceivable therefore that the new plan will present a far greater impediment on the road to better and more fruitful relations with Russia, and a substantial commitment to a continuing US role in the defence of Europe.

A similarly close reading of the recently released Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report suggests that the PAA in Europe is destined to become the model for US BMD policy in other parts of the world, notably East Asia and the Greater Middle East, but also potentially in any region of the world w,here the missile threat necessitates. Perhaps most importantly this renewed focus on regional or "theatre" missile defences has occurred because the Obama administration feels that the 30 ground-based interceptor missiles already operational in the US are sufficient to combat the current rogue state long-range missile threat, and not instead of it.

The Review also highlights strengthening and expanding international cooperation on BMD as a fundamental goal of the Obama administration; to this end, significant amounts of money have been requested for joint BMD development programmes with NATO, Japan, and Israel amongst others. Perhaps even more revealing is the fact that the Review makes it clear that the Obama administration will strongly reject any Russian (or Chinese) proposals to link US BMD activities and expansion to arms control (START) or any other strategic discussions (Iran?).

All this suggests that under Obama the BMD programme is alive, well, and indeed thriving, and that there is much evidence suggesting that its importance will increase rather than decrease in the near future. In fact I would suggest we might entering a period --– especially considering the renewed drive and energy behind nuclear disarmament and abolition –-- where missile defences play a greater role in US extended deterrence in Europe, the Middle East and East Asia, replacing the ‘nuclear umbrella’ which has predominated for decades.

Less than eight years after the abrogation of the ABM Treaty, which prohibited strategic defences, and despite what seems to have become "conventional wisdom", it is quite conceivable that we are entering a period where missile defences have become an accepted, normalized and perhaps even integral component of both US and wider international security thinking. It is hard to see this abating.