Iran: Connecting the Dots --- 5 Signs of Regime Trouble

Mr Verde drops by EA to offer this analysis

The news stories in recent days might appear unrelated, but all of them point to behind-the-scenes manoeuvres and disagreements within the regime. It is too early, given the limited information, to understand exactly what is going on within the Islamic Republic, but it is well worth watching for emerging significance.

1. The Release of Mostafa Tajzadeh

During the week, Mostafa Tajzadeh, leading member of the reformist Islamic Iran Participation Front and former Deputy Interior Minister, was released without bail for the Iranian New Year.



It is an unusual move. The Iranian judiciary has been setting very high bails for post-election detainees. In some instances, even after posting the required bail, detainees have been held for several days. Tajzadeh had refused to pay the bail, saying that he does not own any property to put up as collateral, and now he has been freed temporarily.

Tajzadeh has been a bitter critic of the Guardian Council and its head Ahmad Jannati. He has in the past accused Jannati by name of taking part in fraud during Parliament elections. Given this, who has taken the decision to released Tajzadeh without bail? Why give this small, but very symbolic victory (Tajzadeh has received a hero's welcome, with visits by high-profile political figures) to the reformists at this time?

2. The Parliament Vote Against Ahmadinejad's Subsidy Reform Proposal

To pressure the Majlis to accept his proposal for control of $40 billion from reductions in subsidies, President Ahmadinejad asked the Supreme Leader for help. Khamenei in turn summoned the Majlis Speaker, Ali Larijani, and asked that the Parliament consider the Government's proposal carefully. t

Ahmadinejad then went to the Majlis on the day of the vote and spoke at length in defence of his proposal. He even stayed during the voting to lobby MPs. (Both of these actions are considered illegal.) Despite the Leader’s personal intervention and Ahmadinejad’s appearance, the Majles voted against the President, allowing him to control only $20 billion of the revenue.

Because of the way elections are held in Iran, with the filtering of candidates by the Guardian Council, MPs usually take very seriously what the Supreme Leader says. Many of the current MPs are ex-military, with close links to the Revolutionary Guard and the intelligence services.

So why did 111 MPs vote against the Supreme Leader’s wishes? Has someone else managed to influence the Majles in order to embarrass both Khamenei and Ahamadinejad? Has the Supreme Leader said one thing in public but privately given the go-ahead for the negative vote?

3. The Altered Khamenei Speech

Two weeks after his speech to the Assembly of Experts, the Supreme Leader's website has publisedh a verson of the address with new sections, including references to the Expediency Council’s moves to change the election laws. Khamenei says that he will only approve parts of the Council’s proposals with which he agrees.

Why the two-week delay?  Was this section added to the “speech” after the meeting?  Was it originally omitted not to upset certain people or groups? Is the new version intended to reassure the Guardian Council and its supporters that the Supreme Leader is backing them?

4. Ahmadinejad's Nuclear Story

On Saturday, Fars News quoted Ahmadinejad as saying that, after the 2005 election, he met with the Supreme Leader and asked that the International Atomic Energy Agency's seals be taken off Iran’s nuclear facilities before the President took office.

This directly contradicts Khamenei’s version, as the Supreme Leader has said that he had himself decided for the seals to be removed and uranium enrichment to be resumed.

Is Ahmadinejad deliberately trying to undermine Khamenei? Is he just trying to talk himself up without considering the consequences?

5. Rafsanjani's Moves

Recently Hassan Rohani and Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf, both said to be close to Hashemi Rafsanjani, have taken direct aim at Ahmadinejad’s government. Rouhani said that some people want to run the country with one gang. Qalibaf said that for the past 14 months no serious work has been done in the country.

Rafsanjani has recently said that he does not want students to be quiet, but he has warned students against talk and actions that would provide excuses for people who want crackdowns on Iranian society.

So what is "The Shark" up to? Is he, working with or through Rohani and Qalibaf, pushing against Ahmadinejad? Is he sanctioning protest or trying to hold it back?

Too early to answer any of these questions, but more than enough here to question where All is Well within the Islamic Republic.

Israel-Palestine Proximity Talks: "Theatre of the Absurd"

Sharmine Narwani writes for The Huffington Post:

After a year of grandiose declarations on Mideast peace prospects and a gazillion trips to the region by US envoy George Mitchell, the Obama administration has come up with this?

"Proximity Talks." Look it up in the Dictionary of Realpolitik and you will find the following: "Negotiations going nowhere fast. Wear seatbelts lest the speed of self-destruction spins you off the earth's axis."

Israel-Palestine-Hamas Mystery: Questions & A Response
Israel-Palestine: “Proximity Talks” and US Vice President Biden

Palestinians and Israelis are not even going to be at the table together. Mitchell could not even make that happen. This isn't phase one of a longstanding conflict. These are adversaries who have sat across many tables and struck many agreements over the past 19 years.



And so this is where we are in the gruelingly endless Middle East peace process. About a dozen steps back from where we started.

False Starts

Here's the down-low. After an upbeat set of promises to bring old foes to the Mideast negotiating table, Obama realized that Israel would not move so much as an inch on freezing illegal settlement-building activity -- a fundamental necessity since there can be no land-for-peace agreement without land to cede.

The Obama presidency began just days after Israel's three-week military devastation of Gaza concluded, putting not even the most sycophantic of Palestinian leaders in a position to be generous without a significant Israeli goodwill gesture. Then Benjamin Netanyahu emerged victorious from Israeli national elections and the die was cast.

Netanyahu's Likud Party has never accepted a Two-State Solution, and Obama wasted much time wresting a luke-warm endorsement of this plan from the new Israeli prime minister. But while Netanyahu's "compromise" was lauded by US officials and media pundits, the fact is that Mideast observers knew there was nothing new in his for-the-cameras acceptance of a Palestinian state minus sovereignty.

On the other side of the fence, the increasingly unpopular Fatah-led Palestinian Authority (PA) government -- as corrupt and ineffectual as our Arab allies come -- desperately needed an active peace process to give it a veneer of respectability. Fatah's credibility is in serious jeopardy -- it pushed for participation in peace talks with Israel almost two decades ago at the Madrid Peace Conference -- and has virtually nothing to show for it.

Well, except for the fact that Jewish settlers in the West Bank have quintupled in number and that Israel has managed to divide up the West Bank to its advantage, with Jewish-only roads and checkpoints cutting off Palestinian movement and freedoms further.

But PA leader Mahmoud Abbas was unable to participate in post-Gaza peace talks without a settlement halt -- he had drawn that line in the sand after Obama offered up a settlement freeze as part of his fantasy-based approach to peacemaking.

Eureka!

So, as Israel continued to announce new settlement projects and evict Palestinians in hotly-contested Jerusalem from their homes, Abbas and Obama looked desperately for a way to hang on to credibility and launch talks in some form.

And then the brilliant idea struck. Why, if we can't talk to Israel directly because of its flagrant violations of international principles and laws, let's just have the Americans do it for us. And this way, if anything goes wrong and our popularity suffers, we have plausible deniability and can blame it all on the US.

The Proximity Talks were thus born. Presumably that means "talks that are close, but not too close."

And the absurdity continues. US Vice President Joe Biden, during his visit to Israel on Monday said: "If the talks develop, we believe that we'll be able to bridge the gaps and that the conflict will be ended."

Really? Two decades of talks between Palestinians and Israelis when the players were far more motivated to deliver a solution -- and now -- Biden believes the conflict will be "ended."

One-Way Street To Irrelevance

Here's what I think is actually happening:

I think Obama is realigning his peacemaking priorities in the Middle East -- at least until he has the US economy, health care reform and Iraq under his belt -- a must if he wants to be re-elected in 2012. For both domestic and international public consumption, he cannot accept complete failure in such a visibly-touted part of his global agenda. There must be talks in some form, but they will be placed on a low burner, increasing the risk of more of the same endless "process without peace" that the US has sponsored since 1991.

Instead, Obama is placing his bets on Iran to bring him home a foreign policy "victory" -- contradicting his earlier claims that Palestinian-Israeli conflict resolution should be tackled first, as this will diffuse Iran's grandstanding and reduce its regional influence.

The US's Mideast allies have to be dealt with in the meantime. Saudi Arabia, in particular, is getting testy watching Iran's ascendency in the Persian Gulf, and is champing at the bit to halt this trend. The Saudi King is the proud benefactor of the Arab Peace Plan and he would like to see it advanced. As would Egypt -- facing key elections in 2011 and suffering from regional criticism for its own blockade of Gaza. In return for Saudi and Egyptian cooperation on isolating Iran further - and financial/political help in Afghanistan and Iraq -- the US will push forward its half-baked peace process and try to keep the wheels grinding as long as humanly possible.

In the meantime, the entire US "Camp" is doing all it can to retain the status quo in the Mideast. It isn't just Iran that threatens. The rising popularity of a bloc of nations, leaders and groups that challenges US, Israeli, Saudi and Egyptian hegemony in the region just keeps growing. The Arab and Muslim Street is with the new bloc -- decades of corruption, occupation and stagnation have seen to that.

And here we are, just la-la-la plodding along, ignoring facts and realities in a quick-changing landscape. We are not the economic and military power of yesteryear -- protracted, unwinnable battles in tribal Afghanistan and splintered Iraq demonstrate that we can not even win an elementary victory in the Mideast.

We listen to political decision makers -- not area experts who can clue us in -- and advance forward as though nothing has changed, as though we are the only player that counts. We decide who plays with us -- not the democratically-elected Hezbollah and Hamas whose critical part in any feasible and long lasting Mideast solution we still refuse to acknowledge.

We vilify Iran and others who threaten our view of things, not realizing that this opposition emerges because of our blinkered behaviors and double standards in a region straining to discover its own identity and set wrongs right.

Double standards have destroyed any credibility we have in the region. We resist international demands that Israel and its 300 nuclear warheads join the IAEA, but censure the longstanding IAEA member, Iran, from pursuing a nuclear energy program. We back some of the most despicable dictatorships in the Arab world and then undermine the electoral victories of those we oppose. We send troops and funding to rein in Salafi jihadists throughout the region without a backward glance at the most intolerant nation of them all, our ally Saudi Arabia, the very source of radical militancy. And we don't even offer an apology for the wrongful deaths of hundreds of thousands of their civilians in our zealous attempts to avenge the deaths of 2,750 of ours.

And now we are hosting the Theater of the Absurd -- these so-called proximity talks -- where there are no actors, just us, sitting in a room alone, talking to ourselves. We have fooled them all! Or have we?

Iran Interview: The State of Tehran's Nuclear Programme (Cirincione)

Joseph Cirincione, the President of the Ploughshares Fund on nuclear weapons policy and conflict, talks to Claudio Gallo of La Stampa:

GALLO: Is Iran really trying to build a nuclear weapon?

CIRINCIONE: There is no doubt that the Iranian regime is moving to acquire the technologies that would allow it to build a nuclear weapon. We do not know if the regime has reached a decision to actually build a weapon, however.



It may make strategic sense for Iran to stop at the edge, that is, to have the uranium enrichment capability, to have secretly done design work, and to have a missile capable of carrying a warhead, but not actually build a bomb. This would give it many of the advantages of a nuclear-armed state, without provoking an attack and perhaps delaying its neighbors from reacting with their own nuclear weapon programs.

GALLO: Do you think that stress over Iran's negotiating position may point to the fact that its uranium stockpiles are ending?

CIRINCIONE: Iran does not have enough known uranium reserves to fuel its current enrichment plant at Natanz for very long. It certainly does not have enough to fuel the 10 new enrichment plants it claims it will build. But the most likely reason why the government first accepted, then rejected the uranium swap is that the regime is in crisis. It cannot get the consensus it needs to either accept or completely reject the deal.

GALLO: The Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, Ali Larijani, said recently that "based on terms of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the International Atomic Energy Agency has no right to urge Iran to suspend its nuclear activities". Why is the West saying that Larijani is not right?

CIRINCIONE: By its own admission, Iran misled the IAEA for over 15 years. It is clearly in violation of its obligation under the NPT to report its nuclear material activities and the existence of all its nuclear material facilities. The overwhelming majority of the nations that make up the IAEA board of governors and the UN Security Council found that Iran was and still is in violation of its treaty obligation. Under the terms of the treaty, the Security Council has the right --- in fact, it has the obligation --- to ask Iran to stop its nuclear activities until Iran's good faith can be restored. Few outside of Iran dispute this basic fact.

GALLO: In the last IAEA report, they quote an Iranian study about a nuclear missile warhead. It seems that the source of that report is the same stolen laptop that since 2005 appears at intervals on western newspapers: what do you think about this?

CIRINCIONE: This is the least clear claim. The documents on the laptop do seem to be the source of this claim. It still is not clear where the laptop came from. But Iran has yet to provide any clear answers to the IAEA. Iran has just refused to answer the IAEA's questions. This raises suspicions and seems to support the claim that Iran was doing such research.

GALLO: In May 2009, you were one of the experts, American and Russian, that wrote the report "Iran Nuclear and Missile Potential": it says that Iran, if it decides, may build a nuclear warhead in six to eight years. Is that conclusion still valid?

CIRINCIONE: Since we wrote the report, the time frame for Iran building a nuclear warhead has reduced somewhat. It could probably build a small nuclear bomb in 1-2 years. It would likely take an additional few years to test the device and perfect a warhead that could fit on one of its Shahab missiles. The main reason for the decreasing time frame is Iran's production of enough low-enriched uranium that could be reprocessed into high-enriched uranium for a bomb.

GALLO: And then there is the technical difficulty to build a working IRBM [Intermediate Ballistic Range Missile]....

CIRINCIONE: Iran now has short- and medium-range missiles that can travel as far at 2000 km. It is a major challenge to build a IRBM that could fly 3000-5500 km. This is currently beyond Iran's technical capability.

GALLO: Recently on The Huffington Post, the former Deputy Director General of the IAEA, Bruno Pellaud, wrote that Iran's regime is consciously provoking an attack against nuclear facilities. Do you think it is possible?

CIRINCIONE: The regime is in turmoil. It is not clear how long it can survive. The Revolution Guard would like to change this dynamic. It is possible that the Iranian Revolution Guard is trying to provoke Israel into striking Iran. This would allow them to rally the Iranian public in defense of the nation.

GALLO: President Ahmadinejad said that Israel will attack Iran in spring or summer: do you think that Israel could attack without the American green light?

CIRINCIONE: Possibly, but very unlikely. The US military does not want to start a third war in the Middle East. JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] Chairman [Admiral Mike] Mullen said this week that such an attack would have "unintended consequences".

GALLO: Russia's Chief of the Army Staff, General Nikolai Makarov, warned that an American attack on Iran now, when the US is bogged down in two wars, might well lead to the collapse of the United States. Is this an old-style Russian "provokazia" [provocation] or it makes some sense?

CIRINCIONE: Not the collapse, but great turmoil, and it may unite the Muslim world against the US. Many Muslim governments would like to see the US strike Iran, but the Muslim publics would likely be enraged.

The Latest from Iran (1 March): In Like a Lion?

2135 GMT: Rumour of Day. Kalameh alleges that prisoners held in cellblock 209 of Evin Prison have been commanded to fill in forms about their views on election fraud and whether the protest leaders are connected to foreign countries.

2100 GMT: Dr Mohammad Maleki, the former head of Tehran University, has reportedly been released after 191  days in detention. Maleki, 76, suffers from prostate cancer.

Iran: Understanding the Assembly of Experts Statement “Crisis Continues”
Iran Document: Mousavi’s Interview “Reform Within the Current Framework” (27 February)
The Latest from Iran (28 February): What Do The Statements Mean?

2055 GMT: United4Iran has a profile of Jahanbakhsh Khanjani, former advisor to Iran’s Minister of Interior in the Khatami Presidency, who was released on 24 February after spending more than eight months in prison. According to another released prisoner, Khanjani was under pressure to confess and was constantly moved from general confinement to solidarity confinement.


2030 GMT: 2nd Picture of the Day (see 1540 GMT). The staff of Etemaad newspaper just after its suspension (1455 GMT) by Iranian authorities: "Victory".



1935 GMT: Faoud Sadeghi, the managing director of Ayande News, has reportedly been released.

Journalist Mahsa Jazini has been freed on $100,000 bail in Isfehan.

1930 GMT: Khatami Stands Firm. Back from an academic break to find a statement from former President Mohammad Khatami, responding to the Supreme Leader's declaration that opposition figures had put themselves beyond the Iranian system with their post-election challenge. He said in a meeting with students:

It is easy to create tensions in the world, but difficult to eliminate them. Detente requires courage and finesse, and the system has to take steps to that effect. We should not embark on adventurism in the world under pretext of having won so many enemies. We should hold back from speaking in a manner to inflict heavy costs....

Everyone may have had his own interpretation of reforms, but we mean reforms within the framework of criteria born out of Islam, the revolution and the nation's will. In the face of any possible deviation from Islam and Imam Khomeini's line, we have to give warning....

Go and ask the former revolutionary militants if the ongoing conditions reflect what they were after. Ask them if these arrests, blame games, vendettas and the imposition of costs on the nation were what the revolutionary forces sought. If not, our conscience necessitates that we close ranks in order to improve conditions....

We should not retreat from our demands, and we should keep fighting even if certain groups beat us on the head. Unfortunately, certain hard-line groups in the society are opposed to any compromise within the society.

1615 GMT: Really. Not-Very-Much-News. Iran's Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki has denied, amidst the fuss over the International Atomic Energy Agency report on Tehran's nuclear programme, that there is any problem:

The new chief and the new managers of the agency should look at the record of Iran's cooperation. We have fully cooperated with the agency. This cooperation will continue. We have always welcomed and encouraged negotiations and talks.

1555 GMT: Rigi Mystery. This story isn't over....

Kyrgyzstan’s foreign ministry has issued a statement saying that Iran has officially apologised for forcing a Kyrgyz plane to land in Iran. More significantly, the foreign ministry has denied that any passengers were taken off the plane, including Jundullah leader Abdolmalek Rigi, by the Iranians: “According to information available to this ministry, media reports that s two foreigners were arrested in this fight are untrue."

Now, is Kyrgyzstan making the denial to save face and cover up that Rigi was lifted from one of its flights? Or is it the case that the Jundullah leader was never on that plane?

1540 GMT: Picture of the Day. Abdolreza Tajik after his release from prison (see 0945 GMT):



1520 GMT: A Most Symbolic Visit. Seyyed Hassan Khomeini, the grandson of Ayatollah Khomeini, has visited Ali Karroubi, the son of Mehdi Karroubi who was beaten on 22 Bahman.

1515 GMT: Cutting off Business. Caterpillar, the US building equipment group, has announced steps to sever trading links with Iran. The company is barring its non-US subsidiaries from accepting orders for products that they know are destined for delivery to Iran.

1510 GMT: Not-Very-Much-News (from the Other Side). Press TV gives the Iran version:

Iran has called on the UN nuclear watchdog to bear in mind the West's past breaches of atomic fuel exchange deals with Tehran while reviewing Iran's nuclear program.

In a letter to the UN body, Ali Asghar Soltanieh, Iran's envoy to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), cited three instances on which Western countries failed to meet their commitments and provide Iran with nuclear fuel.

In other words, Tehran will hold out against a "3rd-party enrichment" deal involving Germany, US, or French authorities because they cannot be trusted.

But (and excuse me for being repetitive)...no mention of Japan as unreliable.

1505 GMT: Stopping the Protests. Rah-e-Sabz claims that 20,000 people were detained during the rallies of 22 Bahman (11 February).

1455 GMT: Back to the (Banned) News. Fars reports that Iranian authorities have banned the weekly magazine Iran Dokht, linked with Mehdi Karroubi. Etemaad has also been suspended.

1445 GMT: Not-Very-Much-News (cont.). Nothing --- yes, nothing --- new in the Amano report to the IAEA. It merely restates the long-standing finding, "[The IAEA] continues...to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, but we cannot confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities."

This, however, will not stop many in the media from declaring that something dramatic has occurred. The lead from the Associated Press: "The chief of the U.N. nuclear watchdog agency says he cannot confirm that all of Iran's nuclear activities are peaceful."

Nor will it deflect some from overblown declarations and calls to global conflict. Jamsheed Choksy (apologies that you'll have to pay to get the full polemic) in The Wall Street Journal: "Iran's New World Order --- Its nuclear program is part of a larger plan to radically reduce U.S. power."

1430 GMT: Today's Not-Very-Much-News. Back from an academic break to find the media buzzing over the International Atomic Energy Agency meeting, with a report from new Secretary-General Yukiya Amano. The section on Iran:

I would like to inform you about the current situation concerning Iran’s request to the Agency for assistance in providing fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor, as I receive many questions in this regard.

In June 2009, the Agency received a request from Iran for assistance in obtaining fuel for the research reactor in Tehran, which produces isotopes for medical purposes. In October 2009, at a meeting with the Governments of Iran, France, the Russian Federation and the United States, the Agency made a proposal under which Iranian low enriched uranium (LEU) would be shipped to Russia for further enrichment and then to France for fabrication into fuel. Three of the four countries gave their consent to this proposal.

In a letter to the Agency dated 18 February, 2010, Iran said it continued to wish to buy the necessary nuclear fuel or, if this was not possible, to exchange some of its LEU for reactor fuel from abroad. Iran requested the IAEA to relay its request to potential suppliers and to facilitate the provision of the fuel. The Agency circulated Iran’s letter to Member States as requested.

The arrangement proposed by the Agency in October 2009 remains on the table. I believe it would ensure continued operation of the Tehran Research Reactor and serve as a confidence-building measure. At the same time, I am following up on Iran’s February 18 request, in accordance with the IAEA Statute, and have been in contact with the relevant countries....

Implementation of Safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran

You have received my report on Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran. It is longer than previous reports because I wanted my first report to be a stand-alone document. I tried to make it factual, without overdoing the detail.

The Agency continues, under its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with Iran, to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, but we cannot confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities because Iran has not provided the Agency with the necessary cooperation.

The necessary cooperation includes, among other things, implementation of relevant resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors and the United Nations Security Council, implementation of the Additional Protocol and of modified Code 3.1, as well as clarification of issues related to possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.

I request Iran to take steps towards the full implementation of its Safeguards Agreement and its other obligations as a matter of high priority.

1200 GMT: Rafsanjani Watch. Faezeh Hashemi, the daughter of Hashemi Rafsanjani, has declared that her father accepts no bargaining on people's rights and that the only way out of the crisis is to follow the suggestions in his Friday Prayer of 17 July. Replying to the question of why Rafsanjani has not taken the podium at Friday Prayers since then, Hashemi said, “His main reason is not to cause harm to innocent people. In his last sermon, security and intelligence forces attacked protesters and arrested some of them.”

Hashemi, indirectly commenting on last week's Assembly of Experts meeting that Rafsanjani chaired, warned that extremists were trying to unseat Rafsanjani to achieve their goals.

1100 GMT: Claim of the Day. Rah-e Sabz asserts that the head of Iran's judiciary, Sadegh Larijani, has said that the Supreme Leader asked him to execute more protestors.

Larijani was reportedly confronted by his relatives and associates, including Mostafa Mohaghegh-Damad, the former head of the National Audit Office, who were unhappy with the  executions of Arash Rahmanipour and Mohammad Reza Ali Zamani in late January. Larijani replied, “Go and thank God that I have lowered the number of executions.”

Larijani allegedly said that he had attended a meeting at the time  including Khamenei. Ahmad Jannati (head of the Guardian Council), Mohammad Yazdi, and Mohammad Momen Qomi all invoked of the Sharia law demanding that the protesters and the "leaders of sedition" be executed.

Khamenei responded that, although this was their religious opinion, a large number of executions would cause political problems for the regime. He then turned to Larijani saying, “In all honesty we expected more than this [two executions].” Larijani later told associates, “I have tried very hard to keep the number of executions low, as my superiors had asked for more”.

1045 GMT: Following Up the Assembly. The political moves from last week's Assembly of Experts meeting continue, even beyond Mr Verde's Sunday analysis. While the official statement --- once it finally appeared --- pledged loyalty to the Supreme Leader, there has been an overlooked postscript.

The Secretariat of the Assembly has published the report by the Assembly’s Investigation Committee into the circumstances of the Supreme Leader and his fitness to remain in the post, under Article 111 of the Iranian Constitution). The report, dated 27 February, is signed by Mohsen Mojtahed-Shabestari (Assembly member, Khamenei's representative to East Azerbaijan, and Tabriz's Friday Prayer leader.

Although the report is similar to the Assembly's closing statement, the Green website Rah-e-Sabz is celebrating the publication of this report as a victory for public pressure on the Assembly. For the first time, the Supreme Leader's fitness for his post is now a matter of public discussion.

1000 GMT: But You Could Just Watch the Nukes Instead. On the nuclear programme front, it looks like another day of media focus on the rhetorical battle between Iran and members of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The IAEA, with a new Director-General, begins a four-day discussion of the draft report on Iran's current uranium enrichment efforts, and the occasion has been preceded by a series of Iranian verbals attacks, including the Supreme Leader's denunciation of a US-controlled IAEA.

The Los Angeles Times, for example, devotes a lengthy article to the political theatre: "[Iran has] dramatically shifted its public tone toward the United Nations' nuclear watchdog, dropping its previous deference while harshly criticizing the agency's latest report and its new director-general as an incompetent and biased lackey of the West."

Amidst the furour, few take any notice of Iran's more conciliatory position accepting Japan as a country for "third-party enrichment", signalled by Ali Larijani during his trip to Tokyo. And none, to my knowledge, consider the ripples of Larijani's changed position across the Iranian political waters.

0915 GMT: And so unfolds another week in a crisis which, according to the regime, was over. Mir Hossein Mousavi's interview continues to command attention and more than a few questions about strategy and prospects for the Green Movement. After initial doubts, I'm tilting towards a more optimistic reading. Because of the importance of the issue, the analysis is still being developed: we're hoping to have it out tomorrow.

Meanwhile, the regime --- which, again, has supposedly won this conflict --- continues to bluster. Basij Commander Mohammad Reza Naqdi, continuing the Government's propaganda drive on the capture of Jundullah leader Abdolmalek Rigi, declared that President Obama would confess as quickly if he came to Iran:

This pure form of Islam [practiced in Iran] is such that it will even break our staunchest enemies. This thug [Rigi] was nothing, even if Obama himself, who Rigi has confessed to cooperating with, comes to Iran he will also confess to all his sins under the influence of this [pure form of] Islam.

The U.S. and other Western countries have reached a cultural, military, political and economic dead-end and the only weapon in their hands to bully other countries is technology and if we succeed in prying this tool away from them they will be finished.

Far more significant is the news of the regime's freeing of high-profile figures from detention. Saturday and Sunday releases included editors and journalists Ali Hekmat, Abdolreza Tajik (Farheekhtegan), Mashallah Shamsolvaezin (formerly of Kayhan, Jame'eh, Neshat, and Asr-e Azadegan), Behrang Tonkaboni (Farhang va Ahang), and Mohammad Javad Mozafar (publishing house Kavir and vice president of the Committee for the Defense of Prisoners' Rights), and retired science professor Mohammad Sadeq Rabani.

An Iranian activist adds that journalist Rozbeh Karimi was released today and 20 protesters arrested on Ashura were freed from Rejaie Shahr prison in Karaj last night.

It is too early to tell if this is an orchestrated strategy of mass releases by the regime --- an effective "amnesty" if those freed will just shut up, stop writing, and stay off the streets --- but it follows Sunday's carrot-and-stick statement by Tehran prosecutor Abbas Jafari Doulatabadi (see yesterday's updates). Doulatabadi promises detainee releases on the eve of Iranian New Year but added that those who did not recent would be treated harshly.

The "stick" part of the strategy also has come out in a Rah-e-Sabz report:

Many of those arrested and released over the past few months have been contacted and told to be prepared for interviews, which are subsequently conducted inside Evin Prison....

Interrogators contacted these former prisoners, who have either received their initial verdict or are waiting to receive their verdict, and force them to participate in these interviews. A transcript of the interview is given to the prisoners by their interrogators and they are told to memorize the content and say it in their own words. These former prisoners have been threatened that if they refuse to participate in the interviews they will have to spend the [Iranian] New Year holiday in prison or receive a heavier sentence.

The Jaras [Rah-e-Sabz] reporter said, "Transcripts of these interviews are given to news agencies close to the Reformists and they are forced to publish them. In the recent scenario, aside from the Islamic Student News Agency (ISNA), where prisoners were escorted to upon their release to conduct interviews, Iranian Labor News Agency (ILNA) has been forced on board [as well]. For the news scenario, the date of the interview is sometimes days or months from the time of the prisoner's release and secondly the exact transcription has been forced on news agencies."

Still, even if the Green Movement could be quelled, the Government faces the trouble within. The latest sign of unhappiness is over the recent 18-minute video, shown on BBC Persian and then spread on YouTube, of the 15 June attack on Tehran University's dormitories. Kazem Jalali, a member of Parliament's "truth-finding committee", has hinted that some colleagues are holding out against an acknowledgement of possible wrongdoing:

It would be better if the members of the truth-finding committee all watch this film....I have followed up on the issue a few time via Mr. [Mohammad-Hassan] Abutorabi who heads the committee. I think you should also ask him this question.

However, the head of the National Security Commission, Alaeddin Boroujerdi, has tried to pre-empt any consideration of the evidence of damage, beatings, and even killings by the attackers, whose exact affiliation with the regime is still unclear: "Since the narrator of the film is the BBC, we must look at the matter with doubt because we do not consider the BBC a reliable source."