Video: Dissecting the Cheney Speech on National Security

Video and Transcript: Dick Cheney Speech on “National Security” at American Enterprise Institute (21 May)

Keith Olbermann: "Thank you, Sir, for admitting, obviously inadvertently, that you did not take a serious first look in the seven months and 23 days between your inauguration and 9/11. For that attack, Sir, you are culpable, morally, ethically. At best you were guilty of malfeasance and eternally-lasting stupidity. At worst, Sir, in the deaths of 9/11, you are negligent."

I am refraining from an analysis of former Vice President Dick Cheney's comments on national security yesterday, primarily because I hope that his speech --- which should be treated at most as self-justification --- will just go away. This is hope rather than expectation, however. Despite Dan Drezner's comment that President Obama has "adversaries more boneheaded than himself", Cheney's words will be treated as Tablets from the Mount by his supporters in the broadcast and print media.

So, as a pre-emptive strike against the upholding of Cheney's views as the thoughtful alternative in US homeland security and foreign policy, here are video commentaries from Lawrence O'Donnell and Keith Olbermann, followed by a thorough exposure of the former Vice President's distortions and deceptions by McClatchy News Service's Warren Strobel and Jonathan Landay:




[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0KFy6QhMvBM[/youtube]

Cheney's speech contained omissions, misstatements
WARREN STROBEL AND JONATHAN LANDAY

WASHINGTON — Former Vice President Dick Cheney's defense Thursday of the Bush administration's policies for interrogating suspected terrorists contained omissions, exaggerations and misstatements.

In his address to the American Enterprise Institute , a conservative policy organization in Washington , Cheney said that the techniques the Bush administration approved, including waterboarding — simulated drowning that's considered a form of torture — forced nakedness and sleep deprivation, were "legal" and produced information that "prevented the violent death of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of innocent people."

He quoted the Director of National Intelligence, Adm. Dennis Blair , as saying that the information gave U.S. officials a "deeper understanding of the al Qaida organization that was attacking this country."

In a statement April 21 , however, Blair said the information "was valuable in some instances" but that "there is no way of knowing whether the same information could have been obtained through other means. The bottom line is that these techniques hurt our image around the world, the damage they have done to our interests far outweighed whatever benefit they gave us and they are not essential to our national security."

A top-secret 2004 CIA inspector general's investigation found no conclusive proof that information gained from aggressive interrogations helped thwart any "specific imminent attacks," according to one of four top-secret Bush-era memos that the Justice Department released last month.

FBI Director Mueller Robert Muller told Vanity Fair magazine in December that he didn't think that the techniques disrupted any attacks.

— Cheney said that President Barack Obama's decision to release the four top-secret Bush administration memos on the interrogation techniques was "flatly contrary" to U.S. national security, and would help al Qaida train terrorists in how to resist U.S. interrogations.

However, Blair, who oversees all 16 U.S. intelligence agencies, said in his statement that he recommended the release of the memos, "strongly supported" Obama's decision to prohibit using the controversial methods and that "we do not need these techniques to keep America safe."

— Cheney said that the Bush administration "moved decisively against the terrorists in their hideouts and their sanctuaries, and committed to using every asset to take down their networks."

The former vice president didn't point out that Osama bin Laden and his chief lieutenant, Ayman al Zawahri , remain at large nearly eight years after 9-11 and that the Bush administration began diverting U.S. forces, intelligence assets, time and money to planning an invasion of Iraq before it finished the war in Afghanistan against al Qaida and the Taliban .

There are now 49,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan fighting to contain the bloodiest surge in Taliban violence since the 2001 U.S.-led intervention, and Islamic extremists also have launched their most concerted attack yet on neighboring, nuclear-armed Pakistan .

— Cheney denied that there was any connection between the Bush administration's interrogation policies and the abuse of detainee at Iraq's Abu Ghraib prison, which he blamed on "a few sadistic guards . . . in violation of American law, military regulations and simple decency."

However, a bipartisan Senate Armed Services Committee report in December traced the abuses at Abu Ghraib to the approval of the techniques by senior Bush administration officials, including former Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld .

"The abuse of detainees in U.S. custody cannot simply be attributed to the actions of 'a few bad apples' acting on their own," said the report issued by Sens. Carl Levin , D- Mich. , and John McCain , R- Ariz. "The fact is that senior officials in the United States government solicited information on how to use aggressive techniques, redefined the law to create the appearance of their legality and authorized their use against detainees."

— Cheney said that "only detainees of the highest intelligence value" were subjected to the harsh interrogation techniques, and he cited Khalid Sheikh Mohammad , the alleged mastermind of the 9-11 attacks.

He didn't mention Abu Zubaydah, the first senior al Qaida operative to be captured after 9-11. Former FBI special agent Ali Soufan told a Senate subcommittee last week that his interrogation of Zubaydah using traditional methods elicited crucial information, including Mohammed's alleged role in 9-11.

The decision to use the harsh interrogation methods "was one of the worst and most harmful decisions made in our efforts against al Qaida ," Soufan said. Former State Department official Philip Zelikow , who in 2005 was then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's point man in an internal fight to overhaul the Bush administration's detention policies, joined Soufan in his criticism.

— Cheney said that "the key to any strategy is accurate intelligence," but the Bush administration ignored warnings from experts in the CIA , the Defense Intelligence Agency , the State Department , the Department of Energy and other agencies, and used false or exaggerated intelligence supplied by Iraqi exile groups and others to help make its case for the 2003 invasion.

Cheney made no mention of al Qaida operative Ali Mohamed al Fakheri , who's known as Ibn Sheikh al Libi , whom the Bush administration secretly turned over to Egypt for interrogation in January 2002 . While allegedly being tortured by Egyptian authorities, Libi provided false information about Iraq's links with al Qaida , which the Bush administration used despite doubts expressed by the DIA.

A state-run Libyan newspaper said Libi committed suicide recently in a Libyan jail.

— Cheney accused Obama of "the selective release" of documents on Bush administration detainee policies, charging that Obama withheld records that Cheney claimed prove that information gained from the harsh interrogation methods prevented terrorist attacks.

"I've formally asked that (the information) be declassified so the American people can see the intelligence we obtained," Cheney said. "Last week, that request was formally rejected."

However, the decision to withhold the documents was announced by the CIA , which said that it was obliged to do so by a 2003 executive order issued by former President George W. Bush prohibiting the release of materials that are the subject of lawsuits.

— Cheney said that only "ruthless enemies of this country" were detained by U.S. operatives overseas and taken to secret U.S. prisons.

A 2008 McClatchy investigation, however, found that the vast majority of Guantanamo detainees captured in 2001 and 2002 in Afghanistan and Pakistan were innocent citizens or low-level fighters of little intelligence value who were turned over to American officials for money or because of personal or political rivalries.

In addition, German Chancellor Angela Merkel said on Oct. 5, 2005 , that the Bush administration had admitted to her that it had mistakenly abducted a German citizen, Khaled Masri , from Macedonia in January 2004 .

Masri reportedly was flown to a secret prison in Afghanistan , where he allegedly was abused while being interrogated. He was released in May 2004 and dumped on a remote road in Albania .

In January 2007 , the German government issued arrest warrants for 13 alleged CIA operatives on charges of kidnapping Masri.

— Cheney slammed Obama's decision to close the Guantanamo Bay prison camp and criticized his effort to persuade other countries to accept some of the detainees.

The effort to shut down the facility, however, began during Bush's second term, promoted by Rice and Defense Secretary Robert Gates .

"One of the things that would help a lot is, in the discussions that we have with the states of which they (detainees) are nationals, if we could get some of those countries to take them back," Rice said in a Dec. 12, 2007 , interview with the British Broadcasting Corp. "So we need help in closing Guantanamo ."

— Cheney said that, in assessing the security environment after 9-11, the Bush team had to take into account "dictators like Saddam Hussein with known ties to Mideast terrorists."

Cheney didn't explicitly repeat the contention he made repeatedly in office: that Saddam cooperated with al Qaida , a linkage that U.S. intelligence officials and numerous official inquiries have rebutted repeatedly.

The late Iraqi dictator's association with terrorists vacillated and was mostly aimed at quashing opponents and critics at home and abroad.

The last State Department report on international terrorism to be released before 9-11 said that Saddam's regime "has not attempted an anti-Western terrorist attack since its failed plot to assassinate former President ( George H.W.) Bush in 1993 in Kuwait ."

A Pentagon study released last year, based on a review of 600,000 Iraqi documents captured after the U.S.-led invasion, concluded that while Saddam supported militant Palestinian groups — the late terrorist Abu Nidal found refuge in Baghdad , at least until Saddam had him killed — the Iraqi security services had no "direct operational link" with al Qaida .

Now It's Petraeus' War: US Replaces Top Commander in Afghanistan

GENERAL DAVID MCKIERNAN

Yesterday, I was speaking to British high school students when one asked, "What are President Obama's three greatest challenges today?" After putting the economy Number One and listing (but dismissing) Republican opposition as a potential Number Two, I said:

But I'm concerned that it will be Afghanistan and Pakistan that will bring him down. I think he's being overtaken by his own military, especially General David Petraeus [the head of US Central Command] and their ideas of "strategy".

Before I got home, the news came through: the Obama Adminstration had replaced the commander of NATO and US forces in Afghanistan, General David McKiernan.

My initial reaction was, OK, generals get replaced. They are moved to other military posts or return to Washington for a break from the field. Then, however, the details piled in. McKiernan had done only 11 months of a command tour that normally last 18 to 24 months. He had been ousted, even as the US is planning to pour more troops into a "crisis", and replaced with General Stanley McChrystal, the director of the military's Joint Staff and, before that, head of US Special Operations Forces in Iraq.

All of which pointed to the re-branding of the Afghanistan conflict. This is not Secretary of Defense Robert Gates' war. This is not President Obama's war.

This one has been claimed by David Petraeus.

Gates, announcing McKiernan's departure, was not shy about kicking the general out the door. McKiernan had "probably" had his career cut short because “a new approach was probably in our best interest”. He added, "Fresh eyes were needed."

So what were wrong with those eyes? After all, the commander was no lightweight: he had led US ground troops in the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Pentagon officials piled on the criticism, "General McKiernan...had been removed primarily because he had brought too conventional an approach to the challenge." His honour was to be "the first general to be dismissed from command of a theater of combat since Douglas MacArthur during the Korean War".

In contrast, the officials noted that General McChrystal had led the American forces who captured Saddam Hussein and later killed insurgent leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq: "his success in using intelligence and firepower to track and kill insurgents, and his training in unconventional warfare that emphasizes the need to protect the population, made him the best choice for the command in Afghanistan".

Translation? McKiernan is a "big force" leader. His background is an officer in armoured units, and he led the calls in Iraq for a much larger ground force than that used to occupy the country. McChrystal, on the other hand, is able to organise and direct small, elite units that can strike quickly.

Make no mistake, however. As The New York Times politely frames it, "The change also reflects the influence of Gen. David H. Petraeus." Their emphasis is on a personal battle: Petraeus served under McKiernan in Iraq but eventually overtook him in rank and, again according to Pentagon officials, "the two men did not develop a bond after General Petraeus inherited General McKiernan as his Afghanistan commander".

More importantly, Petraeus is preparing his supposed strategy for victory. His reputation has been built on the mythical or real success of the Iraq "surge" from 2007. While that relied on an increase in US troops, it emphasized the deployment of specialist units to work with local Sunni militias while using Special Forces in "surgical" strikes against the bad guys. The big military idea is that the same approach can work in Afghanistan. Hook up with some of the local leaders and use airstrikes and covert operations to capture or kill key figures in the insurgency.

This is not solely a Petraeus notion. The White House spokesman was quick to say the President agreed with Secretary of Defense Gates and Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that “the implementation of a new strategy in Afghanistan called for new military leadership". And, perhaps ironically, Obama has played into Petraeus' hands. Even though he effectively approved the military's request for an additional 30,000 troops this years, the President's hesitation reinforced the idea that the US will have to succeed with smaller but mobile units rather than overwhelming force.

To call this a fantasy too far would be kind. Iraq, a country of 25 million, could not be pacified by US operations in 2003. (Indeed, if McKiernan wanted to strike back at his critics and the compliant media, he could note: his complaint that the American force for post-Saddam occupation is now generally accepted wisdom.) Now Petraeus is pursuing the same goal in a country of 75 million. He is doing so with a Karzai Government that is trying to establish some independence from Washington and with little apparent knowledge of the intricacies of Afghan politics. Even the symbolic of General McChrystal's record with US special operations has a downside: "He will be confronted with deep tensions over the conduct of Special Operations forces in Afghanistan, whose aggressive tactics are seen by Afghan officials as responsible for many of the American mistakes that have resulted in the deaths of civilians."

In the end, little of this may matter to Petraeus, who could be in a no-lose situation: if his strategy checks the insurgency, he gets the credit. If it does not, he can put the blame on political superiors who didn't give him enough troops or on an Afghan Government that is beyond redemption.

For now, it's David Petraeus' war. But the beauty of his strategic move --- not in Central Asia but in Washington --- is that he can always hand it back if it goes wrong.

Meanwhile in Iraq: Iran Looks for a Border Settlement

Iran Review has posted an intriguing article, translated from the Iranian newspaper Tabnak, by Mirmehrdad Mirsanjanri on "Undecided Fate of Iran’s Longest Border". As Iran pursues its own political reconciliation with a Baghdad asserting its independence from US oversight, the thorough review has a clear objective:

Implementation of the 1975 Algiers Accord and precise demarcation of joint borders 20 years after the Iraqi war against Iran (1980-88) will help forge a formal and lasting peace between the two neighboring countries and lead to the Iranian people’s trust in the Iraqi government’s goodwill.

Undecided Fate of Iran’s Longest Border

Iran’s 1485-km border with Iraq is the longest land border in the country. At the same time it has been one of the most disputed borders between Iranian and Ottoman governments over the past 100 years from the Safavid era onwards.

Following disintegration of the Ottoman Empire in 1920 and creation of a state called Iraq, the dispute continued under all the Iraqi governments from the monarchy to the republican rule of Abdul Ghasem and after him under the Baathist rule. The 1975 Algiers Accord which was inked between Iran and Iraq after lengthy talks between leaders of the countries put an end to the border dispute forever. The agreement specified the land borders with slight changes in favor of Iraq and the Arvand River (Shatt al-Arab) was divided between the two countries through the Thalweg line.

It is to be noted that Iran’s western borders are the only borders shaped without intervention of British colonialism and Russia. The Russians took Aran and Shervan (present day Azerbaijan Republic) through the Golestan Agreement in 1813. They also separated Armenia and Nakhichevan from Iran through the Turkmanchai Accord 15 years later, namely in 1828. Britain too took Herat and Afghanistan away from Iran by imposing the 1850 Agreement. They also separated a major part of Baluchestan from Iran in 1905 and annexed it to their East India Empire.

Contemplation on the situation of Iran’s borders with Iraq located in the Kurdish regions in the north and Arab populated regions in the south makes implementation of the 1975 border agreement inevitable. The successor Iraqi government’s refusal to fulfill its commitment to the accord has received little attention due to the brotherly aids of Iran to the Iraqi people. Failure in border demarcation has caused the Iraqi troops and coalition forces stationed in Iraq to penetrate 500m to 1 km into the Iranian borders on some occasions in open violation of IRI’s territorial integrity.

In the meantime, Iraqi troops maintain a presence in the Iranian section of Arvand River (Shatt al-Arab) every now and then claiming to be in the Iraqi waters. To this we must add repeated violations by Iraqi thugs of Iranian waterway in Arvand River. Under the critical conditions in the region where foreigners intend to harm ethnic solidarity of Iranian tribes it is imperative for the Iranian government to make the Iraqi side respect the 1975 Algiers Accord.

Implementation of the 1975 Algiers Accord and precise demarcation of joint borders 20 years after the Iraqi war against Iran (1980-88) will help forge a formal and lasting peace between the two neighboring countries and lead to the Iranian people’s trust in the Iraqi government’s goodwill.

Meantime, establishment of security in the western borders of the country in addition to thwarting global threats against Iran’s territorial integrity will result in an economic boost for the people of these regions. Let’s not forget that to safeguard every inch of Iran’s land and water borders, the blood of hundreds of thousands of Iranian youth has been shed. Therefore, the Iranian nation will accept no negligence towards practical execution of the 1975 Algiers Accord.

Before waging his war against Iran in 1980, former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein appeared before TV and news media and impudently tore up the 1975 Algiers Accord on the pretext that Iraq’s rights had been overlooked in the international agreement.

And now six years into the fall of Saddam Hussein, the successor Iraqi government has not only failed to show its practical commitment to the agreement and pay war reparations to Iran but we hear Iraqi officials speaking about the need to revise the agreement and urging Tehran to forego the war reparations Baghdad must pay after it was identified by the UN as the aggressor party in the war.

A prominent Iraqi official said in an interview with Al-Arabiya TV network that he had explicitly asked Tehran to skip the war reparations. He also said those who are seeking war reparations are agents of Israel!

However, I would like to drawn the attention of the Iraqi officials to the following points:

1. The 1975 Algiers Accord is a formal and international agreement prepared on the basis of international law; it can neither be abrogated unilaterally nor can it be altered or revised with the change of governments.

2. The war reparations Iraq must pay to Iran do not belong to certain individuals or groups so they would have the right to forgo them. The money rather belongs to each and every Iranian who has tolerated the sufferings of the war with their flesh and blood. In the Iraqi imposed war which is known as the longest classic war in the 20th century, about one million Iranians were martyred, injured, maimed or suffered chemical wounds. The number of those suffering from the mental and psychological impacts of the war is much higher. Moreover, many Iranian families are still looking for their beloved ones who are missing in action. Therefore, it is the Iranian nation who has a right to make a decision on how to deal with the war reparation issue.

3. The refusal by the Iraqi establishment to pay war reparations to Iran is not called courage. Courage means for the Iraqi government to formally apologize to Iranians and announce its readiness to pay the war reparations. On the other hand, real courage by the Iraqi government would be in its firm decision to oust the American and British troops from its land.

4. Undoubtedly for the countries present in Iraq which have drawn up long term plans to plunder Iraq’s abundant wealth the payment of war reparations would be a bitter pill to swallow. By resorting to various schemes, including pressuring the Iraqi officials who have close ties with Iran, these countries are trying to make the Iranian government give up the rights of the present and future generations.

5. The Iraqi war against Iran, according to estimates of experts, caused a delay of 50 years in Iran’s economic and social development. Therefore, the war reparation of 1000 billion dollars would make up only for part of the damage the Iranian people have suffered and will suffer in the future.

6. Leveling “Israeli agents” charges against advocates of the Iranian people’s rights is just a ploy to deceive the people and would have no result for the Iraqi government but to provoke the pan-Arab sentiments of Arabs.

7. While reparations of the short war (Persian Gulf War) amounting to billions is being regularly paid by Iraq to other parties and considering that Iraq is in possession of the largest oil reserves (approx. 200 billion barrels), the Iraqi officials’ refusal to pay war reparations to Iran is not acceptable nor can it be justified in any way.

8. There is no doubt that there are numerous cultural and historical commonalties between Iranians and Iraqi Shias, but what can really establish peace between the two countries after 20 years is for the Iraqi government to respect the UN Security Council Resolution 598, pay war reparations as the aggressor party, and show practical respect for the 1975 Algiers Accord.

9. According to the international law, the change of governments would not clear their successors of respecting the commitments of their predecessors. The Japanese government had to apologize to the Korean people 40 years after committing crimes against them. After the lapse of 60 years since the World War II and despite the coming to power of many governments, the German government is still paying compensation to the war victims.

10. After the goodwill of the Iraqi side in execution of the 1975 Algiers Accord is proved and after Baghdad officially apologizes to the Iranian nation and declares its readiness to pay war reparations, the Iranians could also prove their goodwill through some proposals on mechanisms of payment of war reparations. This could include payment on long term installments; exclusive and long term development by Iran of Iraq’s rich oilfields; or contributions by the countries which aided Iraq in its war against Iran to pay the reparations.