Video and Transcript: Dick Cheney on Fox News (12 May)

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Related Post: Video and Transcript of Dick Cheney on “Face the Nation” (10 May)

Yep, him again. Fed lines by Fox's Neil Cavuto, Cheney blew more smoke with the demand that Government memoranda providing the effectiveness of torture be released, covering up the inconvenience that Government memoranda have been released and demonstrate the ineffectiveness of "enhanced interrogation". He raged against the next symbolic moment, the possible release of hundreds of photographs of the programme (think Abu Ghraib, magnified many times), and repeated how Obama is endangering the nation and the world.



CAVUTO: We’re getting word that by May 28th, up to potentially 2,000 pictures are going to be released by the White House showing various interrogation methods, up to 2,000. What do you think of that?

CHENEY: Well, I guess what I think is important is that there be some balance to what is being released. The fact of the matter is the administration appears to be committed to putting out information that sort of favors their point of views in terms of being opposed to, for example, enhanced interrogation techniques.

But so far they’ve refused to put out memos that were done by the CIA that I’ve requested be declassified that show the positive results of the detainee program, and all of the information and the intelligence we were able to garner from these high-value detainees.

CAVUTO: And you say there are at least two such CIA memos that point to...

CHENEY: Two specifically that I requested.

CAVUTO: To the enhanced interrogation and that it did yield results.

CHENEY: Yes, well, that specifically talked about detainees, about the contributions that we got to our overall intelligence picture. Publicly General Hayden, who used to be director of the CIA, said as late as 2006 a majority of the intelligence we had gotten about al Qaeda came from detainees, high-value targets like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, like Abu Zubaydah, people that we captured during the course of our campaign against al Qaeda.

And they, of course, were obviously also the people that the debate has focused on with respect to enhanced interrogation techniques. So I...

CAVUTO: Have you spoken to anyone in the White House lately about this? And did they give you a head’s up, we’re going to release all of these interrogation...

(CROSSTALK)

CHENEY: Well, what I did was make a formal request for declassification through the National Archives, which is the way you do it, and then it goes out to the agency responsible, in this case, the CIA. And I’m still awaiting a formal answer from them.

CAVUTO: Your daughter, Liz, was on a rival news network this morning.

CHENEY: She was.

CAVUTO: And she made the comment that the White House should have called my dad, I’m paraphrasing here, Mr. Vice President, but it was clearly -- the inference was that that did not happen.

What happened? When this whole dust-up started happening on interrogation and then eliminating waterboarding, did anyone from the White House give you or President Bush a head’s up that this policy was about to be reversed?

CHENEY: Well, I didn’t discuss it with anybody in the administration, but I’m not offended by that. They campaigned all across the country, from one end of the country to the other against enhanced interrogation techniques, and made it very clear they were opposed to that. They called it torture.

I don’t believe it was torture. We had attorneys who gave us a clear guidance as to what was appropriate and what wasn’t. The reason we’ve gotten into this debate at all is because the administration saw fit to go back and release OLC opinions, opinions out of the Office of Legal Counsel and the Justice Department dealing with its classified program.

Now that’s a very rare occurrence. You don’t ordinarily release those opinions, especially when it deals with classified programs. They did it in a way that sort of blocked so far any real discussion of the results of the program, and instead focused upon the techniques themselves.

And they really began the debate then with the suggestions that perhaps people should be prosecuted for having participated in the program or the lawyers who gave us these opinions should be disbarred. I think it’s an outrage.

I think the proposition that a new administration can come in and in effect launch an attack on their predecessor because they disagreed with the legal advice that was given by the Justice Department or because they find that they don’t like the policies that were pursued by the prior administration.

It’s one thing to come in and change the policy, it’s an entirely different proposition to come in and say that you’re somehow going to go after the lawyers and the Justice Department or the agents who carried out that policy. I just -- I think that’s outrageous. And that’s why I’ve spoken out as I have to defend the policy and...

(CROSSTALK)

CAVUTO: But you have, but President Bush has not. And that, to your critics, is a sign of his statesmanship and your lack of it. What do you make of that?

CHENEY: Well, I don’t pay a lot of attention to what the critics say, obviously. From my standpoint, that a notion that I should remain silent while they go public, that I shouldn’t say anything while they threaten to disbar the lawyers who gave us the advice that was crucial in terms of this program, that I shouldn’t say anything when they go out and release information that they believe is critical of the program and critical of our policies, but refuse to put out information that shows the results of what we were able to achieve.

Bottom line is we successfully defended the nation for seven and a half years against a follow-on attack to 9/11. That was a remarkable achievement. Nobody would have thought that was possible, but it was. I believe it was possible because of the policies we had in place, which they’re now dismantling.

CAVUTO: So by that definition, are we more likely to be attacked now? Is that what you’re saying?

CHENEY: I think that we are stripping ourselves of some of the capabilities that we used in order to block, if you will, or disrupt activities by al Qaeda that would have led to additional attacks. I think that’s an important debate to have. I don’t think we should just roll over when the new administration says -- accuses of us committing torture, which we did not, or somehow violating the law, which we did not. I think you need to stand up and respond to that, and that’s what I’ve done.

CAVUTO: Have you raised this with President Bush? Have you talked with him and said, look, I’m going to go out and I’m going to be talking to Fox, I’m going to be talking, I want to let the world know how I feel?

CHENEY: You know, I’ve had a number of conversations on the telephone since January 20th.

CAVUTO: Any recently?

CHENEY: Those are -- oh, it’s been a couple of weeks. But we’re...

CAVUTO: How were those conversations? What do you talk about?

CHENEY: Well, those were private when we were in the White House and they remain so today.

CAVUTO: So you’re not going to tell me?

CHENEY: No.

CAVUTO: OK. Fine.

All right. We’re getting word out of “The Jerusalem Post,” Mr. Vice President, that Iran has deployed mobile ground-to-air and ground-to- sea missiles along the Strait of Hormuz, and perhaps beyond, in the Persian Gulf.

How bad is this getting?

CHENEY: Well, I haven’t seen the reports. I think it’s important to be aware of or recognize that Straits of Hormuz obviously are a key waterway, not just from the standpoint of the United States, but that about -- these numbers are rough, but about 20 percent of the world’s oil supply passes through those straits every day. It’s something close to 18, 19 million barrels that come out of the Gulf, come out of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, and so forth. That’s the major export route, if you will, and so anything that potentially threatens the free flow of that traffic, obviously, would be of concern.

CAVUTO: Well, what they’re obviously doing is saying, you attack us, then we respond in spades (ph). And then the whole world is dealing with $100, $200 a barrel oil, right?

CHENEY: Well, I don’t know what they’re doing, obviously. I can’t speak for what the Iranians are up to. They’re difficult enough to follow when you’re talking to them, and we’re not talking to them and haven’t for a long time. But I do think...

CAVUTO: Well, we are making overtures to them, right? CHENEY: Well, the...

CAVUTO: This president is trying, and that the time for that type of behavior, as well as opening up more to folks like Hugo Chavez and all, the time is now for that, because we got nowhere (ph) this administration is doing. But you did, which was effectively to isolate these guys.

What do you make of that?

CHENEY: The Iranians have a track record. We tried to resolve the issue diplomatically. We worked with our European friends and allies. We tried to persuade them that they did not need to enrich uranium to weapons grade, that the Russians, for example, were prepared to sell them fuel for their reactor and then take the spent fuel back after the fuel had been used.

A lot of ways for them to acquire nuclear power-generating capabilities without producing weapons. They clearly seem to be in the business of wanting to produce weapons. We were unable to talk them out of it previously, and there was a very serious effort diplomatically, working through the United Nations and with the EU3, the way we refer to them, the British and the Germans and the French.

The fact is that, as far as we know, they’re still in the business of trying to produce that capability, and that would be a fundamental threat not only to the folks in the immediate region, but potentially others around the world, including the United States. They’re working on missile technology, and they can marry up a weapon with the missile, and they become a formidable power.

CAVUTO: President Obama is going to be in Egypt next month (INAUDIBLE), which he will use that nation as an address to the Muslim world. He is not stopping by Israel when he is in the neighborhood, so to speak. What do you make of that?

CHENEY: I don’t know that it has any significance. But obviously, I haven’t been part of scheduling for the new administration, so I don’t know what considerations go into that. But I don’t think I can attribute motives one way or the other.

CAVUTO: So, to Israelis who are concerned that maybe this administration, again, with a vested interest for the whole region at heart, is more inclined to engage Muslim nations, maybe even some radical nations. It’s giving some Israelis pause. Should it?

CHENEY: Well, I think it’s giving not only Israelis pause, it’s also - excuse me - creating concerns on the part of nearly everybody in the region. And I would put in that category, although I haven’t talked to him recently, the Saudis, the Gulf states, the Emirates and so forth, because they have been more concerned in recent years about developments in Iran than anything else, than any other issue in the area or the region. And that’s because they believe if you - if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, it’ll fundamentally change the dynamic in that part of the world.

CAVUTO: How close are they, by the way, do you think?

CHENEY: Well, you can get all kinds of estimates. They clearly have installed thousands of centrifuges. That’s their claim. But there have been inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency that can give us fairly precise information on how many centrifuges are installed and so forth. In terms of how close they are, I - you know, there are estimates, but I can’t give you a precise read or take on how much it is.

CAVUTO: Well, what would U.S. policy be, Mr. Vice President, if were to see Benjamin Netanyahu act alone, unilaterally to take out those centrifuges?

CHENEY: Well, I can’t speak for the administration, obviously, and that’s where you need to go to find out.

CAVUTO: What would you think?

CHENEY: I would find it that it would be a reflection of the fact that the Israelis believe this is an existential threat to the state of Israel. That Iran has taken a position and supported it over the years, that Israel should cease to exist, should go out of business, and Iran remains one of the prime sponsors of terror in the world, especially Hezbollah, and that all things considered, I think the Israelis look at developments in Iran, and they have stated publicly that they believe a nuclear-armed Iran is something that fundamentally threatens their existence. So, I would expect them to try to do something about it.

CAVUTO: Soon?

CHENEY: I can’t predict that. I don’t - I obviously don’t know, and can’t predict what they’ll do or when they’ll do it.

CAVUTO: Defense Secretary Robert Gates fired General David McKiernan from leading (ph) Afghanistan and said that whatever we were doing - I’m paraphrasing here, sir - wasn’t working and that we need more of a special-operations guy than we supposedly have now, and saying that the battle game and plan for Afghanistan has changed. Has it?

CHENEY: I think there’s been a significant increase, obviously, in the focus on Afghanistan, which I think is good. We had completed a review of our policy in Afghanistan shortly before we left office, and then decided that we would not put it out at that point, that that would feed into whatever the Obama administration wanted to do and might help them form a sounder policy. One of the things they’ve done and I think makes good sense is send more troops. I also believe the decision yesterday to send Stan McChrystal, lieutenant general, to take over in Afghanistan is a very good one. Stan’s an absolutely outstanding officer. I’m not saying anything critical of General McKiernan, who’s leaving. But Stan McChrystal was head of the Joint Special Operations Command. He’s been a superb officer...

CAVUTO: So, you support that choice?

CHENEY: I think the choice is excellent, and you’d be hard put to find anybody better than Stan McChrystal to take on that assignment.

CAVUTO: If you don’t mind, sir, I’d like to go back to terror (ph) for a second, and...

CHENEY: Excuse me.

CAVUTO: Sure. Nancy Pelosi has been caught up in when did she know and how much did she know, as far as the waterboarding issue, elevated interrogation techniques, and says she was aware of a 2003 meeting, but the way it’s been characterized that she was aware of all the details is wrong, and that painting (ph) her any other way is wrong. What do you make of that?

CHENEY: I don’t know the specifics of what sessions she was in. I know she was listed in a memorandum I’ve seen, a timeline that talks about when various members were briefed that the agencies produced in the last few days as public documents.

CAVUTO: When you say “briefed,” briefed on specifically waterboarding?

CHENEY: Briefed on enhanced interrogation techniques.

CAVUTO: That include waterboarding.

CHENEY: I don’t know. I wasn’t in the meetings, and I can’t speak to the content of the meetings. I know what the intention was. I know that the CIA basically took the responsibility of briefing members of Congress, a few in number, chairman and ranking member of the intelligence committees about the program.

CAVUTO: Congresswoman Jane Harman was among those who did write the letter of protest.

CHENEY: I don’t know about that, but I...

CAVUTO: Now, she passed along her concern to Nancy Pelosi , who I guess went through the legislative channels, who didn’t want to disrupt the legislative channels, to let her do the speaking, if I’m interpreting it correctly. But what...

CHENEY: You’re down in the weeds now.

CAVUTO: I guess I am.

CHENEY: I’m generally, obviously, aware of the program. I’m aware of the fact...

CAVUTO: Would you say more (ph) people knew than are saying so about these interrogation techniques?

CHENEY: I think it paralleled the surveillance program, for example, the terrorist surveillance program that we ran where I ran the briefings. And we briefed every few months the chairman and ranking member, and at one point, the “Big 9,” the speaker and majority and minority leaders in the House and Senate, on the substance of the program, on what we were doing, on how we were doing it, sought their advice and guidance on whether we should continue it.

CAVUTO: Well, do you remember any of them, Mr. Vice President, saying, whoa, whoa, whoa! This is a little too far for our tastes. We don’t want this.

CHENEY: No. On the terrorist surveillance program, after we’d given them the brief in the Situation Room in the basement - I presided over it - I went around the table and asked if they thought we should continue the program. They were unanimous. Then I asked if they thought we should...

CAVUTO: Who was unanimous?

CHENEY: The speaker, the majority and minority leader of the House and Senate, as well as the chairman and ranking member of the Intelligence Committee.

CAVUTO: On everything that had been stipulated, including these interrogations?

CHENEY: No, on the terrorist surveillance program.

CAVUTO: Gotcha.

CHENEY: I’m just giving you an example. And then I asked if they thought we should go back and get additional congressional authority, and they said absolutely not. That would reveal the existence of the program. And I think what happened with respect to enhanced interrogation techniques is, the CIA did go up. They did brief the relevant people, and I think what often happens in these circumstances is once a controversy develops, then some of the people that were briefed get forgetful.

CAVUTO: Let me just, on one last foreign policy issue before we hit on some economics. I know your time is tight. On Gitmo. The administration’s intelligence director had said that detainees who are just misplaced and are here have a right to, among other things, and could get who are just misplaced and are here, have a right, to among other things, and could get welfare, for example. How do you feel about that?

CHENEY: I think it’s a terrible idea. While we were running things at Guantanamo, there were several hundred people that processed through there, that were held there for a period of time and were ultimately sent back to their home countries.

The ones that are remaining, about 245, are the hardcore, the worst of the worst. They’re cases have been reviewed, they were given an review down at Guantanamo, and they were kept in custody because we believe they constituted a threat to the United States, so they had some continuing value.

Of those that were released, we had about a 12 percent recidivism rate, 12 percent that went back into the terrorism business. I think the recidivism on the ones that are still there would be far higher. It includes people like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the mastermind of 9/11.

Now, I think they’re having a very hard time finding anybody around the world who wants to take these folks. I know when we tried to place a few Uighurs, Chinese terrorists...

CAVUTO: Right, right.

CHENEY: And while we were still in office, ultimately, the only country that would take them was Albania. Everybody else rejected them.

CAVUTO: Where do you think they’re going to end up?

CHENEY: Well, I think they need to keep Guantanamo open. I think it’s a mistake to try to close it. I think if you didn’t have it, you’d have to invent it. If you bring those people to the United States, I don’t know a single congressman who is going to stand up and say, gee, send me some terrorists. I’d like to have some al Qaeda-types living in my district. That’s not going to happen.

So I think they’re going to find someplace where they can locate these folks. Guantanamo is a great facility. It’s very well run. These people are very well treated. It’s open to inspection by the International Red Cross and the press and so forth. It’s a good facility, it’s an important program, and we ought to continue it.

CAVUTO: Senator Biden was making his, today, spin to a union group, saying, we have to rebuild the middle class and the way to do that is to help labor unions grow. What do you make of that?

CHENEY: Well, I’m not anti-labor union. I carried a ticket for six years in the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers in my youth. I built power line transmission line all over Wyoming, Utah, Colorado. That’s how I paid for my education. So, I’m not anti-union.

I do think the legislation that the administration is supporting and that the unions are pushing hard, the so-called Card Check Law, would do away with a secret ballot in terms of the question of organizing unions. I think it would be a huge mistake. I don’t think we want to get into the business where we make it easier for there to be the kind of intimidation that we’ve sometimes seen in these operations in the past and where people wouldn’t be able to cast a secret ballot in terms of whether or not they want to join a union.

CAVUTO: Jack Welt (ph) said they be deliteriates (ph) to our economic recovery. Do you agree?

CHENEY: Well, I always felt that what Ronald Reagan did back in 1981in the early part of his administration when he was very tough with the air traffic controllers was a good, sound, solid move. I think that, as I say, people want to join a union, fine. That’s their business. There are provisions for that that allow unions to be represented.

But I think what the unions are trying to do here is dramatically expand the base in terms of membership and they will, in turn, generate vast sums of money in terms of dues and political contributions. And I think it does have wide- ranging ramifications and that the current system where we have secret ballots for people to decide whether or not want to be represented by unions is a good way to go. We ought to preserve it.

CAVUTO: You mentioned Ronald Regan, sir, and Jeb Bush made some news recently made some news recently saying that the party, and I’ll paraphrase here, obsesses a bit too much about Ronald Regan and have got to move on and move forward. What do make of that?

CHENEY: Well, I like Jeb. I think he’s a good man. I’d like to see him continue to say involved politically.

CAVUTO: For president?

CHENEY: I’d probably support him for president.

CAVUTO: Would you really?

CHENEY: He’s a good man.

CAVUTO: Over Mitt Romney?

CHENEY: I’m not - I’m not endorsing anybody today. I’m not...

CAVUTO: Any candidate you like?

CHENEY: I’m not in the business of endorsing anybody at this point, Neil. But I’m a big fan of Jeb’s.

I think, in terms of the Regan legacy, I think it’s important to the party. I think it was a period of time when we had an administration that understood that the engine that drives the American economy is the private sector. That one of the things that was most important from the standpoint of government was to get out of the way of the private sector and let small businesses grow and develop and create jobs and create wealth. You had to reduce the tax burden to the maximum percent possible. Exactly the opposite of the kind of policies we see coming out of the administration today when we’re experiencing a vast - a proposal for a vast increase in the power of the government over the private sector.

CAVUTO: Without, you know, any regard for party, it started with your administration, right? I mean, the bailout, the financial bailouts of the banks and looking to help the auto companies being in very dire economic moments, certainly, was started by you and President Bush.

CHENEY: Well...

CAVUTO: Do you regret any of that?

CHENEY: I disagreed with bailing out the automobile companies. I would have encouraged the process to go forward for a Chapter 11.

(CROSSTALK)

CAVUTO: What about the banks?

CHENEY: ...to go.

The banks were different. And the reason the banks are different is because they are part of the financial system that is the heart and soul of our economy. And the federal government has major responsibilities for the health of our financial institutions. You’ve got the Federal Reserve, the Treasury, the FDIC, SEC, et cetera. And when the markets began to seize up, when people couldn’t get credit any more, when the collapse, for example, of the subprime mortgage market and so forth, put at risk the basic fundamental health of our economy because it threatened that core of our financial system and there isn’t anybody other than the federal government that can fix it. And therefore, we felt that we had no choice. But it’s still...

(CROSSTALK)

CAVUTO: But it’s still in shaky shape, right? After all...

CHENEY: It’s still in shaky shape, but there are...

(CROSSTALK)

CAVUTO: ... bankruptcy like you recommended for the auto companies be applied to the banks...

CHENEY: Not for the banks.

CAVUTO: Really?

CHENEY: I really think that would have been a serious problem when you have...

CAVUTO: Now, what did you see, can you say now, what did everyone see that was going to be so horrific that ...

CHENEY: Well, when we have the secretary of the Treasury or the secretary of the Treasury and the chairman of the Federal Reserve come in and say we’ve got a major crisis on our hands and within 48 hours major financial institutions are going to go down in flames. Or that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac that dominated the mortgage market out there were suddenly in trouble financially because of the collapse of the subprime mortgage...

CAVUTO: But you must have seen where that was going, right? What you do for one, all expecting then - it’s an expectations game, right?

CHENEY: Right. But again, I think you’ve got to, and we did, make a distinction about the financial sector, because it is different than the other parts of the economy. The other parts of the economy can’t function without a strong financial sector, without credit, without sound monetary policy and actions by the government and the Federal Reserve to establish and maintain the value of our currency. Trying

CAVUTO: But now we’ve got the president, the government dictating salaries at these institutions rescued - which, I guess, happens if you take taxpayer dollars - and dictating their very business, right?

CHENEY: Well, the thing I find objectionable is that people are taking what was done with respect to the financial sector and without discriminating, trying to do the same thing for a broader range of sectors. And think that’s a mistake.

CAVUTO: Do you think it went too far?

CHENEY: I think so. I would have kept it focused on the financial institutions. But I do - I worry that the current situation is a set of circumstances where the administration is using the excuse of the economic difficulties in order to significantly broaden the power and authority of the government over the private sector. I think that’s a huge mistake.

CAVUTO: In “The Wall Street Journal’s” story that has it that the president’s tax hikes actually go in to those earning $235,000, not $250,000. What do you think of that?

CHENEY: I haven’t seen the story, but I worry. I don’t see any way you can do what he’s trying to do in terms of the vast expansion of governmental programs and the huge federal deficit and major tax increases without the kind of tax increases that are going to hit virtually every American.

CAVUTO: Do you think it stops at 39.6 percent?

CHENEY: I’m afraid it won’t, not if you go with a government of the size and scale that the administration apparently envisions.

CAVUTO: What do you envision that we’ll ultimately get to?

CHENEY: Well, I’d much prefer a situation in which we did not embark upon a course of the vast expansion of the authority of the federal government over the private sector. I’d be much more focused on tax cuts and reducing the economic burden on the private sector that the federal government represents as the best way to get the economy up and running again. I think you need to create jobs, you need to support small business, you need to encourage people to go out and save and invest and create the kind of entrepreneurial activity that really has given us the greatness that is the American economy, not expand the size of the federal government.

CAVUTO: Finally, Mr. Vice President, many have urged the Republican Party to moderate, to get more mainstream, to do what Democrats did at the time that Bill Clinton in the late ‘80s into ‘92, become more palatable to a wider section of the population. What do you say?

CHENEY: I think we need to run a party that is broadly based, where people of a wide variety of viewpoints are welcome. I don’t think we ought to change the basic fundamental philosophy of the Republican Party. I personally am a conservative Republican. I obviously believe in my philosophy, and I think that’s the basis upon which we have to build any resurgence of our party. I think we will, but I think we’ll do it by being true to our principles, not becoming more like the Democrats.

CAVUTO: So, you don’t think you’d isolate the Republicans going your route?

CHENEY: No.

CAVUTO: Mr. Vice President, thank you very, very much.

CHENEY: Pleasure as always, Neil.

CAVUTO: Thank you very much.

CHENEY: Good to see you.

Now It's Petraeus' War: US Replaces Top Commander in Afghanistan

GENERAL DAVID MCKIERNAN

Yesterday, I was speaking to British high school students when one asked, "What are President Obama's three greatest challenges today?" After putting the economy Number One and listing (but dismissing) Republican opposition as a potential Number Two, I said:

But I'm concerned that it will be Afghanistan and Pakistan that will bring him down. I think he's being overtaken by his own military, especially General David Petraeus [the head of US Central Command] and their ideas of "strategy".

Before I got home, the news came through: the Obama Adminstration had replaced the commander of NATO and US forces in Afghanistan, General David McKiernan.

My initial reaction was, OK, generals get replaced. They are moved to other military posts or return to Washington for a break from the field. Then, however, the details piled in. McKiernan had done only 11 months of a command tour that normally last 18 to 24 months. He had been ousted, even as the US is planning to pour more troops into a "crisis", and replaced with General Stanley McChrystal, the director of the military's Joint Staff and, before that, head of US Special Operations Forces in Iraq.

All of which pointed to the re-branding of the Afghanistan conflict. This is not Secretary of Defense Robert Gates' war. This is not President Obama's war.

This one has been claimed by David Petraeus.

Gates, announcing McKiernan's departure, was not shy about kicking the general out the door. McKiernan had "probably" had his career cut short because “a new approach was probably in our best interest”. He added, "Fresh eyes were needed."

So what were wrong with those eyes? After all, the commander was no lightweight: he had led US ground troops in the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Pentagon officials piled on the criticism, "General McKiernan...had been removed primarily because he had brought too conventional an approach to the challenge." His honour was to be "the first general to be dismissed from command of a theater of combat since Douglas MacArthur during the Korean War".

In contrast, the officials noted that General McChrystal had led the American forces who captured Saddam Hussein and later killed insurgent leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq: "his success in using intelligence and firepower to track and kill insurgents, and his training in unconventional warfare that emphasizes the need to protect the population, made him the best choice for the command in Afghanistan".

Translation? McKiernan is a "big force" leader. His background is an officer in armoured units, and he led the calls in Iraq for a much larger ground force than that used to occupy the country. McChrystal, on the other hand, is able to organise and direct small, elite units that can strike quickly.

Make no mistake, however. As The New York Times politely frames it, "The change also reflects the influence of Gen. David H. Petraeus." Their emphasis is on a personal battle: Petraeus served under McKiernan in Iraq but eventually overtook him in rank and, again according to Pentagon officials, "the two men did not develop a bond after General Petraeus inherited General McKiernan as his Afghanistan commander".

More importantly, Petraeus is preparing his supposed strategy for victory. His reputation has been built on the mythical or real success of the Iraq "surge" from 2007. While that relied on an increase in US troops, it emphasized the deployment of specialist units to work with local Sunni militias while using Special Forces in "surgical" strikes against the bad guys. The big military idea is that the same approach can work in Afghanistan. Hook up with some of the local leaders and use airstrikes and covert operations to capture or kill key figures in the insurgency.

This is not solely a Petraeus notion. The White House spokesman was quick to say the President agreed with Secretary of Defense Gates and Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that “the implementation of a new strategy in Afghanistan called for new military leadership". And, perhaps ironically, Obama has played into Petraeus' hands. Even though he effectively approved the military's request for an additional 30,000 troops this years, the President's hesitation reinforced the idea that the US will have to succeed with smaller but mobile units rather than overwhelming force.

To call this a fantasy too far would be kind. Iraq, a country of 25 million, could not be pacified by US operations in 2003. (Indeed, if McKiernan wanted to strike back at his critics and the compliant media, he could note: his complaint that the American force for post-Saddam occupation is now generally accepted wisdom.) Now Petraeus is pursuing the same goal in a country of 75 million. He is doing so with a Karzai Government that is trying to establish some independence from Washington and with little apparent knowledge of the intricacies of Afghan politics. Even the symbolic of General McChrystal's record with US special operations has a downside: "He will be confronted with deep tensions over the conduct of Special Operations forces in Afghanistan, whose aggressive tactics are seen by Afghan officials as responsible for many of the American mistakes that have resulted in the deaths of civilians."

In the end, little of this may matter to Petraeus, who could be in a no-lose situation: if his strategy checks the insurgency, he gets the credit. If it does not, he can put the blame on political superiors who didn't give him enough troops or on an Afghan Government that is beyond redemption.

For now, it's David Petraeus' war. But the beauty of his strategic move --- not in Central Asia but in Washington --- is that he can always hand it back if it goes wrong.

Transcript: Gates-Mullen Briefing on US Command Change in Afghanistan

SEC. GATES: First, I would like to express my horror and deep regret over today's shooting incident at Camp Liberty in Iraq. I offer my sympathy and condolences to the families of those who were killed. We are still in the process of gathering information on exactly what happened, but if the preliminary reports are confirmed, such a tragic loss of life at the hands of our own forces is a cause for great and urgent concern, and I can assure you that it will get this department's highest-priority attention.

As you know, I just returned from a trip to Afghanistan, where I met with our troops and commanders in the field. My purpose in going was to see firsthand the preparations and plans under way to execute the president's strategy for the region, especially as significantly more American troops begin arriving in country. I thought it critically important to get a sense from the ground level what needs -- what the needs are, what the challenges are and what the solutions to some of the problems are.

As I have said many times before, very few of these problems can be solved by military means alone. And yet, from the military perspective, we can and must do better. We have not been able to fully resource our military effort in Afghanistan in recent years, but I believe, resources or no, that our mission there requires new thinking and new approaches from our military leaders. Today we have a new policy set by our new president. We have a new strategy, a new mission and a new ambassador. I believe that new military leadership also is needed.

After consultation with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commander of Central Command, and with the approval of the president, I have asked for the resignation of General David McKiernan. He will remain in command of both ISAF and U.S. Forces Afghanistan until such time as a relief can be nominated and confirmed.

I am today recommending to the president that Lieutenant General Stanley McChrystal be nominated to replace General McKiernan as commander U.S. Forces Afghanistan.

I am also recommending that Lieutenant General David Rodriguez be assigned to the new position of deputy commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan. I have advised the secretary general of NATO and the minister of defense of Afghanistan of these prospective changes.

I made these decisions only after careful consideration of a great number of factors, including the advice of Admiral Mullen and General Petraeus. In the end, I believe my decisions are in the best interests of our national security and the success of our mission in Afghanistan. I urge the Senate to swiftly confirm Generals McChrystal and Rodriguez so they can begin their important work as soon as possible.

Let none of this detract from, nor cause us ever to forget, General McKiernan's long and distinguished career of military service. For decades, in peace and war, Dave McKiernan has led hundreds of thousands of men and women in uniform with conviction, integrity and courage. He has dedicated his life to the preservation of the freedoms we in this nation enjoy. And on behalf of the Department of Defense and the nation, I thank him for his years of selfless service.

Pam.

Q (Off mike.) Are you worried at all that switching horses in midstream has an air of desperation, or that you -- that you -- what you saw on both of your recent trips there was worse than you had expected to see?

SEC. GATES: Well, let me start and then turn to Admiral Mullen.

I think that the -- as the statement suggested, that -- that with agreement on a new strategy and a new mission, and a new national approach and international approach in Afghanistan, that if there were to be a change, this is the right time to make the change, at a time when we are at the beginning of the implementation of a new strategy. And it is in that context that I emphasize that the focus here is simply on getting fresh thinking, fresh eyes on the problem, and in how we implement the strategy and the mission going forward.

ADM. MULLEN: In fact, for me, based on my recent trips, the opposite is true. In the time that I spent in RC East, I was very encouraged by the progress that we'd made and the depth of understanding of what the requirement was from our people on the military side to generate success.

Clearly that is not the case in the south, because we have not had the forces there, and putting them there this year is critically important. And I would only echo what the secretary said, from the standpoint of, with the new strategy, with the new team across the board, I felt it was very important for new leadership, and supported this decision completely.

Q Mr. Secretary?

Q Admiral Mullen? Mr. -- for both of you gentlemen, while you say you felt there needed to be fresh eyes, fresh thinking, General McKiernan, of course, has only been there for a period of months. He's yet to get the resources he asked the Obama administration for. The troops that he has asked for aren't even there yet.

So what specifically was he not doing that he -- you said you wanted fresh thinking, fresh eyes. Did he resist your ideas? Did he resist change? Was he uncooperative with the new thinking, the new way forward? What went wrong here?

SEC. GATES: Well, first of all, General McKiernan has been in Afghanistan, I think, 11 months. And -- first of all, I would say, nothing went wrong, and there was nothing specific.

It is -- it simply was my conviction, based on my consultations with Admiral Mullen and General Petraeus, that a fresh approach, a fresh look in the context of the new strategy, probably was in our best interest.

Q Mr. Secretary?

Q Admiral Mullen?

Q Admiral Mullen -- excuse me. Admiral Mullen, what -- why couldn't, in your mind -- you said you supported the recommendation; in your mind, why could General McKiernan no longer do the job?

ADM. MULLEN: Again, he's been there almost a year. And, in fact, under normal circumstances, he would have rotated somewhere between 18 and 24 months, depending on timing.

I have said that we must focus all of our effort in terms of making Afghanistan better.

There probably is no more critical ingredient than that -- than leadership. And again, along with all the other changes, it's time now. And that's why I made that recommendation.

Q Is it just loss of confidence? I haven't heard anything yet -- I'm so sorry -- about why you both think he couldn't do the job.

ADM. MULLEN: Well, I'm not going to say a whole lot more, other than the -- I thought there was a need for new leadership -- clearly we have in the two that the secretary -- the two officers that the secretary mentioned a rich experience level -- General Rodriguez in particular deep in Afghanistan, having been there before -- and that I think these two officers will bring a -- not just a renewed but a focus, which we really need in 2009, and I just didn't think that we could wait until 2010.

Q Mr. Secretary, having talked to people who are involved in all this, they say McKiernan was maybe too conventional, too "old Army" in his outlook, not nimble enough to deal with the complex counterinsurgency. And as the admiral mentioned, McChrystal has a lot more experience in Afghanistan. Could you just comment on some of that?

SEC GATES: Well, it's -- you know, I won't -- it's hard to say anything more than we've already said. I would -- Admiral Mullen just talked about the experience that -- in counterinsurgency that both General McChrystal and General Rodriguez have.

I would tell you that those who are speculating on the ingredients in this decision, if it's not Admiral Mullen or me or General Petraeus, has (sic) no inside information on our thinking.

Q So McKiernan just lacked a certain counterinsurgency experience or wasn't nimble enough on this?

SEC. GATES: I think what the admiral said is exactly where we are. It's time for new leadership and fresh eyes. Julian?

Q Secretary Gates, for you, talk to me a little bit more about why General McChrystal and his -- whether it's the Special Operations background came into your thinking.

And Admiral Mullen, if you would talk a little bit about the effort that General McChrystal has been doing for you in terms of how to resource the Afghanistan mission, what -- why you assigned him that, what his mission was in that.

SEC. GATES: I would simply say that both General McChrystal and General Rodriguez bring a unique skill set in counterinsurgency to these issues. And I think that they will provide the kind of new leadership and fresh thinking that the admiral and I have been talking about.

ADM. MULLEN: I just -- for both of them, as -- whenever you look for replacements -- I mean, whenever that occurs, you -- I took a broad range of inputs from military officers.

And McChrystal and Rodriguez rank -- outside this discussion, outside this change, McChrystal and Rodriguez have ranked, for the entire time that I've been chairman, at the top of the list. So we couldn't pick two better officers.

And then specifically, Julian, with respect to the -- the discussions and focus on getting the best people to Afghanistan, making sure that we resource that as rapidly and as thoroughly as possible, making sure that leaders who go there that -- have that experience so that our ramp-up time when we turn over is absolutely minimal -- all of that focuses on the importance of Afghanistan, and actually lessons that we learned from Iraq where some of our rotations would -- you know, we were starting over from an experience level. So it's how to do that and keep that focus and move as fast as we can from a resourcing people, training, expertise standpoint in Afghanistan.

Q Is this something you started thinking about some months ago? And could you also tell us what Ambassador Holbrooke's role might have been in this? And also, when -- did you just tell him today?

SEC. GATES: Ambassador Holbrooke?

Q (Off mike.)

SEC. GATES: No. I talked to him when I was in Afghanistan last week. The answer to part of your question is that Ambassador Holbrooke played no role in this.

Q He had no recommendation, had no thoughts about how --

SEC. GATES: I don't know whether he had any thoughts. He played no role in this.

Q You'd know. (Laughs.)

ADM. MULLEN: No, I mean, he had no role to -- in this at all.

Q Well, can you talk a little bit about how and when you started thinking about this? Is this some months ago? Is it --

ADM. MULLEN: General McKiernan was -- originally planned to be there between 18 and 24 months. So as far back as six or seven months ago, I was looking at his relief, potentially his relief, as well as General Odierno, who's due to leave sometime early in 2010. So there had been discussions about this over an extended period time. I think certainly for me it's been in the last several months, as we've focused heavily on Afghanistan and resourcing it and how we were going to move forward, that this issue -- that the specifics of this really came to bear and that -- that I concluded that it was time for a change, and made that recommendation to the secretary.

Q So is it fair to say that in terms of a -- unique skill sets, that General McChrystal -- for those who don't follow his career, he specializes in black -- commando special operations: the capturing of Saddam Hussein, the killing of Abu Zarqawi, the melding of intelligence and special-ops units in the -- during the surge. Is that what you're looking for from him in terms of Afghanistan -- replicating some of those successes in that terrain?

SEC. GATES: Well, let me say something and then invite the admiral. The way I look at this is as -- McChrystal and Rodriguez as a team. They each bring tremendous skills in a variety of areas that are very pertinent to the kind of fight that we have in Afghanistan. And it is their combined skill set that I think gives us some fresh opportunities looking forward.

ADM. MULLEN: And while General McChrystal has that background that you described, Tony, his background is much deeper and much broader than that. And I've been privileged to work with him over the better part of the last year and seen that, you know, the broadness and the depth that go far beyond just high-end special-operations skills. And I'm extremely confident that he will be able to carry out this mission in its fullness to include, obviously, those skills, but others as well.

Q Those kind of missions, though, to make this more a SOF-like fight?

ADM. MULLEN: I wouldn't be specific about what kind -- you know, exactly the kinds of missions we would increase specifically. But certainly his focus and his background, I think, are very relevant to our needs there. And then -- but it really is also the combination of he and Rodriguez which are so important.

Q Mr. Secretary, you've often said that you were worried about establishing too big a military footprint in Afghanistan. Yet General McKiernan, it seemed like every few months, was asking for more and more and higher levels of forces. Is that one of the areas that wasn't new-think, in your mind? And did you and General McKiernan have a difference there?

SEC. GATES: No, that had nothing to do with it, as far as I was concerned.

Q And about keeping the troop levels lower, you were talking, Admiral Mullen, about the lessons learned in Iraq. Wasn't that one of the lessons learned in Iraq, that we didn't have enough troops in Iraq initially?

ADM. MULLEN: Well, as I've looked at the analysis for what we need, certainly, in the immediate future, the troops we have in the east recently are -- have recently put in there, as well as those going in the south, those meet the needs that we see that we have right now. And I'm very comfortable that they will be able to provide the hold after the clear, which is where we've been short, particularly in the south.

Q Mr. Secretary, can you talk a bit -- now that these changes have been made at the very top, what follow-on changes may take place? I mean, for instance, as an organizational issue, will there be an RC South -- American commands in RC South paralleling RC East? And even in general terms, can you talk about on the ground, tactically, what we may see differently going forward in the months ahead that was not the case up until now?

SEC. GATES: Well, I don't know that I can speak very well to the strategy and tactics going forward. I don't expect there to be a change in the command rotation in RC South. The Dutch are in command now. They will be replaced for -- at the end of a year by the British, who will be in command for a year, and then we will take command in 2010.

And some of the additional troop levels that General McKiernan has asked for are, in fact, a two-star headquarters to support when the U.S. takes command of RC South in the fall of 2010, in November, I think. So I don't anticipate any change in that arrangement.

Q Can you talk even in general terms about what might take place differently on the ground, as far as the prosecution of the war?

SEC. GATES: No, I don't know.

ADM. MULLEN: I think -- I mean, in some ways, we're learning as we go here. I mean, we're -- what General McKiernan has recommended, in terms of the troops that are going there now, are the ones that we're resourcing.

But I'd also certainly want to hear from new leadership what their beliefs are once they get there, get on the ground and make some recommendations about how to move forward as rapidly as possible.

So I'm not aware of any changes. And I wouldn't speak to exactly how they're going to -- how they'd fight it, although I've been briefed, for instance, on, you know, how it's going to apply in the south here over the course of this year.
But certainly with new leadership, there will probably be some fresh views, which we will have very, very good discussions about.

Q Admiral, you said, we can and must do better. And so I'm surprised you don't have any more solid idea of how we need to do better.

ADM. MULLEN: I can't think of a more important decision than putting in new leadership, with respect to that, and then having the impact that is so critical.

Q Actually the secretary said, we must and can do better. Any thoughts on how?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think, that's the challenge that we give to the new leadership. How do we -- how do we do better? What new ideas do you have? What fresh thinking do you have? Are there different ways of accomplishing our goals? How can we be more effective? The admiral and I aren't the source of those ideas. General McChrystal and General Rodriguez are. And that's what we expect from them.

Q Let me ask it a different way. One of the criticisms of General McKiernan was that he hadn't implemented a joint campaign plan, essentially an implementation of the way the strategy would be used on the ground. When the new leadership gets there, do you have a sense that then they will provide new feedback that could change the Af-Pak strategy as we know it? And what might it be?

SEC. GATES: Well, I -- first of all, the new strategy is a strategy approved by the president. And it is a whole-of-government strategy. If there are any changes that they would recommend, it would be in the military part of that strategy.

Q Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Recently North Korea said that if South Korea participated in -- (inaudible) -- then North Korea will regard it as an act of war. What is your comment on this?

SEC. GATES: Well, I've been frankly surprised and disturbed by the kind of rhetoric coming out of North Korea in recent weeks. And I think that North Korea has effectively isolated itself internationally, even greater than was the case before, by some of this rhetoric. But that's what I think it is, rhetoric.

Q (Off mike) -- you can give us any more detail of the shooting in Iraq -- what you know about the soldier, whether he'd been on multiple deployments, whether he was seeking help for combat stress? Are there any details you can give us?

ADM. MULLEN: No, I don't -- I don't have a whole lot more than what -- than that which is already out there. Clearly, the tragedy occurred in a -- in a -- in a place where individuals were -- were seeking help. And I'd also like to certainly extend my condolences and thoughts and prayers to the families of those who were killed.

It does speak to me, though, about the need for us to redouble our efforts, the concern in terms of dealing with the stress, dealing with the whole issue of those kinds of things. And it also speaks to the issue of multiple deployments, you know, increasing dwell time, all those things that we're focused on to try to improve to relieve that stress. But I just don't have the specifics of this particular incident.

Q Mr. Secretary, where do we stand now on the bombings in western Afghanistan? A lot of blame was thrown each way -- senior Defense officials blaming the Taliban; Taliban blaming U.S., saying there was the use of white phosphorous. Where does that investigation stand? Is there any light you can shed on that?

SEC. GATES: Well, let me tell you what I think the status is and ask the admiral to correct me if I get it wrong.
My understanding is that General McKiernan has sent a general officer to Farah province to participate with the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior in an investigation of what happened. I also understand that General Petraeus is either considering or has already decided to send someone to Afghanistan from outside the country to investigate the tragedy.
(To Adm. Mullen.) Is that --

ADM. MULLEN: Yes, sir.

Q Do you have an update on how many civilians may have died?

SEC. GATES: No.

Q And have any payments been made to civilian families, as you suggested they would be done immediately last time you were in Afghanistan?

SEC. GATES: I don't -- I just don't know.

Q Clarification? Mr. Secretary, just a clarification. Does General McKiernan's resignation end his military career?

SEC. GATES: Probably.

Q Sir, can I follow up on that other issue of the bombing? You've expressed concern and frustration the military is unable to counter Taliban or al Qaeda propaganda. In this case, with the bombing in Afghanistan, it seems that they have -- they have a storyline, and the U.S. and McKiernan hinted at another narrative, that the Taliban had killed a bunch of people.
How, going forward, do you hope that that changes? And do you see the new leadership there kind of jumping in on that issue?

SEC. GATES: Well, one of the -- one of the disadvantages we have in these situations is that the Taliban don't tell the truth and they don't care what the truth is. And so when you're making it up, you can respond a lot faster than when you're trying to figure out what actually happened.

And we have -- and that has been a disadvantage for us on an ongoing basis. And we have to figure out how to get inside that strategic communications cycle to get in front of this issue. This is a principal strategic tactic of the Taliban, is the use -- is either provoking or exploiting civilian casualties.

And we have done a lot -- and I must say, General McKiernan has done a lot -- in recent months to try and reduce the level of civilian casualties. The fact of the matter is, civilian casualties since January in Afghanistan are down 40 percent over a year ago during the same period. And U.S., Afghan and ISAF casualties are up 75 percent during the same period.
So there is a tremendous effort going on on our part to try and avoid civilian casualties. But figuring out how to come out better on the strategic communications side of this is an ongoing challenge for us.

Q Is it more of the process, or is it just cultural resistance in the military to just come out and say the truth as soon as you know it?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think -- I'm not sure I would characterize it as a military cultural aspect. I think it's more an American characteristic to try and figure out what happened before you decide --

Q (Off mike) -- President Karzai came out over the weekend. He called upon the U.S. to stop using airstrikes and also to stop nighttime raids. Is that at all practical, do you think?

SEC. GATES: Well, I can't improve on General Jones' statement yesterday, that we can't fight this war with one hand tied behind us. But one of the things that General McKiernan has been working on and that I am confident that Generals McChrystal and Rodriguez will work on is how we can do better in this area.

Q Let me ask you about Swat Valley very quickly. We have seen now perhaps half-a-million Pakistanis displaced in their own country. You've given billions to Pakistan. You've urged them to engage in counterinsurgency. Is this kind of aerial and artillery bombardment the kind of -- with thousands displaced -- the kind of counterinsurgency strategy you wanted them to embark on?

ADM. MULLEN: Actually, I spoke in a continuing dialogue with General Kiyani. I spoke to him earlier today. He called me just to update me specifically. And I won't go into the -- into the details of that, but they actually have made considerable progress in recent weeks and in -- in ways that many of us -- many -- not many of us, but many would have not predicted.
Clearly, there is a concern for the refugees and taking care of that. I know that the prime minister has been out speaking to the need for the Pakistan people to support that. That's also an important strategic both shift and emphasis.
And then I guess I wouldn't get into the details of his planning or his execution, but he's certainly aware of the challenges in particular with respect to the IDPs and the need for his government and other NGOs to address that issue.

Q But are you satisfied with the strategy that you're seeing? Because there are now potentially hundreds of thousands of IDPs? Are you satisfied?

ADM. MULLEN: I think, at least historically in counterinsurgencies, particularly when you're in the -- in the aggressive -- when you -- when you start them, you do -- we do see lots of IDPs and have to address that. And certainly, we're all concerned about that. I know that it's -- that it's -- that concern is being addressed specifically by the Pakistani government as a priority.

SEC. GATES: Thank you all very much.

Transcript: David Petraeus on CNN's "State of the Union"

Related Post: David Petraeus on “Fox News Sunday”

JOHN KING: General Petraeus, welcome back to "State of the Union." I want to start with the offensive under way by the Pakistani military in Pakistan. It took a long time for you to convince Pakistan to get about this. And I'm starting at the map so I can pull out and show our viewers the area we're talking about, the Swat district up here, right in here.

Just a basic question for you, sir. This offensive has been under way for quite a bit of time now. How effective is it?

PETRAEUS: Well, let me say, I'm not sure I accept the characterization that you said. This is Pakistan's offensive, and it was galvanized by Taliban action, certainly not by American rhetoric or encouragement.

What has happened in this case is that the actions of the Taliban in breaking the agreement that was reached for Swat, and then moving into other districts of the Northwest Frontier province, these have served as a catalyst, really, for all of Pakistan. And you now see all of the Pakistani political leaders, including opposition figures, you see the Pakistani people and you see the Pakistani military determined to reverse this trend and to deal with the Taliban threat, ultimately, in Swat Valley.

KING: And how effective do you think it is being -- and let me ask in the context of -- this is a military offensive. They are going in there and bombing and pushing them out and attacking them, but I would not say this is out of the Petraeus counterinsurgency playbook. So do you worry at all that these gains will be short-term, not lasting?

PETRAEUS: Well, the true test in counterinsurgency -- and I can tell you that in our dialogue with Pakistani leaders this past week, there is a clear recognition of the concept of counterinsurgency operations, of employing all the tools of government, a whole of government approach. And over the past year, for example, there have been a number of actions that reflect the kind of, if you will, learning and adapting that our own forces have taken -- gone through in recent years as they have carried out operations in Bajaur and Mohmand and so forth. And this will be the challenge, I think, is to bring all of the assets of the government of Pakistan to bear to help their military as it goes in and conducts operations, which inevitably already have displaced citizens, and certainly will displace more of them over time.

KING: When you were here, sir, with Ambassador Holbrooke a few weeks back, both of you spoke openly about the trust deficit between the United States and the Pakistani government and the Pakistani military that has played out in recent years. After the conversations of the past week, how much of that has been repaired and still how much of it do you have?

PETRAEUS: Well, I think the conversations here were quite productive and positive. In fact, I think most participants assessed after the conduct of the trilateral meetings that not just the rhetoric, but even the substance exceeded expectations. So I think they're very helpful. I think they were truly unprecedented in the way that some of the individuals on either side had never even met each other before, and then we had good bilateral conversations with each of the leaders and their delegations as well.

But this is a process. It continues. The trust deficit, if you will, is something that stems back to us dropping Pakistan in the wake of the expulsion of the Soviets from Afghanistan. It lasted for years, and it will take months and years to reestablish the kind of trust and bonds and partnership that are necessary to move forward.

And of course, it's not just the United States. This is the entire world. And it is with a government that has been in office, the first really truly democratically elected Pakistani government in some time, elected just nine, 10 months ago.

KING: When you were here, you said that the United States would not go into Pakistan unless it saw something compelling. This has been a sensitive issue. As the Pakistani military has put pressure on the Taliban, have there been any occasions in the past few weeks where you have had targets of opportunity that have caused U.S. forces to go across the border?

PETRAEUS: No. And I think we have been unequivocal in saying that this is not about us putting combat boots on the ground. This is about us providing assistance, as we do numerous nations around the world. A bit more robust in this case, certainly, but we provide some training assistance, we provide ammunition, we provide spare parts, help with maintenance systems, processes. But a lot of these very similar to the kinds of security assistance programs that we have around the world, albeit this one more robust, and also in the form of the coalition support funds, significantly additional funding.

KING: As this focus now is on the Taliban, give me your assessment of Al Qaida. It has moved, essentially, its headquarters from Afghanistan into Pakistan. With all the focus on the Taliban right now, is this allowing Al Qaida a chance to regroup? And let me ask it in this context. If Al Qaida in Afghanistan was at a 10 in its operational capability on 9/11, how would you rate Al Qaida on that same scale now, as it is based in Pakistan?

PETRAEUS: I don't want to get into that kind of numerical ranking, but I think it's worth going back and looking at the history, of course. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, we expelled the Taliban and Al Qaida and the other elements of the so-called syndicate of extremists that had found sanctuaries and safe havens in Afghanistan. They eventually relocated into the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and some of the other areas of the border regions.

But I think it's very important to note that those organizations, Al Qaida in particular, has sustained some very serious losses over the course of the last six to 10 months or so, and there is a considerable concern among those leaders because of the losses that they have sustained.

KING: I want you to listen to something that the Afghanistan president, Hamid Karzai, told our Wolf Blitzer a couple of days ago, when he put the question to him, are there still Al Qaida in your country? Let's listen.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

WOLF BLITZER, CNN ANCHOR: Are you saying there's no Al Qaida in Afghanistan right now?

HAMID KARZAI, PRESIDENT OF AFGHANISTAN: No Al Qaida based in Afghanistan.

BLITZER: So who are you fighting against?

KARZAI: That's the thing, that's why we say that the war on terrorism is not in the Afghan villages. That it's in the sanctuaries, it's in the financial support system to them, it's in the training grounds. And it's beyond Afghan borders. That has now been established by the U.S. administration.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

KING: No Al Qaida at all in Afghanistan. Is that an exaggeration, General Petraeus, or is that true?

PETRAEUS: No, I would agree with that assessment. Certainly, Al Qaida and its affiliates. Again, remember that this is, as I mentioned earlier, a syndicate of extremist organizations, some of which are truly transnational extremists. In other words, don't just conduct attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan and India, but even throughout the rest of the world, as we saw in the U.K. a couple of years ago. They do come in and out of Afghanistan, but the Al Qaida -- precise Al Qaida, if you will -- is not based, per se, in Afghanistan, although its elements and certainly its affiliates -- Baitullah Mehsud's group, commander Nazir Khaqani (ph) network and others, certainly do have enclaves and sanctuaries in certain parts of eastern Afghanistan. And then the Afghan Taliban, of course, has a number of districts in which it has its fighters and its shadow government, if you will, even.

But I think, no, I think that's an accurate assessment, and that the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan -- that very, very mountainous, rugged terrain just east of the Afghan border and in the western part of Pakistan -- is the locus of the leadership of these organizations, although they do, again, go into Afghanistan, certainly, and conduct operations against our troops, and have tried, certainly, to threaten all the way to Kabul at various times.

KING: President Karzai was quite adamant in that interview with Wolf that he wants the air strikes to stop. He believes the air strikes are not taking out terrorist elements, and instead are killing civilians in his country and fomenting anti-American sentiment. Will the air strikes stop?

PETRAEUS: Well, he and I had a good conversation about this yesterday, actually, John. I thought it was important to discuss this with him. I heard that interview. There is no question, and we have all agreed for some time -- and General McKiernan, in fact, put out tactical guidance to this end, as did the Central Command headquarters -- that we have to be very, very sensitive that our tactical actions, our tactical employment in battles and so forth of close air support and other enablers does not undermine our strategic goals and objectives.

And we reaffirmed that in our conversation yesterday. We'll certainly relook this yet again in the wake of this latest incident, although as the joint press release that was put out by Afghan and U.S. authorities in Afghanistan after the initial investigation of the latest situation in Farah province in western Afghanistan affirmed that Taliban bears enormous blame for this latest incident by apparently forcing civilians to stay in houses from which they were engaging our forces with heavy-fire RPGs, and quite effective fire, as the term is used.

KING: General David Petraeus, thank you for your time this morning, sir, and best of luck to you.

PETRAEUS: Good to be with you, John. Thanks.