Transcript: Gates-Mullen Briefing on US Command Change in Afghanistan

SEC. GATES: First, I would like to express my horror and deep regret over today's shooting incident at Camp Liberty in Iraq. I offer my sympathy and condolences to the families of those who were killed. We are still in the process of gathering information on exactly what happened, but if the preliminary reports are confirmed, such a tragic loss of life at the hands of our own forces is a cause for great and urgent concern, and I can assure you that it will get this department's highest-priority attention.

As you know, I just returned from a trip to Afghanistan, where I met with our troops and commanders in the field. My purpose in going was to see firsthand the preparations and plans under way to execute the president's strategy for the region, especially as significantly more American troops begin arriving in country. I thought it critically important to get a sense from the ground level what needs -- what the needs are, what the challenges are and what the solutions to some of the problems are.

As I have said many times before, very few of these problems can be solved by military means alone. And yet, from the military perspective, we can and must do better. We have not been able to fully resource our military effort in Afghanistan in recent years, but I believe, resources or no, that our mission there requires new thinking and new approaches from our military leaders. Today we have a new policy set by our new president. We have a new strategy, a new mission and a new ambassador. I believe that new military leadership also is needed.

After consultation with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commander of Central Command, and with the approval of the president, I have asked for the resignation of General David McKiernan. He will remain in command of both ISAF and U.S. Forces Afghanistan until such time as a relief can be nominated and confirmed.

I am today recommending to the president that Lieutenant General Stanley McChrystal be nominated to replace General McKiernan as commander U.S. Forces Afghanistan.

I am also recommending that Lieutenant General David Rodriguez be assigned to the new position of deputy commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan. I have advised the secretary general of NATO and the minister of defense of Afghanistan of these prospective changes.

I made these decisions only after careful consideration of a great number of factors, including the advice of Admiral Mullen and General Petraeus. In the end, I believe my decisions are in the best interests of our national security and the success of our mission in Afghanistan. I urge the Senate to swiftly confirm Generals McChrystal and Rodriguez so they can begin their important work as soon as possible.

Let none of this detract from, nor cause us ever to forget, General McKiernan's long and distinguished career of military service. For decades, in peace and war, Dave McKiernan has led hundreds of thousands of men and women in uniform with conviction, integrity and courage. He has dedicated his life to the preservation of the freedoms we in this nation enjoy. And on behalf of the Department of Defense and the nation, I thank him for his years of selfless service.

Pam.

Q (Off mike.) Are you worried at all that switching horses in midstream has an air of desperation, or that you -- that you -- what you saw on both of your recent trips there was worse than you had expected to see?

SEC. GATES: Well, let me start and then turn to Admiral Mullen.

I think that the -- as the statement suggested, that -- that with agreement on a new strategy and a new mission, and a new national approach and international approach in Afghanistan, that if there were to be a change, this is the right time to make the change, at a time when we are at the beginning of the implementation of a new strategy. And it is in that context that I emphasize that the focus here is simply on getting fresh thinking, fresh eyes on the problem, and in how we implement the strategy and the mission going forward.

ADM. MULLEN: In fact, for me, based on my recent trips, the opposite is true. In the time that I spent in RC East, I was very encouraged by the progress that we'd made and the depth of understanding of what the requirement was from our people on the military side to generate success.

Clearly that is not the case in the south, because we have not had the forces there, and putting them there this year is critically important. And I would only echo what the secretary said, from the standpoint of, with the new strategy, with the new team across the board, I felt it was very important for new leadership, and supported this decision completely.

Q Mr. Secretary?

Q Admiral Mullen? Mr. -- for both of you gentlemen, while you say you felt there needed to be fresh eyes, fresh thinking, General McKiernan, of course, has only been there for a period of months. He's yet to get the resources he asked the Obama administration for. The troops that he has asked for aren't even there yet.

So what specifically was he not doing that he -- you said you wanted fresh thinking, fresh eyes. Did he resist your ideas? Did he resist change? Was he uncooperative with the new thinking, the new way forward? What went wrong here?

SEC. GATES: Well, first of all, General McKiernan has been in Afghanistan, I think, 11 months. And -- first of all, I would say, nothing went wrong, and there was nothing specific.

It is -- it simply was my conviction, based on my consultations with Admiral Mullen and General Petraeus, that a fresh approach, a fresh look in the context of the new strategy, probably was in our best interest.

Q Mr. Secretary?

Q Admiral Mullen?

Q Admiral Mullen -- excuse me. Admiral Mullen, what -- why couldn't, in your mind -- you said you supported the recommendation; in your mind, why could General McKiernan no longer do the job?

ADM. MULLEN: Again, he's been there almost a year. And, in fact, under normal circumstances, he would have rotated somewhere between 18 and 24 months, depending on timing.

I have said that we must focus all of our effort in terms of making Afghanistan better.

There probably is no more critical ingredient than that -- than leadership. And again, along with all the other changes, it's time now. And that's why I made that recommendation.

Q Is it just loss of confidence? I haven't heard anything yet -- I'm so sorry -- about why you both think he couldn't do the job.

ADM. MULLEN: Well, I'm not going to say a whole lot more, other than the -- I thought there was a need for new leadership -- clearly we have in the two that the secretary -- the two officers that the secretary mentioned a rich experience level -- General Rodriguez in particular deep in Afghanistan, having been there before -- and that I think these two officers will bring a -- not just a renewed but a focus, which we really need in 2009, and I just didn't think that we could wait until 2010.

Q Mr. Secretary, having talked to people who are involved in all this, they say McKiernan was maybe too conventional, too "old Army" in his outlook, not nimble enough to deal with the complex counterinsurgency. And as the admiral mentioned, McChrystal has a lot more experience in Afghanistan. Could you just comment on some of that?

SEC GATES: Well, it's -- you know, I won't -- it's hard to say anything more than we've already said. I would -- Admiral Mullen just talked about the experience that -- in counterinsurgency that both General McChrystal and General Rodriguez have.

I would tell you that those who are speculating on the ingredients in this decision, if it's not Admiral Mullen or me or General Petraeus, has (sic) no inside information on our thinking.

Q So McKiernan just lacked a certain counterinsurgency experience or wasn't nimble enough on this?

SEC. GATES: I think what the admiral said is exactly where we are. It's time for new leadership and fresh eyes. Julian?

Q Secretary Gates, for you, talk to me a little bit more about why General McChrystal and his -- whether it's the Special Operations background came into your thinking.

And Admiral Mullen, if you would talk a little bit about the effort that General McChrystal has been doing for you in terms of how to resource the Afghanistan mission, what -- why you assigned him that, what his mission was in that.

SEC. GATES: I would simply say that both General McChrystal and General Rodriguez bring a unique skill set in counterinsurgency to these issues. And I think that they will provide the kind of new leadership and fresh thinking that the admiral and I have been talking about.

ADM. MULLEN: I just -- for both of them, as -- whenever you look for replacements -- I mean, whenever that occurs, you -- I took a broad range of inputs from military officers.

And McChrystal and Rodriguez rank -- outside this discussion, outside this change, McChrystal and Rodriguez have ranked, for the entire time that I've been chairman, at the top of the list. So we couldn't pick two better officers.

And then specifically, Julian, with respect to the -- the discussions and focus on getting the best people to Afghanistan, making sure that we resource that as rapidly and as thoroughly as possible, making sure that leaders who go there that -- have that experience so that our ramp-up time when we turn over is absolutely minimal -- all of that focuses on the importance of Afghanistan, and actually lessons that we learned from Iraq where some of our rotations would -- you know, we were starting over from an experience level. So it's how to do that and keep that focus and move as fast as we can from a resourcing people, training, expertise standpoint in Afghanistan.

Q Is this something you started thinking about some months ago? And could you also tell us what Ambassador Holbrooke's role might have been in this? And also, when -- did you just tell him today?

SEC. GATES: Ambassador Holbrooke?

Q (Off mike.)

SEC. GATES: No. I talked to him when I was in Afghanistan last week. The answer to part of your question is that Ambassador Holbrooke played no role in this.

Q He had no recommendation, had no thoughts about how --

SEC. GATES: I don't know whether he had any thoughts. He played no role in this.

Q You'd know. (Laughs.)

ADM. MULLEN: No, I mean, he had no role to -- in this at all.

Q Well, can you talk a little bit about how and when you started thinking about this? Is this some months ago? Is it --

ADM. MULLEN: General McKiernan was -- originally planned to be there between 18 and 24 months. So as far back as six or seven months ago, I was looking at his relief, potentially his relief, as well as General Odierno, who's due to leave sometime early in 2010. So there had been discussions about this over an extended period time. I think certainly for me it's been in the last several months, as we've focused heavily on Afghanistan and resourcing it and how we were going to move forward, that this issue -- that the specifics of this really came to bear and that -- that I concluded that it was time for a change, and made that recommendation to the secretary.

Q So is it fair to say that in terms of a -- unique skill sets, that General McChrystal -- for those who don't follow his career, he specializes in black -- commando special operations: the capturing of Saddam Hussein, the killing of Abu Zarqawi, the melding of intelligence and special-ops units in the -- during the surge. Is that what you're looking for from him in terms of Afghanistan -- replicating some of those successes in that terrain?

SEC. GATES: Well, let me say something and then invite the admiral. The way I look at this is as -- McChrystal and Rodriguez as a team. They each bring tremendous skills in a variety of areas that are very pertinent to the kind of fight that we have in Afghanistan. And it is their combined skill set that I think gives us some fresh opportunities looking forward.

ADM. MULLEN: And while General McChrystal has that background that you described, Tony, his background is much deeper and much broader than that. And I've been privileged to work with him over the better part of the last year and seen that, you know, the broadness and the depth that go far beyond just high-end special-operations skills. And I'm extremely confident that he will be able to carry out this mission in its fullness to include, obviously, those skills, but others as well.

Q Those kind of missions, though, to make this more a SOF-like fight?

ADM. MULLEN: I wouldn't be specific about what kind -- you know, exactly the kinds of missions we would increase specifically. But certainly his focus and his background, I think, are very relevant to our needs there. And then -- but it really is also the combination of he and Rodriguez which are so important.

Q Mr. Secretary, you've often said that you were worried about establishing too big a military footprint in Afghanistan. Yet General McKiernan, it seemed like every few months, was asking for more and more and higher levels of forces. Is that one of the areas that wasn't new-think, in your mind? And did you and General McKiernan have a difference there?

SEC. GATES: No, that had nothing to do with it, as far as I was concerned.

Q And about keeping the troop levels lower, you were talking, Admiral Mullen, about the lessons learned in Iraq. Wasn't that one of the lessons learned in Iraq, that we didn't have enough troops in Iraq initially?

ADM. MULLEN: Well, as I've looked at the analysis for what we need, certainly, in the immediate future, the troops we have in the east recently are -- have recently put in there, as well as those going in the south, those meet the needs that we see that we have right now. And I'm very comfortable that they will be able to provide the hold after the clear, which is where we've been short, particularly in the south.

Q Mr. Secretary, can you talk a bit -- now that these changes have been made at the very top, what follow-on changes may take place? I mean, for instance, as an organizational issue, will there be an RC South -- American commands in RC South paralleling RC East? And even in general terms, can you talk about on the ground, tactically, what we may see differently going forward in the months ahead that was not the case up until now?

SEC. GATES: Well, I don't know that I can speak very well to the strategy and tactics going forward. I don't expect there to be a change in the command rotation in RC South. The Dutch are in command now. They will be replaced for -- at the end of a year by the British, who will be in command for a year, and then we will take command in 2010.

And some of the additional troop levels that General McKiernan has asked for are, in fact, a two-star headquarters to support when the U.S. takes command of RC South in the fall of 2010, in November, I think. So I don't anticipate any change in that arrangement.

Q Can you talk even in general terms about what might take place differently on the ground, as far as the prosecution of the war?

SEC. GATES: No, I don't know.

ADM. MULLEN: I think -- I mean, in some ways, we're learning as we go here. I mean, we're -- what General McKiernan has recommended, in terms of the troops that are going there now, are the ones that we're resourcing.

But I'd also certainly want to hear from new leadership what their beliefs are once they get there, get on the ground and make some recommendations about how to move forward as rapidly as possible.

So I'm not aware of any changes. And I wouldn't speak to exactly how they're going to -- how they'd fight it, although I've been briefed, for instance, on, you know, how it's going to apply in the south here over the course of this year.
But certainly with new leadership, there will probably be some fresh views, which we will have very, very good discussions about.

Q Admiral, you said, we can and must do better. And so I'm surprised you don't have any more solid idea of how we need to do better.

ADM. MULLEN: I can't think of a more important decision than putting in new leadership, with respect to that, and then having the impact that is so critical.

Q Actually the secretary said, we must and can do better. Any thoughts on how?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think, that's the challenge that we give to the new leadership. How do we -- how do we do better? What new ideas do you have? What fresh thinking do you have? Are there different ways of accomplishing our goals? How can we be more effective? The admiral and I aren't the source of those ideas. General McChrystal and General Rodriguez are. And that's what we expect from them.

Q Let me ask it a different way. One of the criticisms of General McKiernan was that he hadn't implemented a joint campaign plan, essentially an implementation of the way the strategy would be used on the ground. When the new leadership gets there, do you have a sense that then they will provide new feedback that could change the Af-Pak strategy as we know it? And what might it be?

SEC. GATES: Well, I -- first of all, the new strategy is a strategy approved by the president. And it is a whole-of-government strategy. If there are any changes that they would recommend, it would be in the military part of that strategy.

Q Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Recently North Korea said that if South Korea participated in -- (inaudible) -- then North Korea will regard it as an act of war. What is your comment on this?

SEC. GATES: Well, I've been frankly surprised and disturbed by the kind of rhetoric coming out of North Korea in recent weeks. And I think that North Korea has effectively isolated itself internationally, even greater than was the case before, by some of this rhetoric. But that's what I think it is, rhetoric.

Q (Off mike) -- you can give us any more detail of the shooting in Iraq -- what you know about the soldier, whether he'd been on multiple deployments, whether he was seeking help for combat stress? Are there any details you can give us?

ADM. MULLEN: No, I don't -- I don't have a whole lot more than what -- than that which is already out there. Clearly, the tragedy occurred in a -- in a -- in a place where individuals were -- were seeking help. And I'd also like to certainly extend my condolences and thoughts and prayers to the families of those who were killed.

It does speak to me, though, about the need for us to redouble our efforts, the concern in terms of dealing with the stress, dealing with the whole issue of those kinds of things. And it also speaks to the issue of multiple deployments, you know, increasing dwell time, all those things that we're focused on to try to improve to relieve that stress. But I just don't have the specifics of this particular incident.

Q Mr. Secretary, where do we stand now on the bombings in western Afghanistan? A lot of blame was thrown each way -- senior Defense officials blaming the Taliban; Taliban blaming U.S., saying there was the use of white phosphorous. Where does that investigation stand? Is there any light you can shed on that?

SEC. GATES: Well, let me tell you what I think the status is and ask the admiral to correct me if I get it wrong.
My understanding is that General McKiernan has sent a general officer to Farah province to participate with the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior in an investigation of what happened. I also understand that General Petraeus is either considering or has already decided to send someone to Afghanistan from outside the country to investigate the tragedy.
(To Adm. Mullen.) Is that --

ADM. MULLEN: Yes, sir.

Q Do you have an update on how many civilians may have died?

SEC. GATES: No.

Q And have any payments been made to civilian families, as you suggested they would be done immediately last time you were in Afghanistan?

SEC. GATES: I don't -- I just don't know.

Q Clarification? Mr. Secretary, just a clarification. Does General McKiernan's resignation end his military career?

SEC. GATES: Probably.

Q Sir, can I follow up on that other issue of the bombing? You've expressed concern and frustration the military is unable to counter Taliban or al Qaeda propaganda. In this case, with the bombing in Afghanistan, it seems that they have -- they have a storyline, and the U.S. and McKiernan hinted at another narrative, that the Taliban had killed a bunch of people.
How, going forward, do you hope that that changes? And do you see the new leadership there kind of jumping in on that issue?

SEC. GATES: Well, one of the -- one of the disadvantages we have in these situations is that the Taliban don't tell the truth and they don't care what the truth is. And so when you're making it up, you can respond a lot faster than when you're trying to figure out what actually happened.

And we have -- and that has been a disadvantage for us on an ongoing basis. And we have to figure out how to get inside that strategic communications cycle to get in front of this issue. This is a principal strategic tactic of the Taliban, is the use -- is either provoking or exploiting civilian casualties.

And we have done a lot -- and I must say, General McKiernan has done a lot -- in recent months to try and reduce the level of civilian casualties. The fact of the matter is, civilian casualties since January in Afghanistan are down 40 percent over a year ago during the same period. And U.S., Afghan and ISAF casualties are up 75 percent during the same period.
So there is a tremendous effort going on on our part to try and avoid civilian casualties. But figuring out how to come out better on the strategic communications side of this is an ongoing challenge for us.

Q Is it more of the process, or is it just cultural resistance in the military to just come out and say the truth as soon as you know it?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think -- I'm not sure I would characterize it as a military cultural aspect. I think it's more an American characteristic to try and figure out what happened before you decide --

Q (Off mike) -- President Karzai came out over the weekend. He called upon the U.S. to stop using airstrikes and also to stop nighttime raids. Is that at all practical, do you think?

SEC. GATES: Well, I can't improve on General Jones' statement yesterday, that we can't fight this war with one hand tied behind us. But one of the things that General McKiernan has been working on and that I am confident that Generals McChrystal and Rodriguez will work on is how we can do better in this area.

Q Let me ask you about Swat Valley very quickly. We have seen now perhaps half-a-million Pakistanis displaced in their own country. You've given billions to Pakistan. You've urged them to engage in counterinsurgency. Is this kind of aerial and artillery bombardment the kind of -- with thousands displaced -- the kind of counterinsurgency strategy you wanted them to embark on?

ADM. MULLEN: Actually, I spoke in a continuing dialogue with General Kiyani. I spoke to him earlier today. He called me just to update me specifically. And I won't go into the -- into the details of that, but they actually have made considerable progress in recent weeks and in -- in ways that many of us -- many -- not many of us, but many would have not predicted.
Clearly, there is a concern for the refugees and taking care of that. I know that the prime minister has been out speaking to the need for the Pakistan people to support that. That's also an important strategic both shift and emphasis.
And then I guess I wouldn't get into the details of his planning or his execution, but he's certainly aware of the challenges in particular with respect to the IDPs and the need for his government and other NGOs to address that issue.

Q But are you satisfied with the strategy that you're seeing? Because there are now potentially hundreds of thousands of IDPs? Are you satisfied?

ADM. MULLEN: I think, at least historically in counterinsurgencies, particularly when you're in the -- in the aggressive -- when you -- when you start them, you do -- we do see lots of IDPs and have to address that. And certainly, we're all concerned about that. I know that it's -- that it's -- that concern is being addressed specifically by the Pakistani government as a priority.

SEC. GATES: Thank you all very much.

Beyond the Summit: Dan Froomkin on Afghanistan and Pakistan

Latest Post: Obama Fiddles, Afghanistan and Pakistan Burn
Related Post: Pepe Escobar on Obama-Bush in Afghanistan-Pakistan

From Dan Froomkin's excellent overview blog "White House Watch" on The Washington Post site:

What the 'Military Solution' Looks Like

There's a tremendous sense of urgency surrounding President Obama's meetings today with the leaders of Afghanistan and Pakistan. And a sense of urgency often leads people to focus primarily on military solutions.

So it's worth stopping to consider what the "military solution" has been looking like recently in that region of the world.

Rahim Faiez writes for the Associated Press: "The international Red Cross confirmed Wednesday that civilians were found in graves and rubble where Afghan officials alleged U.S. bombs killed had dozens....

"Women and children were among dozens of bodies in two villages targeted by airstrikes, the International Committee of the Red Cross reported Wednesday, after sending a team to the district. The U.S. military sent a brigadier general to the region to investigate.

"A former Afghan government official said up to 120 people died in the bombing Monday evening...

"The first images from the bombings in Farah province emerged Wednesday. Photos from the site obtained by The Associated Press showed villagers burying the dead in about a dozen fresh graves, while others dug through the rubble of demolished mud-brick homes."

Matthew Lee writes for the Associated Press that Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton this morning said "the Obama administration 'deeply, deeply' regrets the loss of innocent life apparently as the result of a U.S. bombing in Afghanistan and will undertake a full review of the incident."

But the damage is done, both to the victims and to our goals. Consider what Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, wrote in a Washington Post op-ed in February: "We have learned, after seven years of war, that trust is the coin of the realm -- that building it takes time, losing it takes mere seconds, and maintaining it may be our most important and most difficult objective.

"That's why images of prisoner maltreatment at Abu Ghraib still serve as recruiting tools for al-Qaeda. And it's why each civilian casualty for which we are even remotely responsible sets back our efforts to gain the confidence of the Afghan people months, if not years."



And now let's take a look at what's going on in Pakistan, where, as Warren P. Strobel and Margaret Talev write for McClatchy Newspapers, "Obama and his team are urging [Pakistani President Asif Ali] Zardari to mount a sustained offensive against the Taliban and its allies, who're imposing a brutal form of Islamic rule across the country's northwest."

The problem: "Religious militants, who aspire to fundamentalist religious rule like the Taliban maintained in Afghanistan for five years until 2001, took advantage of a cease-fire with the government to win control over the scenic Swat valley and have since moved into neighboring districts, some of which are 60 miles from the capital of Islamabad."

But here is what Zardari's solution looks like. As Saeed Shah wrote for McClatchy Newspapers on Monday: "The Pakistani army's assault against Islamic militants in Buner, in northwest Pakistan, is flattening villages, killing civilians and sending thousands of farmers and villagers fleeing from their homes, residents escaping the fighting said Monday...

"[R]esidents' accounts of the fighting contradict those from the Pakistani military and suggest that the government of President Asif Ali Zardari is rapidly losing the support of those it had set out to protect."

Strobel and Talev write that the "heavy-handed military force...could further undermine support for the government.

"'All they're doing is displacing civilians and hurting people,' said a U.S. defense official who asked not to be further identified because he isn't authorized to speak to the media. 'It's not going to work.'"

So what will work? Who knows? As Paul Richter and Christi Parsons write in the Los Angeles Times, Obama seems to have no choice but to "overhaul a painstakingly developed security strategy that was unveiled only five weeks ago but already has become badly outdated."

And the greatest urgency, in fact, is now seen on the Pakistan side of the border. As Richter and Parsons write: "In what is emerging as Obama's first major foreign policy crisis, U.S. officials fear the militants could fracture Pakistan, the far more populous nation, further destabilizing the region and even posing a grave risk to the security of Islamabad's nuclear arsenal...

"Though the situation in Afghanistan may not have improved, it does suddenly seem more manageable. 'By comparison, it looks like Canada,' one U.S. official said in an interview."

Canada? With 60,000 American troops soon to be in harm's way? I don't think so. But you get the point.

Meanwhile, Obama is dealing with two reluctant allies.

As Rajiv Chandrasekaran writes in The Washington Post, "senior members of Obama's national security team say [Afghan President Hamid] Karzai has not done enough to address the grave challenges facing his nation. They deem him to be a mercurial and vacillating chieftain who has tolerated corruption and failed to project his authority beyond the gates of Kabul....

"Vexed by the challenge of stabilizing Afghanistan with a partner they regard as less than reliable, Obama's advisers have crafted a two-pronged strategy that amounts to a fundamental break from the avuncular way President George W. Bush dealt with the Afghan leader.

"Obama intends to maintain an arm's-length relationship with Karzai in the hope that it will lead him to address issues of concern to the United States, according to senior U.S. government officials. The administration will also seek to bypass Karzai by working more closely with other members of his cabinet and by funneling more money to local governors."

And Karen DeYoung writes in The Washington Post: "The Obama administration 'unambiguously' supports Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari, even as it puts 'the most heavy possible pressure' on his government to fight extremists in the country, Richard C. Holbrooke, Obama's special envoy to Pakistan and Afghanistan, told Congress yesterday....

"When the three sit down today, Obama will tell Zardari and Karzai that they 'have to work together, despite their issues and their history. That's just what has to be done,' said one of two senior administration officials who briefed reporters at the White House about the visits on the condition of anonymity."

As the New York Times editorial board writes: "American officials don’t have much confidence in either leader — a fact they haven’t tried to conceal. Most Afghans and Pakistanis share their doubts. But if there is any hope of defeating the Taliban, Mr. Obama will have to find a way to work with both men — and find the right mixture of support and blunt pressure to get them to do what is necessary to save their countries."

Video and Transcript: Obama Remarks After Meeting Afghanistan's Karzai and Pakistan's Zardari (6 May)

Related Post: Obama Fiddles, Afghanistan-Pakistan Burn

President Obama made a statement of almost eight minutes after his meeting with Afghan President Hamid Karzai and Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari yesterday.

Nothing new here. Instead, Obama put out the simplistic rhetoric reducing local opposition and insurgency to "Al Qa'eda and its extremist allies", and he referred both to "civilian and military components" to support Pakistani and Afghan Governments and their people. No reference, of course, to the civilian casualties from US airstrikes, including the dozens killed in western Afghanistan on Tuesday; in fact, there was no mention at all of US drone and missile operations.

Perhaps the only interesting aspect of the statement was the subtle dynamic in Obama's references to Karzai and Zardari. They only got a name-check late in the statement, after the President focused on his own policies and officials: "I'm pleased that these two men -- elected leaders of Afghanistan and Pakistan -- fully appreciate the seriousness of the threat that we face, and have reaffirmed their commitment to confronting it." Which translates as: OK, boys, we're not going to push you out of office, but you best be co-operating with us now.

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xqzrQV8Y_gc[/youtube]

THE PRESIDENT: Good afternoon, everybody. We just finished an important trilateral meeting among the United States, Afghanistan and Pakistan. And earlier today I was pleased to have wide ranging bilateral discussions with both President Karzai of Afghanistan and President Zardari of Pakistan.

We meet today as three sovereign nations joined by a common goal: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its extremist allies in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their ability to operate in either country in the future. And to achieve that goal, we must deny them the space to threaten the Pakistani, Afghan, or American people. And we must also advance security and opportunity, so that Pakistanis and Afghans can pursue the promise of a better life.

And within Pakistan, we must provide lasting support to democratic institutions, while helping the government confront the insurgents who are the single greatest threat to the Pakistani state. And we must do more than stand against those who would destroy Pakistan –- we must stand with those who want to build Pakistan.

And that is why I've asked Congress for sustained funding, to build schools and roads and hospitals. I want the Pakistani people to understand that America is not simply against terrorism -- we are on the side of their hopes and their aspirations, because we know that the future of Pakistan must be determined by the talent, innovation, and intelligence of its people.

I have long said that we cannot meet these challenges in isolation, nor delay the action, nor deny the resources necessary to get the job done. And that's why we have a comprehensive strategy for the region with civilian and military components, led by Ambassador Richard Holbrooke and General David Petraeus. And for the first time, this strategy will be matched by the resources that it demands.

U.S. troops are serving courageously and capably in a vital mission in Afghanistan alongside our Afghan and international partners. But to combat an enemy that is on the offensive, we need more troops, training, and assistance. And that's why we are deploying 21,000 troops to Afghanistan and increasing our efforts to train Afghan security forces -- and I'm also pleased that our NATO allies and partners are providing resources to support our strategy.

And that is why we are helping Pakistan combat the insurgency within its borders -- including $400 million in immediate assistance that we are seeking from Congress, which will help the government as it steps up its efforts against the extremists.

And to advance security, opportunity, and justice for the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan, we are dramatically increasing our civilian support for both countries. We were pleased that these efforts were recently amplified through the $5.5 billion that was pledged for Pakistan at an international donors conference in Tokyo -- resources that will help meet the basic needs of the Pakistani people.

The road ahead will be difficult. There will be more violence, and there will be setbacks. But let me be clear: The United States has made a lasting commitment to defeat al Qaeda, but also to support the democratically elected sovereign governments of both Pakistan and Afghanistan. That commitment will not waiver. And that support will be sustained.

Every day, we see evidence of the future that al Qaeda and its allies offer. It's a future filled with violence and despair. It's a future without opportunity or hope. That's not what the people of Pakistan and Afghanistan want, and it's not what they deserve. The United States has a stake in the future of these two countries. We have learned, time and again, that our security is shared. It is a lesson that we learned most painfully on 9/11, and it is a lesson that we will not forget.

So we are here today in the midst of a great challenge. But no matter what happens, we will not be deterred. The aspirations of all our people -- for security, for opportunity and for justice -- are far more powerful than any enemy.

Those are the hopes that we hold in common for all of our children. So we will sustain our cooperation. And we will work for the day when our nations are linked not by a common enemy, but by a shared peace and prosperity, mutual interests and mutual respect, not only among governments but among our people.

I want to thank President Zardari and President Karzai for joining me here today. I look forward to continuing this close cooperation between our governments in the months and years ahead. Thank you very much, everybody.

Just over a month ago, I announced a new strategy to achieve these objectives after consultation with Pakistan, Afghanistan and our other friends and allies. Our strategy reflects a fundamental truth: The security of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the United States are linked. In the weeks that have followed, that truth has only been reinforced.

Al Qaeda and its allies have taken more lives in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and have continued to challenge the democratically-elected governments of the two Presidents standing here today. Meanwhile, al Qaeda plots against the American people -- and people around the world -- from their safe haven along the border.

I'm pleased that these two men -- elected leaders of Afghanistan and Pakistan -- fully appreciate the seriousness of....

...the threat that we face, and have reaffirmed their commitment to confronting it. And I'm pleased that we have advanced unprecedented cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan on a bilateral basis -- and among Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the United States -- which will benefit all of our people.

Today's meeting is the second in the trilateral dialogues among our countries. And these meetings will coordinate our efforts in a broad range of areas, across all levels of government. To give you a sense of the scope of this effort, Secretary Clinton, Attorney General Holder, Secretary Vilsack, Director Panetta, Director Mueller, and Deputy Secretary Lew will all host separate meetings with their Pakistani and Afghan counterparts. And these trilateral meetings build on efforts being made in the region and in the United States, and they will continue on a regular basis.

Now there's much to be done. Along the border where insurgents often move freely, we must work together with a renewed sense of partnership to share intelligence, and to coordinate our efforts to isolate, target and take out our common enemy. But we must also meet the threat of extremism with a positive program of growth and opportunity.

And that's why my administration is working with members of Congress to create opportunity zones to spark development. That's why I'm proud that we've helped advance negotiations towards landmark transit-trade agreements to open Afghanistan and Pakistan borders to more commerce.

Within Afghanistan, we must help grow the economy, while developing alternatives to the drug trade by tapping the resilience and the ingenuity of the Afghan people. We must support free and open national elections later this fall, while helping to protect the hard-earned rights of all Afghans. And we must support the capacity of local governments and stand up to corruption that blocks progress. I also made it clear that the United States will work with our Afghan and international partners to make every effort to avoid civilian casualties as we help the Afghan government combat our common enemy.

Video: Admiral Mullen Briefing on Pakistan-Afghanistan (4 May)

Monday's showpiece in the ongoing drama of US policy towards Pakistan and Afghanistan was a 20-minute press briefing by Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

VIDEO (PART 1 OF 2)

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n8apwmV_03I[/youtube]

Mullen's immediate purpose was to push both countries as the priority for American foreign and military policy: while the US "remain committed to the mission we've been given in Iraq", it had now been overtaken by crises which left him "gravely concerned": "This isn't about can-do anymore, this is about must-do."

While the admiral referred to both countries in his opening statements, almost all the discussion with the press was about Pakistan (a fact missed by some lazy journalism at both CNN and The Washington Post). Mullen restated the recent Washington line that it was "encouraged" by the Pakistani military operation against insurgents although there is "more that must be done", and stayed out of any manoeuvres over Pakistan's political leadership.

Meanwhile, State Department spokesman Robert Wood restated Hillary Clinton's warning of the "existential threat" posed by extremists in Pakistan. Attention today moves to Capitol Hill, where US envoy Richard Holbrooke is speaking in a Congressional hearing on the US-Pakistan relationship. And there's the small matter of the arrival of Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari and Afghan President Hamid Karzai in Washington for talks.

VIDEO (PART 2 OF 2)

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eOkYtt70NEA[/youtube]

Bye Bye Zardari (Again)? Washington Considers The Political Alternative in Pakistan

Latest Post: More on "Bye, Bye Zardari", Hello Pakistan Military

Enduring America, 18 March: "Having failed to get “stability” with Musharraf, having failed with Zardari, it is not hope that moves Washington but this question: Who or what can come next?

Soon after the Obama Administration took office, we concluded that its Pakistan policy was going around President Asif Ali Zardari, rather than working with him. Two weeks ago, we wrote that the US was behind a de facto military leadership of Pakistani policy, especially in the fight against insurgents in the northwest of the country.

Now Washington's idea of a political alternative is emerging. The New York Times revealed on Saturday that the US is trying to bring Zardari's long-time rival, former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (pictured), into the Pakistani Government. Administration officials told the newspaper, "Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Richard C. Holbrooke, the special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, have both urged Mr. Zardari and Mr. Sharif to look for ways to work together."

That in itself is not news. The Long March demonstrations in March exposed Zardari's political weakness and, conversely, elevated Sharif as leader of democratic opposition. During the protests, Clinton and Holbrooke talked to both men to avoid a violent showdown.

What is significant in the latest report is the open backing of Obama officials of Sharif, formerly seen as too close to "Islamist" (the shorthand for conservative religious groups, backed by Saudi Arabia) elements in Palistan. The simple reason? In the aftermath of the Long March, Sharif is seen as generally popular in contrast to widespread dislike for Zardari. An Obama official said bluntly, "The idea here is to tie Sharif’s popularity to things we think need to be done, like dealing with the militancy."

Washington's readiness to ditch Zardari, or at least push him to the side, was evident last week in statements by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, and President Obama; however, it reached a new level in leaks from General David Petraeus, the head of the US Central Command. After Petraeus spoke with US Congressmen, Fox News claimed that the General asserted “the Pakistanis have run out of excuses” for their failure to confront the insurgency.Petraeus reportedly gave the Pakistani Government two weeks to take "concrete action to destroy the Taliban".

Zardari's allies have tried to push back, rather lamely, with claims that the President is already talking to Sharif about their co-operation in Government. As the Pakistani military reclaimed the town of Buner, 60 miles north of Islamabad, back from insurgents, the Pakistani Ambassador to the US, Husain Haqqani, used The Wall Street Journal --- the preferred outlet of Zardari's public-relations machine --- to counter-attack:

President Asif Zardari has repeatedly declared the war against them a war for Pakistan's soul.....Meanwhile, the change of administration in the U.S. has slowed the flow of assistance to Pakistan. Unfortunately, ordinary Pakistanis have begun to wonder if our alliance with the West is bringing any benefits at all.

It appears, however, that all this is too late to persuade Washington that Zardari is reliable. On Saturday, Petraeus was in all-day meetings with senior Administration officials on Afghanistan and Pakistan. It may be too early to decode the latest American moves --- Secretary of Defense Gates' interview with CNN, airing today, was recorded earlier in the week --- but here's a safe bet:

If Washington has its way, President Zardari will be pushing his chair to the back of the room.