Afghanistan Analysis: Does General McChrystal Have Any Idea of What is Happening? (Mull)

Josh Mull is the Afghanistan Blogging Fellow for The Seminal and Brave New Foundation, and he also writes for Rethink Afghanistan:

Last August, General Stanley McChrystal and Ambassador Karl Eikenberry produced a report, "US Government Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan".  In it they laid out a complete counter-insurgency strategy, including development aid and international assistance, for their mission in Afghanistan. They also provided various criteria to measure success, as well as a requirement for Interagency Quarterly Assessments which would "identify progression / regression, opportunities / obstacles, and course corrections (adjustments to policy, activities, planning or resourcing)".

Afghanistan Report: Losing Hearts and Minds (Mercille)

I certainly haven't seen any of these progress reports from McChrystal, not to mention anything resembling a "course correction". But we do have a new assessment from the Government Accountability Office, and they say we're screwing up horribly.

It seems that McChrystal and Eikenberry were correct in their report. If they don't have these progress assessments, they won't have any idea what's going on in Afghanistan. They won't know if their COIN strategy is successful, which also means that whenever some out-of-touch politician touts these successes, he's simply engaging in the age old art of "making shit up." McChrystal's plan for measuring progress is absolutely required if we care at all about the truth in Afghanistan. However, the variable in this plan is not necessarily the ability to produce these assessments, but access to the sort of reliable, accurate information sources which provide the backbone of these assessments.


So what do we mean by "measuring progress" in Afghanistan? Here's what the plan says:

The USG will assess progress on the Integrated Civ-Mil Campaign Plan quarterly. This assessment will be done in close coordination between US Embassy, ISAF, and USFOR-A. The purpose of the assessment process is two-fold: 1) to provide decision-makers in Afghanistan with necessary information to prioritize and direct allocation of resources and efforts, and 2) inform Washington decision-making through integrated reporting. Rigorous integrated assessment will require additional civilian and military resources committed full-time.

Assessment Principles: Quality integrated assessments require the following principles to be followed:

• Share information, assessment, and analysis in an open and collaborative way within the USG and with key GIRoA and international partners.


• Validate assessments through the use of a full range of USG, Afghan, international community, and independent data sources – to include qualitative assessment, quantitative data, polling, intelligence analysis, and independent analysis.


• Focus assessment of progress or regression of key instability dynamics.


• Test assumptions through integrated analysis to better inform planning and operations.


• Be accurate and credible.

Let's start with the third bullet point, focusing on "key instability dynamics". That's a bureaucratic way of saying "why they hate us." We have to focus on the issues that make Afghanistan so dangerous and violent, not just whatever flashy propaganda exercise the mainstream media chooses. What really makes Afghans join the Taliban movement? What makes them turn against the government? Joshua Foust gives us an excellent example of a "key instability dynamic" to focus on:

[The central government] owns all the natural resources in the country. Its natural resources, especially timber, are severely stressed. At the same time, exploiting those natural resources is often the only way for communities to make money. Even so, the Afghan government has no real means of leasing access, harvesting quotas, or even cadastres of land to local communities for exploitation. It seems to have no problem giving enormous contracts to operate copper mines, but it can’t figure out how to create an institution by which communities can lease access to the land they live on and cultivate.

Thus, harvesting timber for income becomes illegal. You have timber smugglers, and with them timber “lords,” who are wealthy men who profit handsomely from the large scale denuding of Afghanistan’s countryside.[...]

Now if we had "accurate and credible" assessments that led to course corrections, Foust would be talking about the timber problem in terms of how best to solve it, instead of in the context of US troops wildly exacerbating it. A quality measurement of progress wouldn't tell us to send in 30,000 more troops, or vastly expand our drone program, it would tell us to do something about the crippling resource and governance issues, which requires zero troops. But how are McChrystal and Eikenberry supposed to know about real problems like the timber industry, or lack of it? Well, they have their second bullet point about using the "full range of [US Gov't], Afghan, international community, and independent data sources". Just what is an independent data source? It's not CNN. It's citizen journalists, like Sana Saleem next door in Pakistan.

Saleem already understands the idea of focusing on key instability dynamics. She describes the failure of the mainstream media to focus on anything other than trivial or "sensationalized" coverage of the War on Terror. She instead works in areas like reporting on personal safety procedures during military assaults, child abuse, and yes, even coverage of the drone strikes. And speaking of drone strikes, remember what the Los Angeles Times said about reporting on the strikes (emphasis mine):

U.S. officials say the strikes have caused fewer than 30 civilian casualties since the drone program was expanded in Pakistan, a claim that is impossible to verify since the remote and lawless tribal belt is usually off-limits to Western reporters. Some estimates of civilian casualties by outside analysts are in the hundreds.

We'll put aside the obvious racism of it being "impossible" to obtain the truth without Westerners: for all we know, this could be the fault of an artless copy editor. The real problem with this statement is that it's flatly untrue. Westerners do have access to accurate numbers from the region, because we have computers and telephones and other exciting space-age technology. I don't have to bring my magical, better-at-counting Western eyeballs all the way to Waziristan to know what's going on, I can read Sana Saleem and Nasim Fekrat on my cellphone. And that's not me being absurd, that's exactly how it works. I should know:

The top tweeters on Afghanistan are more heterogeneous in their affiliations than the the top retweeted users. A number of high profile news organizations, individual journalists, and official and semi-official military channels comprise the list of top retweeted users. Notable accounts are those of the Pajhwok Afghan News (@pajhwok) and the Alive in Afghanistan project (@aliveinafghan), as well as the latter’s founder Brian Conley (@BaghdadBrian) of Small World News (@smallworldnews). These accounts are the strongest “local” voices offering Afghan perspectives on events. In the same way that individuals with close affiliations in Iran were both prolific and influential sources of information, these represent similar sources for Afghanistan.

Yep, that's me and my colleagues at Small World News as the "strongest 'local' voices" during the election last year. Clearly we're not from Afghanistan. All we did is talk to the Afghan sources themselves, let them tell the story instead of waiting for Western reporters to parachute in, pillage for headlines, and inevitably abandon the place. And we've talked about Pajhwok before. They're nothing but Afghan bylines, and there's no source more credible and qualitative than Pajhwok that I'm aware of.

The usefulness of all these sources to our strategy is that if you actually factor them into a quality assessment, if you include voices like Saleem's, absolutely none of it would lead you to believe "Hey, we could fix this with 30,000 guys with guns" or "You know what would solve this problem? Massive civilian casualties in Pakistan." Actually knowing the truth about Afghanistan, having "honest and credible" quality assessments of our goals there as McChrystal asks for, would help us end the war faster, if not immediately.

And the best part is, it's way crazy cheaper than our ridiculous strategy of military occupation. It didn't cost me $33 billion to embed that Pakistani podcast about Sana Saleem, and a subscription to Pajhwok certainly won't set you back near what California has paid for the war. And that's all McChrystal is asking for with his progress reports, he knows it's required for ending the war. And not just in this fancy public report, he's even saying it in private. This is from his leaked memo:

V. Assessments: Measuring Progress

ISAF must develop effective assessment architectures, in concert with civilian partners and home nations, to measure the effects of the strategy, assess progress toward key objectives, and make necessary adjustments. ISAF must identify and refine appropriate indicators to assess progress, clarifying the difference between operational measures of effectiveness critical to practitioners on the ground and strategic measures more appropriate to national capitals. Because the mission depends on GIRoA, ISAF must also develop clear metrics to assess progress in governance.

He's got to know what's going on in Afghanistan, or we'll continue our bloody, expensive, and entirely ineffective strategy of military occupation. Or you know what, maybe you think McChrystal is terrible at his job, or you just hate him, or whatever. That's fine, it's not really about him or his awful-to-begin-with COIN strategy. The most important part to take away for this is in his first bullet point, emphasis mine:

• Share information, assessment, and analysis in an open and collaborative way within the USG and with key GIRoA and international partners.

The US Government? That's you! You've got to know the truth about what's happening in Afghanistan, because our strategy in Afghanistan, our objectives, or whether or not we have any national interest in Afghanistan period, is all entirely your business, your decision. And you can force the "USG" to take an honest look at Afghanistan, to see that they shouldn't be spending $33 billion on insane wars, to see all the reasons why we shouldn't be continuing this criminal occupation. Pressure works. Contact your representatives and help them get an "honest and credible" view of our strategy in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan Report: Losing Hearts and Minds (Mercille)

Our colleague Julien Mercille from University College Dublin writes for Asia Times Online:

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is losing hearts and minds in Afghanistan, according to a report by the International Council on Security and Development (ICOS) that gives a clear signal of the dangers of the military operation against Kandahar planned for this summer.

Contrary to its stated objectives of protecting the population from insurgents, NATO is actually raising the likelihood that poor Afghans will join the Taliban - not a great report card for General Stanley McChrystal, the top commander in Afghanistan, whose strategies seem to be backfiring.

Afghanistan Analysis: The Growth of the “Taliban Zone” (Porter)

The report, entitled Operation Moshtarak: Lessons Learned [1], is based on interviews conducted last month with over 400 Afghan men from Marjah, Lashkar Gah and Kandahar to investigate their views on the military operation to drive out the Taliban, launched in February in Helmand province, and its aftermath.


It corroborates previous assessments, such as one from the Pentagon released last week which concluded that popular support for the insurgency in the Pashtun south had increased over the past few months. Not one of the 92 districts that are deemed key to NATO operations supported the government, whereas the number of those sympathetic to or supporting the insurgency increased to 48 in March, from 33 in December 2009. [2]

There is no doubt Operation Moshtarak has upset Afghans: 61% of those interviewed said they now feel more negative about NATO forces than before the offensive. This plays into the insurgents hands, as 95% of respondents said they believed more young Afghans are now joining the Taliban. In addition, 67% said they do not support a strong NATO-ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) presence in their province and 71% said they just wanted foreign troops to leave Afghanistan entirely. Locals don't have much confidence in NATO "clearing and holding" the area, as 59% thought the Taliban would return to Marjah once the dust settled, and in any case, 67% didn't believe NATO and the Afghan security forces could defeat the Taliban.

The anger is easy enough to understand. Whereas aid agencies and human rights groups have estimated the number of civilian killed during Operation Moshtarak at fewer than 50, the great majority of respondents believe the toll to be about 200, or roughly a third of the number of insurgents killed; a "collateral damage" clearly too high to "win hearts and minds" - if such damage can ever be justified at all. Moreover, the operation against Marjah displaced about 30,000 people, many forced into refugee camps nearby with inadequate food, medical services or shelter. Such camps are good recruitment sites for the Taliban.

Locals say the main reason why their young men join the Taliban is for the job or money it provides, even if they don't necessarily share the leaders' ideological convictions. Indeed, the majority of those who join the ranks of the insurgency are often unemployed and disenfranchised. One solution could therefore be to spend more funds on reconstruction and development to generate employment. But this has never been a NATO priority: the US alone has spent US$227 billion on military operations in Afghanistan since 2001, while international donors together have spent less than 10% of that amount on development aid.

To make things worse, NATO seeks to eliminate the drugs industry, which makes up about 30% of the country's total economy, often the best source of income for poor farmers. According to the ICOS report, eradication was opposed by 66% of those interviewed, not a surprising finding given that Helmand province cultivates over half the country's poppies and produces about 60% of its opium, with Marjah dubbed by many to be Helmand's “opium capital”. Even NATO's new policy of paying farmers as an incentive for them to eliminate their own crops undermines the economy because sustainable alternative livelihoods are not offered.

The survey also points to a paradoxical finding: notwithstanding their negative perceptions about NATO, two-thirds of interviewees said foreign troops should clear the Taliban from the road linking Lashkar Gah to Kandahar and Kabul and start an operation against insurgents in Kandahar.

This apparent contradiction can be explained in immediate terms by the fact that locals wish to travel and conduct business more easily. From a broader perspective, it suggests that locals simply dislike both the Taliban and foreign troops. As summarized concisely by a major tribal leader from Kandahar, "Ten percent of the people are with the Taliban, 10% are with the government and 80% of the people are angry at the Taliban, the government and the foreigners."

The roots of the dire situation of insecurity faced by many Afghans were explained by the mayor of Kandahar, Ghulam Haider Hamidi, who stated. "It was the international community that went to the warlords after the Taliban and brought them back," with appalling consequences up to this day. [3]

Those views reflect those of democratic-minded Afghans such as member of parliament Malalai Joya and the Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA), who have been campaigning for years against both the Taliban and the warlords and their NATO backers. Yet, their views have been completely ignored by coalition governments.

Rather, NATO and US forces have specialized in (botched) night raids that kill civilians, including pregnant women as happened in February in Paktia province. McChrystal has increased those Special Operations Forces raids since he became the top commander in Afghanistan, skills he had previously honed as commander of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) from 2003 to 2008. Even though civilian deaths from air strikes have declined, those caused by night raids have increased, so much that the UN now estimates they account for half the civilians killed by foreign troops. This has contributed to the 33% increase in civilian deaths last month compared to the same period last year, adding to Afghans' anger. [4]

Finally, 74% of those interviewed by ICOS support negotiations and dialogue with the Taliban, a clear sign that Afghans are tired of war. Bringing Taliban leaders in a political process already dominated by actors whose human rights record is atrocious might not be the ideal solution, but since in practice it is unlikely that NATO will push to have the warlords it allied itself with taken to court, it might be the best political alternative in the short term.

Notes

1. The International Council on Security and Development, formerly known as The Senlis Council, is an international think-tank known for its work in Afghanistan and other conflict zones such as Iraq and Somalia. It is a project of the Network of European Foundations' Mercator Fund. ICOS currently runs three programs: Global Security, Public Security and Public Health and Drug Control.

2. Alissa J Rubin, US report on Afghan war finds few gains in six months. New York Times, April 29, 2010; Gareth Porter, Pentagon map shows wide Taliban zone in the South. Inter Press Service, May 1. 2010.

3. Kathy Gannon, Afghans blame both US, Taliban for insecurity. Associated Press, April 16, 2010.

4. Gareth Porter, Pentagon map belies Taliban's sphere. Asia Times Online, May 4, 2010.

Afghanistan Analysis: The Growth of the "Taliban Zone" (Porter)

Gareth Porter, writing for Inter Press Service, complements the article we posted on Sunday pointing to a surge of Taliban activity over the last six months:

The Pentagon was still trying to spin its report on the war in Afghanistan issued this week as holding out hope because the instability had leveled off, even as some news outlets were noting that it documents the continued expansion of Taliban capabilities and operations.

Afghanistan Analysis: A Very Bad Six Months (White)

The most significant revelation in the report, however, is that Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal and the U.S.-NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) joint command now acknowledge officially that the Taliban insurgents dominate a vast contiguous zone of heavily populated territory across southern Afghanistan that McChrystal regards as the most critical area in the country.


The report admits that the population in key districts across most southern provinces is sympathetic to or supportive of the insurgents.

The contiguous zone of Taliban political power stretches all the way across the 13 provinces from Farah province in the far west of the country through Helmand and Kandahar to Wardak, Logar, Paktia and Khost provinces west and south of Kabul.

The extent of Taliban political power in southern Afghanistan, which had not been acknowledged previously by ISAF, is documented in a map showing an "overall assessment of key districts" as of Mar. 18.

The map shows for the first time the location and political and security status of 121 districts chosen late last year by planners on McChrystal's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Joint Staff as the most important for a strategy of weakening the Taliban gains.

The contiguous Taliban zone includes but is not limited to 58 of the 121 key districts, of which seven have populations assessed as "supporting" the Taliban, 25 with populations "sympathetic" to the Taliban, and 21 with populations that are "neutral".

Only five of the districts within that zone are shown as having populations that are "sympathetic to" the Afghan government and none that are "supporting" the government.

The degree of Taliban political dominance in the south is partly obscured, however, by an obvious effort to portray the attitudes of the population in Helmand and Kandahar provinces more favourably than is reflected in reports from those locations.

Eight of the "neutral" districts shown on the map are in Helmand province, where it has acknowledged in the past that the population was largely sympathetic to the Taliban.

The districts of Nad Ali, in which Marja is located, Naw Zad, Lashkar Gah and Sangin are all shown on the map as having "neutral" populations, even though it has been well documented that the populations of those heavily opium poppy-growing districts had turned decisively against the government and foreign troops over government eradication efforts and the abusive behaviour of police associated with local warlords.

The population of Nad Ali had been shown in an assessment in late December as being supportive of the Taliban. Naw Zad and Sangin districts, on the other hand, had been assessed as "neutral" in December.

A report by The Guardian's Jon Boone last week quoted a recent British visitor to Sangin as remarking on the "intense hatred of people who hate everything you stand for" he had felt from people there.

McChrystal's staff apparently defined "neutral" so as to include populations in districts where U.S. and NATO forces have carried out operations aimed at clearing the Taliban and are now the object of attempts to change their political views.

Earlier this year, however, an ISAF official familiar with the assessment on which the command was basing its plans clearly included those same districts among those in which the Taliban were regarded as having gotten popular support. The official told IPS in an interview in late January, "We have a system of 80 districts where Taliban influence is strongest, where people support the Taliban for whatever reason."

That set of 80 districts that are the most pro-Taliban in the country is same set of 80 "Key Terrain districts" defined in the new Pentagon report as "areas the control of (and support from which) provides a marked advantage to either the Government of Afghanistan or the insurgents."

The ISAF official also said that "about one-fourth" of the 80 districts in which the Taliban had the strongest support would be in the "contiguous security zone" that ISAF was planning to establish in Helmand and Kandahar provinces this year. That coincides with the 19 districts in those two provinces that are shown on the Dec. 24 assessment map as "neutral", "sympathetic" to the Taliban or "supportive" of the Taliban.

If the districts labeled on the map as "neutral" are understood to be pro-Taliban as well, the districts in all three categories form an almost unbroken chain of territory with populations leaning toward the Taliban across the full length of the Pashtun south.

The 80 districts described by the ISAF official in January as providing the strongest support to the Taliban apparently included only those pro-Taliban districts that had the largest population and were closest to the major lines of communications. The list does not include a large number of other districts in several Pashtun provinces of the south where the Taliban insurgents predominate but which are farther from the major roads.

The evidence of a coherent Taliban zone of political control in the new Pentagon assessment is consistent with an Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) Provincial/District Threat Assessment as of Apr. 23, 2009, which was reported by BBC last August. An ANSF security map reflecting the ASNF assessment showed almost every district in the Pashtun south except for Nimruz province as being either "high risk" or Taliban-controlled.

Although McChrystal seemed to reject the idea that the Taliban had broad political support in his initial assessment last August, an "integrated campaign plan" jointly agreed by McChrystal and U.S. Ambassador Karl Eikenberry that same month hinted strongly at such support in Pashtun areas.

The campaign plan document concluded, "Key groups have become nostalgic for the security and justice Taliban rule provided."

McChrystal's announcement earlier this year that ISAF would establish a "contiguous security zone" which would include the bulk of the population of Helmand and Kandahar provinces may have been a response to the recognition that the Taliban had formed its own zone of political dominance in southern Afghanistan.

However, given recent evidence that foreign troops have been unable to clear insurgents from Marja, and that local leaders and elders in Kandahar are opposing U.S. military operations in and around the city, that objective now appears to be well beyond the reach of U.S. and NATO troops.

Video & Transcript: Hillary Clinton on Meet the Press (2 May)

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton popped up on NBC Television's Meet the Press on Sunday. The chat started initially with domestic issues --- the oil spill off the Louisiana coast and immigration --- but then took in Afghanistan, Iran, and Sudan.

Notable points are Clinton trying to evade both the question of an inclusion of the Taliban in the Afghanistan political process and the recent revelation of an expansion of the Taliban's influence across the south of the country and her snippy dismissal of President Ahmadinejad's appearance at the Nuclear Non-Proliferation conference at the United Nations: "I don't know what he's showing up for."

Clinton's appearance begins around the 11:00 mark in the video:

NEW Afghanistan Analysis: The Growth of the “Taliban Zone” (Porter)
Afghanistan Analysis: A Very Bad Six Months (White)
The Latest from Iran (3 May): Mahmoud’s Road Show

Visit msnbc.com for breaking news, world news, and news about the economy

MR. GREGORY: What's certainly in the headlines this weekend is this oil spill off the coast of Louisiana and Mississippi, and it becomes a bigger issue and even a national security issue in--as it applies to climate change, which is an issue that you've dealt with. How will the administration approach this, particularly given the president's interests in offshore drilling? Does that have to stop now?


SEC'Y CLINTON: Well, David, I think that the president has ordered the departments that deal with this, Homeland Security, Interior, Environmental Protection, Defense to all immediately, not only do everything possible to mitigate the effects of this spill, but to try to come up with recommendations going forward. First order of business, however, is to try to get this spill under control--which has been, as you know, very difficult--and to prevent further damage to the coastline along Louisiana to the fishing waters, to the wildlife. I think it does raise questions, which the president has said have to be answered. He put forth a very comprehensive approach that included the potential of drilling off of our own shore. That is a national security concern because we have to do better to lessen our dependence on foreign oil. But it has to be done safely. It can't be done at the risk of having to spend billions of dollars cleaning up these spills. So, as with so much in these difficult areas, it's going to require a balancing act.

MR. GREGORY: Another area that has become a domestic political debate over immigration has also taken on some international ramifications. Mexico, because of the law, the stringent law against--anti-immigration law passed in Arizona has issued a pretty unusual alert...

SEC'Y CLINTON: Mm-hmm.

MR. GREGORY: ...to its own citizens traveling to Arizona. I'll put it up on the screen. This is the alert, a travel alert over Arizona immigration law. This is how the USA Today reported it on Wednesday. "The country warned that the state's adoption of a strict immigration enforcement law has created `a negative political environment for migrant communities and for all Mexican visitors.'

"`It must be assumed that every Mexican citizen may be harassed and questioned without further cause at any time,' according to the foreign ministry." The president, President Calderon, with whom you'll meet soon has talked about criminalizing--"this law criminalizes a largely social and economic phenomenon of migration." This is a pretty big shot across the bow to America here.

SEC'Y CLINTON: Well, it is, and, and I think if you look at it, again, you have a lot of unanswered questions. This law, which is clearly a result of the frustration that people in Arizona and their elected officials feel about the difficulty of enforcing the law along our border and preventing the continued immigration, people who are not documented. But on the other hand, it is written so broadly that if you were visiting in Arizona and you had an accent and you were a citizen from, you know, my state, of New York, you could be subjected to the kind of inquiry that is call--that this law permits.

MR. GREGORY: You think it invites profiling, racial profiling?

SEC'Y CLINTON: I don't think there's any doubt about that because, clearly, as I understand the way the law is being explained, if you're a legal resident, you still have to carry papers. Well, how are--how is a law enforcement official supposed to know? So, again, we have to try to balance the very legitimate concerns that Americans--not just people in Arizona, but across the country--have about safe and secure borders, about trying to have comprehensive immigration reform, with a law that I think does what a state doesn't have the authority to do, try to impose their own immigration law that is really the province of the federal government.

MR. GREGORY: That's important. Do you think this law will not stand up legally?

SEC'Y CLINTON: Well, I don't want to offer a legal opinion. I, I think I'll leave that to the Justice Department, but I know the attorney general of Arizona has raised questions about the legality. And you're right, we have a visit from President Calderon coming up, a state visit. He's a very important partner to us on trying to stop illegal activity along our border--the importation of drugs, of arms, of human beings, all of the crime that that's associated with--and we believe that he has really done the best he can under very difficult circumstances to get this under control. We don't want to make his life any harder either. We want to try to support him in what has been a courageous campaign against the drug traffickers.

MR. GREGORY: Let me move on to some other issues that are obviously on your plate, which is a, a big plate of issues.

SEC'Y CLINTON: Yes.

MR. GREGORY: Let's talk about Afghanistan. A big offensive is being planned for Kandahar, a very important visit by President Karzai's coming up after a period of turbulence between the U.S. and Karzai, which I know the administration has tried to tamp down. And yet, it's the nature of the insurgency that our fighting men and women are dealing with, and the Pentagon issued a report that was reported on by the Los Angeles Times on Thursday. Let me put it up on the screen. It says, "The report presented a sobering new assessment Wednesday of the Taliban-led insurgency in the country, saying that its abilities are expanding and its operations are increasing in sophistication, despite major offensives by U.S. forces in the militants' heartland," like Marja.

"The new report offers a grim take on the likely difficulty of establishing lasting security, especially in southern Afghanistan, where the insurgency enjoys broad support. The conclusions raise the prospect that the insurgency in the south may never be completely vanquished, but instead must be contained to prevent it from threatening the government of the President Harmid Karzai."

A narrow question here. Are you resigned to the fact that the Taliban, the insurgency, will have to be a part of this government in the future?

SEC'Y CLINTON: No. And let me start by putting the, the recent report from the Pentagon into context. It was a look back. It goes from last October through March. When we were devising the strategy that the president announced at West Point in early December, it was during the August, September, October, November period. And there was no doubt that the Taliban had the initiative, that there was a very serious threat to not only our forces, obviously, on the ground, but to the stability and security of Afghanistan.

MR. GREGORY: But you hear all this talk, and Karzai wants some kind of reconciliation with the Taliban as well.

SEC'Y CLINTON: Well, but, David, I think that we have to sort of sort out what we mean by that. We talk about reconciliation and reintegration. They may sound the same, but they're somewhat different concepts. Reintegration refers to the foot soldiers on the field who are coming in increasing numbers and saying, "Look, you know, we're fighting because we get paid. We're fighting because we were volunteered to fight because the Taliban came to our village and intimidated our, our, our elders. So there, there seems to be an ongoing movement of people sort of out of the battlefield. And General McChrystal and his commanders on the ground are seeing that and kind of organizing and running that.

The larger question about reconciliation--I don't know any conflict in recent times that didn't have some political resolution associated with it. People either got tired of fighting and decided they would engage in a peace process, they were defeated enough so that they were willing to lay down their arms. What President Karzai is saying, and we agree with this direction, is that you've got to look to see who is reconcilable. Not everybody will be. We don't expect Mullah Omar to show up and say, "Oh yeah, I'm giving up on my association with al-Qaeda, etc." But we do think that there are leaders within the Taliban--in fact, there are some already who have come over to the other side. Now, if they do so, they have to renounce al-Qaeda, they have to renounce violence, they have to give up their arms, and they have to be willing to abide by the Afghan constitution.

R. GREGORY: Another adversary, of course, gets us to Iran and the fact that President Ahmadinejad from Iran will be coming to New York to the U.N. for a nonproliferation meeting.

SEC'Y CLINTON: Right.

MR. GREGORY: You're moving down a path of sanctions, we understand what that is. Do you feel like he's going to try to show up here the early part of next week and steal the show?

SEC'Y CLINTON: I don't know what he's showing up for because the purpose of the non-proliferation treaty review conference is to reiterate the commitment of the international community to the three goals--disarmament, non-proliferation, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. So the vast majority of countries are coming to see what progress we can make. And this is a very high priority for President Obama. It's why he pressed so hard for the START treaty, which he signed with President Medvedev in Prague. It's why he convened the nuclear security summit to highlight the threat posed by nuclear terrorism. It's why we have begun to work out deals with India and others for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, which countries are entitled to under the non-proliferation regime. If Iran is coming to say, "We're willing to abide by the non-proliferation treaty," that would be very welcome news. I have a feeling that's not what they're coming to do. I think they're coming to try to divert attention and confuse the issue. And there is no confusion. They have violated the terms of the NPT, they have been held under all kinds of restrictions and obligations that they have not complied with by the IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency, by the U.N. Security Council. So we're not going to permit Iran to try to change the, the story from their failure to comply and in any way upset the efforts we are in the midst of, which is to get the international community to adopt a strong Security Council resolution that further isolates them and imposes consequences for their behavior.

MR. GREGORY: Madam Secretary, I'd like to spend a couple minutes on some other global hot spots that you're dealing with. The first one is actually with America's strong ally in the U.K., in Great Britain. Very interesting election going on. You've got three candidates, a resurgent third party in the Social Democrats, televised debates. You know something about those.

SEC'Y CLINTON: I do.

MR. GREGORY: And as you watch what's going on there, do you think there's a movement that could spread? Do you see a third party becoming viable in the United States?

SEC'Y CLINTON: Well, let's see whether it's viable in the U.K. I, I don't know the answer to that. We had, in my lifetime, and certainly long before, viable third party candidates. We've, you know, had Ross Perot, John Anderson, you know, just within my voting history. I think there's always room in a democracy for people to bring their views to the forefront. But I think one of the real strengths of our system has been our two-party approach, where each party may frustrate some of its own members because they, they do have a broad cross-section of voters and opinions. But, look, I'm going to be as interested in anybody in seeing what happens in the election in Great Britain.

MR. GREGORY: Final one has to do with the election in Sudan, where you have Bashir as the victor. And yet, this is--Sudan is a sponsor of state terror, according to the State Department. And this is someone who's boasting about the results and keeping the United States at bay. Nicholas Kristof wrote this in The New York Times: "Until he reached the White House," President "Obama repeatedly insisted" the U.S. "apply more pressure on Sudan so as to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur and elsewhere. Yet, as president, Mr. Obama and his aides have caved, leaving Sudan gloating at American weakness. ...

"President" Bashir, "al-Bashir of Sudan - the man wanted" ... "for crimes against humanity in Darfur - has been celebrating. His regime calls itself the National Congress Party, or N.C.P., and he was quoted in Sudan as telling a rally in the Blue Nile region:" Every America--"`Even America is becoming an N.C.P. member. No one is against our will.'

"Memo to Mr. Obama: When a man who has been charged with crimes against humanity tells the world that America is in his pocket, it's time to review your policy." What do you say?

SEC'Y CLINTON: Well, I would say that, number one, I, I can't take anything seriously that Bashir says. He is an indicted war criminal. The United States is very committed to seeing him brought to justice. But let's look at what's happening in Sudan, because I have the greatest respect, of course, for Nic Kristof and others who share my deep dismay at events in Sudan. But here's what we're trying to do. When we came into office, Bashir threw out the, the groups, the non-governmental organizations who were providing most of the aid in the camps in Darfur, which could have been a disastrous humanitarian crisis. We were able to get a lot of the help back in, and we're beginning to see some slight progress in Darfur. I don't want to overstate it because it is still a deplorable situation. But we're working to try to get the people back to their homes, out of the camps. At the same time, you had this election going on. It was, by any measure, a flawed election. There were many, many things wrong with it, but there hadn't been an election in many years. And so part of our goal was to try to empower opposition parties, empower people to go out and vote. Thousands and thousands did. The result, I think, was pretty much foreordained that Bashir would come out the winner, and that's unfortunate. We are turning all of our attention to trying to help the south and to mitigate against the attitudes of the north. I, I can't sit here and say that we are satisfied because I'm certainly not satisfied with where we are and what we're doing, but it is an immensely complicated arena.

Now, the United States could back off and say, "We won't deal with these people, we're not going to have anything to do with them, Bashir is a war criminal." I don't think that will improve the situation. So along with our partners--the U.K., Norway, neighboring countries--we are trying to manage what is a very explosive problem.

MR. GREGORY: Just a couple minutes left. I want to ask you about another big thrust of your time as secretary of State, and that is forging--well, I should say, a realization that there are limits to what government can accomplish around the world.

SEC'Y CLINTON: Mm-hmm.

MR. GREGORY: You have spent a lot of time working with the private sector...

SEC'Y CLINTON: Mm-hmm.

MR. GREGORY: ...to achieve certain commercial goals, also to achieve goals like the empowerment of women. You've got an announcement this, this weekend having to do with the China Expo...

SEC'Y CLINTON: Right.

MR. GREGORY: ...and the U.S. role in the China Expo, as well as efforts to empower women around the world in developing countries through the help of the private sector. Why is this really the, the route of the future for the government?

SEC'Y CLINTON: Thank you for asking me that because that is exactly what I believe, that diplomacy today is not just government to government. Part of what I had to do when I became secretary of State was to rebuild America's image, standing, and leadership in the world; and certainly President Obama is, you know, our greatest advocate of that. But you can't just do that by the government saying things or even by our president making incredibly important speeches. You have to begin to engage the people in other countries; and, in order to do that effectively, I want more people to people contacts, I want more private sector partnerships with our public sector and with people around the world.

Let me give you two quick examples. You mentioned the Shanghai Expo. You know, there are probably 70 million plus people who go through that Expo. When I became secretary of State, there was no money raised because we don't put public money into a project like that. So with the help of a lot of very dedicated corporate sponsors, we now will be a player in that Expo. Now, what does that mean? Well, when those 70 million Chinese, mostly Chinese, but people from elsewhere in the world, go through, they're going to learn something about America. They're going to learn something about, you know, our values, about our products, about, you know, how we live. I think that helps to build the kind of understanding and connection that is at the root of good relations.

And on women's issues, we just had a great announcement through the combined efforts of a number of corporate sponsors, foundations like the Rockefeller Foundation. We're going to be working to help empower women doing what they do best and to try to up their education levels, their health levels. Why does this matter? Because it's the United States doing it. And it's not just the United States government, it's the people of the United States.

MR. GREGORY: Before you go, a question about whether you think it's realistic that you will stay on as secretary of State for the balance of the first term.

SEC'Y CLINTON: Well, I intend to, yeah.

MR. GREGORY: You do intend to?

SEC'Y CLINTON: I intend to, yeah. But, I mean, you know, people have been asking me this and in, in the interest of full disclosure, it is an exhausting job. But I enjoy it, I have a great time doing it. I feel like we're making a difference around the world, that--you know, I'm a big believer in setting goals, having a vision of where we're trying to get, but then trying to translate that into what we do today and what we do tomorrow. And we've made a lot of progress. We face incredibly difficult problems.

MR. GREGORY: But so, you, you think you'll stay for the whole first term?

SEC'Y CLINTON: Well, I think so. I think so. I mean, look, you know, ask me next month and the month after that. But that certainly is my intention.

MR. GREGORY: And yet you don't care to be on the Supreme Court?

SEC'Y CLINTON: Oh, never. I mean, I'm glad, I'm glad you asked me that.

MR. GREGORY: You're a lawyer with all that background.

SEC'Y CLINTON: I am--I do not and have never wanted to be a judge, ever. I mean, that has never been anything that I even let cross my mind because it's just not my personality.

MR. GREGORY: Do you think the president should pick another women--woman this time?

SEC'Y CLINTON: I think he should pick a very well-qualified, people-savvy, young person to be on the Court to really help to shape the jurisprudence going forward. I think that, you know, it's not a surprise that there's a real division on the Court, and a lot of decisions that have great ramifications for the people of our country, that I would like to see someone put on the Court who can really try to shift the direction of the current Court.

MR. GREGORY: Secretary Clinton, thank you, as always.

SEC'Y CLINTON: You're welcome.

Afghanistan Analysis: A Very Bad Six Months (White)

Jim White writes in The Seminal:

Congress now requires a "Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan" every six months (or, every Friedman Unit), and the latesthas very gloomy news. Here is the best spin that the Defense Department’s accompanying press release could come up with:

NEW Afghanistan Analysis: The Growth of the “Taliban Zone” (Porter)
Afghanistan: Your Guide on How to Be An Expert

Stability in Afghanistan is no longer on the decline, and most Afghans believe that despite increased violence, security actually has improved since this time last year, according to a new report Pentagon officials sent to Congress today.

Notice that "despite increased violence part"? Here is the ugly truth behind that spin:




The reality is that since the beginning of 2007, violent events in Afghanistan, by the Defense Department’s measurements, have doubled, and the trend is still decidedly in the direction of more violence.

When it comes to assessing the strengths of the insurgency, here are the bullet points:

Insurgent Strengths:

• The speed and decisiveness of insurgent information operations and media campaigns remain not only the insurgents’ main effort, but also their most significant strength.
• Organizational capabilities and operational reach are qualitatively and geographically expanding.
• The ability to intimidate through targeted killings and threats in order to force acquiescence to their will.
• The strength and ability of shadow governance to discredit the authority and legitimacy of the Afghan Government is increasing.
• IED use is increasing in numbers and complexity; IEDs are as much a tactic and process as they are a weapon.
• Insurgents’ tactics, techniques, and procedures for conducting complex attacks are increasing in sophistication and strategic effect.

Hmmm. Doesn’t "ability to intimidate through targeted killings and threats" sound familiar? Especially if it is intended to "force acquiescence"? That sounds very much like the night raids that are a central feature of General Stanley McChrystal’s vaunted COIN strategy. Despite the knowledge that night raids are a central driving force for the recruitment of new insurgents, especially when night raids result in the the death or imprisonment of innocent civilians, here is the extent of the explanation of McChrystal’s changes to the night raid strategy:

The Night Raids Tactical Directive, issued on January 23, 2010, raises the threshold that must be achieved before a tactical night raid can be approved. The directive applies to the conduct of night raids by all conventional and SOF in Afghanistan under command of COMISAF. This directive acknowledges that the Afghan population’s judgment of our conduct and perception of our intentions will be critical in their decision to support their nation’s struggle against the insurgency. While night raids are effective and their operational value is understood, the new directive recognizes the cultural dynamics and acknowledges that night raids’ success comes at a steep cost in terms of perceptions of the Afghan population. Therefore, COMISAF directed that night raids should be executed only after all other courses of action have been considered. This directive outlines a number of the planning and execution factors that must be considered if night raids are to be conducted in order to ensure that they are tactically sound, judiciously used, and as transparent as possible.

Note the order of priorities in this description. The primary consideration is that "night raids should be executed only after all other course of action have been considered", rather than the later mention of them being "tactically sound" and "judiciously used", which presumably means that efforts should be made to eliminate faulty targeting of innocent civilians, although it would be more reassuring if they would say that directly.

Perhaps the most revealing information on where the situation in Afghanistan is headed comes in the assessment of the security situation in "key districts". Here are the data from late December compared to mid-March:



That poor security situation has a direct impact on the feelings of the local population. Here is how the New York Times described the population polling information:

In 92 districts assessed for their support of the Afghan government or their antagonism to it, not one supported the government, although the population was neutral in 44 districts. The number of districts sympathetic to the insurgency or supportive of it increased to 48 in March 2010 from 33 in December 2009.

That’s right, in the most recent half Friedman Unit, we went from 33 key districts with support or sympathy for the insurgency to 48. How’s that for an effective surge? By the Defense Department’s own analysis, the insurgency is getting stronger and increasing its efficacy at the same time that it is gaining control in more districts. How on Earth can they then claim that "Stability in Afghanistan is no longer on the decline"?