Middle East Inside Line: Israeli Military Drills & Gestures, Palestinian Boycott of Goods, Syria's Assad v. US Congress

Israel's "Turning Point 4" Military Operation: The Israeli Defense Forces have released a video about their drill, allegedly designed as preparation against Hezbollah in Lebanon.

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bsVe7Dg9h8c[/youtube]

Middle East/Iran Analysis: How the US Has Lost (Narwani)
Middle East Inside Line: Israel’s Settlements; Syria’s Defiance

Israel's "Goodwill Measures": The Jewish Telegraphic Agency gave more details on the Israeli gestures towards Palestine that we noted on Sunday. The measures include allowing Israeli tour guides to enter the Palestinian city of Bethlehem and allowing tourists to enter the city via all crossings; removing 60 roadblocks throughout the West Bank; easing restrictions on senior Palestinian businessmen going through security checkpoints; and permitting Israeli-Arab civilians to travel through all security crossings located on the West Bank security fence.


Palestinian Authority's Boycott of Israeli Goods: With proximity talks, discussion has arisen over the Palestinian boycott of Israeli goods produced in the West Bank and the Golan Heights. Jeff Barak, a former editor-in-chief of The Jerusalem Post, said that "Palestinians' boycott is a political act that does not contribute to the positive atmosphere needed to help the recently launched proximity talks". He continued:

Palestinian traders selling Israeli-made goods produced in the West Bank reportedly face fines of up to $14,000 or even prison which, while not a “hostile act” as the Council of Jewish Communities in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip would have us believe, is still a serious violation of the spirit of the economic agreements made between Israel and the Palestinians during the Oslo period.

However, Barak also pointed out another economic reality:

The manufacturers’ claim that they are providing jobs for the around 20,000 Palestinians who would otherwise be unemployed might have some factual basis, but ignores the real reason for their basing their factories there: the winning combination of cheap land and cheap labor. Were labor costs and rents the same in the territories as they are in Israel, these manufacturers’ concern for Palestinian employment figures would soon disappear.

On Monday, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said at a Likud Party meeting that the boycott of Israeli products from the West Bank cost 2,000 Palestinians their livelihoods and added:

Israel strives for peace, we removed checkpoints in the West Bank, improved the [Palestinians'] quality of life, and are constantly working to help the development of the Palestinian economy, yet the Palestinians oppose economic improvements and takes step that in the end hurt themselves.

Syria's Assad vs. the US Congress & Lobbies: On Monday, in an interview with the Italian daily newspaper La Republica, Syrian President Bashar Assad made four assertions. First, it is not necessary to break Syria's strong ties with Iran to make peace with Israel. Secondly, Syria, did not give Scud missiles to Hezbollah. Thirdly, the US has lost its influence in the Middle East. Lastly, the reason for this failure is not President Barack Obama, who brought hope to the region, but the actions of Congress and American lobbies.

Israel Still Denies Nuke Offer to South Africa: Responding to the report that Israel had offered nuclear warheads to South Africa, a statement from President Shimon Peres' office said:

Israel has never negotiated the exchange of nuclear weapons with South Africa. There exists no Israeli document or Israeli signature on a document that such negotiations took place.

Israel Says 'No' to Aid Ships: A flotilla of humanitarian aid ships sent from Ireland, Greece and Turkey to help people in Gaza will not be allowed into the Gaza Strip. Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Dan Meridor said:

If the people who rule Gaza let [detained Israeli soldier] Gilad Shalit go then everything will look different. They're causing damage to their own people.

Hamas Warns Fatah ahead of Elections: Hamas officials said on Monday that the Islamist movement will boycott the municipal elections that the Palestinian Authority is planning to hold in the West Bank in July. Hamas said that the elections were designed to help Fatah and supporters of the Oslo Accords.

UPDATED Iraq Analysis: 100+ Die as The Politics and The Guerrilla War Continue (Cole)

UPDATE 1215 GMT: Juan Cole has posted another note with the latest death toll (119) and reading of the bombings.

A bit of context for Juan Cole's latest evaluation of the Iraq situation: Steven Lee Myers writes in The New York Times that Monday's attacks killed at least 101 people and wounded hundreds more. In The Guardian of London, former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, whose Iraqqiya list won the most Parliamentary seats in the 7 March election, warns, "This conflict will not remain within the borders of Iraq. It will spill over and it has the potential to reach the world at large, not just neighbouring countries. Now Iraq is at centre stage in the region. But it is boiling with problems, it is stagnant and it can go either way."

A series of coordinated attacks on checkpoints and a Shiite mosque on Monday in Iraq demonstrated that the guerrilla opposition to the US-imposed new order in that country continues to be active and organized. Some 300-400 civilians and members of security forces are still being killed in political violence every month, not counting the insurgents themselves.

Iraq: The Politicians, The Clerics, and a Coalition? (Alaaldin)

The death rate from such violence appears little changed this year from last. The attacks continue to make economic progress difficult; they often disrupt the work (and even destroy the edifices) of government agencies, and they discourage foreign investment. Attacks on Shiite mosques are intended to provoke reprisals against Sunni Arabs, sharpening the contradictions and polarization and making Sunnis easier to recruit and mobilize for the resistance.


Meanwhile, one of the only ways mainstream Sunni Arabs, about 17 percent of the population, can hope to avoid another purely Shiite-Kurdish government would be to acquiesce in the formation of a government of national unity. That step would require the secular Iraqiya List, for which most Sunni Arabs voted, but which includes secular Shiites like its leader Iyad Allawi, to join the government. Thus, Al-Sharq al-Awsat reports in Arabic that incumbent PM Nuri al-Maliki and Iraqiya leader Iyad al-Allawi have met to discuss a place at the table for the Iraqiya.

This move would have benefits for several parties. Al-Maliki campaigned against ex-Baathist secularists, but his current allies, the Shiite religious parties of Ammar al-Hakim and Muqtada al-Sadr, seem insistent on replacing him with someone else, perhaps Ibrahim Jaafari. The Iraqiya might prefer al-Maliki, who has backed off purely sectarian language and speaks like an Iraqi nationalist, even though he remains head of the fundamentalist Islamic Mission Party (Da’wa), to a more sectarian candidate favored by the Sadrists. So, if al-Maliki can draw the Iraqiya in, it might be a way of outmaneuvering Muqtada al-Sadr, whose Mahdi Army al-Maliki attacked militarily in 2008. Ammar al-Hakim of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, which is close to Tehran, has in any case made it clear that he will not join a government from which Allawi’s list is excluded.

So the scenario I predicted soon after the March 7 election, of a core Shiite alliance but a government of national unity that includes Iraqiya and the Kurds, seems in train. It replicates the government of summer, 2006, when US ambassador Ryan Crocker worked hard at cementing it. This time, much of the work seems to be being done by the Iraqis themselves, sometimes reluctantly, as the need for political reconciliation bears in on them and they realize it is key to their future as a state.

Latest from Iran (10 May): Will the Executions Matter?

1920 GMT: Protest Videos. We've now posted three videos of today's anti-Ahmadinejad protest at Shahid Beheshti University and a video of a student walkout at Elm-o-Sanat University over the speech of a Government official.

1910 GMT: Executions --- A Correction. An Iranian activist puts out an important note: Mehdi Islamian, one of the five Iranians hung on Sunday, was not a Kurd. Islamian's brother and three other people were convicted of a bombing in Shiraz and accused of connections with monarchists. The activist claims that Islamian's "crime" was money given to his brother.

NEW Latest Iran Video: Protest Against Ahmadinejad at Shahid Beheshti University (10 May)
NEW Iran Background Video: Protest in Kurdistan Over Political Prisoners
Iran: Farzad Kamangar’s Last Letter “Is It Possible to Teach and Be Silent?
Iran First-Hand: Assessing Life and Opinions in Tehran (Majd)
Iran, Meet Kafka: The Web of Internet Censorship Catches All (Farokhnia)
The Latest from Iran (9 May): 5 Iranian Kurds Executed

1900 GMT: Mousavi on the Executions. Mir Hossein Mousavi has issued a statement on Sunday's execution of five Iranian Kurds (English translation):

The sudden execution of five of the citizens of this country without giving any clear explanations regarding their charges, prosecution procedure and trials to the people, is just similar to the unjust trend that in the recent months have led to the surprising sentences for a lot of caring women, men and citizens of our country.

When the Judiciary shifts its position from supporting the oppressed toward supporting authorities and those in power, it is hard to stop people from judging that the judiciary sentences are unjust. How is it that today the courts pass on those who ordered and committed the crimes of Kahrizak Prison, [the attacks on Tehran] University dormitories, Sobhan residence [3], the days of 15th and 20th of June, and Bloody Ashura [27 December], and closed the massive corruption cases before opening them and then suddenly on the eve of the month of Khordaad [June], the month of consciousness and seeking justice, hangs these five individuals with so many unanswered questions? Is this the Alavi [those who follow the first Imam of Shi'a, Imam Ali] justice that you were after?

1625 GMT: Rafsanjani Watch. Former President Hashemi Rafsanjani has declared that he still believes the solutions he presented in his Friday Prayer address last July --- the last time he spoke from the Tehran podium --- still provide an exit from the current post-election conflict.

Meeting former governors, Rafsanjani said adherence to the Constitution was the most important basis for "moving forces" towards a resolution.

A reminder of Rafsanjani's 17 July speech, which was accompanied by mass protests against the handling of the post-election conflict by the Government:

The most important thing that has happened is that the trust that brought the people
to vote in such large number is not there anymore.
We need to return this trust.

We all need to follow the law. And I’m talking about the government, the parliament, the Islamic Courts and the security forces.
We need to follow the laws.
All problems can be solved if we only follow the framework of the laws.
We need to create an environment where all sides could come together and discuss their issues.
We need to be able to sit down like brothers and sisters and talk about our differences.
Unfortunately,
The chance that was given to the Guardian Council of five days to get people together and regain their trust was not used.
That is not there anymore.
But we still have time to unite.

We shouldn’t imprison our own people,
We should let these people return to their homes,
We shouldn’t let our enemies laugh at us because we’ve imprisoned our own people.
We should sit together with mourners,
And we should console them,
And bring them back closer to the system.
We should not be impatient now.

Please do not censor media outlets that have legally obtained permits.
Let them do what they want to do legally.
Allow a peaceful and friendly environment to prosper.
We are all together in the Islamic Revolution,
We’ve all spent years in suffering,
We’ve all given martyrs for the cause of the revolution,
This unity needs to fostered.

I’m hopeful that we will be able to achieve this unity in the future,
And I’m hopeful we will get out of this situation,
Based on the wishes of the people,
And consensus among the leaders.

1500 GMT: The Executions. Education International has issued a statement that it is "deeply troubled to hear reports that Iranian teacher trade unionist Farzad Kamangar was among five people who were summarily executed in secret on 9 May". The International Trade Union Confederation has also condemned the hanging.

1430 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Sixty professors from the Tehran University of Medical Sciences have written to the university's president, calling for the release of medical student Maryam Abbasinejad from prison.

Abbasinejad was arrested a day after Ahmadinejad’s sudden appearance at the university on 1 May. There is no information on her physical condition or the reason behind the arrest.

1420 GMT: Getting Rid of Bad Books. The Supreme Leader, meeting officials of the Islamic Ideology Dissemination Organization, has urged authorities to prevent the publication of books which contradict Iran's religious and cultural values: "The country's cultural atmosphere, especially in the field of book publishing, should be protected as there are some who seek to distort history and spread issues which are against our values."

Ayatollah Khamenei's remarks come after reports that the Tehran Book Fair barred works by figures such as Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti, a hero of the Islamic Revolution, Grand Ayatollah Sane’i, and Grand Ayatollah Montazeri. (Press TV notes simply, "The meeting [with the IIDO] comes as the Iranian capital of Tehran is hosting an international book fair which runs until May 15.")

1415 GMT: "Hardline" Editor Acquitted. Hossein Shariatmardari, the editor of the "hardline" Kayhan, has been acquitted by a Tehran court of all charges of libel, brought by, amongst others, activists such as Shirin Ebadi and Shadi Sadr and journalist Emaduddin Baghi.

1410 GMT: Maziar Bahari, Master Criminal. An EA correspondent reports that Iranian-Canadian journalist Maziar Bahari was today, in absentia, has been given a sentence of 13 years imprisonment and 74 lashes by the Revolutionary Court of Tehran. This is the longest jail term imposed on a journalist in the post-election conflict.

Bahari was detained in Iran for four months after the election but was released in October. He returned to the United States, although he still has family in Iran.

1345 GMT: Kicking Out the Oil Companies (This Time We Mean It). Iran has issued a new two-week ultimatum to Royal Dutch Shell and the Spanish company Repsol after the expiry of a previous ultimatum last month.

Referring to long-standing contracts for development of natural gas fields, Reza Kasaiezadeh, director of the National Iranian Gas Export Company, said, "The oil ministry has now issued an ultimatum to Shell and Repsol, holding them responsible to determine the situation surrounding contracts on South Pars phases 13 and 14 over a period of two weeks."

On Saturday, Minister of Oil Masoud Mirkazemi had threatened that Iran will expel foreign firms for delaying development, but he did not a specific company. Shell, citing the prospect of Western sanctions, suspended operations in South Pars earlier this year.

1210 GMT: What Demonstrations? Islamic Republic News Agency has posted an article on President Ahmadinejad's speech at Shahid Beheshti University praising Iran's "astonishing speed of scientific progress". Nothing, however, on the student demonstration that greeted news of the visit.

1155 GMT: MediaWatch. Non-Iranian media are gradually picking up on the significance of Sunday's executions. The BBC has now posted a short article, and The Guardian of London goes further with references to demonstrations (although the newspaper's story, "Kurds to protest after Iran executions", misses the fundamental point that many Iranians who are not Kurdish may be demonstrating and linking the hangings to wider post-election issues of injustices and abuses).

1150 GMT: Silent Demonstrations at Universities? Rah-e-Sabz writes that silent protests against the executions of the Iranian Kurds are planned for Wednesday and Thursday at Tehran University.

1140 GMT: We've posted two claimed videos of a protest against President Ahmadinejad's visit to Shahid Beheshti University in Tehran.

1000 GMT: Add Toronto to the list of cities where protests took place against Sunday's executions.


0810 GMT: Mousavi "An Enemy of God". Gholam-Hossein Elham, a member of the Guardian Council, has reportedly said that Mir Hossein Musavi is a "mohareb" (enemy of God).

Elham, quoted by Fars News from a speech at a university, would be the most significant Government official so far to make the allegation --- which carries the death penalty under Iranian law --- against Mousavi.

0800 GMT:  Diversion? Amidst the uproar over the execution of five Iranian Kurds as enemies of the state, Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani has tried to hammer home the themes of Iran's defence against foreign-supported "terrorism". Speaking at the Organization of the Islamic Conference in Turkey, Larijani claimed direct US backing and involvement of groups operating out of Pakistan.

Larijani's comments are made in the context of the recent capture of Abdolmalek Rigi, the leader of the Baluch insurgent group Jundullah.

0700 GMT: MediaWatch. Nazila Fathi writes in both the print and versions of The New York Times this morning about the execution of the five Iranians, taking the line: "Although the authorities announced that the five people executed Sunday had been found guilty of carrying out fatal bomb attacks, the executions were widely seen as intended to discourage people from rallying against the government on June 12 [the anniversary of the Presidential election."

The Washington Post has a shorter, muddled Web-only piece by Thomas Erdbrink. For some reason, the article distinguishes between the hangings of four of the Kurds and the execution of Mahdi Islamian, leading to the distorted headline, "Reported executions of four Kurds could increase tensions in Iran". The report is largely drawn from the account of Iran's Islamic Republic News Agency, so there is no consideration of wider political issues.

0630 GMT: Nuclear Front. In advance of the visit by Brazilian and Turkish leaders to Iran which may signal a brokering of an uranium enrichment deal, Tehran has restated its willingness to reach an arrangement.

The head of Iran'a atomic energy organisation, Ali Akbar Salehi, told reporters, "Some countries have been seeking to impose a series of conditions on Iran, but our condition is receiving concrete assurances."

Salehi continued, "Our stance toward the nuclear fuel swap has not changed. We will give 3.5 percent enriched uranium and receive 20 percent enriched fuel. Our purpose (of continuing negotiations with the West) is to give the Western countries an opportunity to save face and find a way out of the current situation."

0515 GMT: Crackdown on Kurdish Teachers. An Iranian activist reports that four leading members of the Kurdestan Teachers Union were arrested by Iranian intelligence on Sunday.

0500 GMT: It has been a long time since a single story from Iran galvanised reaction outside the country. Iranians and activists throughout the world responded with sadness and fury to the Sunday morning news that five Iranians --- Farzad Kamangar, Ali Heydarian, Farhad Vakili, Shirin Alamhouli, and Mehdi Eslamian --- had been executed for alleged bombings and/or membership of the Kurdish organisation PEJAK. Demonstrations took place in London, Berlin, Paris, Milan and Hamburg, with dozens arrested at the French rally.

But what will the response be inside Iran? Will the hangings provoke public anger or will any display be muted? We have posted video of a demonstration in Sanandaj in Kurdistan in July 2008 over detentions, including that of Farzad Kamangar, who was hung on Sunday. Families of the executed reportedly called for a protest in front of Tehran University at 11 a.m. local time (0600 GMT).

Iraq: The Politicians, The Clerics, and a Coalition? (Alaaldin)

While EA has been occupied with the post-election tensions and manoeuvres in Britain and Iran, Iraq's own political intrigue trundles on.  There seemed to be some prospect of clearing up the muddle last week with reports of an alliance between two largely Shia blocs, the State of Law list headed by Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and the Iraqi National Alliance including Moqtada al-Sadr and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq. That would shut out Iraqqiya, the Shia-Sunni list headed by former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, which narrowly won the most Parliamentary seats in the 7 March elections.

Still, it was unclear whether al-Maliki would remain as Prime Minister or give way to another politician such as former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari. And speculation continues over the role of Iraq's clerics in contributing to a grand arrangement.

Ranj Alaaldin writes for The Guardian of London:

Last week, Iraq's most powerful Shia-dominated blocs, the State of Law coalition, led by Nouri al-Maliki of the Islamic Dawa party, and the Iraqi National Alliance (dominated by the Sadrist-Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq) joined forces for the purposes of forming the country's next government.



The move leaves them just four seats short of an overall majority, meaning they are almost certainly going to take the reins of power, and at the expense of the leading Sunni bloc of the former Iraqi premier, Ayad Allawi, the marginal winner of Iraq's elections last March. Many will bemoan the move and call it a Shia sectarian manoeuvre that sidelines the Sunnis, but it was the most likely scenario all along. As predicted, Allawi's Iraqi National Movement (INM) will have been considered by the Shia parties (and indeed also by the Kurds) as too tainted by its ultra-nationalist – some would say Ba'athist – elements.

The Kurds have astutely played the waiting game, letting their Arab counterparts rip each other apart in the south and waiting to see which winning horse to back. That horse, right now, is the new Shia coalition just formed. However, this does not necessarily mean the end of the game.

If Iraq's new government is going to have some degree of legitimacy then it needs Kurdish as well as Sunni representation. The next step for the Shia coalition right now is to encourage leading personalities within Allawi's bloc (perhaps Allawi himself) to play some notable role in the new government and offer them major positions like the presidency (largely ceremonial) and speaker of the parliament, or control of one of the main ministries. The Kurds will also be pushing for such positions, knowing that there can be no government without their inclusion.

Even assuming these entities are eventually incorporated, there may still be uncertainty ahead, given the conflicting ideological and political agendas of the various groups within the new Shia coalition. Leading coalition entities –-- Dawa, ISCI and the Sadrists –-- accept this themselves: they have signed up to a pact that gives the clerical establishment the final say over any disputes between them.

The system would work in a similar way to the "collective responsibility" of cabinet ministers in Britain: the highest-ranking clerical authority would make a decision and others would follow. Disagreements would not, therefore, be made public. Thus, the leading authority in this instance would be Grand Ayatollah Sistani who takes advice from a close and select group, including his son and other senior religious figures, such as Ayatollah Mohammad Saeed al-Hakim.

Giving the clerics the final say will come as a shock to many. Since the invasion of 2003, Iraq has had a bloody seven years just to achieve the respectable standard of democracy it now has. The move to refer political matters to the clerics will thus be deemed regression and perhaps an insult to the Iraqi electorate.

However, it is easy to get carried away. The fact of the matter is that most major decisions in the political arena are made with some degree of approval from the religious establishment in Najaf. Sistani is regularly consulted by the country's array of political players and can, in fact, make a positive contribution – it was because of his intervention, for example, that Iraq adopted the open-list system for the elections, much to the dismay of the country's politicians but welcomed by its people.

Little will, therefore, change as a result of this agreement, made between parties rather than between party and clerics. The clergy may well choose to publicly denounce the agreement, lest they face challenges similar to those faced by counterparts across the border in Iran.

It is interesting that Dawa has signed up to it, since it has recently pushed a secularist agenda (the INA, on the other hand, made it clear in their electoral programme that they will adhere to the clerical establishment). Publicly, Dawa may therefore downplay the significance of the agreement and it clearly does not feel threatened by the possibility that the INA may hold greater sway in the south because of its more sectarian composition and since the ISCI and its leadership enjoy a special and blood relationship with Hakim.

Iraq is still a long way away from becoming a theocracy and its multi-ethnic and multi-sectarian diversity ensure that it is unlikely to turn into one. Uncertain, still, is the politics. The new Shia alliance may not hold together as it squabbles over who within it should become prime minister and how to establish a representative and inclusive government.

Afghanistan Analysis: The Growth of the "Taliban Zone" (Porter)

Gareth Porter, writing for Inter Press Service, complements the article we posted on Sunday pointing to a surge of Taliban activity over the last six months:

The Pentagon was still trying to spin its report on the war in Afghanistan issued this week as holding out hope because the instability had leveled off, even as some news outlets were noting that it documents the continued expansion of Taliban capabilities and operations.

Afghanistan Analysis: A Very Bad Six Months (White)

The most significant revelation in the report, however, is that Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal and the U.S.-NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) joint command now acknowledge officially that the Taliban insurgents dominate a vast contiguous zone of heavily populated territory across southern Afghanistan that McChrystal regards as the most critical area in the country.


The report admits that the population in key districts across most southern provinces is sympathetic to or supportive of the insurgents.

The contiguous zone of Taliban political power stretches all the way across the 13 provinces from Farah province in the far west of the country through Helmand and Kandahar to Wardak, Logar, Paktia and Khost provinces west and south of Kabul.

The extent of Taliban political power in southern Afghanistan, which had not been acknowledged previously by ISAF, is documented in a map showing an "overall assessment of key districts" as of Mar. 18.

The map shows for the first time the location and political and security status of 121 districts chosen late last year by planners on McChrystal's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Joint Staff as the most important for a strategy of weakening the Taliban gains.

The contiguous Taliban zone includes but is not limited to 58 of the 121 key districts, of which seven have populations assessed as "supporting" the Taliban, 25 with populations "sympathetic" to the Taliban, and 21 with populations that are "neutral".

Only five of the districts within that zone are shown as having populations that are "sympathetic to" the Afghan government and none that are "supporting" the government.

The degree of Taliban political dominance in the south is partly obscured, however, by an obvious effort to portray the attitudes of the population in Helmand and Kandahar provinces more favourably than is reflected in reports from those locations.

Eight of the "neutral" districts shown on the map are in Helmand province, where it has acknowledged in the past that the population was largely sympathetic to the Taliban.

The districts of Nad Ali, in which Marja is located, Naw Zad, Lashkar Gah and Sangin are all shown on the map as having "neutral" populations, even though it has been well documented that the populations of those heavily opium poppy-growing districts had turned decisively against the government and foreign troops over government eradication efforts and the abusive behaviour of police associated with local warlords.

The population of Nad Ali had been shown in an assessment in late December as being supportive of the Taliban. Naw Zad and Sangin districts, on the other hand, had been assessed as "neutral" in December.

A report by The Guardian's Jon Boone last week quoted a recent British visitor to Sangin as remarking on the "intense hatred of people who hate everything you stand for" he had felt from people there.

McChrystal's staff apparently defined "neutral" so as to include populations in districts where U.S. and NATO forces have carried out operations aimed at clearing the Taliban and are now the object of attempts to change their political views.

Earlier this year, however, an ISAF official familiar with the assessment on which the command was basing its plans clearly included those same districts among those in which the Taliban were regarded as having gotten popular support. The official told IPS in an interview in late January, "We have a system of 80 districts where Taliban influence is strongest, where people support the Taliban for whatever reason."

That set of 80 districts that are the most pro-Taliban in the country is same set of 80 "Key Terrain districts" defined in the new Pentagon report as "areas the control of (and support from which) provides a marked advantage to either the Government of Afghanistan or the insurgents."

The ISAF official also said that "about one-fourth" of the 80 districts in which the Taliban had the strongest support would be in the "contiguous security zone" that ISAF was planning to establish in Helmand and Kandahar provinces this year. That coincides with the 19 districts in those two provinces that are shown on the Dec. 24 assessment map as "neutral", "sympathetic" to the Taliban or "supportive" of the Taliban.

If the districts labeled on the map as "neutral" are understood to be pro-Taliban as well, the districts in all three categories form an almost unbroken chain of territory with populations leaning toward the Taliban across the full length of the Pashtun south.

The 80 districts described by the ISAF official in January as providing the strongest support to the Taliban apparently included only those pro-Taliban districts that had the largest population and were closest to the major lines of communications. The list does not include a large number of other districts in several Pashtun provinces of the south where the Taliban insurgents predominate but which are farther from the major roads.

The evidence of a coherent Taliban zone of political control in the new Pentagon assessment is consistent with an Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) Provincial/District Threat Assessment as of Apr. 23, 2009, which was reported by BBC last August. An ANSF security map reflecting the ASNF assessment showed almost every district in the Pashtun south except for Nimruz province as being either "high risk" or Taliban-controlled.

Although McChrystal seemed to reject the idea that the Taliban had broad political support in his initial assessment last August, an "integrated campaign plan" jointly agreed by McChrystal and U.S. Ambassador Karl Eikenberry that same month hinted strongly at such support in Pashtun areas.

The campaign plan document concluded, "Key groups have become nostalgic for the security and justice Taliban rule provided."

McChrystal's announcement earlier this year that ISAF would establish a "contiguous security zone" which would include the bulk of the population of Helmand and Kandahar provinces may have been a response to the recognition that the Taliban had formed its own zone of political dominance in southern Afghanistan.

However, given recent evidence that foreign troops have been unable to clear insurgents from Marja, and that local leaders and elders in Kandahar are opposing U.S. military operations in and around the city, that objective now appears to be well beyond the reach of U.S. and NATO troops.