Monday
Nov022009
Iran Nuclear Talks: Tehran's Middle Way?
Monday, November 2, 2009 at 9:21
Latest from Iran (2 November): The World Takes Notice?
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Writing for Iranian Diplomacy, foreign policy analyst Keyhan Barzegar suggests a "middle way" in the enrichment negotiations, in which Iran can send some of its uranium to a third country --- thus meeting "Western" concerns --- but retain some of its stock.
Barzegar's view is very much that of a pragmatic diplomat, and I'm not sure it takes account of the political considerations both in Western countries and within Iran. (It is interesting to see his representation of Parliamentary objections to the Vienna deal as a reflection of public anxiety rather than as part of a power struggle within the establishment.) The bottom line of the analysis, however, deserves attention: for Barzegar, Iran's response to the enrichment proposal is not a manipulation or evasion but a genuine reflection of its technical as well as political concerns.
Translated by Iran Review:
Explaining about a draft agreement on nuclear fuel for the Tehran research reactor, the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Manouchehr Mottaki has noted, “The two sides decided to go through the draft. It has been done in Vienna and Iran will soon declare its viewpoint.” At the same time, some officials have already voiced their opposition to the recent nuclear agreement.
The main point evident in all those opposite remarks is lack of trust. Iran still distrusts the West and maintains that Western countries are trying to deprive it of its right to enrich uranium in the long run. Therefore, Tehran maintains that it should take a multilateral strategic approach to this issue.
In fact, they say, it is part of a US strategy to take all enriched uranium away from Iran and then raise expectations from Tehran in the next phase. It seems that their main concern is those expectations, which may finally bring the enrichment process, which has been a fixed policy of Iran, to a complete halt. This would cost dearly for those politicians who had insisted on enrichment in Iran, especially President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Therefore, if the negotiations fail to reach a clear result, it could be quite disconcerting.
The opposition heard in the Majlis (Parliament) is in line with the general anxiety in Iran and the idea that negotiations with the United States are not beneficial to Iran because the United States will use its power to inflict losses on Iran in a step by step manner. Therefore, they are totally suspicious about the role of the United States in its power game with Iran and maintain that Iran would be the weaker side of the game.
In the time of Bush, the game followed totally clear rules. He tried to force other countries through bullying and unilateralism to give in to US policies and this built international consensus against him. Obama, however, has adopted a new strategy according to which he is planning to engage in direct talks with Iran. This does not mean that Washington sympathizes with Iran or pursues special relations with Tehran, but it means that the Americans have found out that negotiations constitute the sole means of convincing Iran to give up its nuclear program and this is done through a step-by-step strategy. Iranian politicians, who are wary of the US role in international interactions, regularly oppose negotiations.
The opposition, however, does not signify total negation of the necessity of negotiations, but it should be considered a warning to negotiators that they must be careful not to give concessions to the opposite side. At the same time, the role of the Majlis in nuclear issue and foreign policy decisions indicates that key problems are solved through consensual solutions. This is very important with regard to the nuclear case because it will balance various power levers. At the same time, it shows the foreign side that the nuclear issue is of national importance to Iranians.
Forecasting Iran’s answer
Although it is difficult under the current circumstances to predict Iran’s response to the agreement, but all signs point to a middle way, which if chosen carefully, could be positive and in line with Iran’s national interests. In fact, if Iran kept part of the enriched uranium in the country and sent the rest to another country, it would pave the way for the continuation of cooperation. Iran should manage its nuclear case. I am not agreed to the recent opposition to the latest nuclear agreement because in any game, both sides try to benefit. If Iran believes in a win-win game, it should take a step and manage the situation. In fact, the trust building measures asked by Western countries should be started in Tehran. On the other hand, Iran is distrustful toward the West and expects Western countries to do something.
Therefore, a middle way can lead to a deal and that deal, under the current circumstances, would be to the benefit of Iran and its national interests. In any case, negotiations between Iran and the United States have reached a critical point and the nuclear case is the sole issue enjoying necessary potential to goad on those negotiations because it gives Iran a bargaining chip which forces the United States to accept to talk to Tehran.
Therefore, Iran should be careful not to sell that bargaining chip, that is, independent nuclear fuel cycle, for a low price. Both sides are taking steps to reach the agreed point. Iran is on the path to positive negotiations and is trying to take a positive step to pave the way for a deal. In the meantime, however, a middle way would be the best option to protect Iran’s national interests.
Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis
Writing for Iranian Diplomacy, foreign policy analyst Keyhan Barzegar suggests a "middle way" in the enrichment negotiations, in which Iran can send some of its uranium to a third country --- thus meeting "Western" concerns --- but retain some of its stock.Barzegar's view is very much that of a pragmatic diplomat, and I'm not sure it takes account of the political considerations both in Western countries and within Iran. (It is interesting to see his representation of Parliamentary objections to the Vienna deal as a reflection of public anxiety rather than as part of a power struggle within the establishment.) The bottom line of the analysis, however, deserves attention: for Barzegar, Iran's response to the enrichment proposal is not a manipulation or evasion but a genuine reflection of its technical as well as political concerns.
Translated by Iran Review:
Explaining about a draft agreement on nuclear fuel for the Tehran research reactor, the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Manouchehr Mottaki has noted, “The two sides decided to go through the draft. It has been done in Vienna and Iran will soon declare its viewpoint.” At the same time, some officials have already voiced their opposition to the recent nuclear agreement.
The main point evident in all those opposite remarks is lack of trust. Iran still distrusts the West and maintains that Western countries are trying to deprive it of its right to enrich uranium in the long run. Therefore, Tehran maintains that it should take a multilateral strategic approach to this issue.
In fact, they say, it is part of a US strategy to take all enriched uranium away from Iran and then raise expectations from Tehran in the next phase. It seems that their main concern is those expectations, which may finally bring the enrichment process, which has been a fixed policy of Iran, to a complete halt. This would cost dearly for those politicians who had insisted on enrichment in Iran, especially President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Therefore, if the negotiations fail to reach a clear result, it could be quite disconcerting.
The opposition heard in the Majlis (Parliament) is in line with the general anxiety in Iran and the idea that negotiations with the United States are not beneficial to Iran because the United States will use its power to inflict losses on Iran in a step by step manner. Therefore, they are totally suspicious about the role of the United States in its power game with Iran and maintain that Iran would be the weaker side of the game.
In the time of Bush, the game followed totally clear rules. He tried to force other countries through bullying and unilateralism to give in to US policies and this built international consensus against him. Obama, however, has adopted a new strategy according to which he is planning to engage in direct talks with Iran. This does not mean that Washington sympathizes with Iran or pursues special relations with Tehran, but it means that the Americans have found out that negotiations constitute the sole means of convincing Iran to give up its nuclear program and this is done through a step-by-step strategy. Iranian politicians, who are wary of the US role in international interactions, regularly oppose negotiations.
The opposition, however, does not signify total negation of the necessity of negotiations, but it should be considered a warning to negotiators that they must be careful not to give concessions to the opposite side. At the same time, the role of the Majlis in nuclear issue and foreign policy decisions indicates that key problems are solved through consensual solutions. This is very important with regard to the nuclear case because it will balance various power levers. At the same time, it shows the foreign side that the nuclear issue is of national importance to Iranians.
Forecasting Iran’s answer
Although it is difficult under the current circumstances to predict Iran’s response to the agreement, but all signs point to a middle way, which if chosen carefully, could be positive and in line with Iran’s national interests. In fact, if Iran kept part of the enriched uranium in the country and sent the rest to another country, it would pave the way for the continuation of cooperation. Iran should manage its nuclear case. I am not agreed to the recent opposition to the latest nuclear agreement because in any game, both sides try to benefit. If Iran believes in a win-win game, it should take a step and manage the situation. In fact, the trust building measures asked by Western countries should be started in Tehran. On the other hand, Iran is distrustful toward the West and expects Western countries to do something.
Therefore, a middle way can lead to a deal and that deal, under the current circumstances, would be to the benefit of Iran and its national interests. In any case, negotiations between Iran and the United States have reached a critical point and the nuclear case is the sole issue enjoying necessary potential to goad on those negotiations because it gives Iran a bargaining chip which forces the United States to accept to talk to Tehran.
Therefore, Iran should be careful not to sell that bargaining chip, that is, independent nuclear fuel cycle, for a low price. Both sides are taking steps to reach the agreed point. Iran is on the path to positive negotiations and is trying to take a positive step to pave the way for a deal. In the meantime, however, a middle way would be the best option to protect Iran’s national interests.
Reader Comments (3)
Imho these contradictory signals from Tehran are a clear sign for deep rifts within the regime, due to the unsolved battle between hardliners and pragmatists (especially Rafsanjani) about normalizing relationship with the US. AN's pragmatist move obviously enraged the SL, emphasizing that there will be no relations with America. Impossible for him to give up this "holy principle" on the eve of Aban 13, which has served as a justification of the IRI during the past 30 years. In any case AN has failed to play the oppositional card, not being aware that he cannot be both at the same time.
On the other hand Karroubi and Moussavi play the hardliners' card, perhaps as a signal to senior IRGC members, put aside by actual basically business oriented commanders, but still having some political influence.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/01/AR2009110101705.html?hpid=opinionsbox1
Both factions continue to play their games, while the people are astutely searching for a solution without them.
I'm surprised no one on the Iranian side - whether experts or politicians - has mentioned the simple fact that 70-80% of their LEU will load them up with 112 years' worth of 20% enriched uranium - far more than they need for the Tehran reactor. It seems such a logical and reasonable argument for sending much less LEU abroad.
Anyway, also on Iran Review, Iran University’s Dr Sadeq Zibakalam doesn't even bother with a middle way, but gets fully behind the IAEA proposal, chiding reformists and critics of the government of all stripes who oppose it, because “I believe that whether Ahmadinejad is president of Iran or anybody else, this agreement would be in the long-term benefit of Iran” ….. “defending new agreements reached with the European countries by both reformists and principlists will be the most beneficial approach to protecting Iran’s national interests”.
http://www.iranreview.org/content/view/4959/36/
Incidentally he also reveals once and for all that he is so in the tank for Obama. :-)
Scott -- another sober, solid analysis. Appreciate too that Catherine catches Zibakalam's essay -- which is fascinating, given his rather startling Iran TV appearance in May (the 11th I believe) wherein he made a very strong case for restoring ties to the US.
Alas, the US mainstream media and punditry is lost badly in this overdrawn focus on factionalism -- claiming that the IAEA deal is caught on those shoals. (Or as Abdo put it so badly in yesterday's CSMonitor -- that she thought it a "good bet" that Khamenei was opposed to the deal) I take that bet.