Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen: An Introduction to Conflict

The Latest on Iran (23 November): Reading the Signals of Abtahi’s Release

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The clashes between the Yemeni Government and an insurgency from Houthi Shi'a escalated, both in visibility and intensity, when Saudi forces became involved earlier this month, striking Houthi positions. Most of the media attention is now putting the internal conflict not only into a Saudi context but into a regional arena based on Saudi-Iranian rivalry, given Tehran's support for the Houthi.

Writing for Iran Review, Salimeh Daremi offers an overview of the situation:

Military clashes between government forces of Yemen and al-Houthi Shiites in Saada province are gradually turning into a full-blown, destructive war. Yemen is meanwhile grappling with various crises which reflect wide gaps between the Government of Abdullah Saleh and the opposition in north Yemen as a result of increasing influence of the separatist forces.

Widespread clashes in Saada, which are turning into a full-fledged war, can be very serious for Yemen and ultimately lead to a regional crisis. The ongoing developments in Saada show that both sides are not trying to find another way, but war, to achieve their goals and only believe in use of weapons. The present war in Yemen is not acceptable and the clashing parties should seek other solutions because they have already signed the Doha Agreement and its subsequent obligations.

At the same time, intervention of regional countries in the crisis calls for a regional consensus to reach a final solution and sustainable peace. Six wars, which have broken out between al-Houthi insurgents and the central government since 2004, have proven that foreign interventions are at work to fan the flames of clashes. Explicit intervention of Saudi Arabia in Yemen is a good instance to the point. On the other hand, it seems that Yemeni authorities are trying to attract international support subsequent to intensification of clashes between government forces and al-Houthi Shiites to suppress separatist tendencies.

Yemeni security and military officials have been in talks with the Americans over signing of a joint security agreement which would pave the way for such support. On the other hand, allegations about Tehran’s military and financial support for Shiites in Saada have turned the conflicts into a regional crisis. Although Iran has consistently rejected those allegations, but Arab countries consider Iran a threat to regional security. This viewpoint has its roots in pre-revolution Iran when the country was playing the role of a regional gendarme. Concerns about export of the Islamic Revolution as well as Iran’s support for such groups as Hamas and Hezbollah combined with Iran’s nuclear standoff in recent years are major factors which have sustained that assumption after the victory of the 1979 Islamic Revolution.

Iranian media do not believe that al-Houthi tribe is any danger to Yemen and sympathize with the Shias and this has given rise to allegations that Iran is militarily and financially supporting Yemeni Shias. At the same time, Iranian authorities have reacted to the allegations by Yemenis officials. Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki has noted that Iran does not intend to foster tension in any place as this would be against its policies and national interests.

Summarizing the reasons behind the current crisis to foreign intervention is simplistic and other factors including ignoring the rights of the Shias and inattention to the Doha Agreement should be taken into account when analyzing this crisis. It seems that suspicions about Tehran’s role in the uprising cannot be dispelled through official stances taken by the Iranian officials. Some claims raised by Yemen like seizing a ship carrying Iranian arms for al-Houthi insurgents have led analysts to argue that the clashes in Yemen are, in fact, an indirect confrontation between Tehran and Riyadh. No solid proof, however, has been thus far produced by authorities in Sana’a to validate their claims about Iran supporting al-Houthi insurgents.

The root cause of anti-Iranian allegations by Saudi and Yemeni officials should be sought in recent regional developments. Domestic developments in Iran following the June presidential elections, subsequent negotiations between Iran and 5+1 on the Iranian nuclear case and concerns among US allies in the Persian Gulf over a possible reconciliation between Tehran and Washington, the improved situation of Lebanese resistance movement after publication of Goldstone report, Riyadh’s intervention in Lebanon and establishment of a national alliance government in that country are among major regional developments which have given rise to those allegations.

Iran Nuclear Talks: Tehran's Middle Way?

Latest from Iran (2 November): The World Takes Notice?

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Writing for Iranian Diplomacy, foreign policy analyst Keyhan Barzegar suggests a "middle way" in the enrichment negotiations, in which Iran can send some of its uranium to a third country --- thus meeting "Western" concerns --- but retain some of its stock.

Barzegar's view is very much that of a pragmatic diplomat, and I'm not sure it takes account of the political considerations both in Western countries and within Iran. (It is interesting to see his representation of Parliamentary objections to the Vienna deal as a reflection of public anxiety rather than as part of a power struggle within the establishment.) The bottom line of the analysis, however, deserves attention: for Barzegar, Iran's response to the enrichment proposal is not a manipulation or evasion but a genuine reflection of its technical as well as political concerns.


Translated by Iran Review:

Explaining about a draft agreement on nuclear fuel for the Tehran research reactor, the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Manouchehr Mottaki has noted, “The two sides decided to go through the draft. It has been done in Vienna and Iran will soon declare its viewpoint.” At the same time, some officials have already voiced their opposition to the recent nuclear agreement.

The main point evident in all those opposite remarks is lack of trust. Iran still distrusts the West and maintains that Western countries are trying to deprive it of its right to enrich uranium in the long run. Therefore, Tehran maintains that it should take a multilateral strategic approach to this issue.

In fact, they say, it is part of a US strategy to take all enriched uranium away from Iran and then raise expectations from Tehran in the next phase. It seems that their main concern is those expectations, which may finally bring the enrichment process, which has been a fixed policy of Iran, to a complete halt. This would cost dearly for those politicians who had insisted on enrichment in Iran, especially President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Therefore, if the negotiations fail to reach a clear result, it could be quite disconcerting.

The opposition heard in the Majlis (Parliament) is in line with the general anxiety in Iran and the idea that negotiations with the United States are not beneficial to Iran because the United States will use its power to inflict losses on Iran in a step by step manner. Therefore, they are totally suspicious about the role of the United States in its power game with Iran and maintain that Iran would be the weaker side of the game.

In the time of Bush, the game followed totally clear rules. He tried to force other countries through bullying and unilateralism to give in to US policies and this built international consensus against him. Obama, however, has adopted a new strategy according to which he is planning to engage in direct talks with Iran. This does not mean that Washington sympathizes with Iran or pursues special relations with Tehran, but it means that the Americans have found out that negotiations constitute the sole means of convincing Iran to give up its nuclear program and this is done through a step-by-step strategy. Iranian politicians, who are wary of the US role in international interactions, regularly oppose negotiations.

The opposition, however, does not signify total negation of the necessity of negotiations, but it should be considered a warning to negotiators that they must be careful not to give concessions to the opposite side. At the same time, the role of the Majlis in nuclear issue and foreign policy decisions indicates that key problems are solved through consensual solutions. This is very important with regard to the nuclear case because it will balance various power levers. At the same time, it shows the foreign side that the nuclear issue is of national importance to Iranians.

Forecasting Iran’s answer

Although it is difficult under the current circumstances to predict Iran’s response to the agreement, but all signs point to a middle way, which if chosen carefully, could be positive and in line with Iran’s national interests. In fact, if Iran kept part of the enriched uranium in the country and sent the rest to another country, it would pave the way for the continuation of cooperation. Iran should manage its nuclear case. I am not agreed to the recent opposition to the latest nuclear agreement because in any game, both sides try to benefit. If Iran believes in a win-win game, it should take a step and manage the situation. In fact, the trust building measures asked by Western countries should be started in Tehran. On the other hand, Iran is distrustful toward the West and expects Western countries to do something.

Therefore, a middle way can lead to a deal and that deal, under the current circumstances, would be to the benefit of Iran and its national interests. In any case, negotiations between Iran and the United States have reached a critical point and the nuclear case is the sole issue enjoying necessary potential to goad on those negotiations because it gives Iran a bargaining chip which forces the United States to accept to talk to Tehran.

Therefore, Iran should be careful not to sell that bargaining chip, that is, independent nuclear fuel cycle, for a low price. Both sides are taking steps to reach the agreed point. Iran is on the path to positive negotiations and is trying to take a positive step to pave the way for a deal. In the meantime, however, a middle way would be the best option to protect Iran’s national interests.