Sunday
Nov012009
Emergency Analysis: Josh Shahryar on Afghanistan's Political Turmoil
Sunday, November 1, 2009 at 13:42
Afghanistan: Abdullah Withdraws, US Political Plan Collapses
Understanding “Mr Obama’s Wars”: Five Essential Analyses on Afghanistan and Pakistan
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Enduring America correspondent Josh Shahryar explains the latest political developments in Afghanistan and assesses their significance:
Dr. Abdullah Abdullah announced today that he would not be participating in the upcoming Nov. 7 run-off against Hamid Karzai. The decision comes at a time when both Afghans and the West are waiting patiently for a new government so both political factions can develop a much-needed plan to urgently deal with the rising tide of insecurity in the country. However, Abdullah’s decision to back out may just plunge Afghanistan into chaos.
Abdullah’s decision is rooted in two main issues. The first was the retention of Azizullah Lodin as head of the Independent Election Commission. A Karzai appointee, Lodin is seen by Abdullah’s camp and a large portion of the population as being heavily biased in favor of the President. Under his leadership, the 20 August election was so rigged that, after weeks of scrutiny and debate, a Karzai first-round victory had to be converted into a run-off. So it is no surprise that Abdullah wants Lodin and several other officials out.
Afghanistan’s electorate is very unevenly distributed on a very rugged and often inaccessible terrain. Difficulties are compounded because security is at its worst since the US-led invasion in 2001. Under these circumstances, it would be almost impossible for elections to be free and fair with or without Lodin. His presence, however, will make matters even worse.
The other, equally important issue for Abdullah was a change in Afghanistan’s constitution in order to create the post of Prime Minister, with Abdullah or one of his key supporters could be appointed to that position. This is often kept under wraps by the media and its euphemism "a power-sharing deal".
The negotiations are caught up in ethnic politics. Karzai belongs to the Pashtun ethnic group to which most of the Taliban also belong. Abdullah gets most of his support from the Tajik, the second-largest ethnic group. Together, Pashtuns and Tajiks make up more than three-quarters of Afghanistan’s population.
Since the constitution was drafted, the main point of contention between the two ethnic factions has been over strong presidential government. As Pashtuns make up 40 percent of Afghanistan's population, versus the Tajiks' 30 percent, % of the population, a Pashtun President is almost guaranteed.
This would be balanced if a Parliament-appointed prime minister was established.
Even though Pashtuns make up a larger share of the population, they are more widely dispersed across the country. This dilutes their political power, as Pashtuns almost always receive a smaller percentage of seats in the Parliament compared to their numerical supremacy than they would if they weren’t as widely distributed. This gap was evident in Afghanistan’s first Parliament, elected in 2005, where a Tajik narrowly beat a Pashtun to become the Speaker.
Under these circumstances, Karzai’s insistence upon not sacking Lodin is both naïve and politically disastrous. However, Abdullah’s insistence upon forcing a constitutional change before an election is equally naïve. Hours before Abdullah’s announcement, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton noted that the legitimacy of the election would not be questioned because of Abdullah’s departure. This is a clear signal to Abdullah that, in the next week before the run-off, there simply is not enough time or patience left for the West to sit down with Karzai and persuade him to meet Abdullah’s demands.
However, Abdullah represents a large segment of the Afghan population. His departure from the election is surely going to rouse their discontent with not just Karzai but also the US. This is dangerous for Washington: most of Karzai’s support comes from areas that are hostile towards the US but Abdullah is backed by regions that are for the most part pro-US. If the situation is not handled delicately by the West, it risks losing the support of the majority of Afghanistan’s population and plunging the relatively safer areas into insecurity as well.
A compromise solution is urgently needed to solve this crisis. If Karzai were to meet half of Abdullah’s demands and postpone the other half for after the election, chaos might be averted. Removing Lodin and other officials from their posts would make the elections more acceptable to the populace. This in turn would give both Karzai and Abdullah enough leverage to change the constitution.
Under the current circumstances, even though Abdullah has refrained from asking his supporters to boycott the election or come out to streets, the situation remains critical. The West might have to step in once again to salvage the peace.
Understanding “Mr Obama’s Wars”: Five Essential Analyses on Afghanistan and Pakistan
Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis
Enduring America correspondent Josh Shahryar explains the latest political developments in Afghanistan and assesses their significance:Dr. Abdullah Abdullah announced today that he would not be participating in the upcoming Nov. 7 run-off against Hamid Karzai. The decision comes at a time when both Afghans and the West are waiting patiently for a new government so both political factions can develop a much-needed plan to urgently deal with the rising tide of insecurity in the country. However, Abdullah’s decision to back out may just plunge Afghanistan into chaos.
Abdullah’s decision is rooted in two main issues. The first was the retention of Azizullah Lodin as head of the Independent Election Commission. A Karzai appointee, Lodin is seen by Abdullah’s camp and a large portion of the population as being heavily biased in favor of the President. Under his leadership, the 20 August election was so rigged that, after weeks of scrutiny and debate, a Karzai first-round victory had to be converted into a run-off. So it is no surprise that Abdullah wants Lodin and several other officials out.
Afghanistan’s electorate is very unevenly distributed on a very rugged and often inaccessible terrain. Difficulties are compounded because security is at its worst since the US-led invasion in 2001. Under these circumstances, it would be almost impossible for elections to be free and fair with or without Lodin. His presence, however, will make matters even worse.
The other, equally important issue for Abdullah was a change in Afghanistan’s constitution in order to create the post of Prime Minister, with Abdullah or one of his key supporters could be appointed to that position. This is often kept under wraps by the media and its euphemism "a power-sharing deal".
The negotiations are caught up in ethnic politics. Karzai belongs to the Pashtun ethnic group to which most of the Taliban also belong. Abdullah gets most of his support from the Tajik, the second-largest ethnic group. Together, Pashtuns and Tajiks make up more than three-quarters of Afghanistan’s population.
Since the constitution was drafted, the main point of contention between the two ethnic factions has been over strong presidential government. As Pashtuns make up 40 percent of Afghanistan's population, versus the Tajiks' 30 percent, % of the population, a Pashtun President is almost guaranteed.
This would be balanced if a Parliament-appointed prime minister was established.
Even though Pashtuns make up a larger share of the population, they are more widely dispersed across the country. This dilutes their political power, as Pashtuns almost always receive a smaller percentage of seats in the Parliament compared to their numerical supremacy than they would if they weren’t as widely distributed. This gap was evident in Afghanistan’s first Parliament, elected in 2005, where a Tajik narrowly beat a Pashtun to become the Speaker.
Under these circumstances, Karzai’s insistence upon not sacking Lodin is both naïve and politically disastrous. However, Abdullah’s insistence upon forcing a constitutional change before an election is equally naïve. Hours before Abdullah’s announcement, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton noted that the legitimacy of the election would not be questioned because of Abdullah’s departure. This is a clear signal to Abdullah that, in the next week before the run-off, there simply is not enough time or patience left for the West to sit down with Karzai and persuade him to meet Abdullah’s demands.
However, Abdullah represents a large segment of the Afghan population. His departure from the election is surely going to rouse their discontent with not just Karzai but also the US. This is dangerous for Washington: most of Karzai’s support comes from areas that are hostile towards the US but Abdullah is backed by regions that are for the most part pro-US. If the situation is not handled delicately by the West, it risks losing the support of the majority of Afghanistan’s population and plunging the relatively safer areas into insecurity as well.
A compromise solution is urgently needed to solve this crisis. If Karzai were to meet half of Abdullah’s demands and postpone the other half for after the election, chaos might be averted. Removing Lodin and other officials from their posts would make the elections more acceptable to the populace. This in turn would give both Karzai and Abdullah enough leverage to change the constitution.
Under the current circumstances, even though Abdullah has refrained from asking his supporters to boycott the election or come out to streets, the situation remains critical. The West might have to step in once again to salvage the peace.