Text: The US Draft Resolution on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament

The US, Iran, and Missile Defense: The Inside Story

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

From Politico:

September 11, 2009

United States Draft

UNSC Resolution on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Disarmament

The Security Council,

PP1. Resolving to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons, in accordance with the goals of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all,

PP2. Reaffirming the Statement of its President adopted at the Council’s meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government on 31 January 1992 (S/23500), including the need for all Member States to fulfill their obligations in relation to arms control and disarmament and to prevent proliferation in all its aspects of all weapons of mass destruction,

PP3. Recalling also that the above Statement (S/23500) underlined the need for all Member States to resolve peacefully in accordance with the Charter any problems in that context threatening or disrupting the maintenance of regional and global stability,

PP4. Bearing in mind the responsibilities of other organs of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, arms control and nonproliferation, and supporting them to continue to play their due roles,

PP5. Underlining that the NPT remains the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and calling upon all States Parties to the NPT to cooperate so that the 2010 NPT Review Conference can successfully strengthen the Treaty and set realistic and achievable goals in all the Treaty’s three pillars: non-proliferation, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and disarmament,

PP6. Reaffirming its firm commitment to the NPT and its conviction that the international nuclear non-proliferation regime should be maintained and strengthened to ensure its effective implementation,

PP7. Calling for further progress on all aspects of disarmament to enhance global security,

PP8. Welcoming the decisions of those non-nuclear-weapon States that have dismantled their nuclear weapons programs or renounced the possession of nuclear weapons,

PP9. Welcoming the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament efforts undertaken and accomplished by nuclear-weapon States, and underlining the need to pursue further efforts in the sphere of nuclear disarmament, in accordance with Article VI of the NPT,

PP10. Welcoming in this connection the decision of the Russian Federation and the United States of America to conduct negotiations to conclude a new comprehensive legally binding agreement to replace the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, which expires in December 2009,

PP11. Welcoming and supporting the steps taken to conclude nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and reaffirming the conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, and in accordance with the 1999 UN Disarmament Commission guidelines, enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and contributes toward realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament,

PP12. Recalling the statements by each of the five nuclear-weapon States, noted by resolution 984 (1995), in which they give security assurances against the use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon State Parties to the NPT, and reaffirming that such security assurances strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime,

PP13. Reaffirming its resolutions 825 (1993), 1695 (2006), 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009),

PP14. Reaffirming its resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008),

PP15. Reaffirming all other relevant non-proliferation resolutions adopted by the Security Council,

PP16. Gravely concerned about the threat of nuclear terrorism, including the provision of nuclear material or technical assistance for the purposes of terrorism,

PP17. Mindful in this context of the risk that irresponsible or unlawful provision of nuclear material or technical assistance could enable terrorism,

PP18. Expressing its support for the 2010 Global Summit on Nuclear Security,

PP19. Affirming its support for the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism,

PP20. Recognizing the progress made by the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and the G-8 Global Partnership,

PP21. Reaffirming UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004) and the necessity for all States to implement fully the measures contained therein, and calling upon all UN Member States and international and regional organizations to cooperate actively with the Committee established pursuant to that resolution, including in the course of the comprehensive review as called for in resolution 1810 (2008),

1. Emphasizes that a situation of noncompliance with nonproliferation obligations shall be brought to the attention of the Security Council, which will determine if that situation constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and emphasizes the Security Council’s primary responsibility in addressing such threats;

2. Calls upon States Parties to the NPT to comply fully with all their obligations under the Treaty, and in this regard notes that enjoyment of the benefits of the NPT by a State Party can be assured only by its compliance with the obligations thereunder;

3. Calls upon all States that are not Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to join the Treaty so as to achieve its universality at an early date, and in any case to adhere to its terms;

4 Calls upon the Parties to the NPT, pursuant to Article VI of the Treaty, to undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear arms reduction and disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and calls on all other States to join in this endeavor;

5. Calls upon all States to refrain from conducting a nuclear test explosion and to join the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), thereby bringing the treaty into force;

6. Calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices as soon as possible, and welcomesthe Conference on Disarmament’s adoption by consensus of its Program of Work in 2009;7. Deplores in particular the current major challenges to the nonproliferation regime that the Security Council has determined to be threats to international peace and security, and demands that the parties concerned comply fully with their obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions,

8. Encourages efforts to advance development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy in a framework that reduces proliferation risk and adheres to the highest international standards for safeguards, security, and safety;

9. Underlines that the NPT recognizes in Article IV the right of the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I , II and III of the Treaty,

10. Calls upon States to adopt stricter national controls for the export of sensitive goods and technologies of the nuclear fuel cycle;

11. Encourages the work of the IAEA on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including assurances of nuclear fuel supply and related measures, as effective means of addressing the expanding need for nuclear fuel and nuclear fuel services and minimizing the risk of proliferation, and urges the IAEA Board of Governors to agree upon measures to this end as soon as possible;

12. Affirms that effective IAEA safeguards are essential to prevent nuclear proliferation and to facilitate cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and in that regard:

a. Calls upon all non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT that have yet to bring into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement or a modified small quantities protocol to do so immediately,

b. Calls upon all States to adopt and implement an Additional Protocol, which together with comprehensive safeguards agreements constitute essential elements of the IAEA safeguards system,

c. Stresses the importance for all Member States to ensure that the IAEA continue to have all the necessary resources and authority to verify the declared use of nuclear materials and facilities and the absence of undeclared activities, and for the IAEA to report to the Council accordingly as appropriate;

13. Encourages States to provide the IAEA with the cooperation necessary for it to verify whether a state is in compliance with its safeguards obligations, and affirms the Security Council’s resolve to support the IAEA’s efforts to that end, consistent with its authorities under the Charter;

14. Undertakes to address without delay any State’s notice of withdrawal from the NPT, including the events described in the statement provided by the State pursuant to Article X of the Treaty, while recognizing ongoing discussions in the course of the NPT review on identifying modalities under which NPT States Parties could collectively respond to notification of withdrawal, and affirmsthat a State remains responsible under international law for violations of the NPT committed prior to its withdrawal;

15. Encourages States to require as a condition of nuclear exports that the recipient State agree that, in the event that it should terminate, withdraw from, or be found by the IAEA Board of Governors to be in noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement or withdraw from the NPT, the supplier state would have a right to require the return of nuclear material and equipment provided prior to such termination, noncompliance or withdrawal, as well as any special nuclear material produced through the use of such material or equipment;

16. Encourages States to consider whether a recipient State has in place an Additional Protocol in making nuclear export decisions;

17. Urges States to require as a condition of nuclear exports that the recipient State agree that, in the event that it should terminate its IAEA safeguards agreement, safeguards shall continue with respect to any nuclear material and equipment provided prior to such withdrawal, as well as any special nuclear material produced through the use of such material or equipment;

18. Calls for universal adherence to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and its 2005 Amendment;

19. Welcomes the March 2009 recommendations of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) to make more effective use of existing funding mechanisms, including the consideration of the establishment of a voluntary fund, and affirms its commitment to promote full implementation of UNSCR 1540 by Member States by ensuring effective and sustainable support for the activities of the 1540 Committee;

20. Reaffirms the need for full implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004) by Member States and, with an aim of preventing access to, or assistance and financing for, weapons of mass destruction, related materials and their means of delivery by non-State actors, as defined in the resolution, and calls upon Member States to cooperate actively with the Committee established pursuant to that resolution and the IAEA, including rendering assistance, at their request, for their implementation of UNSCR 1540 provisions, and in this context welcomes the forthcoming comprehensive review of the status of implementation of UNSCR 1540 with a view to increasing its effectiveness, and calls upon all States to participate actively in this review;

21. Calls upon Member States to share best practices with a view to improved safety standards and nuclear security practices and raise standards of nuclear security to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism, with the aim of securing all vulnerable nuclear material from such risks within four years;

22. Calls upon all States to manage responsibly and minimize to the greatest extent that is technically and economically feasible the use of highly enriched uranium for civilian purposes, including by working to convert research reactors and radioisotope production processes to the use of low enriched uranium fuels and targets;

23. Calls upon all States to improve their national technical capabilities to detect, deter, and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear materials throughout their territories, and to work to enhance international partnerships and capacity building in this regard;

24. Urges all States to take all appropriate national measures in accordance with their national authorities and legislation, and consistent with international law, to prevent proliferation financing, shipments, or illicit trafficking, to strengthen export controls, to secure sensitive materials, and to control access to intangible transfers of technology;

25. Declares its resolve to monitor closely any situations involving the proliferation of nuclear weapons, their means of delivery or related material, including to or by non-State actors as they are defined in resolution 1540 (2004), and, as appropriate, to take such measures as may be necessary to ensure the maintenance of international peace and security;

26. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

Transcript/Snap Analysis: Washington's Welcome to Iran

Iran’s Nukes: Full Text of Iran’s Proposal to “5+1″ Powers

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

Here's a surprise. Despite the hostility shown in the Western media towards Iran's latest proposal on its nuclear programme, notably over Tehran's negative response to the international demand to halt its nuclear enrichment programme, the State Department said Friday that the United States and the other members of the "5+1" group (Germany, China, Russia, Britain, and France) had accepted Iran's proposal to hold direct talks. Moreover, Tehran's signals of cooperation on issues such as the stability of Afghanistan and Iraq and the struggle against terrorism are appreciated by Washington.



Here is Friday's daily press briefing on Iran given by State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley:

Political directors of P-5+1 continue to study Iran document

Statement issued by Javier Solana on P-5+1 countries to arrange a face-to-face meeting

Iran paper does not reply to international community's concerns; it does not cover nuclear issue / need an early meeting to see if Iran is willing to engage seriously on these issues

We feel that they are out of compliance with their obligations under the NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty], IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency], Security Council resolutions/wish to have direct dialogue with Iran to see what Iran is prepared to do/5+1 countries want to have face-to-face with Iran to address all the issues that we have concerns about, including the nuclear issue.

We have great concern about Iran's support of terrorism and its role in the region/recognize that we have potentially common interests in terms of a stable Afghanistan; and a stable Iraq; willing to engage Iran on the full range of issues

Iranian election is a matter between the Iranian government and its people

Hence, despite pressure on Washington to allow an Israeli strike on Tehran and claims that the US will press for harsher sanctions, it appears that the Obama Administration is maneuvering towards an expansion of engagement. If this is the case, the next Security Council meeting on September 24 can produce an unexpected consensus with a green light for direct dialogue with Iran. Indeed, when the full transcript is read carefully, it emerges that Washington's signal for negotiations is based on wider political concerns rather than as a specific answer to Iran's nuclear proposals. As Crowley states, the only condition  is that Iran expresses its willingness to talk:

Transcript

QUESTION: On Iran? A question on Iran?

MR. CROWLEY: Sure.

QUESTION: Regarding the proposal the Iranians made this week, you said yesterday – and your comments yesterday seemed to be focused on the fact that they didn’t address the central – the issue of central interest to the U.S., which is the nuclear program, enrichment activity. I’m wondering if, nonetheless, the P-5+1 countries have decided that they will tell the Iranians that they accept the offer to have talks.

MR. CROWLEY: Well, I would kind of bother to turn that around, first and foremost, and recall that it was the nations of the P-5+1 who made a specific offer to Iran to engage directly to address the concerns that the United States has, the international community has, the United Nations Security Council has. So it is Iran providing a paper that responds in a way to the invitation. There was a conference call this morning of the political directors of the P-5+1, and I think we continue to study the Iran document. At the same time, I believe brief – a short time ago, there was a statement made by the EU, by Javier Solana, indicating that he will be in touch with the Iranians on behalf of the P-5+1 countries to arrange a face-to-face meeting as soon as possible.

QUESTION: Just on the one-on-one –

MR. CROWLEY: Sure.

QUESTION: The face-to-face meeting – him and – or all the P-5 --

MR. CROWLEY: I mean, the P-5+1 was put in place to provide a mechanism to address the concerns that the international community has about Iran’s nuclear program. And, clearly, the Iranian paper does not reply to these concerns. It does not cover the nuclear issue. That’s precisely why we think we need an early meeting. We’re not interested in talking for talking’s sake. We’re looking to see – and through an early meeting, should Iran be willing, we’ll be looking to see if they are willing to engage seriously on these issues, but within the context of the P-5+1, the full range of issues that we have among these countries and Iran.

QUESTION: So you’re talking about talks about talks? Because I mean --

MR. CROWLEY: We’re not interested in talks about talks.

QUESTION: Well, okay, but that’s --

MR. CROWLEY: We’re interested in finding out if – I mean, if you go to the Iran document, it says the Iranian nation is prepared to enter into dialogue and negotiation, and so on and so forth. We are going to – as Javier Solana has indicated, we will seek an early meeting and we will seek to test Iran’s willingness to engage. Clearly, from the standpoint of the international community, the central issue that we have is the nuclear issue. If we have talks, we will plan to bring up the nuclear issue. We will hope, as we said earlier this week in the IAEA, that Iran will choose to engage the international community to address the concerns that we have about the nuclear program. So we are seeking a meeting because, ultimately, the only way that we feel we’re going to be able to resolve these issues is to have a meeting. But it’s not just a meeting for meeting’s sake. It is a meeting to be able to see if Iran is willing to engage seriously on these issues.

QUESTION: But they just sent you this response to your offer. You offered them talks on the nuclear issue and other issues. They came back to you and said we’re willing to talk, but not about our nuclear program. So what’s the point of talking to them if you got your response – I mean, then how can you say these are not talks about talks? I mean, they’ve shown you through their official paper their willingness to engage on the nuclear issue, which is not to engage on the nuclear issue. So why would you want to have talks with them if it didn’t? And are you saying that you would sit down with Iran to talk about whether they’re willing to engage on the nuclear issue, or are you not going to sit across the table from Iran unless the nuclear issue is on the table?

MR. CROWLEY: We would expect, if we have a meeting with Iran, that it will be a – we would hope that it would be a substantive exchange. We will go into such a meeting, should Iran agree to prepare to talk about the substance of the issues and concerns that we have on Iran’s nuclear program, as was outlined this week at the IAEA. We feel that they are out of compliance with their obligations under the NPT, IAEA, Security Council resolutions. We wish to have a direct dialogue with Iran. We believe, and the President has said repeatedly, that we feel this is the way in which we will be able to, and hopefully can, resolve these issues. Our objective is clear: to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. I don’t think that we can resolve this issue any other way but through the kind of direct dialogue --

QUESTION: But what in that --

MR. CROWLEY: -- that leads to negotiation that we hope will lead to an understanding --

QUESTION: But what in that letter – you said we expect that there’ll be substantive talks. What gives you that expectation?

MR. CROWLEY: Well --

QUESTION: What in that letter gives you any reason to believe that you would have substantive talks with Iran about its nuclear issue?

MR. CROWLEY: Well, and that’s why we will seek a meeting to see what is – Iran is prepared to do. We’ve been waiting for some months --

QUESTION: So you’re ignoring their letter?

MR. CROWLEY: We have been waiting for some months for Iran to respond to the – to Javier Solana’s invitation earlier this year. We are seeking a meeting now based on the Iranian paper to see what Iran is prepared to do. And then, as the President has said, if Iran responds to our interest in a meeting, we’ll see when that can occur. We hope that will occur as soon as possible, and that as we head towards United Nations General Assembly, I expect there will be further meetings within the P-5+1. As the President has said, we will use this month to assess where we are in terms of our offer of engagement, and then that would lead to a conclusion by the end of the year as to what that approach has yielded.

So I don’t – we’ve gone through this situation where there have been various public statements over the past few weeks. But ultimately, the only way we’re going to resolve the serious and – concerns that we have is to have direct dialogue, see if Iran is willing to engage on these issues. If they’re not, then, obviously, that will – we’ll draw conclusions from that.

QUESTION: Just to clarify, it seems that you think the door is still open to talks on the enrichment because they didn’t explicitly refuse in the letter to talk about that subject.

MR. CROWLEY: Well --

QUESTION: Is that correct?

MR. CROWLEY: -- all I can say is our position has not changed. The United States, the other members of the P5+1 – we seek engagement with Iran, we seek to have better answers, better information, better cooperation from Iran to seriously address the issues that we have. And now it is up to Iran to determine what they are prepared to do. They have given – they’ve provided a paper. It says that they are open to dialogue. The paper itself does not address our nuclear concerns. But we will seek a meeting, as Javier Solana indicated today. And then based on that approach, we’ll see if Iran is willing to have a meeting. At that meeting, we will hope that there will be serious engagement. From that engagement, we hope there will be a willingness to address these issues. And then – but through this process, we’ll be able to determine what Iran is prepared to do, what it’s not prepared to do, and that will lead us to make judgments and there will be consequences going forward.

QUESTION: Let me put it another way. I mean, the paper, the proposals – are they better than their public statements where they refuse strictly to discuss engagement – enrichment?

MR. CROWLEY: The paper itself, I don’t think, broke any new ground. It’s, in a way, a warmed-over version of a previous paper they provided some time ago.

QUESTION: So, P.J., why wouldn’t you just see that as stalling then? I mean, the Iranians for the last several years have done this. You get right up to the deadline and then they put these papers out, then you say, okay, we’re going to go talk to them again, and it just keeps going and going down the road.

MR. CROWLEY: Well – and we will draw conclusions based on how Iran responds to the invitation by Javier Solana and the EU.

QUESTION: And their past behavior hasn’t given you any indication?

MR. CROWLEY: And we will draw conclusions if their past behavior – or their future behavior reflects their past behavior.

QUESTION: I’m sorry, but I still don’t understand – and I think probably most of us don’t – that you say that you’re going to ask Iran for talks based on their response --

MR. CROWLEY: No.

QUESTION: – based on this letter that they sent you.

MR. CROWLEY: No, no, no, no, no. We are – once again, we are making the offer of – for direct dialogue to Iran. It is a consistent approach that --

QUESTION: You made that offer, and they said we’re willing to talk to you about everything that we want to talk to you about and nothing that you want to talk to – about. So why are you – are you, like, ignoring this letter or ignoring the contents, or saying the fact that they sent us anything is a good sign and we’ll see if we could build something on that? Because if you’re saying that we’re asking them for talks based on this piece of paper that they sent you, I don’t see where there’s anything to talk about.

MR. CROWLEY: Well – and we seek direct negotiations. We want to see Iran sit down face to face with the P-5+1 countries and address all of the issues that we have concern about, including the nuclear issue. If we have a meeting, we’re going to bring up the nuclear issue, and we’ll see how Iran responds to that. And this is – this is --

QUESTION: But what – but what about this – I’m sorry, but what about this letter makes you think that they’re willing to talk to you about that? They said no thank you.

MR. CROWLEY: And we’ll find out. We’ll find out. But I – again, I go back --

QUESTION: Why aren’t you taking no for an answer, though?

MR. CROWLEY: Libby, I – Elise, I go back to the – there’s language in the letter that simply says the Government of Iran is willing to enter in a dialogue. We are going to test that proposition. Okay? And if Iran is willing to enter into serious negotiations, then they will find a willing participant in the United States and the other P-5+1 countries. If the – Iran dissembles in the future, as it has in the past, then we will draw conclusions from that.

Recall, we have a two-track strategy here. We are willing to engage, but we are also going to continue to look for ways to pressure Iran to change the path that it’s on. And we are willing to do both of those simultaneously. But ultimately, because these are serious issues, because we have a strategy that will prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power, we feel the only way you’re ultimately going to resolve these issues is through direct dialogue. We recognize that Iran may or may not be willing to do so.

And as the President said, we’re going to assess where we are during the course of this month, including meetings that we’ll have at the UN General Assembly. And then at the end of the year, we’ll be able to draw some conclusions as to how successful our engagement offer has been.

QUESTION: P.J., can I follow up on that?

MR. CROWLEY: Sure.

QUESTION: Isn’t your second track in trouble, though? I mean, you’ve got the Russian foreign minister out there saying yesterday that new sanctions shouldn’t be considered, especially anything on petroleum. That’s the same thing the Russians have been saying since this process got underway back in 2003. It just seems – how are you going to implement the second track?

MR. CROWLEY: These are not mutually exclusive. I’ll let the Russian foreign minister characterize his own words. There is unanimity within the P-5+1 in support of our two-track approach that involves engagement and pressure. Now – and we are willing to meet with Iran. We hope to meet with Iran. We want to see serious engagement on the nuclear issue, in particular. Within the context of the P-5+1, we are willing to address any other issues that they want to bring to the table. But clearly, if Iran refuses to negotiate seriously, we the United States and the international community and the Security Council can draw conclusions from that. And then based on that, we’ll make some judgments in the future.

QUESTION: P.J. --

QUESTION: I’m sorry, a quick procedural question since the announcement happened while we were in here. What level would the talks be on? Is that – the Solana announcement, what level of talks would take place with Iran? Is it political directors?

MR. CROWLEY: I would say likely at the political director level. But again, that will be part of what will be negotiated, depending on what Iran’s response is.

QUESTION: The U.S. will be at the table for that, or would it be only Solana? I’m trying to understand.

MR. CROWLEY: Oh, no. I would expect – I mean, we would seek a meeting –

QUESTION: At the initial meeting here --

MR. CROWLEY: Yes.

QUESTION: – that Solana is requesting, would it be with all six parties plus him?

MR. CROWLEY: Well, again, as he indicated in his statement, Javier Solana will be in touch with Iranian authorities, look for a meeting at an early date. And then we’ll work those details based on the Iranian response.

QUESTION: So you’re not closed to being at an initial meeting, as opposed to the follow-up meeting?

MR. CROWLEY: But I would – I think we would hope that there’d be a full P-5+1 meeting at a senior level. We’ll be looking, for example, to see from the Iranian standpoint, should this happen, what level of interlocutor will they send, what kind of authority will that person have. But we’re looking for a serious engagement by Iran, address these issues that we have. If it’s there, that will be a positive development. If it’s not there, we’ll draw conclusions from that.

QUESTION: Does that –

MR. CROWLEY: Go ahead. Go ahead.

QUESTION: So, basically, this is probably a last chance for Iran to engage on its nuclear issue, which is sort of a precondition for the talks?

MR. CROWLEY: Well, I wouldn’t say – it is a – it is certainly a best opportunity for Iran. As we said at the IAEA earlier this week, we have made an offer to Iran; it’s out of mutual interest and mutual respect. But clearly, we expect to see Iran be willing to address the concerns that we have. As we said earlier this week, Iran says it has rights, but with those rights come responsibilities. So we’ll see what happens. But obviously, should Iran decide to engage, we will be at the table. Should Iran decide not to engage, that will have consequences and we’ll make judgments based on what Iran does or does not do.

QUESTION: Does that include Iran’s views on Israel and also support of terrorism?

MR. CROWLEY: We have great concern about Iran’s support of terrorism and its role in the region. At the same time, we recognize that we have potentially common interests in terms of a stable Afghanistan, in terms of a stable Iraq. As we have said frequently, we are willing to engage Iran on a full range of issues, but obviously, first on our list, first on the international community’s list, is Iran’s nuclear program.

QUESTION: And their views on Israel – wipe out Israel off the world map?

MR. CROWLEY: Obviously, that is a repugnant statement from the United States[1]. And we – but we are willing to – we have great concerns about Iran’s role in the region. It has been – hardly been a constructive player, and we will be clearly prepared to talk about that.

QUESTION: Can you take another one on Iran from another angle? Every year at the end of the month of Ramadan, the Iranian regime has begun this demonstration in support of the Palestinians. It’s coming up. It’s next week, actually. And today, Khamenei threatened the opposition that if they use that demonstration to voice their own displeasure with the results of the presidential elections that they would be faced with a harsh response and full force and everything.

Could that play – this recent comment play – have any room to play in your decision on the talks in general?

MR. CROWLEY: Well, I mean, as we have said many, many times, the situation in the aftermath of the election is really a matter between the Iranian Government and its people. Clearly, there are many within the political structure, within the clerical structure, that want to see a broader political process, a genuine political process, the formation of a genuine political opposition. And clearly, the regime is determined, and has taken direct actions, to inhibit that from happening both in terms of the arrest of those who have expressed their views publicly of intention and inhibitions given to journalists, and so on and so forth. And obviously, this continues to roil within Iran.

I think it’s not for us to give the Iranian regime advice, other than they should continue to take actions, or should start to take actions, to meet the genuine aspirations of their people.

QUESTION: Well, in that proposal they mentioned that they respect the right of people for free – to have free elections, and they talk about justice and rule of law and --

MR. CROWLEY: I think we would say that actions speak more loudly than words. And clearly, their activities of the past few weeks hardly show a government that is interested in having a free and fair and open political process.

Middle East/Iran Inside Line: Israel Presses Ahead with Settlements, Tehran Draws Line on Nuke Talks

The Latest from Iran (6 September): The Reformists Speak

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

Israel Pushes Ahead with Settlements: On Friday, a senior Israeli government source reported that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would approve the construction of hundreds of new housing units in West Bank settlements before he declares a moratorium. Significantly, these "hundreds of houses" are beyond  the 2,500 housing units currently being built.

The Israeli source claimed that Netanyahu informed U.S. officials weeks ago of his decision to authorize the additional construction. The White House, however, "regretted" the reports:

We regret the reports of Israel's plans to approve additional settlement construction... Continued settlement activity is inconsistent with Israel's commitment under the road map.

Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas called Netanyahu's planned approval of the West Bank construction as "unacceptable", and Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini said the new construction has been criticized by all 27 EU ministers.

Iran Draws Line on Nuke Talks: On Friday, Iran's ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Ali Asghar Soltanieh, accused the United States of using "forged documents" to make its case that Iran is building nuclear weapons:

By interfering in the work of the IAEA and exerting various political pressures, the government of the United States attempted to spoil the cooperative spirit between the Islamic republic of Iran and the IAEA... The government of the United States has not handed over original documents to the agency since it does not in fact have any authenticated document and all it has are forged documents.

The agency didn't deliver any original documents to Iran and none of the documents and materials that were shown to Iran have authenticity and all proved to be fabricated, baseless allegations and false attributions to Iran... Therefore, this subject must be closed.

Latest on The IAEA Conclusion on Iran's Nuclear Programme (28 August)

Iran’s Nuclear Programme: Talks, Threats, and Propaganda

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

UPDATE 2 September, 0900 GMT: In an interview with Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohammad el Baradei has said, "Somehow, many people are talking about how Iran's nuclear program is the greatest threat to the world. In many ways, I think the threat has been hyped....The idea that we'll wake up tomorrow and Iran will have a nuclear weapon is an idea that isn't supported by the facts as we have seen them so far."

UPDATE 29 August, 0920 GMT: An EA correspondent has pointed out, in response to my judgement, "These conclusions could be, almost word for word, the conclusions of reports from 2008", that there is a subtle difference from the IAEA's June 2009 report: "The section on possible military dimensions is considerably longer and more detailed...and also entails a subtle change of tone." In particular, the IAEA emphasizes that documentation "derived from multiple sources over different periods [is so] generally consistent and sufficiently comprehensive and detailed that it needs to be addressed by Iran".

This should not be read as a declaration that Iran has moved towards nuclear weapons capability. Rather, it is an amplification of the IAEA's frustration at not getting full access to Iranian facilities to verify the state of research and development.

As we expected, such subtleties are beyond the US press. The New York Times, confused that "Iran Has Bolstered Ability to Make Fuel but Slowed Its Output", gives up and puts out the panicky conclusion, supported by far-from-neutral "outside experts", "If Iran’s current stockpile of low-enriched uranium was further purified, it would have nearly two warheads’ worth of bomb fuel."
---

We reprint below the conclusions of the latest report of the International Atomic Energy Agency on Iran's Nuclear Programme. The full report is available on the website of the Institute for Science and International Security.

As we noted earlier this week, there has been and will be a rush of propaganda around this report. Those who wish to put pressure on Iran, including tougher economic sanctions, will bring out the finding that Iran "has not suspended its enrichment related activities". More ominously, they will convert the IAEA's "remaining issues of concern which need to be clarified to exclude the possibility of military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme" into the conclusion that Iran is definitely pursuing nuclear weapons. (The US State Department has already put out the statement, "Based on what we have seen in press reports ... it seems clear that Iran continues to not cooperate fully and continues its (uranium) enrichment activities." Ha'aretz has trotted out the Israeli line, "The report states that Iran may be working towards acquiring a nuclear weapons capability.")

On the other side, Iranian officials will claim, with the finding of "the non-diversion of declared nuclear material" that they are in compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Or in the objective summary of Press TV, "the UN nuclear watchdog has confirmed that the country is improving its cooperation with the agency while it continues to enrich uranium in spite of UN Security Council resolutions".

All of this will overshadow the real significance of the report, which is that almost nothing has changed over the last year. Indeed, these conclusions could be, almost word for word, the conclusions of reports from 2008. This is a limbo in which Iran is neither culpable of definite violations of the NPT through pursuit of weaponry rather than civilian energy nor exonerated with full inspections of the IAEA of its research and production facilities.

Implementation of the NPT [Non-Proliferation] Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran

Report by the Director General
....
26. The Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran.

Iran has cooperated with the Agency in improving safeguards measures at FEP and in providing the Agency with access to the IR-40 reactor for purposes of design information verification. Iran has not, however, implemented the modified text of its Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, Code 3.1, on the early provision of design information.

27. Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities or its work on heavy water related projects as required by the Security Council.

28. Contrary to the requests of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has neither implemented the Additional Protocol nor cooperated with the Agency in connection with the remaining issues of concern which need to be clarified to exclude the possibility of military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. Regrettably, the Agency has not
been able to engage Iran in any substantive discussions about these outstanding issues for over a year. The Agency believes that it has provided Iran with sufficient access to documentation in its possession to enable Iran to respond substantively to the questions raised by the Agency. However, the Director General urges Member States which have
provided documentation to the Agency to work out new modalities with the Agency so that it could share further documentation with Iran, as appropriate, since the Agency’s inability to do so is rendering it difficult for the Agency to progress further in its verification process.

29. It is critical for Iran to implement the Additional Protocol and clarify the outstanding issues in order for the Agency to be in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.

30. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.