Afghanistan: "A New Way Forward" (Afghanistan Study Group)

A group of US analysts and former Government officials have written a lengthy re-evaluation of American strategy in Afghanistan, in the context of their assertion about the current position that "prospects for success are dim".

"A New Way Forward", in striking contrast to the military-first approach of the Obama Administration, claims "manifold limitations of a military solution in a region where our interests lie in political stability". It recommends shift[ing] our resources to focus on US foreign policy strengths in concert with the international community to promote reconciliation among the warring parties, advance economic development, and encourage region-wide diplomatic engagement".

The report, to be unveiled publicly at 1600 GMT, puts forward a five-point plan: 1. Emphasize power-sharing and political inclusion; 2. Downsize and eventually end military operations in southern Afghanistan, and reduce the U.S. military footprint.3. Focus security efforts on Al Qaeda and Domestic Security; 4. Encourage economic development; 5. Engage regional and global stakeholders in a diplomatic effort designed to guarantee Afghan neutrality and foster regional stability.

The Summary of the report:

Afghanistan: New US Line “Maybe Some Corruption Isn’t Bad” (Jaffe)

At almost nine years, the U.S. war in Afghanistan is the longest in our history, surpassing even the Vietnam War, and it will shortly surpass the Soviet Union’s own extended military campaign there. With the surge, it will cost the U.S. taxpayers nearly $100 billion per year, a sum roughly seven times larger than Afghanistan’s annual gross national product (GNP) of $14 billion and greater than the total annual cost of the new U.S. health insurance program. Thousands of American and allied personnel have been killed or gravely wounded.

The U.S. interests at stake in Afghanistan do not warrant this level of sacrifice. President Obama justified expanding our commitment by saying the goal was eradicating Al Qaeda. Yet Al Qaeda is no longer a significant presence in Afghanistan, and there are only some 400 hard-core Al Qaeda members remaining in the entire Af/Pak theater, most of them hiding in Pakistan’s northwest provinces.

America’s armed forces have fought bravely and well, and their dedication is unquestioned. But we should not ask them to make sacrifices unnecessary to our core national interests, particularly when doing so threatens long-term needs and priorities both at home and abroad.

Instead of toppling terrorists, America’s Afghan war has become an ambitious and fruitless effort at “nation-building.” We are mired in a civil war in Afghanistan and are struggling to establish an effective central government in a country that has long been fragmented and decentralized.

No matter how desirable this objective might be in the abstract, it is not essential to U.S. security and it is not a goal for which the U.S. military is well suited. There is no clear definition of what would comprise “success” in this endeavor. Creating a unified Afghan state would require committing many more American lives and hundreds of billions of additional U.S. dollars for many years to come.

As the WikiLeaks war diary comprised of more than 91,000 secret reports on the Afghanistan War makes clear, any sense of American and allied progress in the conflict has been undermined by revelations that many more civilian deaths have occurred than have been officially acknowledged as the result of U.S. and allied strike accidents. The Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence continued to provide logistics and financial support to the Afghan Taliban even as U.S. soldiers were fighting these units. It is clear that Karzai government affiliates and appointees in rural Afghanistan have often proven to be more corrupt and ruthless than the Taliban.

Prospects for success are dim. As former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger recently warned, “Afghanistan has never been pacified by foreign forces.” The 2010 spring offensive in Marjah was inconclusive, and a supposedly “decisive” summer offensive in Kandahar has been delayed and the expectations downgraded. U.S. and allied casualties reached an all-time high in July, and several NATO allies have announced plans to withdraw their own forces.

The conflict in Afghanistan is commonly perceived as a struggle between the Karzai government and an insurgent Taliban movement, allied with international terrorists, that is seeking to overthrow that government. In fact, the conflict is a civil war about power-sharing with lines of contention that are 1) partly ethnic, chiefly, but not exclusively, between Pashtuns who dominate the south and other ethnicities such as Tajiks and Uzbeks who are more prevalent in the north, 2) partly rural vs. urban, particularly within the Pashtun community, and 3) partly sectarian.

The Afghanistan conflict also includes the influence of surrounding nations with a desire to advance their own interests ---including India, Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia and others. And with the U.S. intervention in force, the conflict includes resistance to what is seen as foreign military occupation.

Resolving the conflict in Afghanistan has primarily to do with resolving the distribution of power among these factions and between the central government and the provinces, and with appropriately decentralizing authority.

Negotiated resolution of these conflicts will reduce the influence of extremists more readily than military action will. The Taliban itself is not a unified movement but instead a label that is applied to many armed groups and individuals that are only loosely aligned and do not necessarily have a fondness for the fundamentalist ideology of the most prominent Taliban leaders.

The Study Group believes the war in Afghanistan has reached a critical crossroads. Our current path promises to have limited impact on the civil war while taking more American lives and contributing to skyrocketing taxpayer debt. We conclude that a fundamentally new direction is needed, one that recognizes the United States’ legitimate interests in Central Asia and is fashioned to advance them. Far from admitting “defeat,” the new way forward acknowledges the manifold limitations of a military solution in a region where our interests lie in political stability. Our recommended policy shifts our resources to focus on U.S. foreign policy strengths in concert with the international community to promote reconciliation among the warring parties, advance economic development, and encourage region-wide diplomatic engagement.

We base these conclusions on the following key points raised in the Study Group’s research and discussions:

The United States has only two vital interests in the Af/Pak region: 1) preventing Afghanistan from being a “safe haven” from which Al Qaeda or other extremists can organize more effective attacks on the U.S. homeland; and 2) ensuring that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal does not fall into hostile hands.

Protecting our interests does not require a U.S. military victory over the Taliban. A Taliban takeover is unlikely even if the United States reduces its military commitment. The Taliban is a rural insurgency rooted primarily in Afghanistan’s Pashtun population, and succeeded due in some part to the disenfranchisement of rural Pashtuns. The Taliban’s seizure of power in the 1990s was due to an unusual set of circumstances that no longer exist and are unlikely to be repeated.
There is no significant Al Qaeda presence in Afghanistan today, and the risk of a new “safe haven”there under more “friendly” Taliban rule is overstated. Should an Al Qaeda cell regroup in Afghanistan, the U.S. would have residual military capability in the region sufficient to track and destroy it.

Al Qaeda sympathizers are now present in many locations globally, and defeating the Taliban will have little effect on Al Qaeda’s global reach. The ongoing threat from Al Qaeda is better met via specific counter-terrorism measures, a reduced U.S. military “footprint” in the Islamic world, and diplomatic efforts to improve America’s overall image and undermine international support for militant extremism.

Given our present economic circumstances, reducing the staggering costs of the Afghan war is an urgent priority. Maintaining the long-term health of the U.S. economy is just as important to American strength and security as protecting U.S. soil from enemy (including terrorist) attacks.

The continuation of an ambitious U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan will likely work against U.S. interests. A large U.S. presence fosters local (especially Pashtun) resentment and aids Taliban recruiting. It also fosters dependence on the part of our Afghan partners and encourages closer cooperation among a disparate array of extremist groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan alike.

Past efforts to centralize power in Afghanistan have provoked the same sort of local resistance that is convulsing Afghanistan today. There is ample evidence that this effort will join others in a long line of failed incursions.

Although the United States should support democratic rule, human rights and economic development, its capacity to mold other societies is inherently limited. The costs of trying should be weighed against our need to counter global terrorist threats directly, reduce America’s $1.4 trillion budget deficit, repair eroding U.S. infrastructure, and other critical national purposes. Our support of these issues will be better achieved as part of a coordinated international group with which expenses and burdens can be shared.

The bottom line is clear: Our vital interests in Afghanistan are limited and military victory is not the key to achieving them.

On the contrary, waging a lengthy counterinsurgency war in Afghanistan may well do more to aid Taliban recruiting than to dismantle the group, help spread conflict further into Pakistan, unify radical groups that might otherwise be quarreling amongst themselves, threaten the long-term health of the U.S. economy, and prevent the U.S. government from turning its full attention to other pressing problems.

The more promising path for the U.S. in the Af/Pak region would reverse the recent escalation and move away from a counterinsurgency effort that is neither necessary nor likely to succeed. Instead, the U.S. should:

We believe this strategy will best serve the interests of women in Afghanistan as well. The worst thing for women is for Afghanistan to remain paralyzed in a civil war in which there evolves no organically rooted support for their social advancement.

1. Emphasize power-sharing and political inclusion. The U.S. should fast-track a peace process designed to decentralize power within Afghanistan and encourage a power-sharing balance among the principal parties.

2. Downsize and eventually end military operations in southern Afghanistan, and reduce the U.S. military footprint. The U.S. should draw down its military presence, which radicalizes many Pashtuns and is an important aid to Taliban recruitment.

3. Focus security efforts on Al Qaeda and Domestic Security. Special forces, intelligence assets, and other U.S. capabilities should continue to seek out and target known Al Qaeda cells in the region. They can be ready to go after Al Qaeda should they attempt to relocate elsewhere or build new training facilities. In addition, part of the savings from our drawdown should be reallocated to bolster U.S. domestic security efforts and to track nuclear weapons globally.

4. Encourage economic development. Because destitute states can become incubators for terrorism, drug and human trafficking, and other illicit activities, efforts at reconciliation should be paired with an internationally-led effort to develop Afghanistan’s economy.

5. Engage regional and global stakeholders in a diplomatic effort designed to guarantee Afghan neutrality and foster regional stability. Despite their considerable differences, neighboring states such as India, Pakistan, China, Iran and Saudi Arabia share a common interest in preventing Afghanistan from being dominated by any single power or being a permanently failed state that exports instability to others.

The remainder of this report elaborates the logic behind these recommendations. It begins by summarizing U.S. vital interests, including our limited interests in Afghanistan itself and in the region more broadly. It then considers why the current strategy is failing and why the situation is unlikely to improve even under a new commander. The final section outlines “A New Way Forward” and explains how a radically different approach can achieve core U.S. goals at an acceptable cost.

Read full report....

Comments

[Catherine]

Last Saturday on CNN"s The Situation Room, host Wolf Blitzer had a very interesting conversation with former US diplomat in Afghanistan Peter Galbraith, who has been expressing his opposition to the current military-driven strategy in Afghanistan (and exposing the corruption in the Karzai government) publically for about year now. A snippet:

BLITZER: Listen to Robert Gates, the secretary of defense in Kabul this week, and he said this, and I want to play this clip. Listen to this.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

ROBERT GATES, DEFENSE SECRETARY: We learned our lesson in turning our back on Afghanistan in 1989 and we have no intention of doing so again.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

BLITZER: He says the U.S. is not going to pull out. What -- how do you react when you hear that?

GALBRAITH: Well, the problem is that we have 100,000 troops, we're spending $120 billion a year on a mission to defeat the Taliban in a counterinsurgency strategy where all of the architects, Secretary Gates included, say that the central feature for success is a credible Afghan partner.

And the partner we have runs the second most corrupt country in the world. He is clearly personally corrupt. He is ineffective. He is known by diplomats as the mayor of Kabul. He is illegitimate. He stole his last election and under those circumstances, there's no prospect for success --

BLITZER: And what should the Obama administration do?

GALBRAITH: Well, it made a huge mistake by tripling the number of troops there and if you are -- and it is really immoral to be sending troops to fight in a mission that they can't succeed at because, again, you don't have that credible partner.

So what I would say is to change the mission to something that is achievable, namely protecting the non-pashtun parts of the country where the Taliban is not present and Kabul. And that you do with 10,000 troops instead of 100,000.

BLITZER: I've heard how U.S. officials in recent days say to me, Peter, that they're worried about Karzai that he seems to be acting in a rather bizarre way, firing one intelligence chief, getting rid of anticorruption chief and now firing his longtime U.S. ambassador. Do you see Karzai becoming more erratic?

GALBRAITH: He has a long history of being erratic, of temper tantrums and now he realizes that he has the U.S. over the barrel and he could do what he wants.

This is the product of a big mistake the U.S. made last year when it went along with the U.N. in covering up the massive fraud in Afghanistan's presidential elections. And Karzai realizes that his weakness is actually -- means the U.S. has to back him up. He came to the U.S. There was a love offensive from President Obama and his top officials. He really thinks he has a blank check.

The trouble is with this weird behavior, this corruption that involves him and his family, it is undermining the chances for success.

BLITZER: So on this issue --

GALBRAITH: Not only undermining --

BLITZER: Sorry for interrupting, but on this issue of what the strategy should be, I hear what you're saying. And it seems to be in total disagreement with General Petraeus.

GALBRAITH: Well, General Petraeus, if he were here, he would say to you, we are -- our strategy is a counterinsurgency strategy. It is one that U.S. troops cannot do by themselves. They need to have a credible Afghan partner.

And so the only question is, is the government of Hamid Karzai a credible partner? And, frankly, I know that many of the officials in the Obama administration privately, they know that -- they see exactly what we all see, what is exemplified by this scandal at the Kabul Bank.

They see a corrupt, ineffective government and they are worried. But, of course, Petraeus would put a public face on it and say something different, but I suspect in his heart he knows, and in private he knows what the score is.
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1009/04/sitroom.01.html" rel="nofollow">http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1009/04/sitroom.01.html

[Catherine]

On the other hand.....

Western Withdrawal Date Brings Old Debate On Islamic Law Into Focus (Afghanistan)
http://www.rferl.org/content/Western_Withdrawal_Date_Brings_Old_Debate_On_Islamic_Law_Into_Focus/2148925.html

[Catherine]

Current Kabul Bank corruption scandals:

Tackle corruption before bailing out Kabul Bank
http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/09/03/tackle_corruption_before_a_kabul_bank_bailout

Collapse of Kabul Bank Points to Fatal Corruption of Karzai Government
http://www.juancole.com/2010/09/collapse-of-kabul-bank-points-to-terminal-corruption-of-karzai-government.html

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