Iran Exclusive: Rafsanjani Declares "I Won't Bear This Situation"

Sources inside Iran have provided new information about the recent political manoeuvres of former President Hashemi Rafsanjani, dramatically altering our assessment of his relationship with the Supreme Leader and others in the Iranian system.

Our reading over the last month has been that Rafsanjani has aligned himself with Ayatollah Khamenei, giving himself both some leverage against the President and protection against attacks from his foes within the establishment.

Iran Exclusive: The Escalating Battle With Ahmadinejad

Publicly this has been displayed by Rafsanjani's support for the Supreme Leader's message of "unity": the former President joined the Qods Day march last Friday to chants of loyalty to Khamenei and praise for Hashemi. Rafsanjani has also devoted his recent statements, for example as head of the Expediency Council, to strident denunciation of the US and the "West" rather than comments on the internal situation.

Specifically, we thought that a key element of the alignment with Khamenei came through action on the post-election abuses. Last month Rafsanjani personally brought the case files of prisoners who had been mistreated to the Supreme Leader, and he insisted on hand-delivering a letter about the systematic abuse of Hamzeh Karami --- his long-time secretary, managing editor of the Jomhouriat website, and senior official at Islamic Azad University --- to Khamenei.

Days later, Iran's judiciary suspended three officials from their posts for connections with the post-election abuses and killings at Kahrizak Prison. One of those officials was Saeed Mortazavi, Tehran Prosecutor General in 2009 and now an aide to the President. Mortazavi had been a primary target for conservatives who were unhappy with Ahmadinejad's handling of the post-election crisis, so we took the move as a sign that the Supreme Leader was listening to their complaints

Our sources, however, bring us a far different narrative, one that points to serious disputes all the way to the top of the Iranian system.

When Rafsanjani brought the Karami letter to Khamenei, he told the Supreme Leader, "I come here by myself because I am sure your office does not care" about the detainees. Khamenei did not take the bait, however. He refused to look at the letter in front of Hashemi, saying he would read it later.

That in itself would seem a minor rebuff, given the broader public signals that followed. It is what happened next that raises eyebrows.

Rafsanjani took his disappointment to a private gathering of officials of his Kargozaran (Executives of Construction) party. His declaration was clear, "I will not bear this situation. I will begin my opposition against everybody."

It is possible, of course, that Rafsanjani was still caught up in the heat of anger, but given his lengthy political experience and his pragmatic approach, it is very unlikely that he spoke from impulse. (Sources support this.)

What may be more important is the question of whether the former President can do anything. One of our top EA correspondents has evaluated, going back to last Qods Day, that Rafsanjani's power within the system is diminished and that he can do little to confront Ahmadinejad.

Another EA correspondent, however, thinks Rafsanjani still has key bases for action. He is head of both the Assembly of Experts and the Expediency Council. For now, he has fended off the President's effort to wrest away control of the Islamic Azad University, Iran's largest, which is still a Rafsanjani stronghold. And this correspondent thinks that Rafsanjani still has an appeal for the Iranian people, who are looking for a way out of the political quagmire and economic stagnation.

We shall see if Rafsanjani makes a move and how much he and his allies can do. Meanwhile, the episode may say just as much about Ayatollah Khamenei.

Rafsanjani's wider message when he took the Karami letter to the Supreme Leader was clear: read it and put Ahmadinejad behind you. Khamenei would not go that far.

And that is indicative of the Supreme Leader's recent manoeuvres (and indeed those going back to the dispute over the Ahmadinejad Cabinet and control of ministries last summer) with his troublesome President. Khamenei will issue public rebukes, as he just did over Ahmadinejad's appointment of special envoys for foreign policy.

However, those rebukes do not necessarily keep the President in check. Last summer Ahmadinejad, forced by the Supreme Leader to withdraw the appointment of his close ally Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai as 1st Vice President, soon brought Rahim-Mashai back into his office as Chief of Staff. And the special envoys have not disappeared yet, despite the anger of the Foreign Ministry.

More on this --- much more --- later this week....