Iran Election Guide

Donate to EAWV





Or, click to learn more

Search

Sunday
Sep052010

Iraq: Obama and A Meaningless Date of Withdrawal (Packer)

George Packer writes in The New Yorker:

What President Obama called the end of the combat mission in Iraq is a meaningless milestone, constructed almost entirely out of thin air, and his second Oval Office speech marks a rare moment of dishonesty and disingenuousness on the part of a politician who usually resorts to rare candor at important moments. The fifty thousand troops who will remain in Iraq until the end of next year will still be combat troops in everything but name, because they will be aiding one side in an active war zone. The proclaimed end of Operation Iraqi Freedom has little or nothing to do with the military and political situation in Iraq, which is why Iraqis were barely aware when the last U.S. combat brigade crossed into Kuwait a few days ago. And for most of us, too—except, perhaps, those with real skin in the game, the million and a half Iraq war veterans and their families—there’s hardly any reality or substance to the moment.

Iraq: Obama Wants Us to Forget the Lessons (Bacevich)


It’s hard to have an honest emotional response or even know what one feels. After seven years of war, the occasion deserves some weight of feeling, but many Americans stopped paying attention a long time ago. And that’s exactly why the President made his announcement: because Americans want the war to be over, have wanted it for years. Tonight he told us what we wanted to hear. August 31, 2010, will go down in history as the day Americans could start not thinking about the war without feeling guilty.

This is not entirely ignoble, by the way. The war has gone on for a long time—almost as long as the Civil War and America’s part in the Second World War combined—and it has taken a heavy toll on the one half of one per cent of Americans who have fought it, and in a democracy this is an intolerable situation. A checked-out public, a stressed-out military, a war hardly anyone can explain: at some point it had to be declared over, and only the President could do it, and Obama is the President, and he was as good as his word in so declaring it on August 31, 2010, not a day sooner or later. He can claim full credit for sticking to his own date certain regardless of circumstances—for not postponing the artificial event that just happened until some future date certain. And in doing so, he restored a small measure of democratic credibility here at home. This is what it looks like when a wartime President is true to his word and the people are behind him. Strange, that it doesn’t look better than it does.

For almost all purposes, Iraq has no government. Almost six months after national elections, the country’s politicians remain unable to compromise and cut a deal, showing the persistent lack of maturity and vision that has earned the political class the justifiable contempt of the Iraqi public. Meanwhile, Iraq’s neighbors are playing their proxies against one another and jostling for a piece of the action. In the vacuum, Sunni extremists are showing just how much—and how little—Iraqi security forces are going to be capable of in the post-American-combat-mission era. It’s not a very encouraging picture. Even if a return to civil war or a military coup, or both, doesn’t happen in the near future, Iraq remains fragile and extremely violent. Daily life—electricity, water, security, the same things Iraqis have been complaining about since 2003—is pretty hellish for most Iraqis. Read the comments from Iraqis in these New York Times interviews. They show the same range of views, some of them within a single individual, that one heard throughout the war. There is great disappointment in and resentment of America, but only one expression of pure hatred, and a fair number affirmations that, at least, Iraqis have been allowed to join the world and enjoy a margin of freedom. Almost all of them fear the future and can only imagine a normal life years or decades from now (fifty years is a common marker). Many of them (especially in Sunni areas), as much as they dislike the occupation, dislike more the prospect of a return to the levels of chaos seen in 2006, which could accompany an American withdrawal. It’s a real possibility, and August 31, 2010 was actually not such a good choice for the end of the combat mission. March 31, 2010, right after the elections, would have been better.

And then there are the hundreds of thousands, the millions, of Iraqis who have fled the country and not yet deemed it in their interest to go back. Among them is the core of the country’s educated, secular-minded middle class, including the younger generation—those who had the most to gain by the American invasion. It’s going to be much harder for Iraq to build itself into a stable, modern country without them.

And yet, to hear the President tell it, Iraq is on the right path and in a surprisingly good position to take its destiny in hand. Those passages from the speech remind me of nothing so much as the fatuously optimistic updates one regularly heard from President Bush and others in the earlier years of the war. Whatever Iraqis said, whatever the evidence of one’s senses, things were always getting better (though “challenges” always remained). And, as it turns out, as of August 31, 2010, this is still the case. As a candidate, Obama was in a position to tell the truth about Iraq, and he did. As President, he’s learned the official language of euphemism and vagueness and distortion. Administration officials who, three years ago and not yet in power, were withering in their assessment of the war and Iraqi politicians, have become their unlikely boosters.

The language of Obama’s speech was as flat and forgettable as anything we’ve heard from him. Unlike Bush’s “major combat operations are over” address in 2003 (which came to be known as the “mission accomplished” speech), Obama’s “the combat mission is over” in 2010 failed to carry conviction—evidence of this President’s intelligence, if not his forthrightness. When he talks about Afghanistan, he thinks about what he’s saying, and as a result he says real things in a way that penetrates, even—or especially-—when he avoids grandiosity, as in his speech last December at West Point. On Iraq, he seemed to be trying not to think too hard about what he was saying, while sprinkling his words with a grandiose coating. Otherwise, he might have had to admit—among other things—that he strongly opposed the surge that his speech praised.

O.K.—why should we expect him to be that much better than any other politician? Presidents never admit they were wrong. (Bush turned the refusal into a badge of honor.) We know how much credit honesty would have gained him among his opponents. John Boehner’s speech on Iraq (which, though it preceded Obama’s by a few hours, was a kind of Republican response) proved that the opposition has no interest in Iraq, except as yet another weapon to use against Obama. So Boehner wants Obama to declare victory, and he suggested that it’s unpatriotic not to do so—Boehner, who couldn’t pronounce General Ray Odierno’s name.

There is no American victory in Iraq, and there is not going to be any American victory in Iraq, and Obama was right not to talk about V-I. There isn’t even a clear truce, with a D.M.Z. and a southern half that, under American protection, might evolve into an economic powerhouse and a liberal democracy. In the Times Tuesday, Paul Wolfowitz proposed South Korea as a model for Iraq. The analogy is closer than Vietnam or the Second World War, but it still fails the test of commensurateness—among other reasons, because there will not be tens of thousands of American troops in Iraq sixty years from now, or even two years from now. We are leaving, undefeated and unvictorious—we are leaving it to the Iraqis....

Read full article....
Sunday
Sep052010

Afghanistan: New US Line "Maybe Some Corruption Isn't Bad" (Jaffe)

We have been noting the tension --- indeed one might call it a battle --- between US officials and Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai over the political and legal approach to corruption.

Writing in The Washington Post, Greg Jaffe reports on an apparent "resolution". Perhaps the sharpest observation on the outcome comes from Marc Lynch, who sets out the American five-step programme for recovery: "1. There's no corruption; 2. International conference to solve it; 3. Military surge will stop it; 4. Maybe it's not so bad; 5. It's key to success."

It should also be noted that this development occurs amidst news that the US and Afghan Governments are discussing how to bail out Afghanistan's biggest bank, the Bank of Kabul, which is reportedly on the verge of collapse:

Afghanistan: Hearts and Minds v. Blood and Anger (Mull)


U.S. military commanders in Afghanistan are developing a strategy that would tolerate some corruption in the country but target the most corrosive abuses by more tightly regulating U.S. contracting procedures, according to senior defense officials.

American officials here have not spoken publicly about countenancing potentially corrupt local power brokers. Such a stance would run somewhat against the grain of a counterinsurgency doctrine that preaches the importance of building competent governance.

But military officials have concluded that the Taliban insurgency is the most pressing threat to stability in Afghanistan and that a sweeping effort to drive out corruption would create chaos and a governance vacuum that the Taliban could exploit.

"There are areas where you need strong leadership, and some of those leaders are not entirely pure," said a senior defense official. "But they can help us be more effective in going after the primary threat, which is the Taliban."

The issue of corruption in Afghanistan has taken on renewed urgency in recent weeks with the arrest of a senior aide to President Hamid Karzai and new questions about Kabul's commitment to fighting graft. Senior Obama administration officials have repeatedly emphasized the need to root out graft in Afghanistan and have deployed teams of FBI and Drug Enforcement Administration agents to assemble corruption cases. The United States has spent about $50 billion to promote reconstruction in Afghanistan since 2001.

It was not immediately clear whether the White House, the State Department and law enforcement agencies share the military's views, which come at a critical time for U.S. forces in Afghanistan. After an eight-month buildup, the 30,000 additional soldiers and Marines that President Obama ordered to this country are almost entirely in place, allowing U.S. and Afghan forces to conduct sweeps of Taliban strongholds and detain insurgents leaders at the highest levels of the nine-year war, military officials said.

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates visited two U.S. Army units on Friday that had been hit with tough losses in recent days as they cleared insurgents from areas in and around Kandahar, the spiritual home of the Taliban and the site of some of the heaviest fighting for U.S. and Afghan forces.

"It has been a tough week for you," Gates told soldiers from an Army battalion that had lost seven soldiers earlier in the week. "Unfortunately, there are going to be more tough weeks ahead."

The Kandahar campaign reflects the broad nature of the problems that the United States faces throughout Afghanistan and explains why some U.S. officials are reluctant to take too hard a line on Afghan corruption. "Kandahar is not just a Taliban problem; it is a mafia, criminal syndicate problem," the senior defense official said, speaking on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the subject. "That is why it is so complicated. But clearly the most pressing threat is the Taliban."

Read full article....
Sunday
Sep052010

Iran Feature: An Open Letter to Detained Activist Shiva Nazar Ahari (Vahidmanesh)

As we wait for news on the trial of journalist and activist Shiva Nazar Ahari, detained since July 2009 and possibly facing the death penalty, we note this open letter from her colleague Parvaneh Vahidmanesh. Translation by Persian2English:

It has not been long since the first time I saw you. It is as though in these short few years great events have taken place.

Dear Shiva, that day in Siah o Sepid café, when we sat across from one another for the first time, and you were, in your words, interviewing me for a job in the Committee of Human Rights Reporters, no reformist had yet heard your name, nor were they ready to work with you. I remember those days when I suggested we enter talks with members of Tahkim Vahdat (one of the major student unions in Iran), and explore the possibility of cooperation with them, you said that they will not let us into their circle, and that we are strangers in their eyes.

The simple blog of the Committee of Human Rights Reporters with the same address in Blogfa was a place where you practiced human rights. When the number of blog viewers would go up, or when the news first published by the blog was cited elsewhere, you would be overcome with joy. There was you, the blog, and the meetings where the absence of each of us would make you angry. You used to say, “The cause is serious, don’t take it as a joke.”

The page turned after the death of Akbar Mohammadi [sentenced for his role in the 1999 student protests, died in detention in 2006]. It was you who recounted the minute-to-minute story of his hunger strike. It was you who did not let his name die in the midst of the month of Mordad (July-August) and its ruckus. When we headed to his hometown to attend his funeral, we were in one bus, and the activists of Tahkim Vahdat were in another. This was where the first steps of cooperation were taken.

Later, and because of the new people who joined the Committee, this tie became stronger, and bore a lot of fruit. You were a women’s rights activist, and Zahra Rahnavard, then president of al-Zahra, an all-women university, had never heard of your name. She never knew that you were sent to solitary confinement for lighting a few candles. Karroubi, the speaker of the parliament with whom you were trying to meet for saving the lives of the prisoners, didn’t know your name.

Akbar Ganji had not heard your name; he who sees you now in the stature of his own daughter, Rezvaneh. He had not heard that there are women who transcend ideology and creed to spend their days defending the rights of prisoners whom they may never greet after release, because they fear of being accused of ties with hostile opposition groups.

Now, Rahnavard cries out your name, she who built the sculpture of “Mother” that sits in the centre of Mohseni Square in Tehran. Many times when you were around the statue, you talked of the mothers who were breastfeeding their children in the prison and were crying blood and cleansing the wounds of the torture they had born. I do not know whether Zahra Rahnavard was thinking of the mothers of those executed in the summer of 1988 when she was making this sculpture, but I do know that every time you saw this statue, you had a lump in your throat. Now, the creator of that sculpture sees herself as a Shiva Nazar Ahari and is ready to be tried in your place. Can you believe it, Shiva?

Can you believe that the very same people who had a position within the ruling establishment and were ignoring you and your ideals are now crying your name? Do you see it Shiva? This change has not come easily. You should be proud of yourself, girl!

Fakhrolsadat Mohtashamipour, whose “Turquoise Girls” was her creative approach to non-violent and reformist resistance, did not know you. Ms. Mohtashamipour now writes for you. Her Turquoise girls carve your name. Shiva is not a strange name to them anymore. Now, the students at Iranian universities call your name.

Remain strong, Shiva! Many have new-found strength through observing your resistance, girl….

Shiva, can you believe that your name is now everywhere: From Senator McCain who was beating on the drums of war with Iran to myriads of private organizations devoted to defending the rights of women and children. When I read McCain’s letter, I thought to myself of the stir you caused by lighting candles and by walking along the highways of southern Tehran where you were coming back from the classes for the children in labour. When I see an American woman who has a hard time pronouncing your name and cannot believe that you are spending days and nights behind bars for defending and supporting women and children, when I see a man on this corner of the world who never knew you [but still] hung your picture on his wall after reading your biography, I realize how much work can be done…how great one can be, how one can become eternal without making common commotions…how one can become the voice of the voiceless and take the hand of the one in need…how one can ridicule interrogators such as Alavi and Mortazavi, and how can one guard and protect the humane virtues and purities in the face of their obscene and nasty looks and stares.

I do not intend to sanctify you, to throne on the highest. I just want to set a reminder for many, for those imprisoned yesterday and today, for the exiled of the past and the present, for the 30-year long memory of this land, for your mother who gave you to the world as a gift on a morning in June, that I will not leave you, that we shall not forget that you are called the mother of human rights in Iran.

Long live, girl. Keep it up. A world is looking up to you!
Sunday
Sep052010

Israel-Palestine: An Interview with Hamas Leader Khaled Meshaal (Narwani)

On the eve of this week's direct talks between the Israeli Government and the Palestinian Authority, Sharmine Narwani spoke with Hamas political director Khaled Meshaal in Damascus:

SN: The peace process has been going on for 19 years -- what in your view has been the major reason for its failure thus far?

KM: Three reasons. First of all, Israel does not want peace. They talk about peace but they are not ready to pay the price of peace. The second reason is that the Palestinian negotiator does not have strong cards in his hand to push the peace process forward. The third reason is that the international community does not have the capability or the desire to push Israel towards peace.

Israel-Palestine Analysis: The Lopsided Table at the Direct Talks (Agha/Malley)


SN: On Thursday, direct talks begin again between the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Israel -- the US has worked hard to bring this about. What are your thoughts on this round, the US role, and prospects for a breakthrough?

KM: These negotiations are taking place for American and Israeli considerations, calculations and interests only. There are no interests at all for us as Palestinians or Arabs. That's why the negotiations can only be conducted under American orders, threats, and pressure exerted on the PA and some Arab countries.

The negotiations are neither supported nationally nor are they perceived as legitimate by the authoritative Palestinian institutions. They are rejected by most of the Palestinian factions, powers, personalities, elites, and regular people -- that is why these "peace talks" are destined for failure.

This represents a perfect example of how the US administration deals with the Arab-Israeli conflict --- how American policy appears to be based on temporary troubleshooting instead of working toward finding a real and lasting solution.

Consecutive US administrations have adopted this same policy of "managing conflict" instead of "resolving conflict". This can be useful for American tactical and short-term purposes, but it is very dangerous on the long-term and the strategic levels. This approach will ultimately prove catastrophic for the region.

SN: There is debate about whether Hamas accepts the premise of a two-state solution -- your language seems often vague and heavily nuanced. I want to ask if you could clarify, but I am also curious as to whether it is even worth accepting a two-state solution today when there has been so much land confiscation and settlement activity by Israel in the West Bank and East Jerusalem?

KM: Hamas does accept a Palestinian state on the lines of 1967 --- and does not accept the two-state solution.

SN: What is the difference between the two?

KM: There is big difference between these two. I am a Palestinian. I am a Palestinian leader. I am concerned with accomplishing what the Palestinian people are looking for --- which is to get rid of the occupation, attain liberation and freedom, and establish the Palestinian state on the lines of 1967. Talking about Israel is not relevant to me --- I am not concerned about it. It is an occupying state, and I am the victim. I am the victim of the occupation; I am not concerned with giving legitimacy to this occupying country. The international community can deal with this (Israeli) state; I am concerned with the Palestinian people. I am as a Palestinian concerned with establishing the Palestinian state only.

SN: Can you clarify further? As a Palestinian leader of the Resistance you have to give people an idea of what you aspire to -- and how you expect to attain it?

KM: For us, the 20 years of experience with these peace negotiations --- and the failure of it --- very much convinces us today that the legitimate rights of Palestinians will be only be gained by snatching them, not by being gifted with them at the negotiating table. Neither Netanyahu nor any other Israeli leader will ever simply gift us a Palestinian state. The Palestinian Authority has watered down all its demands and is merely asking for a frame of reference to the 1967 borders in negotiations, but Netanyahu has repeatedly refused to accept even this most basic premise for peace. Nor will America or the international community gift us with a state --- we have to depend on ourselves and help ourselves.

As a Palestinian leader, I tell my people that the Palestinian state and Palestinian rights will not be accomplished through this peace process --- but it will be accomplished by force, and it will be accomplished by resistance. I tell them that through this bitter experience of long negotiations with the Israelis, we got nothing -- we could not even get the 1967 solution. I tell them the only option in front of us today is to take this by force and by resistance. And the Palestinian people today realize this -- yes, it has a steep price, but there is no other option for the Palestinian people. The Palestinian people tried the peace process option but the result was nothing.

SN: While Hamas has not been a participant in the peace process, many of the Arab nations have pushed for these very negotiations. So then why have they persisted with these talks if most of them think the process is futile?

KM: This bloc (of Arab nations) which has pursued the peace process strategy with Israel is ready to continue with habitual and continuous negotiations without even a single outcome. They will continue with this peace process with Israel because they are not ready to turn to the other option.

SN: And the other option is?

KM: The confrontation of Israel. The other option is resistance --- which will gain the strong cards to pressurize Israel. In short, a weak party (this Arab bloc) will adopt a course of action though he knows that he will see no positive outcome, as he does not have his own strength and has no strong cards. At the same time there is also a great pressure on The Resistance from America and Israel in order to prevent our success. If the peace process is blocked without hope, there is no option for the Palestinian people -- for the people of the region -- but the option of continuing with resistance, even though they realize the pressure that will come, and even though they realize there is a conspiracy against The Resistance.

SN: Well one of these Arab nations that keeps pushing for the peace process is Egypt. Egypt is also a party to the siege of Gaza. And yet Hamas accepts the decision of the Arab League to choose Egypt to mediate reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas. Why did Hamas accept Egypt as a mediator?

KM: There is no doubt we have differences with Egypt regarding many of its political positions and decisions. But the reasons for Egypt's mediation of reconciliation talks are different. The first is that Egypt is a major country in the region --- it is not easy for other nations to just bypass them on any issue. The second reason goes back to geopolitics and the history between Palestine and Egypt, which make Egypt more vested in the Palestinian issue than virtually any other country.

The third reason is that the reconciliation itself consists of two parties --- Hamas and Fatah. No mediator in this reconciliation effort will succeed unless both groups agree to their participation. Fatah simply refuses the intervention of any other Arab country as this will anger Egypt. We in Hamas do not refuse Egypt as the caretaker for the mediation -- what is important for us is not whether we have X or Y as the mediator, what is important to us is that reconciliation itself has to be advanced in a correct way. And it was evident in the last round that the main impediment to this reconciliation is American interference.

SN: But then does reconciliation become impossible if Egyptians always cave to US pressure?

KM: Yes, there is an American pressure where Egypt is concerned. Mahmoud Abbas is also acquiescing to that same pressure and this undoubtedly makes the reconciliation more difficult.

SN: Why, in your view, does the West not engage directly with Hamas and make you a partner to the solution? Surely the only path to a comprehensive peace is a solution agreed upon by all major parties to a conflict?

KM: The West is trying --- either because it lacks the capability or desire --- to get somewhere in the region through pressuring the Palestinian side, and not pressuring the Israeli side. The Americans are still convinced today that if they continue pressuring the Palestinian and Arab negotiators --- and not get Israel angry --- they can reach some breakthrough through this process. The time is coming when they will reach a dead-end because the Palestinian people will simply not agree to any solution which will not provide for all their legitimate rights.

SN: Well some Palestinians would. It appears that the Palestinian Authority is prepared to strike a deal that does not address the Palestinian refugees' right of return. But could that be a real solution?

KM: I am talking about a majority of Palestinians --- not the few. The Palestinian Authority cannot reach a solution with the Israelis without the approval of the majority. Any rightful representatives of the people will advocate for, and not disregard, the Palestinian people's ambitions and legitimate rights. In short, the West will discover sooner or later that any solution that will not fulfill the rights of the Palestinian people will not be successful and will not be implemented. In that very particular instance, when they finally decide to respect the desires and ambitions of the Palestinian people, they will decide to engage with the Hamas movement.

To clarify... Though we are open to them, the key for the success of any solution is not through the West or the Americans --- we believe that the key to success will come through pursuing our national rights. The change will be made from within the region --- whether America is satisfied or not --- because anyone who is awaiting change from the West today will not get any change.

SN: There are rumors that Hamas has been secretly talking to US officials for about two years --- is there any truth to this?

KM: We don't have any interest in concealing official meetings if they take place. Essentially speaking, there are no official or direct talks with the US administration, except for some meetings that happened at the side of some conference in Doha with low-profile individuals, and we do not consider these direct or official talks with the administration.

But we do consider some of these meetings as indirect talks --- we know very well that some non-US officials we meet with report to the administration. And yes, we have met some former Democrat and Republican officials, and we know that they too report to the administration. We are interested in meeting with the Americans and the West, but we do not beg for these meetings and we are not in a hurry.
Saturday
Sep042010

The Latest from Iran (4 September): A Qods Day Failure?

2045 GMT: Academic Corner. The Deputy Treasurer of Tehran University, Mohammad Hossein Moqimi, has announced that about 40 faculty members have "retired" since March.

Moqimi that all the academics had retired according to regulations and legal provisions and that this must not be seen as a political issue.

In recent months, Iranian authorities have replaced the heads of more than 20 universities and education centres.

NEW Iran Breaking: Uncertainty if Lawyer Nasrine Sotoudeh Arrested
NEW Iran Special: How Do You Analyse a Non-Event? (Lucas)
NEW Iran Overview: “A Small Rally to Make More Enemies” (Shahryar)
NEW Iran Propaganda Special: The Green Sedition Festival
UPDATED Iran Video: The Claimed Attack on Karroubi’s House (2/3 September)
Iran Video and English Summary: Mehdi Karroubi after 5th Night of Pro-Regime Siege (3 September)
Iran Urgent: Breaking News with Video on Day 5 of Karroubi “Siege”
The Latest from Iran (3 September): Qods Day and the Karroubi Siege


2010 GMT: The Karroubi Siege. The reformist Islamic Iran Participation Front has written to Mehdi Karroubi, regretting the poor performance of the police in protecting the Karroubi home from pro-regime attackers.

2005 GMT: Economy Watch. Several hundred people have protested at Sari in Mazandaran province in northern Iran over alleged discrimination in allocation of jobs.

The demonstrators claimed that, rather than employing based on ability, authorities show favouritism towards under-qualified candidates. Some protesters claimed that those who were supporters of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad were given preference.

1935 GMT: We have posted a separate feature on emerging news about the possibility that lawyer and women's right activist Nasrine Sotoudeh, summoned to court today, has been arrested.

1925 GMT: The Attack on the Clerics. Radio Zamaneh reports that Grand Ayatollah Dastgheib returned to Qoba Mosque in Shiraz, a day after it was attacked and closed by a pro-regime crowd.

After iron fences set up after the assault were taken down, Ayatollah Dastgheib gave a speech condemning the assault, insisting that even the Supreme Leader could not have supported the attack.

The website adds more details about Friday's events. They followed announcement signed by “the pious followers of the Supreme Leader in Fars Province and the holy city of Shiraz”, distributed in mosques on Thursday night, calling for the prosecution of Ayatollah Dastgheib. The statement accused the cleric of being the “perpetrator of satanic plans” and “speaking the language of the enemy” as well as “threatening the religious beliefs of the people” by sitting at the head of Qoba Mosque.

The statement demanded that Ayatollah Dastgheib be removed and warned the provincial and city authorities that if they do not comply with their demands, they would have to take matters into their own hands.

The Governor of Shiraz, Hossein Ghasemi, reportedly appeared at Qoba Mosque on Friday, but he was forced to leave when the crowd hurled rocks at his car.

1915 GMT: The Karroubi Siege. A group from the Association of Combatant Clerics visited Mehdi Karroubi at his house today.

1910 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Kalameh claims that officials at Evin Prison have told the political detainees of Ward 350 that they have to write letters of repentance if they want phone lines restored. The telephone privileges were reportedly revoked more than seven weeks ago.

1825 GMT: The Karroubi Siege. Mehdi Karroubi's son Hossein has talked to Deutsche Welle about the attacks on his family's house and messages of support from politicians, clerics, and activists.

Hossein Karroubi said some of the attackers were from a local detention centre, indicating regime complicity in the siege.

An Iranian activist adds to our report yesterday that a man and woman were beaten, with the woman's headscarf removed, by the pro-regime crowd. They were Karroubi supporters Hadi Shirpour and his wife, who were watching the attack. The activist claims that police, rather than stopping the assault, joined in.

Shirpour and his wife were then put into a police van and taken away.

1815 GMT: Execution (Ashtiani) Watch. Sajad Ghaderzadeh, the son of condemned detainee Sakineh Mohammadi-Ashtiani, says his mother has been sentenced to 99 lashes for a photograph published of a woman --- falsely claimed to be Ashtiani --- without a headscarf.

Ghaderzadeh said he learned of the punishment from released inmates. Ashtiani has been given the death penalty for adultery.

On 28 August, The Times of London published a photograph that it said was Ashtiani without hijab. Six days later, it said the attribution of the photo was incorrect.

The Guardian of London adds more details about the episode, including the confusion over the mistaken photograph.

1655 GMT: All the President's Men. Omid Memarian writes about the ruthless rise and possible fall of former Tehran Prosecutor General and Presidential aide Saeed Mortazavi, who was recently suspended by the judiciary from his post because of complicity in the post-election abuses and killings at Kahrizak Prison.

In 2004, as one of 20 journalists, bloggers, and website managers detained in a regime crackdown, Memarian had first-hand experience of Mortazavi:
In my case, he warned me what would happen if I ever talked about what had gone on in the prison. “Anyone can be in a car accident, from members of parliament to taxi drivers to plumbers. You journalists are no exception,” he said.

1645 GMT: Sanctions Claim of the Day. This has to be one of the most creative economic analyses I have ever encountered....

First Vice President Mohammad Reza Rahimi has declared that sanctions will bring 200,000 new jobs to Iran. His reasoning is that "the West" will lose 150,000 to 200,000 employees because of the downturn in trade with Tehran and Iran will naturally fill that gap.

1625 GMT: The Karroubi Siege. Former President Mohammad Khatami has called Mehdi Karroubi to condemn the attacks on the Karroubi home.

We have posted new claimed video of Thursday night's attack.

1620 GMT: Secure Regime? Tehran Police Chief Esmail Ahmadi-Moghaddam has criticised counterparts in Iran's security agencies for ordering the mobilisation of forces on Thursday, the day before Qods Day.

1229 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. An Iranian activist reports that, as expected (see 0855 GMT), journalist and activist Shiva Nazar Ahari has been brought to court to face charges including "mohareb" (war against God). She was brought to the courtroom in handcuffs.

It is also reported that Saeed Haeri, a member of Committee of Human Rights Reporters, went on trial today.

Leading reformist politician Mohsen Safaei Farahani, who suffered a heart attack this week in detention, has called home. He says he is better but he is not allowed to say in which hospital he is being treated.

1224 GMT: It's All in the Terminology. Today's post-Qods Day hot topic on the Iranian news portal Balatarin? Using the model of "occupied Palestine" to present an "occupied Iran".

1220 GMT: The US and the Battle Within. Writing in OpenDemocracy, Omid Memarian offers a useful overview of Iran's internal situation and this challenging conclusion:
By removing the threat of a military attack, Washington would make the job of Tehran’s hardliners more difficult, and encourage fragmentation among the top layers of the political elite. In the present circumstances, the end of the military option would create space for those in Iran seeking to hold the hardliners in check, and offer an opening to Iranian democracy and the Iranian people.

1215 GMT: Worried Regime? Daneshjoo News reviews the heavy security presence in Babol and Mashhad as well as Tehran on Qods Day.

0855 GMT: Kamran Asa, brother of the slain protester Kianoush Asa, and Bijan Rezaie are scheduled to appear in court tomorrow.

And if earlier reports are correct, activist Shiva Nazar Ahari, detained since last July and facing a charge of "mohareb" (war against God), will be in court today.

0655 GMT: We have three specials this morning: Scott Lucas tries to figure out the significance of the "non-event" of Qods Day, Josh Shahryar looks at a "small rally that made more enemies", and Pedestrian notes the regime's exhibition of the "Green Sedition Festival".

0600 GMT: The Karroubi Siege. Mir Hossein Mousavi has put out a message condemning the attacks on the home of Mehdi Karroubi: "These black and odious measures will not block the freedom of the people."

0530 GMT: Here's the curious thing: for some in the Iranian system, Qods (Palestine) Day is already gone. Hours after the President's speech, the Friday Prayer sermon by Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami, the wall-to-wall declarations on Iranian media of Tehran's leadership of the movement against Israeli oppression, and the Government's rally, the occasion is nowhere to be found on Press TV's website this morning.

It has almost disappeared from the homepage of the Islamic Republic News Agency, which has moved to a rather dry statement by key Presidential advisor Mojtaba Hashemi Samareh on Iran as the "guiding harbinger of monotheism...and resistance against the oppressors and the hegemonic powers in the world".

Fars News does have the event as its Number 3 item on its pages, but the story seems a bit desperate to prove significance: "A United Arab Emirates newspaper...announced that a big march in Tehran and other Iranian cities, along with some other countries such as Turkey and India, and Indonesia was held."

And Khabar Online, leading site of the challenge within the establishment to the President, has already --- in its top feature --- returned to the issue of how to achieve "conservative unity", including reaching out to "reformers".

There's more, but I think you know where I'm going with this. Full analysis later today....
Page 1 ... 7 8 9 10 11 ... 15 Next 5 Entries »