Engaging Iran: The Obama Administration, A Think Tank, and An Israel-First Policy?

Last week the Washington Institute for Near East Policy released its latest report on Iran, "Preventing a Cascade of Instability: U.S. Engagement to Check Iranian Nuclear Progress" . At its heart is a wonderful if dangerous (and unacknowledeged) tension. The influential think-tank thunders:

An Iran on the brink of possessing, or actually possessing, nuclear weapons would create a multitude of problems in the Middle East. Not only would the United States have to deter and contain an emboldened Iran, it could also have to forestall a cascade of destabilizing reactions by other states, whether they were to accommodate Iran, attack it, or match its capabilities. Preventing Iran’s acquisition or development of a military nuclear capability is therefore a vital national priority.

Yet, in the next breath, WINEP declares that the purpose of blocking Iran's "nuclear progress" (not "nuclear weapons" but "progress" towards any nuclear energy capability) is not defensive but ensure Washington remakes the region in its desired image:

Confronting the Iran nuclear program also offers other opportunities to advance U.S. interests: to demonstrate U.S. commitment to multilateral diplomacy, to deepen U.S. relationships with its Middle East friends, and to strengthen the global nonproliferation regime.

To do this, the report advocates a two-stage process. The Obama Administration can initially pursue diplomacy, but "time is short if diplomatic engagement is to have a chance of success":

If the international community appears unable to stop Iran’s nuclear progress, Israel may decide to act unilaterally. Whatever Americans may think, Israeli leaders seem convinced that at least for now, they have a military option....Israel...may feel compelled to act before the option disappears.

Thus, the US has to "use deterrence as an instrument of dissuasion", in other words, give a lot of weapons to Arab states and Tel Aviv: "The enhancement of the modern missile defenses already being deployed in Israel and purchased by several GCC states may introduce uncertainty into the minds of Iranian leaders about the military utility of Iran’s nuclear and missile programs." It also should "use the risk of cascading instability to produce more action now", which is none-too-subtle coding for more aggressive economic sanctions.

So, does this have any significance for policy inside the Obama Administration, rather than advice outside it? WINEP has received attention because, up to early 2009, its leadership and task forces included Obama officials such as Dennis Ross (now envoy for Southwest Asia and "the Gulf") and Susan Rice (Ambassador to the United Nations). This current report draws upon a June 2008 predecessor, signed by Ross and Rice, "Strengthening the Partnership: How to Deepen U.S.-Israel Cooperation on the Iranian Nuclear Challenge".

Yet, in that context, there is an important between the 2008 and 2009 WINEP approaches, one which may or may not point to the rapid-fire diplomacy of Obama's "engagement" and Hillary Clinton's wild ride across the Middle East last week. The earlier report advocated many of the measures in its 2009 successor, but this was founded on an important starting premise:

"That the president initiate, with the prime minister of Israel, a high-level dialogue on the most urgent security matters on our strategic agenda so as to ensure that common threat perceptions and
common interests translate into policies that are as coordinated as possible."

This dialogue would not be begun by the leaders of the US and Israel or their highest-level representatives --- this might be politically sensitive --- but by "one or two...aides...among the most trusted advisors to the president and prime minister --- officials or emissaries empowered to engage in all manner of discussion with the utmost creativity and maximum discretion."

"Preventing a Cascade of Instability" offers no such recommendation. So, has the starting point of an Iran policy based on discussions with Tel Aviv been dropped, by WINEP or --- more importantly --- the Obama Administration? Or, through an official such as Dennis Ross, has it simply been smuggled in quietly, pending the arrival of a new Israeli Government?