The Latest from Iran (2 September): The Votes on the Cabinet

NEW Iran: Busted! Would-be Minister of Science Rewrites His "Ph.D."
The Latest from Iran (1 September): The Ripples of Debate Continue

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2000 GMT: Here is That Split in the Judiciary. For those who don't think there is a battle going on within the establishment, take note that pro-Ahmadinejad and anti-Ahmadinejad officials are praying in separate parts of the judiciary building.

1740 GMT: Checking the Scorecard on the Nuclear Talks.

What We Predicted (1145 GMT): "The foreign policy story to watch today is not in Germany, where there will be a ritual consideration of the "5+1" powers of Iran's reported new proposal over its nuclear programme but no substantive developments (because, if Iran has really submitted a new proposal, time will be needed to examine it)."

What Happened (The Statement): "World powers pressed Iran on Wednesday to meet them for talks on its disputed nuclear program before a United Nations General Assembly meeting later this month.

Volker Stanzel, political director in the German foreign ministry, made the comments in a statement after chairing a meeting with his counterparts from Russia, China, the United States, France and Britain to discuss Iran's nuclear program."

What Happened (Translation): Nothing.

EA Scorecard: Bullseye!

1545 GMT: Another Story to Watch. We saw a report earlier today but held off pending verification. The Assembly of Members of Parliament, made up of former MPs, was due to see opposition leaders including Mohammad Khatami, Mir Hossein Mousavi, and Mehdi Karoubi at its general meeting.

The gathering was cancelled, however, after pressure from authorities, including -- according to one MP --- threatening phone calls from security forces.

Some of you may remember that last month some former MPs issued a call, invoking the Iranian Constitution, for reconsideration of the Supreme Leader's position.

1535 GMT: More on that supposed Supreme Leader letter urging MPs to confirm the Ahmadinejad Cabinet. It is being reported that one of the Ministerial nominees is circulating the letter.

1320 GMT: The reformist Parleman News has a useful summary of today's discussions of the Cabinet nominees. The headline claim is that the Supreme Leader has unofficially asked Parliament to give its approval, a step that would support our interpretation of a working Khamenei-Ahmadinejad alliance (0730 GMT) until the Cabinet is established.

1315 GMT: The Mystery of the Dismissed Ambassadors. The Iranian Foreign Ministry has downplayed the report that President Ahmadinejad has dismissed 40 ambassadors for "supporting rioters" after the elections. Spokesman Hassan Qashqavi said, "Changing the ambassadors, the heads of our overseas offices and consulates is a natural affair that happens every three years."

1310 GMT: Press TV has now posted an English-language summary of the breaking story that President Obama has sent a second letter to the Supreme Leader. It adds from Tabnak that Obama's first letter, sent four months ago, was answered: ""The Leader at the time replied to the letter by providing argumentation."

1240 GMT: The leader of the reformist bloc in Parliament, Mohammad Reza Tabesh, has responded to the claims by the commander of the Revolutionary Guard, General Mohammad Ali Jafari, that former President Khatami and other reformist leaders have tried to topple the Supreme Leader (0830 GMT). Tabesh said that the Revolutionary Guard "should be a non-partisan organization and those who gave the permision to IRGC to enter election politics, making arrests and obtain the 'confessions' should be prosecuted".

1230 GMT: Parliamentary Notes. Reuters reports that the nominee for Minister of Science, Research, and Technology, Kanesh Daneshjou, has faced criticism in the Majlis. The rumour that Daneshjou is claiming a false Ph.D. from a British university does not appear to be the problem; rather, it is his role running the Interior Ministry's election headquarters. Comments have included, "Considering the heat in the society after the presidential election, there are doubts whether the nomination of Mr. Daneshjou will help to cool down the society or whether it increases the heat," and "The question is whether the university environment will accept a renowned political and security figure like you as a scientific figure?"

1205 GMT: Another Delay. State media are now indicating, and the lack of news supports this, that votes of confidence in Parliament will be on Thursday.

1145 GMT: The Foreign Policy Story to Watch Today. It is not in Germany, where there will be a ritual consideration of the "5+1" powers of Iran's reported new proposal over its nuclear programme but no substantive developments (because, if Iran has really submitted a new proposal, time will be needed to examine it).

Instead, the story could well be in Tabnak, which is claiming that President Obama has sent a second letter to the Supreme Leader. The content is not known, but speculation is that this is another invitation to open up paths for dialogue.

Notice, however, that the path has cut out the "middle man" of President Ahadminejad and gone straight to the top.

1000 GMT: Mehdi Karoubi has written to Grand Ayatollah Montazeri expressed his deep appreciation for Montazeri's support during the post-election conflict, in particular, the Ayatollah's expressions of regret and condemnation of attacks on protestors and detainees.

0830 GMT: Piling on the Pressure. Yet more confirmation of the Ahmadinejad-Revolutionary Guard to break the opposition: the Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, General Mohammad Ali Jafari, has claimed that “the unpublished section of the confessions of the prisoners” indicate that former President Mohammad Khatami and other reformist leaders were trying to topple the Supreme Leader and the regime with post-election unrest.

(The stridently pro-Government Fars News features this as their lead story.)

0730 GMT: We've had another look at the story from yesterday of behind-the-scenes meetings between Ahmadinejad representatives, pro-Government senior clerics, and MPs to ensure approval of the President's ministers. Here is the translation from the National Iranian American Council:

There have been contacts from the office of the Supreme Leader and people close to Ahmadinejad to MPs. In one case, Commander of the Armed Forces Hassan Firouzabadi called some MPs into his office.

One MP told Rouydad [newspaper]: “They have contacted Representatives and they want Representatives to approve all of the Cabinet members. Their goal is to show, through a high vote of approval of all Ministers, that their power is great and that the influence of post-election protests has been negligible.”

When asked who did the contacting, this MP said, “The contacts came from the Supreme Leader’s office and some people close to Ahmadinejad, and Maj. Gen Hassan Firouzabadi even called some Representatives into his office.”

...The decision to put pressure on MPs to approve Cabinet officials was made last week in a meeting with the presence of Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami, Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, Mehdi Taeb, Morteza Moghtadaie, and some of Ahmadinejad’s deputies and some MPs including Gholamali Haddad-Adel, Mehdi Koochakzadeh, Hamid Rasaie, Movid Hosseini-Sadr, and Kazem Mousavi, as well the heads of two pro-government newspapers.

"Contacts from the office of the Supreme Leader". Is it safe to presume that, despite the weeks of bickering between Ayatollah Khamenei and President Ahmadinejad over political and legal issues, the two will be firmly allied to ensure the Cabinet is put in place?

0555 GMT: As we noted yesterday, the internal story in Iran is likely to be pushed aside by the international media in favour of the "5+1" talks on the Iranian nuclear programme in Germany today. This coverage was assured after Iran trumpeted that it was going to be put a new proposals to the powers (the US, UK, France, China, Russia, and Germany).

A separate feature isn't needed at this point. Here's the read: the date "15 September" has been floating around as the cut-off point for US engagement with Iran. While that date has been more a creation of White House spin and media speculation rather than a policy decision, Tehran needed to do something if it wanted to release the public pressure. That need is greater because the Ahmadinejad Government --- unlike the nuke-obsessed US media --- needs to concentrate on its internal position. So the day before a major international gathering, the Iranians say, "We'll talk," but give the appearance of doing it on their terms with a supposed new package.

0545 GMT: We held off from publishing this story yesterday, as it felt --- despite its apparent publication in Fars News --- like a rumour, but it has now been repreated by several Iranian sources.

President Ahmadinejad has apparently dismissed 40 ambassadors from their posts to bring "fundamental correction in the [Foreign] Ministry". The claim is that these ambassadors supported the Green movement and dissidents abroad and will be replaced with "specialists devoted to the bases of revolution".

If true, the action is far from unprecedented: soon after his initial election in 2005, Ahmadinejad recalled Iranian ambassadors from major posts, including London and Paris. In the current context, it should be seen as part of the President's efforts to assert his control over key ministries, including the judiciary and the Ministry of Intelligence as well as Foreign Affairs.

0530 GMT: After three days of debate, the Iranian Parliament is convening this morning for its votes of confidence in President Ahmadinejad's 21 Cabinet nominees. It's still anyone's guess how many will be rejected. Estimates of up to 7 had been put about.

News from the chamber yesterday continued to be mixed for the Government. MPs accepted without reservation Ahmadinejad's selection for Minister of Defence, Ahmad Vahidi, and the nominees for Justice and Agriculture apparently escaped criticism. However, the nominee for Welfare,  Fatehmeh Ajorloo, like another proposed female Minister, Marziyeh Vahid-Dastjerdi (Health), was attacked for her lack of knowledge.

Comments

[Outsider]

"Commander of the Armed Forces Hassan Firouzabadi called some MPs into his office" - that is a rather direct and open interference of the top military chief into the political process, isn't it?

[Amy]

How is it that MPs were so angry about AN's removal of Cabinet officials & nominations for VP & Cabinet replacements, but we hear no reactions about the purges at Intelligence and now the ambassadors? The purges of department employees seems equally important as changing the heads bec the staff make decisions that determine the day to day activities of the department.

[whereismyvote]

@AMY
The conservative MP's and the Larijani brothers are closing ranks with the leader and AN to ensure succession. Expect some show for the people, and then in two months AN will form his cabinet. There will be changes but nothing major.
To expect any more is to be unreasonable. The question is will the reformers and Rafsanjani stay quite, or will they make a second push and a second assault. As it stands don't expect the parliament to stop AN

[Outsider]

Hassan Firouzabadi is not just the Commander of the Armed Forces but the Head of the Armed Forces General Command Headquarters. Wikipedia says: “All branches of armed forces fall under the command of General Headquarters of Armed Forces” including (but not limited to) IRGC.
It seems Firouzabadi hailed Ahmadinejad even before the latter had announced his decision for running for a second term. (http://www.presstv.com/detail.aspx?id=83844)
Firouzabadi’s letter to the Hidden Imam gives me the impression that he doesn’t feel much need for guidance of theologians in religious matters (http://www.memri.org/bin/latestnews.cgi?ID=SD249209#_ednref1).
Question of a google-using outsider totally ignorant of Iranian politics: Could it be that the hand behind it all was all the time a military glove? Holding up Ahmadinejad by his upper arms as the civil face of a military force staging something like a “velvet military coup”? And the façade getting more transparent as time goes by? Could this explain why Ahmadinejad could dare to act so provocative and contemptuous against Khamenei, the majlis, or nearly everybody else?
I read that the regular Iranian army principally keeps out of the political sphere. But I remember how that was said about the Army of Chile - before 1973.

[whereismyvote]

Outsider, we have from the day one said that there was a coupe. The fact that AN is backed by the Pasdaran is clear. The fact that the Pasdaran is taking over control is also clear, what is unclear is whether SL has gone alone willingly, or is hostage to Pasdaran and as such is towing the line. Weather Rafsanjani will take this takeover quietly or he will fight back. Otherwise, don't expect the regular army to do much. They have been pushed to the side for the past 30 years by Pasdaran, and are now in almost not a single decision making position.

[Amy]

Outsider
Following up on whereismyvote's comment, as a fellow non-Iranian, I wasn't sure what Pasdaran are. They are an army unto themselves, independent from the regular army. Here are a couple of definitions from EA commenters:

it is called SEPAH PASDARAN – Islamic Revolutionary Guards – The most sophisticated Army of Iran – Army of 120.000

Basij and Ansar Hezbollah are Militia.

~~~

Pasdaran are the uniform wearing section of the the IRGC. The Basijji are a para military militia force and don’t wear a uniform typically. They are not officially a Pasdar. The official Farsi name Sepah Pasdaran Jomhori Eslami (Islamic Republic Guards Corp), but in Farshi we interchangeably use Pasdaran or Sepah to refer to the IRGC members.

RAND has a great in depth article on this force, if you want to see in detail their activities, story etc. Search in google for RAND and IRGC.

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[Amy]

@ whereismyvote
I don't remember the sources-- maybe it was just another Western media fantasy:
Is there any chance that the army would ever get so disgusted by Pasdaran treatment of the people that it would stand with the people? In the early days after the election when the people were being attacked in the streets, there was talk of that possibility.

addendum:
There were some army officers arrested for some sort of "plot"

[kevina]

@ Amy
It's hard to know, but it was a strong rumor amongst Iranian tweeters. The bigger question, given the strength of IRGC, is would it matter? If low-level Guards break ranks, then maybe. Course, that also means civil war...

[Outsider]

OK, did I get this right? Firouzabadi did his career in the Pasdaran, not in the regular army? In 1995 he was Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, whatever that may mean.
And the position of the “Head of the Armed Forces General Command Headquarters” has gone to someone from the Pasdaran? I just wondered under what sort of pressure Firouzabadi could put on members of the majlis. What sorts of threats could he make? By what authority?
Obviously the regular army doesn’t have either the economical or the political clout of the IRGC, so it can be confidently assumed that they aren’t players in this game. But before Pinochet’s coup nobody expected the army of Chile to do anything.

[whereismyvote]

In 1990's under Rafsanjani there was a push to bring Pasdaran under control, as such it was split into Officer corps and regular force. In addition much of the high brass for regular army and Pasdaran was integrated. However slowly the Pasdaran overtook all positions of top brass and effectively have control of all strategic military command / control positions. Its a western fantasy if you will see Iranian Army fight Pasdaran in the streets. Will not happen.
More importantly it is when will the people revolt against the Pasdaran takeover, and how far are they willing to go to hold to power. I expect them to do anything, as they are both ruthless and capable. Also as they have everything to lose.

[Afshin]

To understand the situation in Iran one has to look for answers on a few fundemental questions. The first is who the players are and if the war at the top of the Regime is genuine. One could argue that this is all a conspiracy and a game to give people the illusion that it is not a game of the people vs the regime and to allow people to have some faith yet in Islam, the Clergy and the revolution.

Now assuming that there really is a war being fought, another questions comes up which is who is fighting who and what each groups interests are. In the last weeks we have gone through this a few times and have disscussed and argued about the players and their motives.

If we dig in a little deeper and look at where the battles are actually taking place and what the results are so far things might become more transparant. From the info available so far battles are taking place atleast at the following levels;

1 - Elections - He came, he cheated, he conquered

2 - The streets (protests) - The Green movement and the people put up a brave fight but situation seems calm and under control, so far A.N seems to be winning the streets as well

3 - Majlis (Parliment) - There was a lotta of barking from the Majlis headed by the older Larrijani brother but looks as if the Poker game played by A.N and Pasdaran is paying off - we will learn more on this in a few days. (chances are A.N will have his cabinet approved)

4 - Judicary - appointment of the younger larrijani was again seen as a major major set back for A.N but so far it has again been alot of barking with no real bite

5 - Ministry of Intelligence - A.N has not just sacked the head but also almost all top managers replacing them with his own people

6 - Other top Positions - For years now Pasdaran seem to be putting up more of their people at top positions such as in the Majlis, Govenors, Ministerial positions, top management roles and now again with the (rumour) embassies

7 - Economie - The smuggling biz alone is worth billions but they are also getting all major goverment contracts and have lots of other legit business interests

8 - The Media - It is here where we see the first major blows for A.N. Still he may be losing big outside of Iran, but inside Iran I think he is doing better them many think. Still he has gotten some major blows internally as well (such as the Karoubi Letters)

9 - Qom (Clergy) - This is so far the one front A.N has lost big. This however is expected as these are the people he is fighting so no surprise there

One thing so far is that when it comes to A.N and the Pasdaran it is clear what they are doing, what they want to achieve and how they are getting there, looking at the Green Movement and Hashemi, the clerics and even the S.L I miss this clear path and strategy. We have some ideas at what might be but at the end it is just a best guess....

I was away for work a few days and just got back, kinda tired so I may have missed some stuff so please all feel free to add in your thoughts...

[Outsider]

Sorry, that was a misunderstanding. I wouldn't dream of dreaming of the Iranian Army fighting the Pasdaran. I wouldn't have imagined someone might fantasize of such a possibility. I for one do not.
I just pondered the idea (when everybody and his dog gets politicised) if the Army might join the fray on the side of the "powers that be" and compete for the pole position (not the same as "fighting against"). Just as the army of Chile did in 1973, ruthless and capable and having nothing to loose except its reputation of political neutrality. Or is the reputation of the Iranian army too angelic for that?

[Afshin]

@ Outsider

Well it is a matter of asking what the real Army in Iran is. The answer to that is PASDARAN, so yes what you are saying is very true and is happening. This is a coupe by Pasdaran. The other (Regular) Army will not really be allowed to get involved as the soldiers are regular kids, same kids that are on the streets chanting against the regime and Pasdaran. Now the idea of allowing such kids walk around in Tehran with weapons in their hands is not something anyone would want in Iran.

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[Amy]

Afshin
Good to see you back. I was a little worried, but better to know you're being safe than to know what you are up to.

....the idea of allowing such kids walk around in Tehran with weapons in their hands is not something anyone would want in Iran.

Yet they send Basij kids out in the streets with weapons

[kevina]

Yeah Afshin, how dare you have a life! We need you! ;)

Serious question, though, if a serious (say 1/3 or more) of the "rank-and-file" Pasdaran ever defected to the Greens, would that shift your analysis?

We all know the IRGC brass is hardline all the way, but what about "rank-and-file?"

[Amy]

Hi Arshama,
Actually, over time, we talk about a number of things here. The article you referenced, http://homylafayette.blogspot.com/2009/09/is-blue-collar-wave-of-protest-on-its.html" rel="nofollow">"Is a blue-collar wave of protest on its way?", paints a vivid picture. The article says that as the economy disintegrates, the people must turn more & more to the black market. One commenter here has pointed out that Pasdaran are the ones who benefit from sanctions because they "own" the black market. Since Pasdaran run both the privatized industries and the black market, it sounds like they are poised to rake in the money, whether the economy is great or is going all to hell. So in the short run, they're likely to be richer & more powerful. But if things are bad enough, there has to be a tipping point, despite their institutional control and their weapons. How do you see the situation playing out?

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[Arshama]

Hi Amy,
I really appreciate EA and this forum, and I can imagine how difficult it is for all contributors to evaluate the complex situation in Iran. However reading these articles sometimes gives me the impression, as if all this is happening in fairly stable conditions. The truth is that AN has ruined domestic economy far more successfully than any sanctions could do.
You are right in pointing to Pasdaran's benefits because they "own" the black market, but this is not the point: In the last four years nearly everything from rice to clothing has massively been imported from China and other "friendly" nations. As a consequence important sectors of domestic production are on the verge of collapse. Homylafayette's article does not mention that rice from Caspian sea shores (Gilan and Mazandaran) or domestic textiles are more expensive than similar imported products. This means that healthy domestic production sectors are systematically destroyed for short-term profit, leading to growing unemployment and impoverishment.
Iranian unemployment rate is already at about 20 %, but AN is only aiming at feeding his beloved IRGC mafia. This problem will become more serious, especially because 60 % of the population is below the age of 30.
Sanctions may have short-term benefits for the Pasdaran, but on the long run they will only worsen this critical situation. Even IRGC membres do not live in a bubble.
Yesterday a friend from Tehran mentioned another important point. Apparently the actual rift is not restricted to the "common" population, but reaches into the leading classes. Their well-to-do younger generation is fed up with everyday restrictions (yesterday a new police project entitled "Social discipline" started in Tehran) and wants to live as freely as abroad. Many of them are ashamed to belong to a class of murdereres and rapists and try to conceal their origins.
AN recently spoke of "an army of 70 millions" (in his favour). On the long run this army will turn against him.

[Amy]

Arshama
You're right... We haven't been talking about this side of the situation at all. I would really like to know more about what you are saying. There is a lot in your post. It's after midnight here in eastern US & my brain isn't all here. It would be great if you could repost this comment or something similar tomorrow (September 3). I'll be in & out, but I think the others would be interested too.

The US economy also was impacted by cheap imports from China & other countries that affected prices and employment, but the dynamics are very different. I'm curious to know if you think SL has any understanding, not as economist, but I mean, does he have any idea that the country is on the edge of an abyss? Do the members of the regime think they can just make things work Glancing back at the article, it looks like some of them think they can handle things with monetary policy, but that kind of move won't even buy time if nothing else changes. I'm beginning to realize what you mean... hope to see you around so we can pick up this discussion tomorrow (ach, it's 1:00 in the morning)

[Afshin]

@kevina

I am sorry, It will not happen again.

To answer your question, there is alot of resistance within the Guardseven at the top. Think of all the ex leaders such as (Rezai) who has distanted himself from the current top or even the extreme example (Sazegara).

But still you need to know where you want to go and how you want to reach it to really get there. The green movement needs to lead but there is no real ledership now. No Real (known) plan, no path to glory.

This way alot of energy is spoiled, wasted .....