The Latest from Iran (26 September): The False Flag of the Nuke Issue

NEW Iran: The "Die Zeit" Article on Opposition and Change
NEW Iran Video: Ahmadinejad Interview on CNN’s Larry King
Iran's Nuclear Programme: The US State Department Line
Video: Ahmadinejad Interview with Time Magazine
Transcript: Obama and Sarkozy Statements on Iran Nuclear Programme
Iran: Obama’s “Get-Tough” Move for Engagement
Iran: Rafsanjani, Ahmadinejad, and the Multi-Sided Chess Match
The Latest from Iran (25 September): The Nuclear Distraction

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2140 GMT: We've now posted an English translation of the Die Zeit article, with its explosive rumours of significant change in the Iranian system.

2005 GMT: Rouydad carries an explosive story, from an inside source, that the Ministry of Guidance and Culture has created a five-person committee to create and spread disinformation, including the claim of a meeting between billionaire George Soros and former President Mohammad Khatami as part of the "velvet revolution". The committee allegedly includes the head of a news agency, an expert on the Internet, a television presenter, and an intelligence official. Millions of dollars are being devoted to the effort.

1955 GMT: President Ahmadinejad has returned from New York with an upbeat political assessment of his "satisfactory" and "successful" stay in the US. He has emphasised the need for change in the management of the United Nations, including the Security Council. No mention, however, of the nuclear issue.

1925 GMT: Report that activist and Mehdi Karroubi supporter Housein Mahdavi has been arrested in Khoramabad.

1730 GMT: Today's "Velvet Revolution" Showcase. It comes courtesy of the Supreme Leader's Advisor For Military Affairs, Major General Seyed Yahiya Rahim Safavi, who said on Saturday, "The (enemies') soft war is aimed at changing the (Iranian nation's) culture, views, values, national beliefs and belief in values. Soft warfare is a complicated type of political, cultural, information operations launched by the world powers to create favorable changes in the target countries."

1715 GMT: The Wall Street Journal, snarling for a confrontation with Iran, inadvertently exposes the weakness in the dramatic presentation of the second enrichment facility:

"Let's also not forget the boost Iran got in late 2007, when a U.S. national intelligence estimate concluded that Iran had stopped its nuclear weapons program in 2003 and kept it frozen. The U.S. spy agencies reached this dubious conclusion while apparently knowing about the site near Qom."

Probably for the chest-thumpers at the WSJ is that the conclusion is not dubious at all (see the State Department's defense of it in a separate entry). Even if the second facility had taken in shipments of uranium, which is not alleged even by the US Government, even if high-grade centrifuges had been installed, which is not established, even if those centrifuges had begun enriching uranium, which is not claimed anywhere, that would not establish a direct link with a resumed nuclear weapons program. It would merely establish that Iran now had some quantity of enriched uranium which might or might not be for military rather than civilian purposes.

However, the WSJ's railing do not have to be logical to show the problems for the Obama Administration's strategy. Opponents will now claim that the 2nd enrichment facility shows that all intelligence assessments from 2007 must be thrown out and will put by default the faith-based assertion that Iran is hell-bent on the Bomb and beyond diplomacy.

1650 GMT: The Institute for Science and International Security has posted images "of two possible locations of the gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facility under construction near Qom, Iran. Both are tunnel facilities located within military compounds approximately 30-40 kilometers away."

1620 GMT: Just to follow up on the biggest of rumours (see 1400 GMT) for change in the Iranian system, with the five-person committee to replace the Supreme Leader and the replacement of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad with Tehran Mayor Qalibaf. I've read the Die Zeit piece, and it reads like rumour, Chinese whispers, and wishful thinking rather than hard information on any plan from Hashemi Rafsanjani or another source.

1600 GMT: The Grand Rafsanjani Plan? While the details of Hashemi Rafsanjani's purported political compromise are in the category of rumour, its existence is verified by the number of politicians and clerics asking for its consideration. Reformist MP Darius Ghanbari has called for "more efforts...to achieve...consensus and a calm atmosphere" and said, "Hashemi has all these features to bring the sides together", although "this will be achieved only when conditions that allow the rebuilding of trust to eliminate extremism and hatred." Another MP has called on Parliament's National Security Commission to act on the lines set out by Rafsanjani's 14 July Friday Prayer speech as the "best solution for an exit from the current situation".

1445 GMT: Not-So-Dramatic Breaking News. Iran's chief official for the nuclear programme, Ali Akbar Salehi, says Tehran will allow the International Atomic Energy Agency to inspect the second uranium enrichment facility.

Look for the media to play this up as an important development. It's not. The logical strategy for Iran is to draw out the process of negotiation over access, appearing to be receptive to international demands for inspection while defending sovereignty and political position. That's why Salehi "didn't specify when inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency could visit the site" and said "the timing will be worked out with the U.N. watchdog".

1410 GMT: The Battle Among the Experts. Ayande News Agency has revealed the bitter division in the Assembly of Experts. Hussein Ka'abi criticised Ayatollah Ali Mohammad Dastgheib, who has been prominent in his condemnation of the "illegitimate" Ahmadinejad Government and the brutal suppression of post-election dissent, and started a petition amongst the members of the Assembly for Dastgheib's dismissal. It is claimed that the Supreme Leader rejected the petition.

1405 GMT: Political activist Maysam Roudak was detained on Tuesday. She was previously arrested in September 2007, charged with acting against national security, and then bailed for $50,000.

1400 GMT: Noting the Even More Intriguing Rumour. This morning (0455 GMT) we wrote about the unconfirmed story that Hashemi Rafsanjani is trying to bring a political resolution through the intervention of the Expediency Council, which he chairs.

Even that pales, however, before the stunning claims in the German Die Zeit. The scenario is that a new system of "Supreme Leaders" with set terms would replace the current overall Supreme Leader with office for life and, more specifically, that the current Mayor of Tehran, Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf, would replace Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as President.

We're looking for the original German article, but a Farsi summary is available via Deutsche Welle.

0930 GMT: Nonsense and War Talk. The "analysis" of the Iran in many of today's newspapers is simply awful. The Guardian of London's "Q and A Guide" bluntly informs, "[This] shows Iran has not been telling the truth about its nuclear activities," omitting little points such as Tehran's declaration to the International Atomic Energy Agency on Monday and the differing interpretations of its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The journalist, Ian Black, blithely assures, "It seems unlikely that a revelation of such importance would have been made without rigorous checking of sources." Which sounds good unless you realise that Black's next paragraph, "It is known that two years ago the US managed to penetrate Iranian computer systems," refers to the highly suspect American claim of a magic Iranian laptop, supposedly obtained from a defector, which has yet to be seen by the IAEA.

All of this might be harmless if ludicrous, were it not for the inconvenience that it aids and abets talk of War, War, War. In The Wall Street Journal, Anthony Cordesman, exalted by the US media as a top military expert, explains, "Israel must consider not just whether to proceed with a strike against Iran—but how", and kindly offers his "Iran Attack Plan". And the BBC's flagship radio programme, Today, having just heard from the British Foreign Minister, David Miliband, that diplomacy must be pursued, immediately turned to Mark Fitzpatrick of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, who declared, well, no, the military option should be prepared.

0505 GMT: The Iranian (State) Line. Press TV frames President Ahmadinejad's political strategy, which is to downplay any dispute and offer on the surface an accommodation over the second enrichment facility: "Ahmadinejad: 2nd nuclear site open for inspection". It summarises the President's New York press conference, which was delayed yesterday, and features his stance that Iran is within the law (which we picked up in Friday updates): "According to the IAEA rules, countries must inform the Agency 6 months ahead of the gas injection in their uranium enrichment plants. We have done it 18 months ahead and this should be appreciated not condemned."

0455 GMT: And, if you're not caught up with the "secret nuclear plant", what are the internal developments in Iran? To be honest, in the last 48 hours, all parties have caught breath and assessed their positions. The most intriguing possibility is that Hashemi Rafsanjani is trying to seize the initiative by setting up the Expediency Council as the proposer and arbiter of a political settlement. The Council is a different body from the clerical Assembly of Experts, which Rafsanjani also heads: its official function in the Iranian system is to rule in disputes between the Parliament and the Guardian Council, but it works primarily as an advisory body to the Supreme Leader.

At this point, the story is still rumour, but it is prominent in Internet chatter. Our readers offer a useful introduction in their comments on yesterday's updates.

0420 GMT: A "false flag" ship is one that disguises its true origin by sailing under the colours of another country. The parallel for Iran today is a near-hysterical situation in which an issue far removed from the critical questions of the post-election conflict suddenly becomes the primary, and even the sole, criterion by which Tehran is judged.

The "Western" media run headlong, escorted and often led by a Government agency, towards a finish line of the most dramatic and damning tale. The Times of London turns itself into Boys' Own Intelligence Journal, "How secrecy over Iran's Qom nuclear facility was finally blown away".

The New York Times gets closer to the immediate politics in its opening paragraph, "On Tuesday evening in New York, top officials of the world nuclear watchdog agency approached two of President Obama’s senior advisers to deliver the news: Iran had just sent a cryptic letter describing a small “pilot” nuclear facility that the country had never before declared." Then, however, it takes the US Government's bait, substituting supposed anguish and hurt for Washington's balancing of "engagement" and pressure on Tehran (see Chris Emery's analysis, which is far beyond anything in mainstream media this morning), "The Americans were surprised by the letter, but they were angry about what it did not say. American intelligence had come across the hidden tunnel complex years earlier, and the advisers believed the situation was far more ominous than the Iranians were letting on."

CNN, meanwhile, hits a new low in its spiralling coverage of Iran, falling into the Iranian President's own public-relations campaign by putting him on The Larry King Show, which usually devotes itself to interviewing Hollywood celebrities, participants in headline crime stories, or anyone loosely connected with Michael Jackson. Ahmadinejad's far-from-stunning revelation? ""We simply didn't expect President Obama to say something that was baseless."

None of this hyperbole and alarm, fuelled by the US Government's need to put pressure on Tehran before talks begin in Geneva on 1 October, comes close to the complexity of the politics on the uranium enrichment facility near Qom. None of it appreciates what an EA correspondent points out:

Let's hold our horses on this one. The International Atomic Energy Agency has to certify that the plant is not new and that Iran has been working in it for years. Right now there is complete discordance between the Iranian and Western versions of events on this, but both curiously point out to one key factor: no enrichment is happening right now in the Qom installation, and construction is still in progress.

But all of the hyperbole and alarm replaces any consideration of and even attention to the internal developments in Iran.

Iran: The Supreme Leader and the Larijani-Karroubi Meeting

Iran’s Chess Match: Setting Up the Pieces for Friday
The Latest from Iran (16 September): Smoke Before Battle

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Maryam at Keeping the Change has posted an article on Monday's meeting between Speaker of the Parliament Ali Larijani and Mehdi Karroubi, offering important detail on the discussion. Equally significant is her reading of the power politics behind the encounter:

"The combination of these contradictory tactics may indicate that Khamanei is carefully crafting a strategy for resolving the post-election conflict that applies these different forms of pressure where appropriate. At the same time, however, Khamanei's approach could indicate that the Supreme Leader has a thin, unguided non-strategy and is simply throwing all his resources at the Opposition, in a desperate attempt to end the political standoff -- on this analysis, Khamanei's alternative use of aggression and diplomacy is less an affirmative, calculated decision and more a reaction to the failure of one or the other approach."

Maryam's reading is a vital contrast to our analysis, developed this morning, that it is President Ahmadinejad and his allies that are in the lead with the Supreme Leader scrambling to regain his own position. At the same time, her pondering of "careful strategy" v. "non-strategy" could be applied not only to Ayatollah Khamenei but to the Government's measures in the run-up to Qods Day.

More Details on Karroubi's Meeting Monday with Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani

The website Rouydad adds additional detail to the earlier piece we posted from Karroubi's news outlet, Eteemade Melli. According to this newest report, during yesterday's meeting Karroubi informed Larijani of his concerns with the work of the three-man committee investing the prisoner rape and assault claims, as well as the actions of the state news agecy "Voice & Visage." At the end of the meeting Karroubi reportedly told Larijani of his hope that "unlike his brother [Sadegh Larijani], [Ali Larijani] will not sell his religion to the world." The report goes on to claim that Larijani asked Karroubi to "keep quiet" until the domestic situation improves, promising that his allegations would be properly investigated once calm had been restored. Karroubi replied, "I would prefer death to remaining quite in the face of these violations."

Interestingly, Rouydad's account of the meeting begins with a quotation from a source inside Parliament, stating that: "On the orders of the Supreme Leader, Larijani met with Karroubi. Mr. Larijani is the bearer of the Leader's message." With this in mind, Larijani's request for restraint from Karroubi and Karroubi's purported refusal to do so take on added signficance. As we observed in our earlier post on this meeting, it appears that the Refomists' hand is not as weak as some have suggested and that attempts at conciliation have not been wholly put aside by the Supreme Leader. If anything, this development, taken together with the events of the last week, may indicate that Khamanei is taking multiple approaches to the post-election conflict. On the one hand, he appears to be using some elements of his arsenal, such as the Revolutionary Guard, to strike a confrontational approach with the Reformists, while at the same time using other allies, such as the hardline pragmatic Ali Larijani, to pursue negotiations with Opposition leaders.

The combination of these contradictory tactics may indicate that Khamanei is carefully crafting a strategy for resolving the post-election conflict that applies these different forms of pressure where appropriate. At the same time, however, Khamanei's approach could indicate that the Supreme Leader has a thin, unguided non-strategy and is simply throwing all his resources at the Opposition, in a desperate attempt to end the political standoff -- on this analysis, Khamanei's alternative use of aggression and diplomacy is less an affirmative, calculated decision and more a reaction to the failure of one or the other approach. This reading is borne out by a pattern which appears to have developed post June 12, with periods of intense confrontation followed by spurts of appeasement and vice-versa (witness the fourth Tehran trials and accusations against Reformist leaders of collusion with foreign governments, followed by Khamanei's public statements denying the possibility of any such conspiracy) .

In all likelihood, it is the second analysis that may best capture Khamanei's mindset -- Khamanei is, after all, known to be less than an astute politician, with a tendency to favor uncompromising, agressive political strategies to diplomacy. He is, as such, disinclined to pursue appeasement unless his preferred confrontational approach has failed. In this vein, the recent events surrounding Karroubi are telling. After the raid on his offices, the closure of his newspaper, and the threats of arrest against him have all failed to silence Karroubi, Khamanei may have decided that conciliation should, at least in the short term, be explored. If Karroubi remains defiant, however, we should expect to see Khamanei return to his tried and true aggressive posture.

Other than providing potential insight into Khamanei's political strategy, Karroubi's meeting with Larijani should serve as a small reminder of the in-roads made by the Reformists over the last two months and of the Government's heretofore inability to decisively snuff out the Movement's leaders. There is little doubt that the current situation inside the country, as well as the Government's response, is unique in the history of the Islamic Republic. This is hardly the Iran of 1988, when thousands of political activists were summarily executed, expelled, and otherwise removed from the Iranian political scene. Of course, the circumstances were differen then: those killed and exiled during that period were hardly Establishment darlings, but rather were, by and large, members of dissident groups ideologically opposed to the Islamic Republic; moreover, their elimination was religiously sanctioned by a fatwa issued by Ayatollah Khomeini. Perhaps more tellingly, however, the recent events in Iran also bear little ressemblance to the atmosphere that reigned during the Presidency of Mohammad Khatami, when the Reformists remained cowed and unable to unite against the conservative forces that were working to disrupt Khatami's efforts at change.

Outside of the brutal crackdown against demonstrators, the Government has not yet resorted to large scale violence, such as mass executions or targeted assassinations of Movement leaders, to resolve the crisis. At the same time, the Reformists have managed to maintain some semblance of unity (with Khatami, Karroubi, and Mousavi almost appearing to alternate in the role of "Movement Leader"). Moreover, the Opposition has adapted its tactics in order to maintain pressure on the Government, focusing its message less directly on the election issue and more on the events and incidents that occurred in the aftermath of the dispute, such as the show trials and allegations of prisoner rape and abuse. While these may seem like modest accomplishments, the country's history of political repression and opposition to reform over the last 30 years make them the signposts of a society in transition.

As always, trying to predict where this conflict is headed is futile. What we can conclude, however, is that the Establishment has yet to achieve a decisive victory and that this failure, in and of itself, may tell us more about the future of Iran than any one arrest, office closure, or high-ranking political meeting ever will.

The Latest from Iran (6 September): The Reformists Speak

Iran Analysis: How Important is the Mousavi Statement?
Text: Mousavi Statement to “Green Path of Hope” (5 September)
Middle East/Iran Inside Line: Israel Presses Ahead with Settlements, Tehran Draws Line on Nuke Talks
The Latest from Iran (5 September): A Quiet Phase

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2000 GMT: Psychological Warfare. Unsurprisingly, the Fars News story that Mehdi Karroubi's son Ali is the subject of an arrest warrant, due to a financial dispute with the mobile phone company Irancell, appears to be a bit of fiction to shake up the reformist movement.

The specific claim is that Ali Karroubi is connected with Persian Telecom, which failed to carry out advertising obligations for Irancell. However, Irancell has told Saham News, connected with Karroubi party's Etemade Melli:

Mr. Ali Karroubi does not hold any shares in Persian Telecom....The two companies have a business association in the form of purchasing Irancell products and selling them and therefore no advertisement is done on behalf of Irancell by Persian Telecom. (Translation from Tehran Bureau)

1925 GMT: The Reformist Fightback. A series of reformist members of Parliament and clerics have been striking back at the comments of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps commander, General Ali Mohammad Jafari (see 1730 GMT), all day. The latest is Hojatoleslam Alikhani, a cleric and MP, who has emphasised that the military should not enter political issues.

1920 GMT: The Battle for the Universities (Cont.). Iranian newspapers and the Islamic Republic News Agency report, “The Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies [has been] tasked by the Supreme Cultural Revolution Council to revise the human sciences curriculum."

The head of the Institute declared, “In our country a large part of the syllabus… is not in line with our Iranian-Islamic culture. This calls for a revision." The syllabus will be revised
“based on the supreme leader’s recommendations.” (Agence France Press has an English summary.)

1730 GMT: Pursuing the Revolutionary Guard. Following up our last update yesterday, The Assembly of Combatant Clerics had responded to the claims of Revolutionary Guard Commander General Mohammad Ali Jafari, alleging that former President Khatami and other prominent reformists have tried to "unseat" the Supreme Leader and Government, by filing a formal complaint against Jafari and Keyhan newspaper for publishing lies and insulting several members of the Assembly.

1725 GMT: Responding to claims by Deputy Head of Judiciary, Ebrahim Raeesi, that he had not presented any evidence of detainee abuse in his meeting with the three-member panel investigating the claims, Mehdi Karroubi has described three documents that he presented.

1715 GMT: Hey, Look Over There! According to Press TV, the Supreme Leader gave visiting Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez a quick international lesson on Sunday: "The US had far greater failures in the Islamic Republic of Iran than in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon and Palestine. A power has been formed in this region which was once regarded by the US as its courtyard."

Surprisingly, the article offered no reference by Ayatollah Khamenei made to Iran's internal situation.

1440 GMT: Regime Goes After Karroubi. Fars News reports that an arrest warrant has been issued for Mehdi Karroubi's son, Ali. The cause of the action is a financial dispute involving one of Iran's largest mobile phone companies, Irancell, for whom Karroubi's company was supposed to sell phone cards. The amount involved is almost $2.5 million.

Nice touch, by the way, for Fars to use this as the illustration for the story:


1305 GMT: Josh Shahryar's "Green Brief" summarising the events of Saturday is now out.

1255 GMT: As the regime pushes its campaign for a "proper" academic sector (see 0740 GMT), former President Khatami held his own discussion with the Islamic Association of University Teachers. He pointedly challenged both the Supreme Leader's call on academics to be the commanders in a war against "Western" soft power and last Friday's prayer address in Tehran for a "non-Western" approach to humanities. Khatami expressed his opposition to those who in the name of fighting western liberalism, were forcing people to follow their path by employing fascism and totalitarianism ideologie and warned the authorities to start rebuilding public trust before all the opportunities are wasted."

1015 GMT: Business as Usual. Deputy head of judiciary Ebrahim Raeesi, who seems to be the regime's "hold-the-line" guy on detentions and prosecutions, declared Saturday that the replacement of Saeed Mortazavi as Tehran prosecutor by Abbas Jafari Dolatabadi will make no difference to the current approach: “The trials will continue and we will do our best so that the rule of law is upheld and justice prevails."

1010 GMT: Methinks He Doth Protest Too Much. Presidential spokesman Aliakbar Javenfekr is a bit upset at the claim, highlighted by Deputy Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Reza Bohanar (see Friday's updates), that up to six of the Ministerial nominees only got approval after the Supreme Leader's intervention of a letter to Parliament: "This was not an order at all but a consultative and friendly view which compelled the lawmakers to work more tolerantly with the government." Bahonar was "insulting the lawmakers who through their independent, conscious, and intelligent vote helped establish a powerful, efficient government".

0850 GMT: The three-member judiciary panel investigating allegations of detainee abuse has said that Mehdi Karroubi has formally submitted the names of four detainees who will appear before the panel if invited.

0810 GMT: We've split off our opening update on the reformist fightback as a separate entry, "How Important is the Mousavi Statement?"

0800 GMT: No, No, It Ain't So. The head of Parliament's National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, Alaeddin Boroujerdi, is insisting that the claims of 72 deaths in post-election violence are "questionable, given the fact that no detail on the identity of the victims has been present".

We linked Friday to the Farsi-language site Norooz, which has collected the names and descriptions of the dead, but we're hoping to help Mr Boroujerdi later today with an English translation of the list.

0740 GMT: In recent days, we've been updating on the regime's statements linking academia and the "proper" post-election path in Iran, including the Supreme Leader's address to heads of universities and research centres as "commanders" of the fight against foreign "soft power" and the statement in last Friday's prayers in Tehran warning against "Western-style" instruction in humanities.

Today The New York Times has an excellent article by Robert Worth today, "Iran’s Universities Punish Students Who Disputed Vote". Drawing from Iranian website, it not only notes the arrests and summoning for questioning of politically active students but also writes that "a presidential panel has begun an investigation of the humanities curriculums at universities".

The lengthiest passage, however, summarises the academic and political fight around Islamic Azad University:

Significantly, several clerics and high-ranking officials have taken aim at Islamic Azad University, which is based in Tehran and has branches around the country. The university is largely run by the family of former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a powerful moderate and leading opponent of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

“This university must once again be purified,” Ayatollah Muhammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi, the president’s spiritual adviser, said during a meeting with new cabinet members, the Rouydad Web site reported. “This purification must occur at the management level and other levels. You see just how many who do not believe in religion, Islam and God have attended and graduated from this university.”

Another cleric, Muhammad-Reza Babai, called for the new minister of higher education to review Azad’s management charter, during a Friday Prayer sermon in the central city of Kerman. The new minister, Kamran Daneshjoo, has also accused Azad of failing to meet standards.

The Latest from Iran (2 September): The Votes on the Cabinet

NEW Iran: Busted! Would-be Minister of Science Rewrites His "Ph.D."
The Latest from Iran (1 September): The Ripples of Debate Continue

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2000 GMT: Here is That Split in the Judiciary. For those who don't think there is a battle going on within the establishment, take note that pro-Ahmadinejad and anti-Ahmadinejad officials are praying in separate parts of the judiciary building.

1740 GMT: Checking the Scorecard on the Nuclear Talks.

What We Predicted (1145 GMT): "The foreign policy story to watch today is not in Germany, where there will be a ritual consideration of the "5+1" powers of Iran's reported new proposal over its nuclear programme but no substantive developments (because, if Iran has really submitted a new proposal, time will be needed to examine it)."

What Happened (The Statement): "World powers pressed Iran on Wednesday to meet them for talks on its disputed nuclear program before a United Nations General Assembly meeting later this month.

Volker Stanzel, political director in the German foreign ministry, made the comments in a statement after chairing a meeting with his counterparts from Russia, China, the United States, France and Britain to discuss Iran's nuclear program."

What Happened (Translation): Nothing.

EA Scorecard: Bullseye!

1545 GMT: Another Story to Watch. We saw a report earlier today but held off pending verification. The Assembly of Members of Parliament, made up of former MPs, was due to see opposition leaders including Mohammad Khatami, Mir Hossein Mousavi, and Mehdi Karoubi at its general meeting.

The gathering was cancelled, however, after pressure from authorities, including -- according to one MP --- threatening phone calls from security forces.

Some of you may remember that last month some former MPs issued a call, invoking the Iranian Constitution, for reconsideration of the Supreme Leader's position.

1535 GMT: More on that supposed Supreme Leader letter urging MPs to confirm the Ahmadinejad Cabinet. It is being reported that one of the Ministerial nominees is circulating the letter.

1320 GMT: The reformist Parleman News has a useful summary of today's discussions of the Cabinet nominees. The headline claim is that the Supreme Leader has unofficially asked Parliament to give its approval, a step that would support our interpretation of a working Khamenei-Ahmadinejad alliance (0730 GMT) until the Cabinet is established.

1315 GMT: The Mystery of the Dismissed Ambassadors. The Iranian Foreign Ministry has downplayed the report that President Ahmadinejad has dismissed 40 ambassadors for "supporting rioters" after the elections. Spokesman Hassan Qashqavi said, "Changing the ambassadors, the heads of our overseas offices and consulates is a natural affair that happens every three years."

1310 GMT: Press TV has now posted an English-language summary of the breaking story that President Obama has sent a second letter to the Supreme Leader. It adds from Tabnak that Obama's first letter, sent four months ago, was answered: ""The Leader at the time replied to the letter by providing argumentation."

1240 GMT: The leader of the reformist bloc in Parliament, Mohammad Reza Tabesh, has responded to the claims by the commander of the Revolutionary Guard, General Mohammad Ali Jafari, that former President Khatami and other reformist leaders have tried to topple the Supreme Leader (0830 GMT). Tabesh said that the Revolutionary Guard "should be a non-partisan organization and those who gave the permision to IRGC to enter election politics, making arrests and obtain the 'confessions' should be prosecuted".

1230 GMT: Parliamentary Notes. Reuters reports that the nominee for Minister of Science, Research, and Technology, Kanesh Daneshjou, has faced criticism in the Majlis. The rumour that Daneshjou is claiming a false Ph.D. from a British university does not appear to be the problem; rather, it is his role running the Interior Ministry's election headquarters. Comments have included, "Considering the heat in the society after the presidential election, there are doubts whether the nomination of Mr. Daneshjou will help to cool down the society or whether it increases the heat," and "The question is whether the university environment will accept a renowned political and security figure like you as a scientific figure?"

1205 GMT: Another Delay. State media are now indicating, and the lack of news supports this, that votes of confidence in Parliament will be on Thursday.

1145 GMT: The Foreign Policy Story to Watch Today. It is not in Germany, where there will be a ritual consideration of the "5+1" powers of Iran's reported new proposal over its nuclear programme but no substantive developments (because, if Iran has really submitted a new proposal, time will be needed to examine it).

Instead, the story could well be in Tabnak, which is claiming that President Obama has sent a second letter to the Supreme Leader. The content is not known, but speculation is that this is another invitation to open up paths for dialogue.

Notice, however, that the path has cut out the "middle man" of President Ahadminejad and gone straight to the top.

1000 GMT: Mehdi Karoubi has written to Grand Ayatollah Montazeri expressed his deep appreciation for Montazeri's support during the post-election conflict, in particular, the Ayatollah's expressions of regret and condemnation of attacks on protestors and detainees.

0830 GMT: Piling on the Pressure. Yet more confirmation of the Ahmadinejad-Revolutionary Guard to break the opposition: the Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, General Mohammad Ali Jafari, has claimed that “the unpublished section of the confessions of the prisoners” indicate that former President Mohammad Khatami and other reformist leaders were trying to topple the Supreme Leader and the regime with post-election unrest.

(The stridently pro-Government Fars News features this as their lead story.)

0730 GMT: We've had another look at the story from yesterday of behind-the-scenes meetings between Ahmadinejad representatives, pro-Government senior clerics, and MPs to ensure approval of the President's ministers. Here is the translation from the National Iranian American Council:

There have been contacts from the office of the Supreme Leader and people close to Ahmadinejad to MPs. In one case, Commander of the Armed Forces Hassan Firouzabadi called some MPs into his office.

One MP told Rouydad [newspaper]: “They have contacted Representatives and they want Representatives to approve all of the Cabinet members. Their goal is to show, through a high vote of approval of all Ministers, that their power is great and that the influence of post-election protests has been negligible.”

When asked who did the contacting, this MP said, “The contacts came from the Supreme Leader’s office and some people close to Ahmadinejad, and Maj. Gen Hassan Firouzabadi even called some Representatives into his office.”

...The decision to put pressure on MPs to approve Cabinet officials was made last week in a meeting with the presence of Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami, Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, Mehdi Taeb, Morteza Moghtadaie, and some of Ahmadinejad’s deputies and some MPs including Gholamali Haddad-Adel, Mehdi Koochakzadeh, Hamid Rasaie, Movid Hosseini-Sadr, and Kazem Mousavi, as well the heads of two pro-government newspapers.

"Contacts from the office of the Supreme Leader". Is it safe to presume that, despite the weeks of bickering between Ayatollah Khamenei and President Ahmadinejad over political and legal issues, the two will be firmly allied to ensure the Cabinet is put in place?

0555 GMT: As we noted yesterday, the internal story in Iran is likely to be pushed aside by the international media in favour of the "5+1" talks on the Iranian nuclear programme in Germany today. This coverage was assured after Iran trumpeted that it was going to be put a new proposals to the powers (the US, UK, France, China, Russia, and Germany).

A separate feature isn't needed at this point. Here's the read: the date "15 September" has been floating around as the cut-off point for US engagement with Iran. While that date has been more a creation of White House spin and media speculation rather than a policy decision, Tehran needed to do something if it wanted to release the public pressure. That need is greater because the Ahmadinejad Government --- unlike the nuke-obsessed US media --- needs to concentrate on its internal position. So the day before a major international gathering, the Iranians say, "We'll talk," but give the appearance of doing it on their terms with a supposed new package.

0545 GMT: We held off from publishing this story yesterday, as it felt --- despite its apparent publication in Fars News --- like a rumour, but it has now been repreated by several Iranian sources.

President Ahmadinejad has apparently dismissed 40 ambassadors from their posts to bring "fundamental correction in the [Foreign] Ministry". The claim is that these ambassadors supported the Green movement and dissidents abroad and will be replaced with "specialists devoted to the bases of revolution".

If true, the action is far from unprecedented: soon after his initial election in 2005, Ahmadinejad recalled Iranian ambassadors from major posts, including London and Paris. In the current context, it should be seen as part of the President's efforts to assert his control over key ministries, including the judiciary and the Ministry of Intelligence as well as Foreign Affairs.

0530 GMT: After three days of debate, the Iranian Parliament is convening this morning for its votes of confidence in President Ahmadinejad's 21 Cabinet nominees. It's still anyone's guess how many will be rejected. Estimates of up to 7 had been put about.

News from the chamber yesterday continued to be mixed for the Government. MPs accepted without reservation Ahmadinejad's selection for Minister of Defence, Ahmad Vahidi, and the nominees for Justice and Agriculture apparently escaped criticism. However, the nominee for Welfare,  Fatehmeh Ajorloo, like another proposed female Minister, Marziyeh Vahid-Dastjerdi (Health), was attacked for her lack of knowledge.