Wednesday
Sep162009
Iran: The Supreme Leader and the Larijani-Karroubi Meeting
Wednesday, September 16, 2009 at 8:23
Iran’s Chess Match: Setting Up the Pieces for Friday
The Latest from Iran (16 September): Smoke Before Battle
Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis
Maryam at Keeping the Change has posted an article on Monday's meeting between Speaker of the Parliament Ali Larijani and Mehdi Karroubi, offering important detail on the discussion. Equally significant is her reading of the power politics behind the encounter:
"The combination of these contradictory tactics may indicate that Khamanei is carefully crafting a strategy for resolving the post-election conflict that applies these different forms of pressure where appropriate. At the same time, however, Khamanei's approach could indicate that the Supreme Leader has a thin, unguided non-strategy and is simply throwing all his resources at the Opposition, in a desperate attempt to end the political standoff -- on this analysis, Khamanei's alternative use of aggression and diplomacy is less an affirmative, calculated decision and more a reaction to the failure of one or the other approach."
Maryam's reading is a vital contrast to our analysis, developed this morning, that it is President Ahmadinejad and his allies that are in the lead with the Supreme Leader scrambling to regain his own position. At the same time, her pondering of "careful strategy" v. "non-strategy" could be applied not only to Ayatollah Khamenei but to the Government's measures in the run-up to Qods Day.
More Details on Karroubi's Meeting Monday with Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani
The website Rouydad adds additional detail to the earlier piece we posted from Karroubi's news outlet, Eteemade Melli. According to this newest report, during yesterday's meeting Karroubi informed Larijani of his concerns with the work of the three-man committee investing the prisoner rape and assault claims, as well as the actions of the state news agecy "Voice & Visage." At the end of the meeting Karroubi reportedly told Larijani of his hope that "unlike his brother [Sadegh Larijani], [Ali Larijani] will not sell his religion to the world." The report goes on to claim that Larijani asked Karroubi to "keep quiet" until the domestic situation improves, promising that his allegations would be properly investigated once calm had been restored. Karroubi replied, "I would prefer death to remaining quite in the face of these violations."
Interestingly, Rouydad's account of the meeting begins with a quotation from a source inside Parliament, stating that: "On the orders of the Supreme Leader, Larijani met with Karroubi. Mr. Larijani is the bearer of the Leader's message." With this in mind, Larijani's request for restraint from Karroubi and Karroubi's purported refusal to do so take on added signficance. As we observed in our earlier post on this meeting, it appears that the Refomists' hand is not as weak as some have suggested and that attempts at conciliation have not been wholly put aside by the Supreme Leader. If anything, this development, taken together with the events of the last week, may indicate that Khamanei is taking multiple approaches to the post-election conflict. On the one hand, he appears to be using some elements of his arsenal, such as the Revolutionary Guard, to strike a confrontational approach with the Reformists, while at the same time using other allies, such as the hardline pragmatic Ali Larijani, to pursue negotiations with Opposition leaders.
The combination of these contradictory tactics may indicate that Khamanei is carefully crafting a strategy for resolving the post-election conflict that applies these different forms of pressure where appropriate. At the same time, however, Khamanei's approach could indicate that the Supreme Leader has a thin, unguided non-strategy and is simply throwing all his resources at the Opposition, in a desperate attempt to end the political standoff -- on this analysis, Khamanei's alternative use of aggression and diplomacy is less an affirmative, calculated decision and more a reaction to the failure of one or the other approach. This reading is borne out by a pattern which appears to have developed post June 12, with periods of intense confrontation followed by spurts of appeasement and vice-versa (witness the fourth Tehran trials and accusations against Reformist leaders of collusion with foreign governments, followed by Khamanei's public statements denying the possibility of any such conspiracy) .
In all likelihood, it is the second analysis that may best capture Khamanei's mindset -- Khamanei is, after all, known to be less than an astute politician, with a tendency to favor uncompromising, agressive political strategies to diplomacy. He is, as such, disinclined to pursue appeasement unless his preferred confrontational approach has failed. In this vein, the recent events surrounding Karroubi are telling. After the raid on his offices, the closure of his newspaper, and the threats of arrest against him have all failed to silence Karroubi, Khamanei may have decided that conciliation should, at least in the short term, be explored. If Karroubi remains defiant, however, we should expect to see Khamanei return to his tried and true aggressive posture.
Other than providing potential insight into Khamanei's political strategy, Karroubi's meeting with Larijani should serve as a small reminder of the in-roads made by the Reformists over the last two months and of the Government's heretofore inability to decisively snuff out the Movement's leaders. There is little doubt that the current situation inside the country, as well as the Government's response, is unique in the history of the Islamic Republic. This is hardly the Iran of 1988, when thousands of political activists were summarily executed, expelled, and otherwise removed from the Iranian political scene. Of course, the circumstances were differen then: those killed and exiled during that period were hardly Establishment darlings, but rather were, by and large, members of dissident groups ideologically opposed to the Islamic Republic; moreover, their elimination was religiously sanctioned by a fatwa issued by Ayatollah Khomeini. Perhaps more tellingly, however, the recent events in Iran also bear little ressemblance to the atmosphere that reigned during the Presidency of Mohammad Khatami, when the Reformists remained cowed and unable to unite against the conservative forces that were working to disrupt Khatami's efforts at change.
Outside of the brutal crackdown against demonstrators, the Government has not yet resorted to large scale violence, such as mass executions or targeted assassinations of Movement leaders, to resolve the crisis. At the same time, the Reformists have managed to maintain some semblance of unity (with Khatami, Karroubi, and Mousavi almost appearing to alternate in the role of "Movement Leader"). Moreover, the Opposition has adapted its tactics in order to maintain pressure on the Government, focusing its message less directly on the election issue and more on the events and incidents that occurred in the aftermath of the dispute, such as the show trials and allegations of prisoner rape and abuse. While these may seem like modest accomplishments, the country's history of political repression and opposition to reform over the last 30 years make them the signposts of a society in transition.
As always, trying to predict where this conflict is headed is futile. What we can conclude, however, is that the Establishment has yet to achieve a decisive victory and that this failure, in and of itself, may tell us more about the future of Iran than any one arrest, office closure, or high-ranking political meeting ever will.
The Latest from Iran (16 September): Smoke Before Battle
Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis
Maryam at Keeping the Change has posted an article on Monday's meeting between Speaker of the Parliament Ali Larijani and Mehdi Karroubi, offering important detail on the discussion. Equally significant is her reading of the power politics behind the encounter: "The combination of these contradictory tactics may indicate that Khamanei is carefully crafting a strategy for resolving the post-election conflict that applies these different forms of pressure where appropriate. At the same time, however, Khamanei's approach could indicate that the Supreme Leader has a thin, unguided non-strategy and is simply throwing all his resources at the Opposition, in a desperate attempt to end the political standoff -- on this analysis, Khamanei's alternative use of aggression and diplomacy is less an affirmative, calculated decision and more a reaction to the failure of one or the other approach."
Maryam's reading is a vital contrast to our analysis, developed this morning, that it is President Ahmadinejad and his allies that are in the lead with the Supreme Leader scrambling to regain his own position. At the same time, her pondering of "careful strategy" v. "non-strategy" could be applied not only to Ayatollah Khamenei but to the Government's measures in the run-up to Qods Day.
More Details on Karroubi's Meeting Monday with Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani
The website Rouydad adds additional detail to the earlier piece we posted from Karroubi's news outlet, Eteemade Melli. According to this newest report, during yesterday's meeting Karroubi informed Larijani of his concerns with the work of the three-man committee investing the prisoner rape and assault claims, as well as the actions of the state news agecy "Voice & Visage." At the end of the meeting Karroubi reportedly told Larijani of his hope that "unlike his brother [Sadegh Larijani], [Ali Larijani] will not sell his religion to the world." The report goes on to claim that Larijani asked Karroubi to "keep quiet" until the domestic situation improves, promising that his allegations would be properly investigated once calm had been restored. Karroubi replied, "I would prefer death to remaining quite in the face of these violations."
Interestingly, Rouydad's account of the meeting begins with a quotation from a source inside Parliament, stating that: "On the orders of the Supreme Leader, Larijani met with Karroubi. Mr. Larijani is the bearer of the Leader's message." With this in mind, Larijani's request for restraint from Karroubi and Karroubi's purported refusal to do so take on added signficance. As we observed in our earlier post on this meeting, it appears that the Refomists' hand is not as weak as some have suggested and that attempts at conciliation have not been wholly put aside by the Supreme Leader. If anything, this development, taken together with the events of the last week, may indicate that Khamanei is taking multiple approaches to the post-election conflict. On the one hand, he appears to be using some elements of his arsenal, such as the Revolutionary Guard, to strike a confrontational approach with the Reformists, while at the same time using other allies, such as the hardline pragmatic Ali Larijani, to pursue negotiations with Opposition leaders.
The combination of these contradictory tactics may indicate that Khamanei is carefully crafting a strategy for resolving the post-election conflict that applies these different forms of pressure where appropriate. At the same time, however, Khamanei's approach could indicate that the Supreme Leader has a thin, unguided non-strategy and is simply throwing all his resources at the Opposition, in a desperate attempt to end the political standoff -- on this analysis, Khamanei's alternative use of aggression and diplomacy is less an affirmative, calculated decision and more a reaction to the failure of one or the other approach. This reading is borne out by a pattern which appears to have developed post June 12, with periods of intense confrontation followed by spurts of appeasement and vice-versa (witness the fourth Tehran trials and accusations against Reformist leaders of collusion with foreign governments, followed by Khamanei's public statements denying the possibility of any such conspiracy) .
In all likelihood, it is the second analysis that may best capture Khamanei's mindset -- Khamanei is, after all, known to be less than an astute politician, with a tendency to favor uncompromising, agressive political strategies to diplomacy. He is, as such, disinclined to pursue appeasement unless his preferred confrontational approach has failed. In this vein, the recent events surrounding Karroubi are telling. After the raid on his offices, the closure of his newspaper, and the threats of arrest against him have all failed to silence Karroubi, Khamanei may have decided that conciliation should, at least in the short term, be explored. If Karroubi remains defiant, however, we should expect to see Khamanei return to his tried and true aggressive posture.
Other than providing potential insight into Khamanei's political strategy, Karroubi's meeting with Larijani should serve as a small reminder of the in-roads made by the Reformists over the last two months and of the Government's heretofore inability to decisively snuff out the Movement's leaders. There is little doubt that the current situation inside the country, as well as the Government's response, is unique in the history of the Islamic Republic. This is hardly the Iran of 1988, when thousands of political activists were summarily executed, expelled, and otherwise removed from the Iranian political scene. Of course, the circumstances were differen then: those killed and exiled during that period were hardly Establishment darlings, but rather were, by and large, members of dissident groups ideologically opposed to the Islamic Republic; moreover, their elimination was religiously sanctioned by a fatwa issued by Ayatollah Khomeini. Perhaps more tellingly, however, the recent events in Iran also bear little ressemblance to the atmosphere that reigned during the Presidency of Mohammad Khatami, when the Reformists remained cowed and unable to unite against the conservative forces that were working to disrupt Khatami's efforts at change.
Outside of the brutal crackdown against demonstrators, the Government has not yet resorted to large scale violence, such as mass executions or targeted assassinations of Movement leaders, to resolve the crisis. At the same time, the Reformists have managed to maintain some semblance of unity (with Khatami, Karroubi, and Mousavi almost appearing to alternate in the role of "Movement Leader"). Moreover, the Opposition has adapted its tactics in order to maintain pressure on the Government, focusing its message less directly on the election issue and more on the events and incidents that occurred in the aftermath of the dispute, such as the show trials and allegations of prisoner rape and abuse. While these may seem like modest accomplishments, the country's history of political repression and opposition to reform over the last 30 years make them the signposts of a society in transition.
As always, trying to predict where this conflict is headed is futile. What we can conclude, however, is that the Establishment has yet to achieve a decisive victory and that this failure, in and of itself, may tell us more about the future of Iran than any one arrest, office closure, or high-ranking political meeting ever will.