Friday
Sep042009
Iran: OK, The Cabinet's In, Has Ahmadinejad "Won"?
Friday, September 4, 2009 at 10:19
The Latest from Iran (4 September): A Friday Pause?
The Latest from Iran (3 September): Ahmadinejad Gets His Cabinet
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Today, on Iran's "weekend", should be a political catch-your-breath day after the culmination of Parliament's approval of 18 of 21 proposed Ministers for the Ahmadinejad Cabinet. News slowed to a standstill last night, and there is almost nothing of significance this morning. There are Friday prayers in Tehran, but no sign that they will produce the headline statements of the last three months, from the Supreme Leader's 19 June drawing of the post-election line to Hashemi Rafsanjani's 14 July intervention to President Ahmadinejad's hard-line anti-opposition pitch last week.
The President's immediate victory, with one unexpected minor setback (the loss of his proposed Minister of Energy), does not mean that the battle is over. Far from it. However, to appreciate the tensions, contests, and manoeuvres, you have to read far beyond "mainstream" coverage, especially outside Iran.
Most of the Western press have pretty much lost the plot. That's why, to our obvious frustration, almost all (with the notable exception of The New York Times) offered simple and misleading reviews of the final Parliament act yesterday. For some, the vote was the signal to move the focus to Iran's nuclear programme. For some, it was the quick grab headline of the Islamic Republic's first woman minister or Mr Most Wanted (Ahmad Vahidi, for a 1994 bombing in Argentina) becoming the Minister of Defense. For others, it was a "white flag" moment for the opposition, as Iran's "hardliners" had united behind the President. Game over.
Wrong. To be honest, I found yesterday's discussion by readers on our updates far more fascinating and useful than the press summaries. (Thanks, by the way, to all who have contributed.) Have a look, because it is here that the next steps of Hashemi Rafsanjani --- who dropped out of the non-Iranian narrative of events --- are considered. It is here that the important matter of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps, and its relationship with the President and the Supreme Leader, is in play.
And it is here that attention is paid to those conservative and principlist elements who continue to dislike and even move against Ahmadinejad, even if they did not make their stand yesterday. What now for the Larijanis --- Ali still as Speaker of the Parliament, Sadegh as head of judiciary --- and their allies? What now for high-profile MPs like Ali Motahari and Ahmad Tavakoli, who have bitterly challenged the President and his inner circle since mid-July? What now for those who saw the in-fighting at Ministries like Intelligence as an attempt by Ahmadinejad (and the IRGC) to expand their control and who didn't take too kindly to it?
(And, lest we forget, our question from last week is not resolved, despite Ayatollah Khamenei's open intervention to assist with confirmation of the Cabinet, "What now for the Supreme Leader?")
For us, the post-election crisis has never been a matter of a single, dramatic showdown between the regime and its opponents but a series of waves, inside and outside the Government. There was the immediate wave of mass demonstrations (which were renewed at points throughout July), the wave of resistance to Ahmadinejad's inauguration, the wave of response to the detentions and trials, fed both by Mehdi Karroubi's initiatives and by conservative/principlist disquiet, and the wave that led up to yesterday's vote.
Clearly, the wave of resistance to an Ahmadinejad Cabinet is now dissipated. Indeed, I think it is now fair to drop the label "post-election crisis". Despite all those who will never believe that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad won the 12 June vote, he has now gone through all the bureaucratic motions of re-assuming office. However, there is still a "legitimacy crisis". Just because you're President doesn't mean that folks accept your authority.
In part, that "legitimacy crisis" may not be as prominent because the Green wave is in a bit of a lull. Ramadan plays its part here, as well as battle fatigue and the disruption of the opposition's organisation. The leadership of Mir Hossein Mousavi in particular is now primarily on Facebook pages, given the shutdown of his websites, the detentions of some of his top advisors, and restrictions on his movements.
But, whether as an outcome of these difficulties or as a measured strategy, the Green movement has now set out its next resurgence. On 18 September, Qods (Jerusalem) Day, the plan is to assemble as Hashemi Rafsanjani speaks at Friday prayers in Tehran.
OK, but that's two weeks away, and there's no guarantee that the movement will produce a mass show of resistance (or even that Rafsanjani, given his withdrawal from prayers in mid-August, will appear), right? Of course, but that scepticism in turn discounts that tensions continue within the regime.
At the risk of repeating our "Iranians love chess" cliche too often, one strong move does not mean checkmate. And the President and his allies still have a glaring weakness in their defences. Look at the list of waves above. The one that has always been crashing ashore since mid-July has been the criticism of the post-election crackdown through detentions, beatings and abuses, confessions, and trials. And that wave was not put out to sea with the Parliament vote.
It is possible that Ahmadinejad has come through the worst of this. There was a signal this week that the post-election criticism of Mohsen Rezaei, despite the death of his campaign advisor's son in detention, may be muted by putting Rezaei at the head of State broadcasting. The Supreme Leader may be satisfied that he made his point when he "closed" Kahrizak prison. Sadegh Larijani may be content to take his place at judiciary and not challenge the continuing trials; alternatively, Ahmadinejad and the IRGC may accept that they should now curb the crackdown and let proceedings take a lower profile, with releases of some prisoners and "moderate" sentences for others. Ayatollah Khamenei may even announce an end-of-Ramadan "amnesty" for iconic detainees such as Saeed Hajjarian and Mohammad Ali Abtahi.
But, as of now, we don't know. And there's a twist in the tale.
Actually, it's not a twist. It's a storyline that has been here all the time. As EA's Chris Emery and our sharp-eyed/sharp-minded readers have noted, post-election events have added to the strains on the Iranian economy. The post-election crisis brought Government to a standstill and exposed problems in Iran's infrastructure. Of course, Ahmadinejad and his new Cabinet may try to stabilise or even jump-start the economy, but the President's record in this area hasn't been too good.
And that is where "post-election crisis" turns into "legitimacy crisis". It's one thing for an activist to get angry over a stolen vote; another for a "non-activist" to get angry because transport doesn't work, food is more expensive, housing isn't assured, and the lights go out.
If that is the case, if there is a wave of resentment over the economy that happens to arise at the same time as the ongoing waves over the political authority of the President and his allies (and I write that in full cognizance of the opinion of EA colleagues and some of our readers that the Revolutionary Guard has shown its muscle in recent weeks).....
Welcome back to the storm.
The Latest from Iran (3 September): Ahmadinejad Gets His Cabinet
Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis
Today, on Iran's "weekend", should be a political catch-your-breath day after the culmination of Parliament's approval of 18 of 21 proposed Ministers for the Ahmadinejad Cabinet. News slowed to a standstill last night, and there is almost nothing of significance this morning. There are Friday prayers in Tehran, but no sign that they will produce the headline statements of the last three months, from the Supreme Leader's 19 June drawing of the post-election line to Hashemi Rafsanjani's 14 July intervention to President Ahmadinejad's hard-line anti-opposition pitch last week.The President's immediate victory, with one unexpected minor setback (the loss of his proposed Minister of Energy), does not mean that the battle is over. Far from it. However, to appreciate the tensions, contests, and manoeuvres, you have to read far beyond "mainstream" coverage, especially outside Iran.
Most of the Western press have pretty much lost the plot. That's why, to our obvious frustration, almost all (with the notable exception of The New York Times) offered simple and misleading reviews of the final Parliament act yesterday. For some, the vote was the signal to move the focus to Iran's nuclear programme. For some, it was the quick grab headline of the Islamic Republic's first woman minister or Mr Most Wanted (Ahmad Vahidi, for a 1994 bombing in Argentina) becoming the Minister of Defense. For others, it was a "white flag" moment for the opposition, as Iran's "hardliners" had united behind the President. Game over.
Wrong. To be honest, I found yesterday's discussion by readers on our updates far more fascinating and useful than the press summaries. (Thanks, by the way, to all who have contributed.) Have a look, because it is here that the next steps of Hashemi Rafsanjani --- who dropped out of the non-Iranian narrative of events --- are considered. It is here that the important matter of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps, and its relationship with the President and the Supreme Leader, is in play.
And it is here that attention is paid to those conservative and principlist elements who continue to dislike and even move against Ahmadinejad, even if they did not make their stand yesterday. What now for the Larijanis --- Ali still as Speaker of the Parliament, Sadegh as head of judiciary --- and their allies? What now for high-profile MPs like Ali Motahari and Ahmad Tavakoli, who have bitterly challenged the President and his inner circle since mid-July? What now for those who saw the in-fighting at Ministries like Intelligence as an attempt by Ahmadinejad (and the IRGC) to expand their control and who didn't take too kindly to it?
(And, lest we forget, our question from last week is not resolved, despite Ayatollah Khamenei's open intervention to assist with confirmation of the Cabinet, "What now for the Supreme Leader?")
For us, the post-election crisis has never been a matter of a single, dramatic showdown between the regime and its opponents but a series of waves, inside and outside the Government. There was the immediate wave of mass demonstrations (which were renewed at points throughout July), the wave of resistance to Ahmadinejad's inauguration, the wave of response to the detentions and trials, fed both by Mehdi Karroubi's initiatives and by conservative/principlist disquiet, and the wave that led up to yesterday's vote.
Clearly, the wave of resistance to an Ahmadinejad Cabinet is now dissipated. Indeed, I think it is now fair to drop the label "post-election crisis". Despite all those who will never believe that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad won the 12 June vote, he has now gone through all the bureaucratic motions of re-assuming office. However, there is still a "legitimacy crisis". Just because you're President doesn't mean that folks accept your authority.
In part, that "legitimacy crisis" may not be as prominent because the Green wave is in a bit of a lull. Ramadan plays its part here, as well as battle fatigue and the disruption of the opposition's organisation. The leadership of Mir Hossein Mousavi in particular is now primarily on Facebook pages, given the shutdown of his websites, the detentions of some of his top advisors, and restrictions on his movements.
But, whether as an outcome of these difficulties or as a measured strategy, the Green movement has now set out its next resurgence. On 18 September, Qods (Jerusalem) Day, the plan is to assemble as Hashemi Rafsanjani speaks at Friday prayers in Tehran.
OK, but that's two weeks away, and there's no guarantee that the movement will produce a mass show of resistance (or even that Rafsanjani, given his withdrawal from prayers in mid-August, will appear), right? Of course, but that scepticism in turn discounts that tensions continue within the regime.
At the risk of repeating our "Iranians love chess" cliche too often, one strong move does not mean checkmate. And the President and his allies still have a glaring weakness in their defences. Look at the list of waves above. The one that has always been crashing ashore since mid-July has been the criticism of the post-election crackdown through detentions, beatings and abuses, confessions, and trials. And that wave was not put out to sea with the Parliament vote.
It is possible that Ahmadinejad has come through the worst of this. There was a signal this week that the post-election criticism of Mohsen Rezaei, despite the death of his campaign advisor's son in detention, may be muted by putting Rezaei at the head of State broadcasting. The Supreme Leader may be satisfied that he made his point when he "closed" Kahrizak prison. Sadegh Larijani may be content to take his place at judiciary and not challenge the continuing trials; alternatively, Ahmadinejad and the IRGC may accept that they should now curb the crackdown and let proceedings take a lower profile, with releases of some prisoners and "moderate" sentences for others. Ayatollah Khamenei may even announce an end-of-Ramadan "amnesty" for iconic detainees such as Saeed Hajjarian and Mohammad Ali Abtahi.
But, as of now, we don't know. And there's a twist in the tale.
Actually, it's not a twist. It's a storyline that has been here all the time. As EA's Chris Emery and our sharp-eyed/sharp-minded readers have noted, post-election events have added to the strains on the Iranian economy. The post-election crisis brought Government to a standstill and exposed problems in Iran's infrastructure. Of course, Ahmadinejad and his new Cabinet may try to stabilise or even jump-start the economy, but the President's record in this area hasn't been too good.
And that is where "post-election crisis" turns into "legitimacy crisis". It's one thing for an activist to get angry over a stolen vote; another for a "non-activist" to get angry because transport doesn't work, food is more expensive, housing isn't assured, and the lights go out.
If that is the case, if there is a wave of resentment over the economy that happens to arise at the same time as the ongoing waves over the political authority of the President and his allies (and I write that in full cognizance of the opinion of EA colleagues and some of our readers that the Revolutionary Guard has shown its muscle in recent weeks).....
Welcome back to the storm.
tagged Ahmad Tavakoli, Ahmad Vahidi, Ali Larijani, Ali Motahari, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Hashemi Rafsanjani, Iran, Iran Elections 2009, Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, Islamic Revolution Guard Corps, Kahrizak Prison, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Mehdi Karroubi, Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mohammad Ali Abtahi, Mohammad Sadegh Larijani, Mohsen Rezaei, Saeed Hajjarian in Middle East & Iran
Ahmad Tavakoli, Ahmad Vahidi, Ali Larijani, Ali Motahari, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Hashemi Rafsanjani, Iran, Iran Elections 2009, Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, Islamic Revolution Guard Corps, Kahrizak Prison, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Mehdi Karroubi, Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mohammad Ali Abtahi, Mohammad Sadegh Larijani, Mohsen Rezaei, Saeed Hajjarian in Middle East & Iran
Reader Comments (19)
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Lookig at the situation all the battles fought on diffrent fronts and their outcome the best title for any paper or news channel should have been;
"A.N, The Guards and their Pyrrhic victory"
A Pyrrhic victory is a refrence to the battle won by King Pyrus of Epirus over the Romans at Asculum in 279 BC. Noting the heavy losses his own side had taken, he is reported to have said: "One more such victory and I am lost." In other words it is victory so costly that it is near equivalent to a loss.
This is even more fitting when looking at the position of the S.L. The Guards and the S.L in their united assaults have so far won in almost each front. At the same time fighting small yet very symbolic battles amongst each other. The score is tied there with A.N looking the better and fitter of the two. But at what price?
On wednesday we talked about each of the fronts these battles have taken and concluded that the Guards are almost winning on all fronts. Yesterday we looked at the possible replies from the Greens and Hashemi and if they could have any major effect. Again we saw that the choices are limited., most probable scenario would be more open defiances, repeated dis-aknowledgement of the goverment, more public unrest, more and harsher condemnation by the clergy and possibly the use of a very difficult yet effective tool: Strikes. These are all the short term scenarios and I have no doubt that the Guards and S.L can handle these attacks for now. And allthough it would be intresting to work out the possible scenarios and the Guards/ SL response I like to focuss on something else for now, namely what I started with. Namely the Pyrrhic victory. So again yes the S.L and the Guards have won this battle but at what price? Lets look at the S.L position first;
S.L
1 - His son (and maybe even himself now) is PE number 1 - Chanting their slogans no one said death to A.N, they ridiculed him at best but no death wishes. They compared him to a monkey asked him top open a grocery store etc etc. (Ahmadi Haya kon Sabzi forooshi wa kon) but with Mojtaba and even the S.L him self it was clear and open... DEATH TO... Marg Bar Khamenei they said at times and Mojtaba may you die and never be leader (Mojtaba Bemiri, Rahbari ro nabini)
2 - He has lost his undisputed and devine powers
Both Reforminst as well as A.N have openly defied his orders.
3 - His clerical qualifications have been questioned more openly. He is a mere Hojjatol eslam and not a Ayatollah let alone a Marja.. Many Marja's have attacked him on that. (Example Montazeri)
4 - He has lost even more power to A.N (Intelligens ministeries, Cabinet)
5 - He has seen his most loyal soldiers openly flirt with the enemy (Example: Larrijani's)
6 - He has lost his arbitration position. He is no longer the leader of all Iranians but has shown in an orwelian way that indeed all Iranians are Equal but some Iranians are more Equal then others. Now politicians, the people as well as the Clergy look to HASHEMI for Justice rather then the S.L.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
So what about the Guards and A.N then ?
1 - He has new enemies, The conservatives/ S.L
2 - He has seen the power of his enemies increase same as the S.L allowed the guards to grow as a response to Reformists and the west he has done the same against the guards now (Larrijani's)
3 - Public opnion, He has lost big there both in Iran as well outside Iran. Even some of the die hard A.N fans have turned against him
4 - A very split country that shows with all levels of goverment, making it very difficult if not impossible to govern (Leaks from Ministeries, etc)
5 - A Goverment without creditability (un-accepted with in Iran and many parts of the world)
6 - Strikes Looming around the corner
7 - Possible attackes from the Judicary
8 - Financial Burden (This coup is costing the Guards a great deal of money, how long can they keep this up)
9 - World opinion leading to Financial damaged to the country as well political pressure
10 - This is the most important one and I have said this before;
One can lead a country if loved, one can even lead a country is feard but one can NEVER lead if truely HATED.....
Have A.N and the Guards won ?? yes thay have, a Pyrrhic victory indeed.
But the question now is, Will they have another such battle ??
A fundamental fact that's glossed over is that Khamenei is known to be ill and the Ahmadinejad/IRGC faction want to pre-empt the succession war by gaining complete control before that event. For that they must finish-off Rafsanjani forcing the latter to fight for his and his family's survival. If a cornered cat is dangerous, just imagine a cornered "shark"...
There will be many more rounds before the game is over.
@ Hamid
Fully agree with the analyses hamid, but I think what is really intresting is to look at the weapons Hashemi (and allies) have in their arsenal and anticipate which one he is going to use and in what way.
A.N has again made his move (the S.L chickend out and expectedly so could not call A.N bluff, he made his move by advising to approve the full cabinet) so it is now the Green movement and Hashemi's turn to move..
I agree fully that it is all but over yet what are the possible next moves, is what interests me...
@ Afshin
Agree with you on this "Pyrrhic Victory" analysis. I had also written in the past arguing the foolishness of the game the SL played cause his victory would be hollow once complete, due to the high price paid by him and Pasdaran / AN in obtaining it. You have laid it out factually and accurately here. A far better and more eloquent presentation of the same thought. It is however so canny how two independent interpretations of the facts lead to such identical conclusions....
As to your last point with respect to the next play, I too have to say this is extremely interesting at this moment. We all are watching the play, and want to anticipate the next move. What will it be? Mousavi wants to play the street protest card with Rafsanjani again on Ghods day. Karoubi is looking to lead a populist legal charge with the rape cases. Although his victims are becoming like Houdini the magician. Khatami has been relatively weak in not having clawed for himself any position......
Clearly the next move is Rafsanjani's to make. You laid out his cards, yesterday, and unless the unexpected happens, we will see one or a combination of those cards played... But then again this play would be boring if it was that simple. Being Iran, the unexpected has to be expected. 30 years of revolution has thought us that. I call this the Joker card, the unexpected happening that we all say, I did not see that coming. Although not in the next 3 to 4 weeks, but certainly in the next 4 to 12 months, we should see at least 2 or 3 jokers thrown down.....
whereismyvote
I want to apologize for sounding heavy-handed yesterday about US interference in Iran. I thought you were saying that you thought we should do more & my brains went off-- do what? What could we do that wouldn't make everything ten thousand times worse? I reread today & realized that we are on the same wavelength. Sorry if I was over-the top :)
@Amy
No appology needed. We are all welcome to our opinion and passion. It is what makes the discussion lively and good. Else it would be boaring at best....
But all the same, Thank you very much and much appreicated.
One more important point: The regime cannot stop. The Supreme Leader and Ahmadinejad have committed themselves to consolidate power. For example, in the long term, the next Parliamentary elections will have to be as boldly rigged as the last Presidential elections. In short term, the Supreme Leader will have to silence Karroubi and neutralize Rafsanjani. The regime's actions will create more anger and instability, and the regime will have to consolidate power further in response.
@Bendix
Ehh, I'm not sure they'll have to. My guess is ridiculously low turnout (why the h=ll bother?), thus giving the hardliners a "win."
Of course, if they want a turnout, they may have to put guns to people's heads...
Oh But dear Bendix,
If all goes according to plan Is there still a S.L and will there be a candidate to run against Pasdaran @ next election ?
In the US, we have a saying: "Pick your battles"
There are tactical wins and there are strategic wins. Toward the end of the cabinet debates, the regime pulled out the big guns & made it clear that a win by this route would prove costly. And what would be gained by rejecting nominees? AN would not be unseated. He would pick new nominees who would be no more qualified and no less loyal than the first set. Parliament gave AN the Pyrrhic Victory instead of taking it for themselves.
"Pick your battles"
How do you think strikes might play out? (Cards #1 and #8 from yesterday)
Strikes could originate as a new stage of the Green Movement, but it the economy comes undone, everybody would be hit & the response would be more broadly based.
There are several kinds of strikes
- Picket lines & marches
- Sick-outs... everybody calls in sick every day-- a short-lived tactic (1 week or less)
- Slow-downs... everybody takes sooooo long to finish any project
I'm sure there are other ways of doing it too. The classic picket-line strike seems unlikely bec it would meet the same response as the protest marches. The Sick-out is too short to be effective in this case. It seems like the slow-down would be the way to go.
It would have to be coordinated to be effective & in order to have the protection of the group. Everybody would be hurt by it. It would be hard bec people have to eat & to feed their families...
- Is it likely to happen if the economy holds up, ie, without the added stress of a bad econ?
- Might it be used with the intent to cripple or bring the economy down?
It seems like an effective tool re Pasdaran bec of their role in the economy, where other tactics are more indirect
Sorry for the incoherent post-- just throwing out some thoughts bec I'm interested in your comments
For strikes to be effective there is a few things needed.
1) Mass support, with schools closing, refinary closing, flights canceled etc.
2) Symbolic support with the Bazar closing and other such symbolic places
3) Ultimately government workers staying away, banks closing and the like.
It takes time and momentum to organize and I fear Mousavi and the green camp have been crippled enough that they can not make such event truely happen.
I think some limited form of strike will be attempted with street protests, but I feel too much momentum has been lost since the 40th of Neda for the whole thing to gain too much momentum. These things need to play out and it is now a little cold. We will have to wait and see
What would such a strike look like? You are describing something different from any of the options I mentioned. My experience with strikes is limited to reading about labor strikes here, so I was thinking about, for example, slow-down strikes in several key industries lasting several months. What you said sounds like a national strike where everybody stays home, or maybe takes to the street. Are you talking about a prolonged work stoppage or would it be something like once a week? Just wondering...
@ Amy
Your third option is no good. It has to be option 1 to be effective.
to carry on where "whereismyvote" left off, things are cold right now, and in order to do that people need to be HOT... they need to have trust that they are not going to be the minority participating. to gain this trust first some other cards need to be played;
1) New and huge street protests again
2) Better, more clear and direct leadership
3) More high profile people getting involved
4) Possibly more support from Judicary
5) Better media Coverage
Basically these are more or less all the cards we discussed yesterday. As "whereismyvote" allready stated things are cold right now.. Last time there was not enough time to organise the strike succesfully, if they want to have another go they need to replay all their other cards again, starting with huge street protests again.
Afshin
What if the economy tanks? It's an incentive that crosses all political boundaries, creating a new line: the "haves" and the "have nots". People who wouldn't otherwise take a chance may come out when jobs are disappearing.
Not really... Otherwise Zimbabwe was freed loooooooooooooooong ago..
Dont want to downgrade this to nothing but that is a loooong process and time is no ones friend in Iran right now.. This battle needs to end before the S.L dies...
(edit) I didn't see the 2nd part of your comment till after posting this one, so I'll leave what I wrote below, but I get your point. Even though it's not an immediate issue, how stable is the economy in your opinion? I've seen many different accounts
~~~
It's not the poverty. People in Zimbabwe somehow found a way to live within the means available there. I'm not saying it's OK-- just saying the issue is different. Here in the US, people get unemployment payments when laid off (made redundant). It's a certain percentage of what the person was earning, so it's not enough to pay the bills. Most people buy a house, car, etc, based on their wages. If the job disappears, unemployment doesn't pay enough to make house payments, car, etc. It's not Zimbabwe, but it's left a lot of people homeless here.
Does anyone know what chance we poor Iranians have of ever getting an iranian Republic (instead of Islamic Republic). Dont get me wrong I am a Muslim but I really have come to the conclusion that it is best to separate religeon from politics for Humanitarian reasons, and for progression of our dear country from the Middle Ages. What needs to be done to get there and is there the remotest chance with armed basij and wealthy Mullahs in the way?