Iran's Chess Match: Setting Up the Pieces for Friday

The Latest from Iran (16 September): Smoke Before Battle
Iran: The Supreme Leader and the Larijani-Karroubi Meeting
Iran Analysis: Checking the Scorecard of Opposition
The Latest from Iran (15 September): Momentum Builds

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It was a quieter day on Tuesday, but make no mistake, there were some significant moves. And in those moves were the indications of both possibilities and problems for the opposition and for the Government.

For the Green movement, yesterday brought alignment of the pieces. Mehdi Karroubi, to say the least, is already in play; the question now, after all the Government threats against him, is how high a profile he takes on Friday. Tuesday morning brought the entry of Mir Hossein Mousavi with the announcement that he would participate in the Qods Day demonstration and encourage followers to do so; Mohammad Khatami repeated the process in the afternoon.

Expect the "followers" today to make their declarations, with political activists and possibly some clerical groups issuing statements that Qods Day will be their day. The obvious challenge is to turn declaration into mass practice. Communications within Iran are still difficult, and the threat of arrests and violence is strong. How many turn out on the street in the next 48 hours?

The most striking story on Tuesday, however, came on the Government side. The regime was preparing to shut out Hashemi Rafsanjani from Qods Day prayers so President Ahmadinejad could introduce his hard-line supporter, Ahmad Khatami, and signal that Enough is Enough and This Game is Over; however, its powerful move turned into farce. Pro-Government outlets such as Fars News, seeking a dramatic proclamation, leaked the news, and the regime spent the rest of the day issuing denials, clarifications, and wait-and-sees amidst the confusion.

This morning we still don't know who will take the podium on Wednesday. Fars now makes no reference to Friday prayers, and the Islamic Republic News Agency prefers "Green Wave disturbance in the scramble for Qods rallies". I still think Ahmadinejad-Khatami is the plan for Friday, but the Government has converted an opportunity into a fumble and stumble.

This is not an indication that the the President is trouble. Paradoxically, the bungling comes from a position of power. Ahmadinejad and his allies can issue declarations, send out security forces for raids and arrests, and count on almost all of the state media to put out supporting "news".

At the same time, this is a large bureaucracy, so signs of clever co-ordination may actually be officials working off different scripts. For example, is the near-simultaneous release of some high-ranking opposition activists (for example, Mousavi campaign manager Javad Emam yesterday) and the arrest of others (Karroubi advisor Fayez Ahzad) the ultimate in carrot-and-stick or is it a confusion over whether to offer limited concession or bring down the fist?

This is a bureaucracy which is supposed to be governing --- running an economy, providing services, pursuing a foreign policy. For all the headlines that the third task is being pursued, with the dance around talks with Western powers and Ahmadinejad's forthcoming appearance at the UN, the other two areas aren't exactly inspiring confidence.

This is a bureaucracy which is not yet secure "within". After the apparent victory quelling conservative and principlist concerns, symbolised by the approval of the Ahmadinejad Cabinet, the last 48 hours have brought the first signs that leading MPs may be ready to poke the President in the eye once again. The symbolic issue is currently the nomination of the First Vice President, Mohammad Reza Rahimi: how much of a groundswell against him is signalled by the accusations of high-profile conservatives like Morteza Motahhari and Ahmad Tavakoli (who is close to the Larijanis)?

I'm not even sure this is a bureaucracy which has a comfortable alignment of power between the Supreme Leader and the President. Weeks of shifting relations between the two were supposed to culminate in last Friday's prayers, where Ayatollah Khamenei would put to rest the notion that the opposition could prevail against his Government. Instead, the "other" moves of the week --- the raids and arrests, the threats against opposition leaders --- brought the question: is the Supreme Leader now a follower of Ahmadinejad and the Revolutionary Guard? And yesterday just adds a punctuation mark. Who exactly is deciding what takes place on Friday?

And oh, yes, one other question as the timer for this chess match is started. While the opposition tries to line up for Friday and the Government looks to convert its immediate advantages of more powerful forces into checkmate, what happens to the piece that was supposed to be taken off the board on Tuesday?

Enduring America readers have shrewdly recognised and alerted others that Hashemi Rafsanjani is not the opposition movement. At the same time, he has been a catalyst --- symbolic and political --- for those trying to put pressure on the regime.

Mousavi, Karroubi, Khatami, thousands (how many thousands?) are ready to make moves on Friday. But does the former President suddenly jump onto the board --- and if so, are his own moves coordinated with those of the other pieces? --- or does he stand aside, possibly waiting for the Assembly of Experts meeting next Tuesday?

Qods Day is two days away.

Iran: OK, The Cabinet's In, Has Ahmadinejad "Won"?

The Latest from Iran (4 September): A Friday Pause?
The Latest from Iran (3 September): Ahmadinejad Gets His Cabinet

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Today, on Iran's "weekend", should be a political catch-your-breath day after the culmination of Parliament's approval of 18 of 21 proposed Ministers for the Ahmadinejad Cabinet. News slowed to a standstill last night, and there is almost nothing of significance this morning. There are Friday prayers in Tehran, but no sign that they will produce the headline statements of the last three months, from the Supreme Leader's 19 June drawing of the post-election line to Hashemi Rafsanjani's 14 July intervention to President Ahmadinejad's hard-line anti-opposition pitch last week.

The President's immediate victory, with one unexpected minor setback (the loss of his proposed Minister of Energy), does not mean that the battle is over. Far from it. However, to appreciate the tensions, contests, and manoeuvres, you have to read far beyond "mainstream" coverage, especially outside Iran.

Most of the Western press have pretty much lost the plot. That's why, to our obvious frustration, almost all (with the notable exception of The New York Times) offered simple and misleading reviews of the final Parliament act yesterday. For some, the vote was the signal to move the focus to Iran's nuclear programme. For some, it was the quick grab headline of the Islamic Republic's first woman minister or Mr Most Wanted (Ahmad Vahidi, for a 1994 bombing in Argentina) becoming the Minister of Defense. For others, it was a "white flag" moment for the opposition, as Iran's "hardliners" had united behind the President. Game over.

Wrong. To be honest, I found yesterday's discussion by readers on our updates far more fascinating and useful than the press summaries. (Thanks, by the way, to all who have contributed.) Have a look, because it is here that the next steps of Hashemi Rafsanjani --- who dropped out of the non-Iranian narrative of events --- are considered. It is here that the important matter of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps, and its relationship with the President and the Supreme Leader, is in play.

And it is here that attention is paid to those conservative and principlist elements who continue to dislike and even move against Ahmadinejad, even if they did not make their stand yesterday. What now for the Larijanis --- Ali still as Speaker of the Parliament, Sadegh as head of judiciary --- and their allies? What now for high-profile MPs like Ali Motahari and Ahmad Tavakoli, who have bitterly challenged the President and his inner circle since mid-July? What now for those who saw the in-fighting at Ministries like Intelligence as an attempt by Ahmadinejad (and the IRGC) to expand their control and who didn't take too kindly to it?

(And, lest we forget, our question from last week is not resolved, despite Ayatollah Khamenei's open intervention to assist with confirmation of the Cabinet, "What now for the Supreme Leader?")

For us, the post-election crisis has never been a matter of a single, dramatic showdown between the regime and its opponents but a series of waves, inside and outside the Government. There was the immediate wave of mass demonstrations (which were renewed at points throughout July), the wave of resistance to Ahmadinejad's inauguration, the wave of response to the detentions and trials, fed both by Mehdi Karroubi's initiatives and by conservative/principlist disquiet, and the wave that led up to yesterday's vote.

Clearly, the wave of resistance to an Ahmadinejad Cabinet is now dissipated. Indeed, I think it is now fair to drop the label "post-election crisis". Despite all those who will never believe that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad won the 12 June vote, he has now gone through all the bureaucratic motions of re-assuming office. However, there is still a "legitimacy crisis". Just because you're President doesn't mean that folks accept your authority.

In part, that "legitimacy crisis" may not be as prominent because the Green wave is in a bit of a lull. Ramadan plays its part here, as well as battle fatigue and the disruption of the opposition's organisation. The leadership of Mir Hossein Mousavi in particular is now primarily on Facebook pages, given the shutdown of his websites, the detentions of some of his top advisors, and restrictions on his movements.

But, whether as an outcome of these difficulties or as a measured strategy, the Green movement has now set out its next resurgence. On 18 September, Qods (Jerusalem) Day, the plan is to assemble as Hashemi Rafsanjani speaks at Friday prayers in Tehran.

OK, but that's two weeks away, and there's no guarantee that the movement will produce a mass show of resistance (or even that Rafsanjani, given his withdrawal from prayers in mid-August, will appear), right? Of course, but that scepticism in turn discounts that tensions continue within the regime.

At the risk of repeating our "Iranians love chess" cliche too often, one strong move does not mean checkmate. And the President and his allies still have a glaring weakness in their defences. Look at the list of waves above. The one that has always been crashing ashore since mid-July has been the criticism of the post-election crackdown through detentions, beatings and abuses, confessions, and trials. And that wave was not put out to sea with the Parliament vote.

It is possible that Ahmadinejad has come through the worst of this. There was a signal this week that the post-election criticism of Mohsen Rezaei, despite the death of his campaign advisor's son in detention, may be muted by putting Rezaei at the head of State broadcasting. The Supreme Leader may be satisfied that he made his point when he "closed" Kahrizak prison. Sadegh Larijani may be content to take his place at judiciary and not challenge the continuing trials; alternatively, Ahmadinejad and the IRGC may accept that they should now curb the crackdown and let proceedings take a lower profile, with releases of some prisoners and "moderate" sentences for others. Ayatollah Khamenei may even announce an end-of-Ramadan "amnesty" for iconic detainees such as Saeed Hajjarian and Mohammad Ali Abtahi.

But, as of now, we don't know. And there's a twist in the tale.

Actually, it's not a twist. It's a storyline that has been here all the time. As EA's Chris Emery and our sharp-eyed/sharp-minded readers have noted, post-election events have added to the strains on the Iranian economy. The post-election crisis brought Government to a standstill and exposed problems in Iran's infrastructure. Of course, Ahmadinejad and his new Cabinet may try to stabilise or even jump-start the economy, but the President's record in this area hasn't been too good.

And that is where "post-election crisis" turns into "legitimacy crisis". It's one thing for an activist to get angry over a stolen vote; another for a "non-activist" to get angry because transport doesn't work, food is more expensive, housing isn't assured, and the lights go out.

If that is the case, if there is a wave of resentment over the economy that happens to arise at the same time as the ongoing waves over the political authority of the President and his allies (and I write that in full cognizance of the opinion of EA colleagues and some of our readers that the Revolutionary Guard has shown its muscle in recent weeks).....

Welcome back to the storm.