Friday
Sep252009
Iran: Rafsanjani, Ahmadinejad, and the Multi-Sided Chess Match
Friday, September 25, 2009 at 7:29
The Latest from Iran (25 September): Catching Up
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Yesterday EA's Mr Smith sent me a challenging analysis of the significance of this week's Assembly of Experts meetings and Hashemi Rafsanjani's latest manoeuvres:
"Basically the much-anticipated Assembly of Experts meeting ended up according to plan. There were some grievances on the current state of affairs --- Rafsanjani and others, such as Ayatollah Dastgheib, did emit warnings regarding the government --- but all in all it was far from being a threat to Ayatollah Khamenei. Of course, we have to wait and see what the proposal from the eminent politicians cited by Rafsanjani is going to be about. The photos published from the customary meeting between the AoE and Khamenei relay an atmosphere of cordiality. All accusations are vague and quite frankly not new."
I agree with Mr Smith that one outcome of the Assembly meeting is the clearest of indications that Rafsanjani is now aligning with the Supreme Leader, but that is far from a new development. Rafsanjani's Friday Prayer speech on 17 July did pose challenges to Khamenei, but throughout August and September, the former President has manoeuvred for position by declaring his firm support for the Supreme Leader and "unity".
Put bluntly, if this were an issue of a straightforward chess match of Rafsanjani v. Khamenei, this could be a case of Hashemi offering an honourable draw and moving to the next match alongside, rather than against the Supreme Leader. If that match was against the reformists, then one of the persistent questions of this crisis would have been settled: having raised prospects so high two months ago with his effective declaration that he was with the Green movement's opposition to the current system, Rafsanjani would have walked away from the struggle.
But, as EA readers corrected me many weeks ago, this is not a two-player chess match. There are several sides to the board: the reformists occupy one, and so does the President and his allies. And, after all the head-scratching I've done this week, this feels like a different alignment of players:
Rafsanjani does want to be alongside Khamenei, but the ultimate opponent is Ahmadinejad. To be successful in that contest, it is to Rafsanjani's advantage to keep the other players in the match
Let's put the chess analogy another way: it is the President who has been trying to reduce this conflict to a straight-up, two-sided battle. Mahmoud v. the Greens. The system v. the illegitimate opposition. "Iran" v. the foreigners. Every statement he has made since the 12 June election, beginning with his denigration of the opposition as "dust" points to that simplification.
But, ironically, it was others within the Establishment and not the Green movement who complicated that plan. When the conservative and principlist politicians rebelled against the abuse of detainees and, more specifically, Ahmadinejad's leadership of his Cabinet, another player was at the chessboard. When the Supreme Leader made his limited but clear steps to criticise the President, including the closure of Kahrizak Prison and his insistence on the removal of First Vice President Rahim-Mashai, he had put his own set of pieces in play.
So Ahmadinejad and the Revolutionary Guard have not only had to fight their initial contest with the Green movement, they have to get back to that us v. them showdown. They succeeded, for now, in retiring the conservatives/principlists, but the Supreme Leader posed a trickier chess problem. Move too quickly in a challenge against Khamenei and the entire system of velayat-e-faqih (supreme clerical authority) becomes an issue. And, even if the President may wish to curb that system in practice, he probably does not want to appear to be doing so, for then the symbolic basis of the Islamic Republic since 1979 is exposed.
I have no doubt that Rafsanjani knows this. So this past week, indeed over the past weeks, he made a calculation and decisions to keep the board multi-sided. He did not need to make a high-profile appearance at Qods Day because the Green movement stayed in play with their own momentum of protest. Instead, he could concentrate on keeping the Supreme Leader in the game as an actor who could move against the President as well as the reformists.
And there's more. I think another player is now at the table. If there was a concrete step in the Assembly's general declaration, it was that the criticisms of marjas (the most senior Shi'a clerics) must be heeded, not only in principle but in practice. This does not mean immediate concessions to a Government opponent such as Ayatollah Montazeri who, for all his symbolic resonance with many Iranians, is on the fringe of the main contest. It does mean a recognition and response to the challenges put by other Grand Ayatollahs, including some who have long been seen as "conservative".
Consider two incidents. Less than two months ago, Ahmadinejad's supporters on the Assembly of Experts tried to reduce the chessboard by taking Rafsanjani out of play, with the blundering letter that claimed to be in the name of the Assembly and called for the former President's removal as chairman. Earlier this week it was Rafsanjani demonstrating that he was very much there and very much commanding the attention both of the Government and of its opponents.
But Rafsanjani was absent when the Assembly's statement was read, right? Absolutely, but my initial brow-raising concern, that he had suffered a setback, was replaced by another possibility. Rafsanjani needs his position as chair of the Assembly, but he is not solely reliant upon its members for his influence. Stepping away from the proceedings, he could indicate that he had achieved his main purpose and was now moving to the next steps of his alignment with Khamenei and others.
For consider the second incident. Before Qods Day, Speaker of the House Ali Larijani, apparently carrying messages from Ayatollah Khamenei, met Grand Ayatollahs and other senior clerics. The content of those discussions has not been leaked, but it now appears that Larijani's mission was not to warn the marjas but to seek an accommodation with them. And, if that is the case, who is the accommodation against?
A two-sided chess analogy might say the "Green movement". But some of those marjas are now supportive of the Green movement. And it is those marjas whom Rafsanjani said, only days after the Larijani meeting, are important in this ongoing political battle.
There's an important caveat in this analysis: just because Rafsanjani wants Khamenei in this match, able to move against as well as with Ahmadinejad, does not mean that this is a Supreme Leader on a string. And yesterday, as Khamenei addressed the Assembly, he tacked back to the "sophistication and extensiveness in planning by the enemy in the current situation". Coming weeks after the Supreme Leader had played down the notion of a "velvet revolution" in the post-election conflict, this appears to be Khamenei's own re-alignment with Government propaganda against the Green movement:
Khamenei praised the election --- again --- with "a high and unprecedented vote is one of our great strengths". He praised Iran's "solid infrastructure and the country's preparedness for a leap forward, significant scientific progress, the system's 30-year experience, an energetic, educated and self-confident young generation, and the [20-year strategic] plan defining the movement of the country towards its horizons until 2026".
What he did not do, however, was single out the President for exaltation. And that, as Hashemi Rafsanjani listened, leaves open the question: who has aligned with whom against whom?
A rule: the more players in the chess match, the more difficult the situation is for Ahmadinejad, even if he tries to walk away from that match with his "international" appearances. And, to me, it looks like this chessboard expanded, rather than contracted, this week.
Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis
Yesterday EA's Mr Smith sent me a challenging analysis of the significance of this week's Assembly of Experts meetings and Hashemi Rafsanjani's latest manoeuvres:"Basically the much-anticipated Assembly of Experts meeting ended up according to plan. There were some grievances on the current state of affairs --- Rafsanjani and others, such as Ayatollah Dastgheib, did emit warnings regarding the government --- but all in all it was far from being a threat to Ayatollah Khamenei. Of course, we have to wait and see what the proposal from the eminent politicians cited by Rafsanjani is going to be about. The photos published from the customary meeting between the AoE and Khamenei relay an atmosphere of cordiality. All accusations are vague and quite frankly not new."
I agree with Mr Smith that one outcome of the Assembly meeting is the clearest of indications that Rafsanjani is now aligning with the Supreme Leader, but that is far from a new development. Rafsanjani's Friday Prayer speech on 17 July did pose challenges to Khamenei, but throughout August and September, the former President has manoeuvred for position by declaring his firm support for the Supreme Leader and "unity".
Put bluntly, if this were an issue of a straightforward chess match of Rafsanjani v. Khamenei, this could be a case of Hashemi offering an honourable draw and moving to the next match alongside, rather than against the Supreme Leader. If that match was against the reformists, then one of the persistent questions of this crisis would have been settled: having raised prospects so high two months ago with his effective declaration that he was with the Green movement's opposition to the current system, Rafsanjani would have walked away from the struggle.
But, as EA readers corrected me many weeks ago, this is not a two-player chess match. There are several sides to the board: the reformists occupy one, and so does the President and his allies. And, after all the head-scratching I've done this week, this feels like a different alignment of players:
Rafsanjani does want to be alongside Khamenei, but the ultimate opponent is Ahmadinejad. To be successful in that contest, it is to Rafsanjani's advantage to keep the other players in the match
Let's put the chess analogy another way: it is the President who has been trying to reduce this conflict to a straight-up, two-sided battle. Mahmoud v. the Greens. The system v. the illegitimate opposition. "Iran" v. the foreigners. Every statement he has made since the 12 June election, beginning with his denigration of the opposition as "dust" points to that simplification.
But, ironically, it was others within the Establishment and not the Green movement who complicated that plan. When the conservative and principlist politicians rebelled against the abuse of detainees and, more specifically, Ahmadinejad's leadership of his Cabinet, another player was at the chessboard. When the Supreme Leader made his limited but clear steps to criticise the President, including the closure of Kahrizak Prison and his insistence on the removal of First Vice President Rahim-Mashai, he had put his own set of pieces in play.
So Ahmadinejad and the Revolutionary Guard have not only had to fight their initial contest with the Green movement, they have to get back to that us v. them showdown. They succeeded, for now, in retiring the conservatives/principlists, but the Supreme Leader posed a trickier chess problem. Move too quickly in a challenge against Khamenei and the entire system of velayat-e-faqih (supreme clerical authority) becomes an issue. And, even if the President may wish to curb that system in practice, he probably does not want to appear to be doing so, for then the symbolic basis of the Islamic Republic since 1979 is exposed.
I have no doubt that Rafsanjani knows this. So this past week, indeed over the past weeks, he made a calculation and decisions to keep the board multi-sided. He did not need to make a high-profile appearance at Qods Day because the Green movement stayed in play with their own momentum of protest. Instead, he could concentrate on keeping the Supreme Leader in the game as an actor who could move against the President as well as the reformists.
And there's more. I think another player is now at the table. If there was a concrete step in the Assembly's general declaration, it was that the criticisms of marjas (the most senior Shi'a clerics) must be heeded, not only in principle but in practice. This does not mean immediate concessions to a Government opponent such as Ayatollah Montazeri who, for all his symbolic resonance with many Iranians, is on the fringe of the main contest. It does mean a recognition and response to the challenges put by other Grand Ayatollahs, including some who have long been seen as "conservative".
Consider two incidents. Less than two months ago, Ahmadinejad's supporters on the Assembly of Experts tried to reduce the chessboard by taking Rafsanjani out of play, with the blundering letter that claimed to be in the name of the Assembly and called for the former President's removal as chairman. Earlier this week it was Rafsanjani demonstrating that he was very much there and very much commanding the attention both of the Government and of its opponents.
But Rafsanjani was absent when the Assembly's statement was read, right? Absolutely, but my initial brow-raising concern, that he had suffered a setback, was replaced by another possibility. Rafsanjani needs his position as chair of the Assembly, but he is not solely reliant upon its members for his influence. Stepping away from the proceedings, he could indicate that he had achieved his main purpose and was now moving to the next steps of his alignment with Khamenei and others.
For consider the second incident. Before Qods Day, Speaker of the House Ali Larijani, apparently carrying messages from Ayatollah Khamenei, met Grand Ayatollahs and other senior clerics. The content of those discussions has not been leaked, but it now appears that Larijani's mission was not to warn the marjas but to seek an accommodation with them. And, if that is the case, who is the accommodation against?
A two-sided chess analogy might say the "Green movement". But some of those marjas are now supportive of the Green movement. And it is those marjas whom Rafsanjani said, only days after the Larijani meeting, are important in this ongoing political battle.
There's an important caveat in this analysis: just because Rafsanjani wants Khamenei in this match, able to move against as well as with Ahmadinejad, does not mean that this is a Supreme Leader on a string. And yesterday, as Khamenei addressed the Assembly, he tacked back to the "sophistication and extensiveness in planning by the enemy in the current situation". Coming weeks after the Supreme Leader had played down the notion of a "velvet revolution" in the post-election conflict, this appears to be Khamenei's own re-alignment with Government propaganda against the Green movement:
The Islamic system has a 30-years experience in confronting different challenges, but, in view of the development in the system and the complexity of its achievements, its opponents' conspiracies and plots have also become more complex. Thus, its diverse aspects must be identified in order to overcome them....
In their soft war, the opponents of the system have made use of an overwhelming amount of propaganda and telecommunications tools to attack the beliefs, the power of discernment, the motivation, and the foundations and pillars of a system and the country.
Khamenei praised the election --- again --- with "a high and unprecedented vote is one of our great strengths". He praised Iran's "solid infrastructure and the country's preparedness for a leap forward, significant scientific progress, the system's 30-year experience, an energetic, educated and self-confident young generation, and the [20-year strategic] plan defining the movement of the country towards its horizons until 2026".
What he did not do, however, was single out the President for exaltation. And that, as Hashemi Rafsanjani listened, leaves open the question: who has aligned with whom against whom?
A rule: the more players in the chess match, the more difficult the situation is for Ahmadinejad, even if he tries to walk away from that match with his "international" appearances. And, to me, it looks like this chessboard expanded, rather than contracted, this week.
Reader Comments (6)
Hi Scott,
Talk about a week being long time in politics . . .
This is not just a chessboard - it's a 3 dimensional chessboard! Maybe more like a Rubik's cube.
Your alternative could be right as to Rafs not reading the statement - and I guess it's way too early to know whether that is the reason or not. For what we don't know is whether he chose to not to be there or was forced not to be there . . .
(Or was it that he could not and would not read out that statement, as unlike his FP and call to Qod's day there was nothing in it to support the people?)
Rafsanjani is a clever man. But at the same time he doesn’t have any principles. He wants power and hence aligns himself with the winner (or the future winner) of this political battle. When Green’s are out in their millions, he is with them. If they are defeated or crushed, don’t expect any support from him.
I don’t see anything wrong in that. All politicians in the democratic world are also power seekers. What makes them listen to their people is the threat of loosing the next election. In Iran however the power comes from both people and the establishment. This allows Rafsanjani to side with a more powerful of the two. I am sure if Iran was truly democratic, Rafsanjani would have been an excellent, caring politician, loved by its people.
One last point: For the Greens it is ok to work with a politician like Rafsanjani, provided the play strong and that make having him by their side certain, which in turn make the movement doubly strong.
The analysis makes a lot of sense. Khamenei and Rafsanjani appear to have made their peace. My speculative view is that the IRGC's moves may have been blunted post-election, so that the present situation at the top-level resembles the situation prior to the election.
On the one-hand, the population has been marginalized for the time being; however, the IRGC-Ahmadinejad factions assertion of more top-level control, which it hoped to gain post-election has also been checked. Roiling beneath the surface is popular discontent -- a factor that is likely to increase over time.
Looming over all of this are questions centering around Khamenei's succession, which will come into play eventually. When that moment comes, many of the old grievances are likely to come to the surface again. A heavy-handed, public maneuver against key reformists could also bring conflict into the open again in the near-term.
Ksara,
Great points about Rafsanjani. I too believe he is a master politician and must work with both sides (or should I say ALL sides) to dismantle the coup & Ahamadinejad.
However Scott, I not sure I believe Ahmadinejad is Rafsanjani's ultimate opponent. Perhaps Rafs is being smart by only playing one opponent at a time in this chess match. If he can succeed with this it will naturally open other doors.
I think it is Khamenei who is alligning himself with Hashemi then the other way around. He tries to stop the pressure from the marjas, and hence statement/warning from the guards towards SL. At this point unless SL makes a big gesture in attempt to reconlice with the Marjas, their pressure will continue, on the other hand any gesture towards the Marjas will make the Guards retalitate. This is just a maneuver trying to buy time, figuring out what to do next.
Roozonline has an interesting analysis of Rafs absence from the AoE.
http://www.roozonline.com/english/news/newsitem/article/2009/september/25//supreme-leaders-performance-proven.html