Thursday
Dec102009
Iran Analysis: Are Rafsanjani and National Unity Plan "Spent Forces"?
Thursday, December 10, 2009 at 4:17
Many thanks to readers and EA colleagues who gave valuable feedback and criticism on yesterday's analysis of the meetings between clerics and Hashemi Rafsanjani discussing moves for a National Unity Plan manoeuvring between the Ahmadinejad Government and the Green opposition.
A basic but, I think, important start to a reply: there is a big difference between questioning whether meetings took place and questioning whether those meetings will be effective.
Iran Exclusive: Clerics and Rafsanjani Plan The “Third Way” of Unity
The Latest from Iran (10 December): Reading the Chessboard
Almost all the reaction has focused on that second question. Some readers noted, quite rightly, that Nasser Makarem-Shirazi is the only Ayatollah who has gone public, and then in general terms regarding "unity" rather than in reference to the meetings. That's a fair point, even though we have information that other senior clerics have been involved in the discussions.
Some readers have questioned whether any Plan can get the approval of the Supreme Leader or, alternatively, the Revolutionary Guard.
Again, that is a necessary challenge, but any Plan is likely to be a tactical move against the authority of the President rather than a strategic approach for re-alignment or major change in the Iranian system. The question then becomes not whether Ayatollah Khamenei will defy any proposal revising velayat-e-faqih but whether he will side with the "third way" against Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. (I agree that, if the Revolutionary Guard rather than the Supreme Leader are in charge that even this is problematic, but I don't start from that assumption at this point.)
Note: there is a related issue here as to whether the Supreme Leader is in an unshakeable position where he can wield a veto without any repercussions on his position. So far, I think that is true, but there have been rumblings during this crisis aimed at Khamenei's undisputed authority. While these seemed to have been quelled, a firm No No No by the Supreme Leader to a Plan which has wide support could risk a backlash such as that against his 19 June speech trying to close off the Presidential election.
Perhaps the most significant criticism, however, is that neither the clerics nor Rafsanjani now have that much influence. As one EA colleague put it bluntly yesterday, Grand Ayatollah Makarem-Shirazi is a "spent force" and Rafsanjani "no longer has substantial power".
That, to me, is a telling statement. Throughout this crisis, one of the recurrent assumptions has been that Rafsanjani --- the master political operator, "the Shark" --- could play a decisive role in this conflict. That assumption underlay the excitement around his mid-July Friday Prayer speech and the disappointment over his non-appearance at prayers in August (and since) and the weak statement of the Assembly of Experts under his leadership.
In September, however, protesters were chanting on Qods Day, "Hashemi, where are you?". The possibility arose that they were chanting this not because they needed Rafsanjani but because they now felt they could get along without him.
In October we carried the news, offered by Habibollah Asgharoladi, that Rafsanjani had taken the National Unity Plan to the Supreme Leader. Since nothing more was heard, that approach was probably rebuffed.
So, to me, it is quite likely that Rafsanjani has tried to re-establish not only the Plan but his own place in Iranian politics with the recent meetings. Arguing that the Plan is likely to go nowhere implies that Rafsanjani, amidst the continued threats to his family and his own retreat from public apprearances since August, is likely to go nowhere. He is now an isolated as well as a spent force.
But is that the case? An EA source reports that Asgharoladi, in addition to his recent meeting with Rafsanjani, also saw the President. He criticised Ahmadinejad for his weak relationships with the senior clerics and Rafsanjani and for his support of the controversial former 1st Vice President and current Chief of Staff Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai.
An EA colleague cautions that Asgharoladi and his party are now marginal political actors, but the Deputy Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Reza Bahonar renewed his attack on Ahmadinejad yesterday. He criticised Ahmadinejad for the way the President has dealt with and treated the parliament, and he also derided the interference of the Revolutionary Guard in politics and the economy. It may be far from incidental that Bahonar had been a supporter of the National Unity Plan earlier in the autumn.
An EA colleague may have gotten to the heart of the matter and any "Third Way": "The one element that could tip the balance, as said in the past, would be the Larijani brothers swaying towards the Rafs camp. That has hasn't happened yet."
Yet. Ali Larijani, as Speaker of Parliament, could be a catalytic force given the hostility to Ahmadinejad amongst key Parliamentary members. His brother Sadegh, head of Iran's judiciary, may also have a role: yesterday, the newspaper Jomhoori Islami --- owned by Masih Mohajeri, who accompanied Rafsanjani to the Mashhad meetings last week --- asked Sadegh Larijani, "Why don’t you take action against Ahmadinejad and his friends who corrupt and play with people's religious beliefs?"
After 24 hours of reflection, the easy decision is to stand by the exclusive we published yesterday: at least in the eyes of those who met last week --- clerics, Asgharoladi, and Rafsanjani --- the National Unity Plan is not a "spent force".
The tougher analysis is: what next? Given the caveats that readers put yesterday, it is time to put away any thought of Rafsanjani --- for all his past prowess --- being the Shark who changes the political waters. More big fish are needed.
But will they surface?
A basic but, I think, important start to a reply: there is a big difference between questioning whether meetings took place and questioning whether those meetings will be effective.
Iran Exclusive: Clerics and Rafsanjani Plan The “Third Way” of Unity
The Latest from Iran (10 December): Reading the Chessboard
Almost all the reaction has focused on that second question. Some readers noted, quite rightly, that Nasser Makarem-Shirazi is the only Ayatollah who has gone public, and then in general terms regarding "unity" rather than in reference to the meetings. That's a fair point, even though we have information that other senior clerics have been involved in the discussions.
Some readers have questioned whether any Plan can get the approval of the Supreme Leader or, alternatively, the Revolutionary Guard.
Again, that is a necessary challenge, but any Plan is likely to be a tactical move against the authority of the President rather than a strategic approach for re-alignment or major change in the Iranian system. The question then becomes not whether Ayatollah Khamenei will defy any proposal revising velayat-e-faqih but whether he will side with the "third way" against Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. (I agree that, if the Revolutionary Guard rather than the Supreme Leader are in charge that even this is problematic, but I don't start from that assumption at this point.)
Note: there is a related issue here as to whether the Supreme Leader is in an unshakeable position where he can wield a veto without any repercussions on his position. So far, I think that is true, but there have been rumblings during this crisis aimed at Khamenei's undisputed authority. While these seemed to have been quelled, a firm No No No by the Supreme Leader to a Plan which has wide support could risk a backlash such as that against his 19 June speech trying to close off the Presidential election.
Perhaps the most significant criticism, however, is that neither the clerics nor Rafsanjani now have that much influence. As one EA colleague put it bluntly yesterday, Grand Ayatollah Makarem-Shirazi is a "spent force" and Rafsanjani "no longer has substantial power".
That, to me, is a telling statement. Throughout this crisis, one of the recurrent assumptions has been that Rafsanjani --- the master political operator, "the Shark" --- could play a decisive role in this conflict. That assumption underlay the excitement around his mid-July Friday Prayer speech and the disappointment over his non-appearance at prayers in August (and since) and the weak statement of the Assembly of Experts under his leadership.
In September, however, protesters were chanting on Qods Day, "Hashemi, where are you?". The possibility arose that they were chanting this not because they needed Rafsanjani but because they now felt they could get along without him.
In October we carried the news, offered by Habibollah Asgharoladi, that Rafsanjani had taken the National Unity Plan to the Supreme Leader. Since nothing more was heard, that approach was probably rebuffed.
So, to me, it is quite likely that Rafsanjani has tried to re-establish not only the Plan but his own place in Iranian politics with the recent meetings. Arguing that the Plan is likely to go nowhere implies that Rafsanjani, amidst the continued threats to his family and his own retreat from public apprearances since August, is likely to go nowhere. He is now an isolated as well as a spent force.
But is that the case? An EA source reports that Asgharoladi, in addition to his recent meeting with Rafsanjani, also saw the President. He criticised Ahmadinejad for his weak relationships with the senior clerics and Rafsanjani and for his support of the controversial former 1st Vice President and current Chief of Staff Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai.
An EA colleague cautions that Asgharoladi and his party are now marginal political actors, but the Deputy Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Reza Bahonar renewed his attack on Ahmadinejad yesterday. He criticised Ahmadinejad for the way the President has dealt with and treated the parliament, and he also derided the interference of the Revolutionary Guard in politics and the economy. It may be far from incidental that Bahonar had been a supporter of the National Unity Plan earlier in the autumn.
An EA colleague may have gotten to the heart of the matter and any "Third Way": "The one element that could tip the balance, as said in the past, would be the Larijani brothers swaying towards the Rafs camp. That has hasn't happened yet."
Yet. Ali Larijani, as Speaker of Parliament, could be a catalytic force given the hostility to Ahmadinejad amongst key Parliamentary members. His brother Sadegh, head of Iran's judiciary, may also have a role: yesterday, the newspaper Jomhoori Islami --- owned by Masih Mohajeri, who accompanied Rafsanjani to the Mashhad meetings last week --- asked Sadegh Larijani, "Why don’t you take action against Ahmadinejad and his friends who corrupt and play with people's religious beliefs?"
After 24 hours of reflection, the easy decision is to stand by the exclusive we published yesterday: at least in the eyes of those who met last week --- clerics, Asgharoladi, and Rafsanjani --- the National Unity Plan is not a "spent force".
The tougher analysis is: what next? Given the caveats that readers put yesterday, it is time to put away any thought of Rafsanjani --- for all his past prowess --- being the Shark who changes the political waters. More big fish are needed.
But will they surface?
tagged Ali Larijani, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Ayatollah Nasser Makarem-Shirazi, Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai, Habibollah Asgharoladi, Hashemi Rafsanjani, Iran, Iran Elections 2009, Islamic Revolution Guard Corps, Jomhoori Islami, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Masih Mojaheri, Mohammad Reza Bahonar, National Unity Plan, Sadegh Larijani in Middle East & Iran
Ali Larijani, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Ayatollah Nasser Makarem-Shirazi, Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai, Habibollah Asgharoladi, Hashemi Rafsanjani, Iran, Iran Elections 2009, Islamic Revolution Guard Corps, Jomhoori Islami, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Masih Mojaheri, Mohammad Reza Bahonar, National Unity Plan, Sadegh Larijani in Middle East & Iran
Reader Comments (22)
Unity? khoda pedare shoma ra biamorzad! (May God rest your father's soul, sorry, untranslatable)
BBC reports that Intelligence minister Heydar Moslehi accused Rafsanjani of quoting the "leaders of rebellion" and renewed his accusations against Raffi's son Mehdi:
http://www.peykeiran.com/Content.aspx?ID=10559
As Sazegara properly noticed yesterday on VOA, AN and the IRGC's final aim is the elimination of all other factions. This means abandoning the delicate equilibrium of power, guaranteeing the relative stability of this corrupt system.
Interestingly Moslehi said also that the IRI is menaced from within, especially by the "aghazade-ha", i.e. the sons of influential political figures and mullahs, who collapsed (joined the movement).
I spent the morning reading these tweets and - as always with MikVerbrugge -
wondering who his sources are. Does anyone here know who/where he gets his information from?
Regarding the 'edit' function discussion: I just posted, edited twice (spacing issues) successfully, then tried once more. Received a message telling me that editing posts was not possible after someone else had posted. Apparently, that's the way this function works at present. Perhaps there is a parameter that admin can change.
Catherine, I don't know about the sources. However, Verbrugge sometimes posts a synopsis of the latest information he gets at
http://mikverbrugge.tumblr.com/
There's an archive link there that let's you see posts for months in the past. One can decide for one's self how accurate the post predictions have turned out to be.
To me, it doesn't seem practical to reveal identities of inside sources for all the obvious reasons.
Observer
I hope these news are true ! when you have this kind of informations, share them with us please; thank you so much
Reference by commenter above:
"As Sazegara properly noticed yesterday on VOA..."
Never mind the substance, I gather then that "Mr. Referendum" is back on VOA? Is he too like Makmalbaf still characterizing himself as a spokesperson for the greens, and/or "I speak for Musavi?"
I find it a bit un-nerving that we Americans don't know what's being broadcast in our name on VOA.... by one who obviously has an interesting (if changing) agenda..... Does this bother anyone else? (other than the AEI crowd who've long been pushing for VOA to be a vehicle for "regime change")
Maybe I need correcting too. Is VOA now also making its broadcasting available in translated form -- so we can understand what our tax dollars are paying for....? Or are we to "trust" these chaps?
On Verbrugge, hey he had the Asgharoladi-Raf meeting before EA did (not slighting Scott- I would have waited on it too if I were him), so I don't ignore him.
While I'm not able right now to go through his archives or old tweets and do anything like a comprehensive analysis, simply operating off memory, it seems like Verbrugge has been quite accurate and reliable over the months. I would say that after about 5-6 months of following him closely, my skepticism of his reports is not much greater than my skepticism of anything I might read in, say, the Guardian. [Of course, some things are too "inside" to have come out into the open, so it is tough to verify everything.]
Basiji Brutality caught on tape:
http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=b9b_1260372437
Has audio confirming it was from the 16 azar.
Observer,
Regarding the talk of eliminating subsidies could this move be a result of the economy? It seems with the reserves so low this would be a logical choice. I personally believe they don't want to do it because so many of the poor loyalists depend on these subsidies. The question however is would they just cut subsidies only to channel a portion back to their loyalists leaving out those in the middle class that form the majority of the reform movement. Appreciate your thoughts.
Thx
Bill
Observer, thanks for these posts. My skeptical side says that these are unconfirmed twitters and we should stick to confirmed facts. But my realist side says these claims fit perfectly with Rafsanjani's statements and actions. A few months ago he claimed he was simply trying to save the system, and now he seems to have given up on the whole idea and is explaining that it is time for the regime to go.
In particular it explains perfectly why Rafsanjani seems so calm and liberated while explaining that the regime that he built and that made his career, is finished. The facts are there and he has simply accepted them and can now live free of the burden of having to defend or justify this regime.
Notice that when he says "if the people no longer want us, we must leave", he does so without the slightest hint of defiance or revolutionary zeal. It sounds like he has simply looked at the facts and decided that it is over and he is preparing to move on, sending his son abroad to manage the financial and legal fallout and going to Universities and clerics to explain to them that he understands that the regime has come to an end. This will serve him well as he probably has saved himself from later prosecution... Khamenei is responsible for too many deaths of innocents in the last 6 months to save himself.
Bill Davit,
Am certainly not versed in economics, but the need for subsidy cuts seems to be a steadily current topic. The Iranian parliament speaker and others have criticized the government subsidy bill because government (read Ahmadinejad) insisted on having complete control of saved subsidy monies to disperse without oversight.
Parliament amended his bill to include oversight and sent it to the Guardian Council for decision. The GC had a problem with the bill, returned it to Parliament. Amidst all this activity, Ahmadinejad has said he would withdraw the bill. Parliament members stated that doing so would be illegal because the bill had already gone to the GC. Lots of squabbling about it.
Further, other reading suggests that discussions about how quickly to cut subsidies, which portions of the population should receive compensation from the saved funds, whether the plans are unfair to other segments of the population, and so on, seem to be common topics lately. The President of Iran's Chamber of Commerce, Industries and Mines had an interesting interview with Khabar Online about it all.
A few articles made sense to me on that site (Khabar English). I think this publication is supposed to be 'close to' Speaker Larijani. The articles are still available:
http://www.khabaronline.ir/news-28156.aspx
Majlis didn't bow to Ahmadinejad on subsidy bill
http://www.khabaronline.ir/news-29271.aspx
Implementation of subsidy bill amid economic crisis is problematic
http://www.khabaronline.ir/news-29194.aspx
Government will suggest new plans on subsidy bill
Would very much appreciate explanations/added information from commenters on this subject. Thank you.
Rafsanjani still has quite a bit of power and has many supporters in the Sepah. Makeram Shirazi is not an influential cleric. As I stated yesterday and again repeat this today, the fight is not about Ahmadinajad or his powers, it is about Khamanei and his powers. Most thought Rafsanjani had gone to Qom back in late June to try to dislodge khamanei from power via the assembly of experts. But I think he would be a lot more cautious than that. He simply was waiting. He is known to be a patient and calculating man. After all he is the one who made a supreme leader out of Khamanei an insignificant and not very popular hojatoleslam. The earlier report this morning in which the Intelligence minister simply accused Rafsanjani and his kids of undermining the Khamanei and the authority of Valie Faghih further substantiates this scenario. There is no real plan for reconciliation. Rafsanjani's plan is to overthrow Khamanei. Khamanei's plan is to get rid of Rafsanjani.
Observer,
Thanks for the information and links. I read through them and after looking at your post again this just looks like your typical political squabble. This squabble centers on who has the right to pass on the funds. The funds will of course be used to further the agenda of whom ever has them. It will be interesting to see what happens. I think Ahmadinejad realized the danger of letting go of the subsidies and thus tried to anull the bill. Sort of shows his actions were largely self serving and not based on sound economic practices. I think the politicians pushng for it realize it is to risky to do it now but they ask themselves can they survive if the continue status quo.
Thx
Bill
@ data
Sazegara or "Mr Referendum" as you call him never left VOA. His regular Wednesday discussions with journalist Alireza Nourizadeh, a staunch critic of the regime, seem to be very popular among Iranians. I started to follow them after the elections.
To make it clear: I neither like him nor Makhmalbaf, but you can not expect substantial informations about current domestic developments from Iranians who left the country 20 or 30 years ago.
Obviously many of his statements are pure propaganda, but very important for all those inside Iran, who have no access to reliable informations about developments in foreign countries. This article in LATimes may be revealing: http://www.latimes.com/news/nation-and-world/la-fg-iran-exiles10-2009dec10,0,2320373,full.story
No one has to push VOA Persian for regime change, bringing down the IRI is its (undeclared) goal. As long as independent Iranian media remain a dream, I am very thankful to VOA for broadcasting muzzled voices of students, human rights activists, political analysts and many others inside Iran. All debates are obviously in Persian.
Bill Davit, I think Ahmadinejad wanted to withdraw the bill as amended because he couldn't do what he originally intended -- take the subsidy savings and dispense them without accountability restrictions.
I also think that the 'political squabble' contains a bit more - Larijani has been throttling Ahmadinejad's proposals at every turn for a while now, which may or may not be 'small potatoes.'
Additionally, most politicos/officials expect that elimination of subsidies, even though at some point necessary to help right the economy, will displease most Iranians and cause higher inflation in the midst of what is already an economic and political crisis. Most likely, none look forward to the blowback. Gas rationing in 2007 was seriously protested, if recall is accurate.
In the meantime, reports typically say the country is going broke. Time will tell more, I guess. Wish I knew more about it ....
@ Observer and Bill
(OBS - thanx for your reply to my question on MikVerbrugge)
Here's an article you'll probably find interesting:
Falling Energy Investment Threat
Sayeh Sabz | London | 9 December 2009
By Sayeh Sabz
A recent study in Iran has shown that the country is in dire need of investment in its energy industry, without which it may suffer grave consequences. A leading official think-tank affiliated to Iran’s parliament, the Majlis Research Centre, issued a report in October 2009 saying that Iran needed at least 4.5 billion US dollars of investment in its energy industry.
Otherwise, it added, in the worst-case scenario Iran would have to stop oil exports in eight years. Whether realistic or not, the report gives a stern warning to Iranian officials that their nightmare of diminishing oil income may be about to come true in a country where 85 per cent of the annual budget is funded by such revenues.
Although President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad uses every opportunity to defend and praise his economic policies, Iran’s ailing economy has even led the president’s allies, including conservative members of parliament, to harshly criticise the government and even suggest the possibility of impeaching the president, according to Aftab-e Yazd daily on December 7. But how did Iran end up here?
Rest: http://www.mianeh.net/en/articles/?aid=233
Catherine, I don't wish to add even another 'off-topic' post in this thread, but did want to thank you very much for the link. Have you seen this one from over there:
http://www.mianeh.net/en/articles/?aid=227
a useful 'backgrounder' for the subsidy cut topic.
Again, thanks for the information.
Observer,
I will agree on that premise of who A Ma Dinner Jacket wanted to pass into onto. However, I believe a large motivating factor was the "blow back" you mentioned. The president while a fanatic is far from stupid. In any event as you indicated the economy is sliding and their cash reserves are down to $12 billion. Once that dries up the regime won't be able to "pay" for their support anymore. I would have to imagine the funds they shelling out for the basiji and supporters is really starting to effect their budget. It is sad that all of Iran will have to suffer the economic consequences of this regime but the reality is it will help the reform movement long term.
Thx
Bill
Thx
Bill
Catherine,
Thank you for the reference. I was some what aware of the dire situation of their energy infrastructure but not all the details. A bigger issue farther down the road is the fact that 80 to 85% of the Middle East's GDP is energy resources. I like to call it the luck of geology because they had to do very little to exploit it. With peak oil already here/coming soon and the world's move to renewable energy the issue is only going to get worse. The middle east is almost entirely dependent on these sources of revenue and little else. I attribute this to Islam's early rejection of greek thought(critical thinking) which has lead to a general
Catherine,
Thank you for the reference. I was some what aware of the dire situation of their energy infrastructure but not all the details. A bigger issue farther down the road is the fact that 80 to 85% of the Middle East's GDP is energy resources. I like to call it the luck of geology because they have had to do very little to exploit it. With peak oil already here/coming soon and the world's move to renewable energy the issue is only going to get worse. The middle east is almost entirely dependent on these sources of revenue and little else. This over reliance on one thing has led them to neglect economic diversity and in general educating their people. They are fat and happy why upset the status quo! Makes you wonder if any of these states would have ever survived without the oil revenue--especially the "nanny states." I attribute much of this to Islam's early rejection of greek thought(critical thinking) which has lead to a general rejection of the modernity/progress of the West.
The Sunni and to some extent the Shia Mullah attitude is that anything coming out of the west is either an innovation to be avoided or else it must be islamasized first. In addition the Sunni case largely bases their rejection on the premise that having man figure things out for himself contradicts what was divinely revealed. Ironically, because the Shia faith did not close the gates of Ijtihad they have been more open to dealing with others in general real education. It is why the most assimalated or itegrated Muslims in the West almost always are Iranians and Shias. It is also why I believe, unlike any other islamic state, Iran will be the one most likely to prosper once the theocracy is gone. The greatest irony of it all is that the regime placed so much of a focus on educating its people! It was the right move for the people but it will most likely be their downfall. Educated people almost always never want to live in the monoculture theorcracies build. Educated people use logic and critical thinking something that flys in the face of the clerics who base everything on scripture. We in the West threw off the tryanny of religious intolerance centuries ago and I think we are starting to see that same movement in many parts of the Islamic world--Iran just happens to be the first large scale example and we know why--its the education stupid now they know their oppressed!!!
Thx
Bill
"Marg Bar Dictator" God we should make a T-shirt out of that slogan and hand them out for free!!!