Iran Special: Interpreting the Videos of the Tehran Dorm Attacks

Mr Verde writes for EA:

For eight months now, there has been a steady stream of footage showing security forces beating up protesters. What sets apart the footage from the night of 24-25 Khordad 88 (14-15 June 09), shown by BBC Persian and disseminated by YouTube, is the cameraman. Almost all other videos have been taken by ordinary people on their cameraphones. (A few clips were taken by professional camera crews in the first days of the post-election protests in June, before they were expelled by the authorities.) This footage was taken by one of the attackers using a professional camera.

Latest Iran Video: The Attack on Tehran University Dormitories (14/15 June 2009)
The Latest from Iran (23 February): Sideshows and Main Events

Much of the amateur footage of the protests has shown security and intelligence agents filming the protestors. For the first time in eight months we are actually seeing one of these videos. In that sense, this is the first “official” footage confirming the brutality of the Islamic Republic’s security forces.


This footage confirms the allegations of extreme brutality by the security forces against the students on that night. It confirms the allegations that the police and plainclothes enforcers (referred to by Islamic Republic officials as “lebas shakhis”) work side-by-side. The attack was pre-planned and well-organized and carried out by uniformed police and these plainsclothesmen.

No one in the Islamic Republic accepts responsibility for the actions of the non-uniformed forces. Their actions are usually denied by officials or are attributed to unknown people (and sometimes blamed on foreign intelligence agencies). In the summer the Supreme Leader referred to the attack on the student dorms as crimes, but he added that the attacks were carried out by assailants who had not been identified (see video).

This video proves that either Khamenei, despite being the Supreme Leader, was not given the complete facts about the events or he was lying.

A few days ago, the Tehran Police Commander, Azizollah Rajabzadeh, was replaced. In his departing speech, he said that the police had not killed anyone in Tehran and that, after the elections, the police’s responsibilities and authority had been passed to the Seyyed-o-Shohada Command of the Revolutionary Guards, who are now in charge of Tehran. He was in effect defending himself and saying that the Guards were responsible for the violence against protesters.

The following day the commander the Seyyed-o-Shohada Command of the Revolutionary Guards was also replaced. Now this video was leaked to the press and public. Either this is an unauthorized leak, in which case the Islamic Republics security and intelligence services have serious problems, or this was officially sanctioned. If the latter, there could be different explanations:

* It could be an attempt to discredit the outgoing Tehran Police Commander and prove that the attack on the student dormitories was ordered by him (at one stage the cameraman is heard saying this). This could even set him up for prosecution.

* It could be an attempt to shift the blame for the post-election violence from the Revolutionary Guards into the police (at some points the plainclothes personnel, who could be assumed to be Ministry of Intelligence, Basij militia, or Guards operatives are seen asking the uniformed police not to beat the students).

* It could be an attempt to show that the police actions were coordinated with the Basij and the Guards (the Basij is now part of the Revolutionary Guards) and jointly carried out.

* It could be that someone from within the regime who is unhappy with the brutality has leaked the video, or it may have been leaked by someone or some group to gain political leverage within the establishment.

Whatever the motives behind the leak, the leaking of this video, the removal of two very senior security commanders of Tehran and the statement by the Tehran Police Commander may be an indication of problems behind the scenes. The past eight months have shown that there are serious rifts within the political leadership of the Islamic Republic, and these events may point to divisions within the security, military, and intelligence communities too.

Whatever the intention was for leaking this video, it has the effect of exposing the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic as either an uninformed figurehead or a liar. Neither of these two possibilities bode well for the regime.

Comments

[Observer]

Oh yes. The question of Khamenei as the 'uninformed figurehead' or the 'liar.' To date, cannot come down for certain on either side, but have no problem with a 'both' conclusion. Thank you for this information.

[pessimist]

Well I hope that this vid gets shown to him as no doubt he never gets to see 'nasty' things with his 200 (?) aids and bulwark against reality.

[Arshama]

Mr Verde,

Thank you so much for your concise report and especially the explanations.
Nima Rasaee from Roozonline obviously favours the first, i.e. that this video was leaked to discret Rajabzadeh, whom he labels as one of the two scapegoats the regime is going to sacrifice to calm down the popular anger. Said Mortazavi should be the second: http://www.roozonline.com/persian/opinion/opinion-article/article/2010/february/23//-f281306c20.html

Imho all four explanations are feasible, depending on who wants to denounce whom. Personally I would prefer explanation #4, the unhappy security personnel, but #3 would be far better, because it puts the blame on all of them.
In any case I agree with Observer: the SL is responsible, and if he cannot control the forces, who should protect the people instead of beating, raping and killing them, it's high time for him to move to a nursing home.

[Publicola]

The following brief study might answer a lot of questions ?

(here just a few questions to be answered:
why do the security forces appear relatively disorganized?
why are rules, normally painstakingly observed by security organs, not observed?
Why do some/quite a few of the perpetrators (members of the security unit) appear not to be as physically fit and present as it is to be expected from trained security forces?
why has this video been published at all and now? etc. etc.)

»Ansar-i Hizbullah / Followers of the Party of God

Ansar-i hizbullah, the followers of the party of God, (also known as Ansar-i Hezbollah or Ansar-e Hezbollah), is a semi-official, paramilitary organization in Iran which carries out attacks on those whom it perceives to be violating the precepts of Islam, such as women wearing makeup, reformist protestors, and unmarried couples.

This clandestine organization took its formal name in 1992. However, its origins date back to the street gangs of the urban poor, called "Hezbollah" (Party of God), organized by various forces in the Islamic Republic regime during the revolution of 1979. Most of the members of Ansar-i Hizbullah either belong to the Basij militia or are veterans of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) who believed that they must continue fighting for the integrity of Islam. They realize their vision through physical intimidation of those whom they view as the enemies of Ayatollah Khameini and Islam. They are known to break up demonstrations against the government, assault people in western dress, and raid shops that sell forbidden items. They have also been accused by some of politically-based assassinations.

Ansar-i Hizbullah became more prominent after it attacked student dormitories at Tehran University in July of 1999. This attack was in response to a peaceful student protest on July 8th concerning further restrictions on the press. In concert with police, members of Ansar-i Hizbullah chased and beat the students back to their dorms. At the end of the morning, two students were dead and twenty were hospitalized. When the newspapers reported these attacks, protests lasting five days spread to 13-18 other cities in Iran.

The Iranian government has chosen to tacitly support groups like Ansar-i Hizbullah because they both aim to maintain the conservative status quo in Iran. Senior conservative clerics use gangs like Ansar-i Hizbullah as a way to consolidate their power and harass and/or eliminate their enemies. Therefore, Ansar-i Hizbullah enjoys a semi-official status; while they are not officially a part of the government, they complement the Iranian government's existing intelligence and security apparatus. Many senior clerics have been associated with Ansar-i Hizbullah and are thought to finance it. Additional evidence of its favorable status lies in the fact that during its 1999 attack on Tehran University, its members used 1000cc-engine motorcycles, which only security service members are allowed to possess.

Thus, the Iranian government is behaving in a manner similar to Maoist China when it channeled youthful nationalists into Red Guard gangs which would assault the government's purported enemies. Like these Red Guards, Ansar-i Hizbullah wishes to make the revolution permanent by assaulting those who advance an agenda of change.

The Iranian government, confronted with internal calls for reform, enacted a compromise by not performing a massive military crackdown on the dissidents, but rather letting militant groups like Ansar-i Hizbullah prevent the movement from spreading further.

While paramilitary groups like Ansar-i Hizbullah are currently useful in extending the government's control over its citizens, they also pose a threat to the government. First, the Iranian government must keep these groups on a tight leash or they may become powerful enough to challenge the government for political power. Second, if the government ever decides to institute any reforms, groups like Ansar-i Hizbullah may violently oppose any such actions and create instability and unrest.

Ansar-i Hizbullah has succeeded in quieting many of its political opponents through its intimidating tactics. Nonetheless, its recent violent acts may be a portent that they, along with their conservative backers, are losing power in Iran - Ansar-i Hizbullah would not be committing these acts of violence if there were no signs of modernization to confront.«

Source:
Website of GlobalSecurity.org – page last modified 26th April, 2005

http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/iran/ansar.htm