UPDATED Iran Analysis: And The Nuclear Sideshow Goes On...And On...And On

UPDATE 1200 GMT: The US side of this nuclear dance just gets stranger. In a clear sign of the bureaucratic in-fighting, the Pentagon has issued an official statement repudiating the Secretary of Defense's reported three-page memorandum denouncing a lack of clear US strategy. Spokesman Geoff Morrell said the Obama Adminsitration has "spent an extraordinary amount of time and effort considering and preparing for the full range of contingencies".

So who was the original mischief-maker (and from which agency) who fed the Gates story to The New York Times?

The first day of Tehran's 48-hour nuclear disarmament festival, a response to Barack Obama's Washington summit, dazzles the non-Iranian media this morning. Even the top analyst Juan Cole follows the lead, with attention to the Supreme Leader's declaration that the use of nuclear weapons is forbidden (haram) in Islamic law:

An American audience just assumes that Khamenei is just lying and they feel (with some justification) that he is simply engaged in anti-American propaganda, and so he words fall on deaf ears here. But in much of the world, Khamenei’s speech will be taken as devastating to the US position.

I'm not sure how much rhetorical devastation has taken place --- I suspect that shrewd onlookers, despite the media brouhaha, will see both the Washington and Tehran gatherings as posturing in the US-Iran political contest.

However, our old friend David Sanger at The New York Times, fueled by the US Government, has his own mini-explosion to contribute:

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates has warned in a secret three-page memorandum to top White House officials that the United States does not have an effective long-range policy for dealing with Iran’s steady progress toward nuclear capability, according to government officials familiar with the document.

Several officials said the highly classified analysis, written in January to President Obama’s national security adviser, Gen. James L. Jones, came in the midst of an intensifying effort inside the Pentagon, the White House and the intelligence agencies to develop new options for Mr. Obama. They include a set of military alternatives, still under development, to be considered should diplomacy and sanctions fail to force Iran to change course.

Officials familiar with the memo’s contents would describe only portions dealing with strategy and policy, and not sections that apparently dealt with secret operations against Iran, or how to deal with Persian Gulf allies.

One senior official, who like others spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitive nature of the memo, described the document as “a wake-up call.” But White House officials dispute that view, insisting that for 15 months they had been conducting detailed planning for many possible outcomes regarding Iran’s nuclear program.

If Sanger took a moment's retreat from his dramatic prose, he might realise he is being given a walk-on part (see the precedent of Rosencrantz and Guildestern in W. Shakespeare's political case study Hamlet) in a bureaucratic battle over Iran policy. Gates isn't entirely happy with the State Department's diplomatic approach, so he fires off some paragraphs to the NSC to ask them to have a look at military options. Some of his staffers or allies in other departments pick up the phone to Sanger so he, as reporter, could put on some public pressure. Other officials (NSC? State Department? White House?) counter with the assurance that the US policy is being thoughtfully and carefully formulated.

Beyond this internal battle, Gates' "military alternatives", contrary to Sanger's implication in his lead paragraph, does not mean attacking Iran but strengthening the "containment" of Tehran in the region through a bolstered US presence and through the now ever-present rationale of tying the nuclear issue to "terrorism". That is not that distant from the policy being considered in other parts of the Obama Administration; the issue is one of degree --- how far to consider Iran as rival to be contained? how far to think of Tehran as a power who can be approached in discussions, to the point of pursuing a rapprochement over issues such as Iraq and Afghanistan?

Needless to say, Sanger never countenances the possibility that Iran is far from marching --- a la Khamenei's own theatrical declaration --- toward an atomic bomb. And he sprinkles in, from his unnamed Government officials, generalisations such as, "[Gates] wrote the memo after Iran had let pass a 2009 deadline set by Mr. Obama to respond to his offers of diplomatic engagement."

(Set aside Iran's media spin that it is taking the lead in diplomatic engagement to pursue disarmament. Tehran's reiterations that it wants discussions on a swap of uranium fuel --- albeit still murky as to whether that occurs inside or outside Iran --- is enough to puff away this US Government-supported article.)

Oh, well. Another 24 hours in Tehran of poses and declarations today. Then we'll be back to the rat-a-tat-tat, with no "That's All, Folks", of sanctions, sanctions, sanctions v. Iran's declarations that it stands tall in the face of Western provocation.

Afghanistan: US Night Raids v. "Hearts and Minds"? (Porter)

Gareth Porter writes for Inter Press Service:

General Stanley McChrystal has recently acquired the image of a master strategist of the population- sensitive counterinsurgency, reducing civilian casualties from airstrikes and insisting that troops avoid firing when civilians might be hit during the recent offensive in Helmand Province. One recent press story even referred to a "McChrystal Doctrine" that focuses on "winning over civilians rather than killing insurgents".

UPDATED Afghanistan Eyeball-to-Eyeball: Obama Administration v. Karzai

But there is a glaring contradiction between McChrystal's new counterinsurgency credentials and his actual policy toward the politically explosive issue of night raids on private homes by Special Operations Forces (SOF) units targeting suspected Taliban.


Since he took over as top commander in Afghanistan, McChrystal has not only refused to curb those raids but has increased them dramatically. And even after they triggered a new round of angry protests from villagers, students and Afghan President Hamid Karzai himself, he has given no signal of reducing his support for them.

Two moves by McChrystal last year reveal his strong commitment to night raids as a tactic. After becoming commander of NATO and U.S. forces last May, he approved a more than fourfold increase in those operations, from 20 in May to 90 in November, according to a report in the Los Angeles Times on 16 December. One of McChrystal's spokesmen, Lt. Col. Tadd Sholtis, acknowledged to IPS that the level of night raids during that period has reflected McChrystal's guidance.

Then McChrystal deliberately protected night raids from political pressures to reduce or even stop them altogether. In his "initial assessment" last August, he devoted an entire annex to the subject of civilian casualties and collateral damage, but made no mention night raids as a problem in that regard.

As a result of McChrystal's decisions, civilian deaths from night raids have spiked, even as those from air strikes were being reduced. According to United Nations and Afghan government estimates, night raids caused more than half of the nearly 600 civilian deaths attributable to coalition forces in 2009.

Those raids, which also violate the sanctity of the Afghan home, have become the primary Afghan grievance against the U.S. military. As long ago as May 2007, Carlotta Gall and David Sanger described in The New York Times how night raids had provoked an entire village in Herat province to become so angry with the U.S. military that men began carrying out military operations against it.

By 2008, the targets of the SOF raids had shifted from higher-level and mid-level al Qaeda and Taliban officials to low-level insurgents, especially those working on manufacturing and planting IEDs, the organization's main form of attack against foreign military personnel. That shift accelerated as the number of raids ballooned under McChrystal.

The inevitable botched raids killing large numbers of civilians brought a new wave of protests. After a December 2009 raid killed at least 12 civilians in Laghman province, according to an investigation by the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, students at Nangarhar University blocked the highway between Jalalabad and Kabul for several hours.

Read rest of article....