Afghanistan: Turning a Blind Eye to Corruption? (Sengupta)

Kim Sengupta writes in The Independent of London:

NATO has agreed on its long-awaited road map for the future of Afghanistan amid warnings that the process risks tolerating corruption and the power of the warlords for the sake of security.

The Alliance's summit in the Estonian capital ended [Friday] night without the details of the framework for a handover of security to President Hamid Karzai's forces being made public. The Independent has learned, however, that an area will be deemed ready for transfer if serious violence has been in abeyance for a period of time, if there is access to power by different ethnic and tribal elements and if the conditions are present for development projects taking place in relative safety.

Afghanistan: US Overruling Afghan “Allies” for Kandahar Offensive? (Porter)

According to senior diplomatic sources, clusters of provinces, rather than individual ones, will be transferred to "provide critical mass" able to withstand the Taliban. The decisions on the locations for handover and the timeframe involved will be made at a Nato conference later this year after talks between Western and Afghan government officials.


The start of the handover will not, however, mean that troops can start to withdraw, NATO officials stressed. British troops in particular will have to wait before pulling out as the areas in the south where they are based – the main battleground with the Taliban --– will be among the last to be transferred to Afghan control. [British Prime Minister] Gordon Brown had stated that the handover process will start this year, allowing UK forces to begin returning home.

The NATO secretary general, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, warned: "The future of this mission is clear and visible: more Afghan capability and more Afghan leadership... But it will not be a pullout. It will not be a run for the exit....Our soldiers will move into a more supportive role. So it will be a gradual process. This is conditions-based and not calendar-driven.''

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said: "We believe that with sufficient training and mentoring, the Afghans themselves are perfectly capable of defending themselves against insurgents. Does this mean it will be smooth sailing? I don't think so, just look at Iraq. A lot of progress has been made there but there are still problems with terrorism."

Mrs Clinton said she appreciated that there was a shortfall of staff to train the Afghan security forces. However, she added: "We have a gap that we're still working to fill. I'm convinced we'll get that filled. For me, the glass is way more than half full."

Although Afghan forces will take the lead, Western troops will be available to provide firepower and back-up if the insurgents appear to be making a comeback. If an area which has been handed back shows signs of suffering from endemic corruption or depredations of warlords the local people could protest through shuras – public meetings – said Nato officials. Mr Rasmusson, however, has said the handover process would be "irreversible" and a senior Western diplomat acknolwedged that a degree of corruption will necessarily have to be tolerated as long as it does not threaten the security of Nato forces. "It is not for us to detemine whether a particular district's governance is working or not, it is whether there is a threat to the area to a point that the insurgency threatens to take over," he said.

The diplomat pointed out that the policy of transfers remained uncertain. "Unless we are saying that we will stay and colonise the country we can't say everything is irreversible for ever and we will probably need to remain in support for several decades."

NATO officials also said that the Afghan side in the talks to decide which provinces or districts were suitable for transfer would be represented by officials of the Karzai government at national and local levels and there would be no input from independent groups on the matter.

Some Afghan observers pointed out that NATO's seemingly relaxed attitude about corruption was in marked contrast to the public condemnation by the US and British governments of the corruption in President Karzai's government and his link to warlords such General Abdul Rashid Dostum and Marshal Muhammad Qasim Fahim.

Syed Ali Laghmani, a political analyst based in Kabul, said: "There is a big danger that areas will be given over to strongmen because they can deliver security for the right side and keep out the Taliban. If the West does not make sure that people do not suffer from corruption in these districts then there will be a lot of trouble in the future.''

Afghanistan: US Overruling Afghan "Allies" for Kandahar Offensive? (Porter)

Gareth Porter writes for Inter Press Service:

The U.S. military has now officially backtracked from its earlier suggestion that it would seek the consent of local shuras, or consultative conferences with those elders, to carry out the coming military occupation of Kandahar city and nearby districts --- contradicting a pledge by Afghan President Hamid Karzai not to carry out the operation without such consent.

Afghanistan: Misunderstanding the Society, Killing the Civilians

Lt. Col. Tadd Sholtis, a spokesman for Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the commander of U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan, told IPS Tuesday that local tribal elders in Kandahar could "shape the conditions" under which the influx of foreign troops operate during the operation, but would not determine whether or where NATO troops would be deployed in and around the city.



Asked whether the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is committed to getting local approval before introducing more troops into Kandahar and surrounding districts, the McChrystal spokesman said, "We're not talking about something as simple as a referendum."

At a Mar. 29 briefing in Kabul on plans for the Kandahar operation, however, an unnamed senior U.S. military official told reporters that one of the elements of the strategy for gaining control over the Taliban stronghold is to "shura our way to success" - referring to the Islamic concept of consultative bodies. In those conferences with local tribal elders, the officials said, "The people have to ask for the operation... We're going to have to have a situation where they invite us in."

Those statements clearly suggested the intention to get the support of local tribal elders before going ahead with the large-scale military operation scheduled to begin in June.

That is what President Karzai said to a shura of between 1,000 and 2,000 Kandahar province tribal elders Apr. 4. Karzai said NATO's Kandahar operation would not be carried out until the elders themselves were ready to support it, according to a number of press reports.

According to the report by RTA, Afghanistan's state television service, Karzai actually said, "I know you are worried about this operation," before asking their opinion. He also said that the shuras to be organised at the district level were for the purpose of "getting approval and deciding" on the operation, according to the RTA report.

And the assembled elders made it known that they didn't want the operation.

That was clearly not what McChrystal, who was sitting behind Karzai at the shura, wanted to hear.

McChrystal's Deputy Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. William Mayville, and spokesman Sholtis both sought to minimise the damage from the incident. Mayville asserted that Karzai is "on board" on the Kandahar offensive, adding, "We would not have had this shura if he wasn't convinced this is the right stuff."

Sholtis suggested that Karzai had only "made it clear that he would involve local leaders in the decision-making process".

Sholtis acknowledged that "nobody wants a counterinsurgency fought in their backyard", but claimed that the elders who spoke at the Kandahar shura had "made it clear that Kandahar also suffers from an unwanted Taliban presence."

Sholtis also said the three elders who had expressed concerns about the operation had been supported by "probably about a third of the more than 1,000 who attended".

But published accounts of the meeting show that the elders were not calling for expelling the Taliban from the city and its environs. When Karzai asked the assembled elders whether they were "happy or unhappy for the operation to be carried out", they shouted loudly, "We are not happy," the Sunday Times of London reported.

As reported by AFP, when Karzai asked, "Are you worried?" the elders shouted back, "Yes we are!"

According to the RTA account, one elder interrupted Karzai to say, "Who are the Taliban, but my son and another's nephew? The problem is actually these people who are in power, in particular the tribal elders and those who have power in Kandahar city."

And in a revealing response, Karzai said, "Absolutely, you are right..."

Some of the elders told CNN's Atia Abawi they preferred to negotiate with the Taliban rather than confront them in a military offensive.

Read rest of article....

Iran: A View From Tehran "The New Year Challenges"

Analysis from inside Iran can often be as interesting for what lies behind the words on the page as for the claims on the surface. Consider, for example, the latest perspective in Iran Review from Firouzeh Mirrazavi:

About one month after the beginning of the new Iranian calendar year (March 21, 2010) and following international registration of Norouz by the United Nations General Assembly, Iran is facing new challenges: part of this is domestic while another part emanates from Iran’s international and regional policies as well as international pressures it is bearing. Some Iran experts maintain that social unrests following presidential polls in 2009 have led to the isolation of certain parts of the Iranian society, political circles, media crew, and political parties and activists. Post-election events have deepened the gaps and put the country on a wrong track which cannot help to solve any of the existing problems.

The Latest from Iran (15 April): Accepting Authority?

As history has proven in past several thousands of years, enemies usually hit the country in such junctures by fanning the flames of differences. Ambiguities in international relations, especially where Iran’s national security is at stake, have further complicated the situation. Examples to the point include:


1. Iran’s nuclear case and plans by the Security Council and 5+1 to impose tougher sanctions on Iran as the country is getting ready to host an international conference on disarmament and nonproliferation and a similar conference on nuclear security is forthcoming in the United States;

2. Elections in Iraq and persistence of political challenges over the composition of the next Iraqi government;

3. The ongoing situation in Afghanistan and prospects of possible reconciliation between [President Hamid] Karzai and NATO alliance and Taliban forces;

4. Iran’s relations with Saudi Arabia which have been marred by an ongoing crisis of distrust between the two states in addition to territorial and strategic pressures from other Persian Gulf states which are in line with the regional interests of western countries;

5. Israel’s continued threats to use military force against Iran;

6. Tension between Iran and its northern neighbors over the country’s share of the Caspian Sea’s energy resources; and

7. Insecurity of the Iranian borders due to widespread presence of foreign troops in neighboring countries and activities of terrorist and insurgent groups in border areas.

Having a healthy, happy and progressive society by taking advantage of knowledge, expertise and efficiency of all social classes and political groups is the best way to overcome the above-mentioned difficulties. Problems can be successfully solved only when the majority of the Iranian nation, regardless of their political tendencies, lends its support to the government. National unity is an inevitable necessity under existing circumstances and to secure Iran’s rights and interests, there is no better option than strengthening national unity and fostering peace and tranquility in the country.

Afghanistan: Misunderstanding the Society, Killing the Civilians (Porter)

Gareth Porter writes for Inter Press Service:

A Special Operations Forces raid on Feb. 12 on what was supposed to be the compound of a Taliban leader but that killed three women and two Afghan government officials demonstrated a fatal weakness of the U.S. military engagement in Afghanistan: after eight years of operating there, the U.S. military still has no understanding of the personal, tribal and other local socio-political conflicts.

In targeting the suspected Taliban in such raids, therefore, the U.S. military command has been forced to rely on informants of unknown reliability --- and motives.

Afghanistan: Death And The Prices We Pay for Intervention

As a provincial council member from Gardez, near the scene of the botched raid, declared bitterly last week, U.S. Special Forces "don't know who is the enemy and who isn't".


When the commander of the Joint Special Operations Command, Adm. William McRaven, went to the site of the raid to apologise, the head of the extended family which lost five people to the SOF unit, Hajji Sharibuddin, demanded that the U.S. military turn over "the spy who gave the false information to the Americans".

Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal and his chief of intelligence, Gen. Michael Flynn, have admitted the profound ignorance of the U.S. military about Afghan society, while avoiding the implications of that ignorance for the issue of false intelligence on the Taliban.

McChrystal acknowledged in his "initial assessment" last August that his command had to "acquire a far better understanding of Afghanistan and its people".

In an interview with National Public Radio Aug. 13, Flynn admitted, "What we really have not done to the degree that we need to is really truly understand the population: the tribal dynamics, the tribal networks, the ethnicity…."

Such dynamics are different "from valley to valley", Flynn observed.

And in an unusual paper published by the Centre for a New American Security last October, Flynn was even more frank, saying, "I don't want to say we're clueless, but we are. We're no more than fingernail deep in our understanding the environment."

Flynn avoided any suggestion that this profound ignorance of the society in which U.S. troops are operating could affect targeting of suspected Taliban. He asserted that the intelligence problem is not about the Taliban but about the lack of knowledge about governance and development issues.

But a foreign military force that is so fundamentally ignorant of the socio-political forces at play inevitably allows local sources which have access to it to act in their own self-interest.

More often than not, the U.S. and NATO have depended heavily on ties with Afghan tribal leaders and warlords. That has proven disastrous over and over again.

Read rest of article....

Afghanistan: Death And The Prices We Pay for Intervention

Stephen Walt ,  writing on Foreign Policy about the recent Wikileaks release on the killing of civilians in Iraq in 2007 by US forces, touches on the idea that massacres like the one in the Wikileaks video are to be expected as part of the price of our interventionist policies:

Notice that I am not suggesting that the personnel involved failed to observe the proper "rules of engagement," or did not genuinely think that the individuals they were attacking were in fact armed. Rather, what bothers me is that they were clearly trying to operate within the rules, and still made a tragic error. It reminds us that this sort of mistake is inevitable in this sort of war, especially when we rely on overwhelming firepower to wage it. When we intervene in other countries, this is what we should expect.

Afghanistan: The Humanity Missing From Our Debate

It's an excellent point, but unfortunately it's too easily dismissed with the old "war is hell" cliche, as in this piece from Bouhammer:

Soldiers cannot get wrapped around every single life they are forced to take by virtue of being in combat. Soldiers (and I use soldiers generally describing all service-members), use dark humor and take it all in stride when they have to take lives. They can’t be effective by getting wrapped around the axle over taking human lives. So what you hear in this video is soldiers being soldiers. Nobody likes killing innocents, especially children and that is evident when the soldiers on the ground immediately start calling for a MEDEVAC to come get the wounded children.

Clearly not everyone sees killing people as an unacceptable price of war, particularly when it's soldiers doing it. Bouhammer simply took Walt's adviceand expected the horrible deaths as a natural result of the policy.

But there is a bit more to the price of war than just the loss of lives. So let's get a little cold-hearted for a moment and just accept that we need to murder these people as part of our strategy. Even if we're OK with that, the price of this strategy is still astronomically expensive.

Let's start just with the cost of transporting supplies to our troops. Not the supplies themselves, just the cost of transporting them. Tom Engelhardt explains:

Believe it or not, according to the Washington Post, the Defense Department has awarded a contract worth up to $360 million to the son of an Afghan cabinet minister to transport U.S. military supplies through some of the most dangerous parts of Afghanistan – and his company has no trucks. (He hires subcontractors who evidently pay off the Taliban as part of a large-scale protection racket that allows the supplies through unharmed.) This contract is, in turn, part of a $2.1 billion Host Nation Trucking contract whose recipients may be deeply involved in extortion and smuggling rackets, and over which the Pentagon reportedly exercises little oversight.

That'sthe US taxpayer, paying $2 billion just for trucks run by corrupt warlords and Taliban interlopers who will use them to smuggle  God knows what, possibly drugs or guns used to kill our soldiers. Lovely. But we have to pay that, because in order for our war strategy to work we've got to have soldiers in "some of the most dangerous parts of Afghanistan".

That's just for the trucks. How do we get the supplies on to those trucks? Well, they come through an airbase in Kyrgyzstan. The price for that is the usual support for a police state dictator and paying rent with US taxpayers' money. And that price is about to go up:

The news of ongoing unrest in the central Asian republic has been received with concern by Washington. The U.S. embassy in Bishkek said it was "deeply concerned" about "civil disturbances" in the country, in a statement released on Wednesday.

Saying that the situation in Kyrgyzstan was "still very fluid", John Kerry, the chair of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, expressed "regret for the loss of life" in the country and called on all sides to be "calm and refrain from violence". He called upon Kyrgyz parties to address the "underlying political, economic and social issues" in a "transparent process that brings stability and fundamental rights to all."

The U.S. State Department said that transport operations at the Manas military installation outside Bishkek have been "functioning normally." The U.S. military has used the base over the past several years as a staging post for its operations in Afghanistan. Despite the call for the base’s closure by opposition leaders reportedly in charge now, it remains to be seen whether the new government will take practical steps toward that end.

There are worries in the U.S. that the new opposition-led government may increase the rent for Manas base by renegotiating the terms of its agreement with the U.S., according to Foreign Policy’s Cable blog. Such a renegotiation, Cable said, may offer Russia an opportunity to influence an agreement over the base.

So our pet dictator was ousted in a violent uprising (I won't get into the awful stuff he did to deserve that here), and now the new opposition government is going to be raising the rent, if not evicting us completely. This also apparently gives Russia, who we desperately need in other matters like the Iranian nuclear file, a bargaining chip to play against the US.

But the cost goes beyond rent or trucks or anything you can put a dollar sign on. We're also actively working to subvert European democracies as part of the cost of our war:

A newly leaked CIA report prepared earlier this month analyzes how the U.S. Government can best manipulate public opinion in Germany and France -- in order to ensure that those countries continue to fight in Afghanistan. The Report celebrates the fact that the governments of those two nations continue to fight the war in defiance of overwhelming public opinion which opposes it -- so much for all the recent veneration of "consent of the governed" -- and it notes that this is possible due to lack of interest among their citizenry: "Public Apathy Enables Leaders to Ignore Voters," proclaims the title of one section.

We're paying the CIA to figure out how to screw over the voters of France and Germany, and I wouldn't be surprised if the same chicanery was happening in American politics. We're way past blowing taxpayer funds and into the territory of destroying our own national values. And for what? Who actually stands to benefit from all of these prices that we're paying?

Afghan President Hamid Karzai has slammed Western backers for the second time in a week, accusing the United States of interference, The Wall Street Journal reported Sunday.

In a private meeting with up to 70 Afghan lawmakers Saturday, Karzai also warned that the Taliban insurgency could become a legitimate resistance movement if foreign meddling in Afghan affairs continues, the Journal said, citing participants in the talks.

During the talks, Karzai, whose government is supported by billions of dollars of Western aid and 126,000 foreign troops fighting the Taliban, said he would be compelled to join the insurgency himself if the parliament does not back his bid to take over Afghanistan's electoral watchdog

That's right, we're paying a couple billion to Taliban warlords over here, propping up a police state over there, subverting democracies all over the place, and all for a corrupt mountebank like Karzai who wants to join the Taliban. And remember, I'm just picking examples out of thin air here; the cost of trucks, the Kyrgyz airbase, the CIA memos. These aren't even the total cost of the war which will wind up costing in the trillions.

Let's go back to Walt's piece:

It reminds us that this sort of mistake is inevitable in this sort of war, especially when we rely on overwhelming firepower to wage it. When we intervene in other countries, this is what we should expect.

See, Americans do expect these costs. They understand the cliches that "war is hell" and, indeed, expensive. But Americans do question why they're paying these costs only to prop up criminals like Karzai. Why are we paying billions to Taliban smugglers and police states and anti-democratic intelligence operations just to build a country for a guy who wants to join the Taliban? And he's the best thing we've got over there, we've been there for over 9 years, there is no one else.

Americans aren't opposing the cost of this war because they magically turned into pacifist hippies, they oppose the cost because we're paying for nothing over there. The best case scenario for the current price we're paying is we shell out trillions in deficit money, leave our soldiers to keep dying and killing innocent civilians for the next few years, subvert democracies worldwide, and destroy our own national values. All so Karzai will maybe not join the Taliban. Whatever goals we have in Afghanistan are simply not worth the price we're paying.

Josh Mull also writes for The Seminal and Rethink Afghanistan.