Afghanistan: Turning a Blind Eye to Corruption? (Sengupta)

Kim Sengupta writes in The Independent of London:

NATO has agreed on its long-awaited road map for the future of Afghanistan amid warnings that the process risks tolerating corruption and the power of the warlords for the sake of security.

The Alliance's summit in the Estonian capital ended [Friday] night without the details of the framework for a handover of security to President Hamid Karzai's forces being made public. The Independent has learned, however, that an area will be deemed ready for transfer if serious violence has been in abeyance for a period of time, if there is access to power by different ethnic and tribal elements and if the conditions are present for development projects taking place in relative safety.

Afghanistan: US Overruling Afghan “Allies” for Kandahar Offensive? (Porter)

According to senior diplomatic sources, clusters of provinces, rather than individual ones, will be transferred to "provide critical mass" able to withstand the Taliban. The decisions on the locations for handover and the timeframe involved will be made at a Nato conference later this year after talks between Western and Afghan government officials.


The start of the handover will not, however, mean that troops can start to withdraw, NATO officials stressed. British troops in particular will have to wait before pulling out as the areas in the south where they are based – the main battleground with the Taliban --– will be among the last to be transferred to Afghan control. [British Prime Minister] Gordon Brown had stated that the handover process will start this year, allowing UK forces to begin returning home.

The NATO secretary general, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, warned: "The future of this mission is clear and visible: more Afghan capability and more Afghan leadership... But it will not be a pullout. It will not be a run for the exit....Our soldiers will move into a more supportive role. So it will be a gradual process. This is conditions-based and not calendar-driven.''

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said: "We believe that with sufficient training and mentoring, the Afghans themselves are perfectly capable of defending themselves against insurgents. Does this mean it will be smooth sailing? I don't think so, just look at Iraq. A lot of progress has been made there but there are still problems with terrorism."

Mrs Clinton said she appreciated that there was a shortfall of staff to train the Afghan security forces. However, she added: "We have a gap that we're still working to fill. I'm convinced we'll get that filled. For me, the glass is way more than half full."

Although Afghan forces will take the lead, Western troops will be available to provide firepower and back-up if the insurgents appear to be making a comeback. If an area which has been handed back shows signs of suffering from endemic corruption or depredations of warlords the local people could protest through shuras – public meetings – said Nato officials. Mr Rasmusson, however, has said the handover process would be "irreversible" and a senior Western diplomat acknolwedged that a degree of corruption will necessarily have to be tolerated as long as it does not threaten the security of Nato forces. "It is not for us to detemine whether a particular district's governance is working or not, it is whether there is a threat to the area to a point that the insurgency threatens to take over," he said.

The diplomat pointed out that the policy of transfers remained uncertain. "Unless we are saying that we will stay and colonise the country we can't say everything is irreversible for ever and we will probably need to remain in support for several decades."

NATO officials also said that the Afghan side in the talks to decide which provinces or districts were suitable for transfer would be represented by officials of the Karzai government at national and local levels and there would be no input from independent groups on the matter.

Some Afghan observers pointed out that NATO's seemingly relaxed attitude about corruption was in marked contrast to the public condemnation by the US and British governments of the corruption in President Karzai's government and his link to warlords such General Abdul Rashid Dostum and Marshal Muhammad Qasim Fahim.

Syed Ali Laghmani, a political analyst based in Kabul, said: "There is a big danger that areas will be given over to strongmen because they can deliver security for the right side and keep out the Taliban. If the West does not make sure that people do not suffer from corruption in these districts then there will be a lot of trouble in the future.''

Afghanistan: US Overruling Afghan "Allies" for Kandahar Offensive? (Porter)

Gareth Porter writes for Inter Press Service:

The U.S. military has now officially backtracked from its earlier suggestion that it would seek the consent of local shuras, or consultative conferences with those elders, to carry out the coming military occupation of Kandahar city and nearby districts --- contradicting a pledge by Afghan President Hamid Karzai not to carry out the operation without such consent.

Afghanistan: Misunderstanding the Society, Killing the Civilians

Lt. Col. Tadd Sholtis, a spokesman for Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the commander of U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan, told IPS Tuesday that local tribal elders in Kandahar could "shape the conditions" under which the influx of foreign troops operate during the operation, but would not determine whether or where NATO troops would be deployed in and around the city.



Asked whether the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is committed to getting local approval before introducing more troops into Kandahar and surrounding districts, the McChrystal spokesman said, "We're not talking about something as simple as a referendum."

At a Mar. 29 briefing in Kabul on plans for the Kandahar operation, however, an unnamed senior U.S. military official told reporters that one of the elements of the strategy for gaining control over the Taliban stronghold is to "shura our way to success" - referring to the Islamic concept of consultative bodies. In those conferences with local tribal elders, the officials said, "The people have to ask for the operation... We're going to have to have a situation where they invite us in."

Those statements clearly suggested the intention to get the support of local tribal elders before going ahead with the large-scale military operation scheduled to begin in June.

That is what President Karzai said to a shura of between 1,000 and 2,000 Kandahar province tribal elders Apr. 4. Karzai said NATO's Kandahar operation would not be carried out until the elders themselves were ready to support it, according to a number of press reports.

According to the report by RTA, Afghanistan's state television service, Karzai actually said, "I know you are worried about this operation," before asking their opinion. He also said that the shuras to be organised at the district level were for the purpose of "getting approval and deciding" on the operation, according to the RTA report.

And the assembled elders made it known that they didn't want the operation.

That was clearly not what McChrystal, who was sitting behind Karzai at the shura, wanted to hear.

McChrystal's Deputy Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. William Mayville, and spokesman Sholtis both sought to minimise the damage from the incident. Mayville asserted that Karzai is "on board" on the Kandahar offensive, adding, "We would not have had this shura if he wasn't convinced this is the right stuff."

Sholtis suggested that Karzai had only "made it clear that he would involve local leaders in the decision-making process".

Sholtis acknowledged that "nobody wants a counterinsurgency fought in their backyard", but claimed that the elders who spoke at the Kandahar shura had "made it clear that Kandahar also suffers from an unwanted Taliban presence."

Sholtis also said the three elders who had expressed concerns about the operation had been supported by "probably about a third of the more than 1,000 who attended".

But published accounts of the meeting show that the elders were not calling for expelling the Taliban from the city and its environs. When Karzai asked the assembled elders whether they were "happy or unhappy for the operation to be carried out", they shouted loudly, "We are not happy," the Sunday Times of London reported.

As reported by AFP, when Karzai asked, "Are you worried?" the elders shouted back, "Yes we are!"

According to the RTA account, one elder interrupted Karzai to say, "Who are the Taliban, but my son and another's nephew? The problem is actually these people who are in power, in particular the tribal elders and those who have power in Kandahar city."

And in a revealing response, Karzai said, "Absolutely, you are right..."

Some of the elders told CNN's Atia Abawi they preferred to negotiate with the Taliban rather than confront them in a military offensive.

Read rest of article....

Iran: A View From Tehran "The New Year Challenges"

Analysis from inside Iran can often be as interesting for what lies behind the words on the page as for the claims on the surface. Consider, for example, the latest perspective in Iran Review from Firouzeh Mirrazavi:

About one month after the beginning of the new Iranian calendar year (March 21, 2010) and following international registration of Norouz by the United Nations General Assembly, Iran is facing new challenges: part of this is domestic while another part emanates from Iran’s international and regional policies as well as international pressures it is bearing. Some Iran experts maintain that social unrests following presidential polls in 2009 have led to the isolation of certain parts of the Iranian society, political circles, media crew, and political parties and activists. Post-election events have deepened the gaps and put the country on a wrong track which cannot help to solve any of the existing problems.

The Latest from Iran (15 April): Accepting Authority?

As history has proven in past several thousands of years, enemies usually hit the country in such junctures by fanning the flames of differences. Ambiguities in international relations, especially where Iran’s national security is at stake, have further complicated the situation. Examples to the point include:


1. Iran’s nuclear case and plans by the Security Council and 5+1 to impose tougher sanctions on Iran as the country is getting ready to host an international conference on disarmament and nonproliferation and a similar conference on nuclear security is forthcoming in the United States;

2. Elections in Iraq and persistence of political challenges over the composition of the next Iraqi government;

3. The ongoing situation in Afghanistan and prospects of possible reconciliation between [President Hamid] Karzai and NATO alliance and Taliban forces;

4. Iran’s relations with Saudi Arabia which have been marred by an ongoing crisis of distrust between the two states in addition to territorial and strategic pressures from other Persian Gulf states which are in line with the regional interests of western countries;

5. Israel’s continued threats to use military force against Iran;

6. Tension between Iran and its northern neighbors over the country’s share of the Caspian Sea’s energy resources; and

7. Insecurity of the Iranian borders due to widespread presence of foreign troops in neighboring countries and activities of terrorist and insurgent groups in border areas.

Having a healthy, happy and progressive society by taking advantage of knowledge, expertise and efficiency of all social classes and political groups is the best way to overcome the above-mentioned difficulties. Problems can be successfully solved only when the majority of the Iranian nation, regardless of their political tendencies, lends its support to the government. National unity is an inevitable necessity under existing circumstances and to secure Iran’s rights and interests, there is no better option than strengthening national unity and fostering peace and tranquility in the country.

Afghanistan: The Humanity Missing From Our Debate

EA correspondent Josh Mull is also the Afghanistan Blogging Fellow for The Seminal and Brave New Foundation and publishes at Rethink Afghanistan.

Former South Carolina senator Ernest Hollings has written an excellent editorial  calling the US war in Afghanistan "Not Necessary." It's always good to see fiscal conservatives sticking to their beliefs and opposing the incredible cost, but Hollings also stakes his reputation and personal experience in Vietnam against the current conflict:

I was "a hard charger" on the war in Vietnam. In fact, the motion for the last $500 million that went into the Vietnam War was made by me on the Senate Appropriations Committee. I thought the Vietnamese were willing to fight and die for democracy. Some were, but a lot more were willing to give up their lives over ten years for communism. Now I have learned that people want other types of government other than democracy. I've been to Hanoi; visited John McCain's prison, and the people of Vietnam are happy.

Clearly he's not some reckless hippy, he actually supported Vietnam. But he learned the harsh realities of war, the futility and madness of it all.



Unfortunately, there's a downside to Hollings' piece. He seems to justify part of his opposition with the orientalist smear of Afghans as xenophobic:

The one thing we learned in Charlie Wilson's War is that Afghans don't like or trust foreigners. President Karzai in the morning news is campaigning against the UN and all foreigners because he knows this makes him popular with the Afghans.

Yes, apparently the reason our efforts are failing is because the Afghans are just too racist to listen to our ideas. It couldn't possibly be something we're doing, right? It has to be those racist Afghans.

After all, Americans love foreigners! When Hispanic immigrants come to El Norte, our minuteman militias are there at the border to greet them with candy and job brochures. When our factories are shipped overseas, American workers are happy just to be giving those impoverished foreigners a job. And certainly none of us would think to insult the President by calling him a foreigner. Only Afghans hate foreigners, just like in Charlie Wilson's War.

So do I think Hollings is that delusional? No way. His remarks are just indicative of how comfortable we've become, on all sides of the conflict, with thinking of the Afghans as bizarre, alien creatures instead of the human beings they are. Hollings is taking a highly admirable, principled stand against the war, indeed against war itself, but he still manages to smear the Afghans for the failure of our invasion. Why? Because they "don't like or trust foreigner..

Let's go deeper into this alien Afghan fantasy with Michael Yon, who brings us this tale about his visit to an Afghan village:

With the Battle for Kandahar kicking off, and our troops surging in for the counteroffensive, villages previously beyond the periphery of our effective reach are becoming more accessible. Many of them have been Taliban-controlled. We don’t always know whether these isolated, dusty mud-walled places support, provide sanctuary, or are the native home of Taliban fighters. The Afghanistan government remains absent from most Afghan villages. The central government hidden away in Kabul still offers zero. Not juice, justice or security. The Taliban at least offers justice in some areas.

And so Charlie Company, some Afghan police, and Haji Oboyadulah Popal (the governor of Shah Wali Kot district), headed to the hills.

Just like Hollings' piece, we're off to a good start. Yon lays out the facts: The government in Kabul is "hidden away" and "offers zero" while the Taliban does a much better job of providing services to the locals. But that's not the point of Yon's post. He's taking us on a magical mystery tour to meet alien Afghan children.

For the first hour or so, no girls were to be seen, but the boys wanted their photos taken. Many villagers have never had their photos taken. The boys didn’t seem to know what the camera was until they saw their images. Soldiers and Marines sometimes carry Polaroid Cameras to villages. The villagers love to get the shots which often are the only photos they have ever owned.

Finally a lone girl came out. She wandered around for some time and a boy showed her to me, and when I lifted the camera he even shielded her eyes, but a moment too late. This was the first instance I saw anyone care if a young girl was photographed. Even the girl is covering her face. [emphasis added]

Weeeird. The zany Afghan culture seems to forbid strange foreign men taking pictures of little girls. But that's OK, Yon snapped a picture anyway, Americans know it's just nonsense. After all, Americans often approach little girls on the street and photograph them without permission. "Don't worry," they tell the parents, "it's just for my blog on the  Internet that anyone in the world can see." And Americans are super cool with that. But Yon has made another discovery --- fart jokes

There was a meeting going on with Captain Hanlin and the elders and the boys were well-behaved with them, but they were angling for attention.

The boys would have been fun if there were no meeting. We could have started a slingshot competition. But they were getting to be a pain. They magically disappeared and soon were crowded around the mortar team maybe 30 meters away. The crowd of boys began laughing so loudly that the meeting stopped a couple times to see what was up.

The British will designate a soldier to be the comedian during missions. When kids disrupt soldiers, the comedian can distract them away from business. Our folks were borrowing that good idea. I walked over and asked our guys how they had lured the kids away. Why were they laughing so loud? A soldier answered that they didn’t try to entertain the boys. He continued, “I just farted and they went crazy.” So he did it again and so on. The soldier boys with the mortars were getting along famously with the village boys.

Who knew that public corporeal depressurization is a great taboo in Afghanistan, but incredibly entertaining when done by Americans?

Yeah, crazy, not only is flatulence a "great taboo" to Afghans, but also their young males seem to find it humorous. That's nothing like American boys, who we know mostly prefer the early Woody Allen catalog and the letters of Oscar Wilde when it comes to comedy, never fart jokes. And a taboo? Americans are constantly farting on each other, to big applause and sincere appreciation. It's just good manners, like saying "please" and "thank you".

Of course, I don't think either Yon or Hollings intended to portray the Afghans in this light, as xenophobic murderers preventing our democracy or as fascinating creatures from an alien culture. We are simply too quick to gloss over the fact that we're dealing with people, human beings who deserve dignity, respect, and our consideration. When we dismiss their humanity, even unintentionally, it's actually us who suffers. We lose our humanity. Look at this post from Spencer Ackerman:

To get obscure for a second, there’s been a sense in this country for a decade about air strikes on terrorists and insurgent groups that equate them with weakness. Think about the number of times you’ve read permutations about “lobbing cruise missiles” at terrorist training camps or some such. There’s an understandable reason for that: air strikes are what you do when you can’t get close to a target on the ground. So imagine my surprise a couple years ago when I read al-Qaeda theoretician Abu Mus’ab al-Suri’s almost-mystical bewilderment with U.S. air power. (Seriously, read this book.) Having never been on the receiving end of a cruise missile or a predator missile or a JDAM, it can be easy to lose perspective about the destructive capability of those weapons, and the way they can focus the mind of an enemy. It’s fair to say al-Suri really was shocked and awed. He just wasn’t defeated by air strikes. Maybe that distinction is what’s led some of us perhaps to overcorrect our view of airpower in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency....

I do not know if any of that is happening. I just know that it makes some sense to believe that it could based on past observable behavior. The drone strikes themselves should probably not be viewed just as lethal occurrences, but as events that facilitate reactions in both an enemy cohort and a civilian population caught up in the mix. Any strike that occurs only occurs because an intelligence network allowed it to occur. And that’s the unheralded aspect — and the real determinant factor — of what the CIA’s drone program really is.

According to Ackerman, air strikes should be reconsidered because they scare the hell out of people, and we should try to judge the drone program in that light. Think about that for a moment. He says we should rethink our blasting away at "an enemy cohort and a civilian population" with "a cruise missile or a predator missile or a JDAM" because it effectively "shocked and awed" them, although admittedly it doesn't actually defeat them.

Good point! Now if only there was one simple term we could apply to this strategy of using violence to coerce and frighten a population into accepting your political agenda. Hmm.

Oh right. Terrorism.

Have I exposed Ackerman's secret desire to promote terrorism? Nope. Just like Hollings and Yon, Ackerman inadvertently forgot that he was talking about real Afghan human beings. Human beings who, just like us, enjoy fart jokes and hate corrupt government and don't like it when foreigners terrorize them with bombs. If you forget that, it's easy to think that the CIA using terrorism against xenophobes thousands of miles away is a good idea.

Now these are all pretty harmless examples of seemingly good-intentioned people de-humanizing the Afghans. But as over the top as I've been in my characterizations of them, these ideas that they unintentionally proliferate do have real, deadly consequences. My colleague at Rethink Afghanistan, Derrick Crowe, spent his Easter Sunday putting together this report:

Remember that survivors of the raid said that the special operations forces denied the wounded medical treatment and prevented survivors from going to get medical help for an extended period of time, during which one of the women and one of the men who were mortally wounded died.

That means special operations forces were busy digging bullets out of walls and/or people to cover their asses while the innocent people they shot were bleeding to death.

Those men and pregnant women our soldiers were carving bullets out of, those are the Afghans who "don't like or don't trust" foreigners, those are the Afghan boys who just like to have their picture taken, and they're the ones who are "shocked and awed" by our bloody bombing campaigns.

That's what we get when we deal with them on these orientalist terms. Our military carried out a nauseatingly gruesome massacre of Afghan civilians, covered it up, and then smeared the journalist who tried to report it. And why not? Afghans aren't people, they're an alien culture who hates foreigners, and we've got to use our awesome shock and awe strategy to defeat them, right? Nonsense.

Respect for Afghans is sorely lacking on all sides of the Afghanistan debate. It's 2010, nine years into the war, and we're still talking about Afghanistan in these orientalist terms. Yet it confuses and bewilders us when stories of war crimes and cover-ups like Derrick's seem to go unnoticed. We know why nobody wants to hear about the massacre. We don't want to think about them as human. This has to change now.

Afghanistan Update: US Military Reverses Position, Admits Killing Three Women

UPDATE 1255 GMT: The International Security Assistance Force has posted its official statement "that international forces were responsible for the deaths of three women who were in the same compound where two men were killed by the joint Afghan-international patrol searching for a Taliban insurgent".

The statement concludes, "'We regret any confusion caused by the initial statements and are committed to improving our coordination and understanding of Afghan culture and customs,' said [Brigadier General Eric] Tremblay.



ISAF officials will discuss the results of the investigation with the family of the individuals killed, apologize for what happened, and will provide compensation in accordance with local customs."

On 13 March, we carried a report from Jerome Starkey of The Times of London, “A night raid carried out by US and Afghan gunmen led to the deaths of two pregnant women, a teenage girl and two local officials in an atrocity which Nato then tried to cover up." We also carried the denial of the International Security Assistance Force: the report was "categorically false".

We took some heat for carrying the reports of killings of civilians by the US military. One reader commented, "This story is blatantly biased and filled with a bunch of ‘allegations’....Good luck with all that ‘Death to America’ bullshit."

This just in from The New York Times, picking up on Starkey's latest report (but not crediting him by name):

After initially denying involvement or any cover-up in the deaths of three Afghan women during a badly bungled American Special Operations assault in February, the American-led military command in Kabul admitted late on Sunday that its forces had, in fact, killed the women during the nighttime raid.


The admission immediately raised questions about what really happened during the Feb. 12 operation — and what falsehoods followed — including a new report that Special Operations forces dug bullets out of the bodies of the women to hide the true nature of their deaths.

A NATO official also said Sunday in an interview that an Afghan-led team of investigators had found signs of evidence tampering at the scene, including the removal of bullets from walls near where the women were killed. A senior NATO official later denied on Monday that any evidence tampering occurred.

Starkey's article offers more detail:

A senior Afghan official involved in a government investigation told The Times: “I think the special forces lied to [commander of US forces, General Stanley] McChrystal.”

“Why did the special forces collect their bullets from the area?” the official said. “They washed the area of the injuries with alcohol and brought out the bullets from the dead bodies. The bodies showed there were big holes.”

The official, who asked not to be named until the results of the investigation have been made public, said that the assault force sealed off the compound from 4am, when the raid started, to 11am, when Afghan officials from Gardez were finally allowed access to the house.

At least 11 bullets were fired during the raid, the investigator said, and the shooting was carried out by two American gunmen positioned on the roof of the compound. Only seven bullets were recovered from the scene.

“I asked McChrystal, ‘why did the Americans clean some of the bullets from the area?’ They don’t have the right to do that,” the official said.

Haji Sharabuddin, the head of the family who were attacked, toldThe Times last month that troops removed bullets from his relatives’ bodies, but his claims were impossible to verify. The hallway where four of the five victims were killed had been repainted and at least two bullet holes had been plastered over.