Transcript and Analysis: Mullen, Eikenberry Sell the Afghanistan War on CNN (23 August)

Video & Transcript: Mullen, Eikenberry Sell Afghanistan War on "Meet the Press" (23 August)

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This may be one of the most depressing interviews I have read since the start of the Obama Administration. (And it will get worse later today --- I have seen clips from a similar performance on NBC's Meet the Press; we're waiting for the full video and transcript.) The White House, amidst the political complexity of this week's events in Afghanistan, put up two military men --- Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, and the US Ambassor to Afghanistan, General Karl Eikenberry --- for set-up questions from John King.

The political knowledge in this exchange is almost vacant, with the platitudes about "democracy" (note Eikenberry's excited spin that he couldn't get the indelible ink off his finger) substituting for the serious issues about the election --- today, there are reports that the declaration of the vote may be delayed because of fraud allegations --- and the politics beyond it.

Instead the conversation turns to militarising the US involvement, with the question, "How many more troops?" And, of course, this is all rationalised by skipping over the Afghan people and referring to "Al Qa'eda" (who, I'll note for the record, are not in Afghanistan but in another country).

KING: This is the “State of the Union” report for Sunday, August 23rd.

In Afghanistan today, both President Hamid Karzai and his top challenger are claiming victory in last week’s election, raising tensions, even though it could be weeks or more before the official results are certified. It is an uncertain military situation, as well, with fighting between U.S. forces and the Taliban intensifying. And fresh indications President Obama could soon be asked to commit more American troops.

Here to talk about this and other global challenges are the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen , and the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, Karl Eikenberry. He joins us from Kabul.

And Mr. Ambassador, let me start with you. There are complaints, escalating complaints this Sunday about fraud in the elections. On the threshold question of will this balloting be credible, what is your answer?

EIKENBERRY: Well, John, it was an extraordinary two months that we’ve been through, with this being a very historic election. Afghanistan, the first time in the past 30 years that the Afghan people have led an election for their president, for provincial councils, very intense campaign that occurred over the last two months, all new in Afghanistan. Presidential televised debates, campaign rallies. A very civil debate that occurred over this time.

The election itself, everyone knows how challenging it is in the country like Afghanistan to run an election. There’s an insurgency in parts of the country right now. It was an election in which over 6,000 voting stations were set up, crossing deserts and mountains, donkeys carrying ballots to the last polling stations of Afghanistan, and a very well-organized campaign. The Afghan-led independent electoral commission looks like it managed a pretty good process. There’s adjudication systems that have been up, an electoral complaints commission. There was a media complaints commission that was set up.

I got out myself and looked at some of the voting that was going on, and I can tell you, at least one part of the process, the indelible ink, over three days now I haven’t been able to get it off the finger.

Now, against all of that, where are we? Well, right now we’re waiting for the results of this election to come in. The electoral -- the independent electoral commission, they’re waiting for the tallies to be count from across the country. There’s been charges of fraud. The electoral complaints commission is taking those on right now.

We’re really not going to know, John, for several more weeks exactly where we do stand in this process.

We’re not sure exactly what the level of voter turnout was. Millions turned out to vote, but of course, Taliban intimidation, especially in southern Afghanistan, certainly limited those numbers. But for now, we don’t know, and it’s for us to wait and see and allow this process to move forward.

KING: Well, Admiral, jump in on that point. Wait and see, could be weeks, could be longer. It’s already a very tenuous political situation, a dangerous military situation. How worried are you that if you have complaints of fraud, you have a candidate from the north, one challenger, the president who’s from the south. Are you worried about ethnic tensions, ethnic violence escalating and complicating an already bad situation?

MULLEN: Well, this election was truly remarkable, and in terms of what Ambassador Eikenberry has laid out, in the face of what has been a growing insurgency, and certainly intimidation to a certain degree -- and we’ll see over the next few weeks how it actually plays out.

Our forces under the leadership of our new commander out there, General Stan McChrystal, were very focused in support of the Afghan security forces. And one of the highlights for me is that the Afghan security forces, the police and the army, provided security for these elections. And over 95 percent of the polling stations were open.

And so, we’ll keep that focus. And one of the possibilities, obviously, if there isn’t a majority winner here is a runoff. And so we’ll keep that focus and be able to keep that focus.

And at the same time, we’re aware of the insurgency. We’re addressing that, particularly in the south and the east. And so our combat leaders are very focused on that, as well, while General McChrystal shifts his focus to the security and the needs that the Afghan people have specifically for that security.

KING: Well, you mentioned General McChrystal. He is preparing a report to the president, in which many, especially members of the congressional delegation that just met with him, believe he’s going to ask for more troops.

Here’s what [Senator] Susan Collins said on her blog after meeting with both the ambassador and the general. She said, “Along with Ambassador Karl Eikenberry and their aides, the general provided us with a detailed briefing. He begins with his chilling assessment that the situation in Afghanistan is serious and deteriorating.” She says, sir, she left that meeting with no doubt that he will ask for more troops. And there have been a number of options circulated. A low-risk 15,000 more; medium-risk 25,000 more; high-risk 45,000 more.

Senator John McCain out this morning saying that he is worried that that has been made public, because he thinks there’s political pressure, and that at best, then, you guys will split the difference and give 25,000 more troops. Pressure?

MULLEN: Well, I think it is serious and it is deteriorating, and I’ve said that over the last couple of years, that the Taliban insurgency has gotten better, more sophisticated. Their tactics just in my recent visits out there and talking with our troops certainly indicate that.

General McChrystal is about to wrap up his assessment, and he’ll come in with that assessment in detail, and I haven’t seen that, that...

KING: You have no doubt he’ll ask for more troops?

MULLEN: Actually, we’re not at a point yet where he’s made any decisions about asking for additional troops. His guidance from me and from the Secretary of Defense was to go out, assess where you are, and then tell us what you need. And we’ll get to that point. And I -- I want to, I guess, assure you or reassure you that he hasn’t asked for any additional troops up until this point in time.

KING: Mr. Ambassador, you’re also a retired general, so you’re a military man now in a diplomatic role. I want to read you something from Senator John Kerry , the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, in the context of rising doubts here in the United States about what is the mission in Afghanistan, not only in the Congress but with the American people. Senator Kerry says, “I’m very concerned about Afghanistan’s footprint. The breadth of the challenge that we face there, with police, with governance, corruption, narcotics, tribalism, other kinds of things may well be beyond the narrower definition the president gave the mission.”

Do you believe, sir, that the American people understand what the mission is in Afghanistan?

EIKENBERRY: John, there are extraordinary challenges that we face in carrying out this mission, but we need to go back and remember Afghanistan and how it looked on the 10th of September of 2001. At that time, this was a state that was controlled by international terrorism. And so, the president’s strategy, the administration’s strategy is clear. It’s to disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al Qaeda.

Now, for what this means to us here in Afghanistan, to prevent the conditions that existed on the 10th of September in 2001, it means the hardening of the Afghan state, and that has a dimension to it of an Afghanistan where the government can provide for its own security with a capable army and a police force. It means the government upon which those security forces rest. It’s a government...

KING: Sir, I want to interrupt you. I want to interrupt you. I’m sorry to interrupt, but...

(CROSSTALK)

EIKENBERRY: ... services to the people.

KING: I just want to jump in, because there’s a credibility question that many people ask. And it may not be fair to you in the challenge of Afghanistan, but because of what happened in Iraq, people in Congress and the American people, certainly in my travels -- I was at Ft. Riley this past week -- they asked these questions.

I want to go back in time. In 2006, you were on this network when you were still in the military and you were asked about the situation in Afghanistan in 2006, and you said this.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP) EIKENBERRY: Things are getting better in Afghanistan in every dimension. If you look at it from the Al Qaida or the Taliban perspective, four and a half years ago, you ruled in Afghanistan. Now you’ve been pushed out of Afghanistan.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

KING: And that a year later, sir, you were back on this network, 2006 turned into a not so good year, but you were back the very next February and you sounded optimistic again.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

EIKENBERRY: I think as we’re now moving into 2007, we’re very well-postured for success. We see a very significant increase in the combat power of the Afghan national army, the police. President Karzai continues to improve governance. So I think we’re reasonably well-postured in 2007.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

KING: Is it not fair now in 2009, we are 18 days from the eighth anniversary of 9/11 -- you mentioned the situation on September 10th -- is it not a fair question for the American people to say, where has all the money gone? And why has there not been more progress? And should they, I’m sorry, sir, believe optimistic statements from their government?

EIKENBERRY: Well, John, I don’t think my statement right now would be characterized as optimistic. I’m being -- I’m giving a candid assessment that, as Admiral Mullen said, we have a very difficult situation in parts of Afghanistan today.

What we do have for the first time, I believe, since 2002, we have a very clear strategy, and matched against that we have sufficient -- we have resources that are being mobilized. That’s in the security domain. That’s in terms of very (ph) importantly on the civilian side here within the United States embassy, and our mission.

Admiral Mullen talked about the military dimension for Afghanistan. It’s critical, but in and of itself, it’s not sufficient. This is not going to be won entirely on the battlefield here for us in Afghanistan. It’s going to require that the government of Afghanistan develops capability over the next several years. It’s going to require further work in helping to develop a sustainable economy.

There’s a regional diplomacy dimension to this. And I think that as we look ahead, we see what our goals and objectives are. We’re mobilizing sufficient resources for those, but I don’t want to understate the degree of challenges that we’re facing.

KING: I would like to ask the ambassador and the admiral to stand by. Much more with Admiral Mullen and Ambassador Eikenberry in just a moment. When we come back, we’ll head to the magic wall for a closer look at these global challenges.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

KING: We’re back with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mike Mullen , and the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, Lieutenant General, retired, Karl Eikenberry.

Gentlemen, let’s continue the conversation. Here are the three leading candidates in Afghanistan -- President Karzai, Dr. Abdullah and Mr. Ghani. I want to move on to a major challenge, and you have a new strategy for dealing with this, Admiral. Help me understand. Look at this, the numbers are stunning. In 2001, Afghanistan produced 185 metric tons of opium. In 2008, look how much that has gone up, 7,700, from 12 percent of the world’s poppy crop to 93 percent of the world’s poppy crop.

Do you have a new counter-narcotic strategy that allows you to target drug kingpins if you believe they are supporting the Taliban and the insurgency? Is that correct?

MULLEN: Actually, yes, and we’ve had that for many months, and specifically changed our rules of engagement so that kingpins, laboratories, individuals who support, transport, specifically, these products are also able to be both either captured or killed. But we’re just...

KING: How? How if there is a pro-U.S. government, how has that happened?

MULLEN: We’re -- I just think it’s something that has not been the focus of the Afghan government, specifically over the last seven or eight years.

I mean, some of the things we’re seeing right now in terms of this conflict and the challenge is really a very comprehensive addressal of all aspects of it. So yes, I’ve got -- and -- changed ROE that allows me to do this, but that’s just part of the counter- narcotics strategy. Because...

(CROSSTALK)

KING: I’m sorry to interrupt, but if this has happened under President Karzai, do you have any reason to believe that if he’s reelected, that that will go down?

MULLEN: Well, I think it’s clearly something we’re going to have to keep a very close eye on and move in that direction.

There’s an agricultural strategy that goes across this, where they grow it. It wasn’t -- it was a few decades ago, but -- that Afghanistan actually produced enough food for itself, it exported food in this very rich agricultural valley.

Now, we’ve got to, I think, across our government and theirs focus on creating the infrastructure which allows them to produce the kind of products that they used to produce agriculturally.

KING: I want to look now, here is a glimpse at the U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan. 62,000 now, and most expect, although you say the review is not complete, that number to keep going up. Ambassador, I want you to come in on this point here. 62,000 U.S. troops, about 35,000 from other nations, those NATO allies. Many of the NATO allies invested a modest number of troops to provide security through the elections. Mr. Ambassador, define through the elections. Are some of these 35,000 now going to leave that the elections are over? Or do you have commitments for them to stay through final results?

EIKENBERRY: John, they are committed. We’ll know on the 17th of September, that’s the target date, at least for the independent electoral commission of Afghanistan, Afghanistan-led, to give the final announcements on the election. If no candidate achieves 50 percent, then there’ll be a runoff among the top two contenders, and we would expect that that election will occur then perhaps six weeks later or about four weeks later in mid-October. So we could have a four to six weeks delay here in the whole process if we do go to a runoff. But we have commitments from the forces that are here to stay on if needed for a runoff.

KING: For a runoff. Would you like more NATO forces, sir? And just how deep is your frustration that our allies, given the increasing challenge, will not commit more? To you, Mr. Ambassador?

EIKENBERRY: John, that was for me?

KING: Yes, sir.

EIKENBERRY: John, the commitment that we’ve got from our NATO allies here is pretty extraordinary. We’ve got, as you had pointed out, 100,000 troops on the ground; about 40,000 of those are non-U.S. They’re from 40 different countries, 40 plus different countries, from all the countries of NATO. This is the most ambitious, the most difficult mission that NATO in its 60-year history has ever conducted.

And so, yes, we’re hoping for more progress with our allies, but if we look at where this alliance was 10 years ago and where they are today, far from Europe, inside of Afghanistan, I think we have to take stock of the extraordinary commitments that our European and Canadian allies have made.

KING: We are running short on time, but Admiral Mullen, a couple quick questions for you in closing. Here’s the U.S. troop level in Iraq, down now to in the mid-120,000. We were at about 140,000 at the beginning of the year. Horrific violence this past week. Many saying just what was to be expected. They knew the U.S. troops were coming out, that the insurgents, those who want to commit violence, waited. Are you concerned about what’s happening in the context of the Iraqi response and to whether you’ll be able to keep this timeline to keep pulling U.S. troops out?

MULLEN: Extremely concerned by the incidents last week. I think everybody was, and the key is whether this is an indicator of future sectarian violence. And certainly, many of us believe that one way that this can come unwound is through sectarian violence.

Our leadership’s focussed on it. I know the leadership in politically and militarily in Iraq is very focussed on that. We’ve got also a little longer-term focus through the elections in January, and then after that, you know, that slope that you see there on the right-hand side of your graph is going to continue pretty dramatically between March and August of next year. The message is that the Iraqi leadership really has to take control and ensure...

KING: Is there a risk -- is there a risk this stops?

MULLEN: There’s always a risk. We have not seen a lot of this really until last week. And we’ve seen some positive signs up north, where possibilities existed before, but it’s something we’re all very, very mindful of and watching very carefully. Not just us from here, but our troops on the ground there as well.

KING: I want to ask you lastly, sir, your impressions, reactions. The Scottish court released the gentleman who was convicted of the Lockerbie bombing. He has gone back to Libya. There was a hero’s welcome on the ground in Libya despite a very strong message from the United States -- one, that they did not want him released, and two, that he should be put under house arrest in Libya. The FBI director says Libya is now -- that decision gives comfort to the terrorists, and obviously you saw the reaction in Libya.

There are proposed military sales to Libya on the table. As the gentleman who has to sign the orders sending men and women into combat around the world, what signal did the court send? And what have you seen out of Libya?

MULLEN: Well, this is obviously a political decision, which is out of my lane. But I mean, just personally, I was appalled by the decision.

KING: And if there are proposed Pentagon sales to Libya on the table, you’ll say no?

MULLEN: Well, we’ll deal with those down the road. It’s just where I am right now.

KING: All right, Admiral, I understand the restrictions you’re under there. I can tell by your face you’d like to say something a bit stronger. Admiral Mike Mullen , Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, thank you very much.

And up next, three U.S. senators from across the ideological spectrum debate whether to send more troops to Afghanistan and whether Congress hears your concerns about proposed health care changes. Stay with us.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

KING: President Obama says the war in Afghanistan is not one of choice, but of necessity. Still some in Congress are concerned that there’s no endgame for the U.S. military mission. Let’s talk it over with the ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Richard Lugar of Indiana, Armed Services Committee member and independent Senator Joe Lieberman of Connecticut, and Democratic Senator Benjamin Cardin of Maryland, a member of the Foreign Relations Committee.

Gentlemen, welcome. I want to get to Afghanistan in a minute, but I want to start where I ended with Admiral Mullen. Your reaction, the three of you involved so much in our international policy, to what happened, the Scottish court first releasing the gentleman convicted of the Lockerbie bombing.

And then we can show our viewers, I hope, the hero’s welcome he received back in Libya after a direct message from the United States to put him under house arrest and to not do just this.

Senator Lugar, what should the United States do now in the context of, A, relations with Libya which had improved and, in fact, on the table were some proposed military sales.

LUGAR: Well, I think we ought to continue our relations with Libya, but we ought to condemn as strongly as possible this release. I think the president has indicated he felt it was obnoxious, I would certainly concur with that.

But I think it’s very important to notice that the President Gadhafi has a constituency in Libya, which I suppose he was appealing. And the rest of the world is now engaged in diplomatic relations with Libya.

KING: You were there, sir...

LIEBERMAN: Yes.

KING: ... on a congressional delegation. And you delivered this same message. That you hoped he was not released, but if he was, there should not be that welcome. What should the consequences be?

LIEBERMAN: That’s absolutely right. That’s exactly what we said to Colonel Gadhafi. He obviously didn’t get the message that he believed that Al Megrahi was convicted politically. But the fact is he was convicted in a court of law according to the rule of law. This release -- the Scottish justice secretary committed an act of gross injustice here. The suggestions that have followed both from Libya, Gadhafi himself, his son Saif, and from the head of the British Libyan Business Council, that there was an intermixing here of Megrahi’s fate with British interest in oil exploration in Libya, are shocking.

I don’t want to believe that they are true, but they are hanging so heavily in the air that I hope that our friends in Britain will convene an independent investigation of this action by the Scottish justice minister to release a mass murder.

With regard to Libya, we warned respectfully at that point, because we hoped Colonel Gadhafi would get our message that he could not expect relations with the United States, which have been good since after the Iraq War of 2003.

He has destroyed his WMD. He is cooperating in counterterrorism with us. But he could not expect them to go on normally if Megrahi was not only released, but greeted as a hero. And that has happened. So I would say suspension of arms sales, don’t expect President Obama to meet Gadhafi at the U.N. General Assembly in New York in September.

This is a real setback for the anti-terrorist cause and takes our relations with Libya back to where they were for too long, a bad place.

KING: Do you agree with that assessment vis-a-vis Libya? And what do you believe was the motivation of releasing? Is it a humanitarian gesture, he has terminal cancer? Or do you believe there is something more suspicious?

CARDIN: Well, first, I think there should be consequences to those actions. So the terrorist showed no compassion for his victims. And to give him a compassionate release was wrong.

I think we also have to realize what impact this has on our war against terror. Here you see a terrorist being released after serving just eight years, a mass murder. I think it’s very serious and I think there should be consequences.

KING: And in terms of the motivation of the Scottish court? Do you share his questioning?

CARDIN: I think Senator Lieberman raises a very valid point. I think we need to know what this oil deal was all about and whether there was a compromise to the judicial system for commercial gain.

KING: All right. Let’s move on to Afghanistan and I want to ask a threshold question first, because we all lived through the Iraq debate. From a policy standpoint and from a political standpoint, it got pretty ugly here in the United States.

And, Senator Lugar, starting with you, has the president laid out to the American people a clear statement of the mission? Now, where we’re going, and what the endgame is?

LUGAR: In Afghanistan, is that a question?

KING: Yes.

LUGAR: No. And I think everyone waits for General McChrystal to give, really, the outline of where we’re headed, how many troops or whatever else is going to be required, and of course, as time goes by, the debate goes on.

The Washington Post had polling that indicated that a large number of Americans are losing faith in the mission. A majority of Democrats do not really favor continuing very strongly. Republicans still in favor of it. So I hope we don’t get into a partisan battle of that variety.

I think the president really has to face the fact that his own leadership here is critical. He really can’t just leave this to the Congress, to General McChrystal, and say, folks, sort of, discuss this, after the report comes in.

KING: Well, let me bring in Senator Cardin on that point. As the Democrat of the group here, 70 percent in that poll, Senator Lugar just referred to in The Washington Post poll, 70 percent of Democrats say this is a fight not worth fighting.

If General McChrystal says, I need more troops, will you vote for them?

CARDIN: Well, first, I think we have to see what he says. Clearly the president is defining our mission to go after the terrorists. There’s a lot of problems in Afghanistan. We didn’t choose this war, they attacked us. We need to make sure that Afghanistan and, quite frankly, the border with Pakistan is not a safe haven for terrorists.

That should be our objective. And we now need to know what do we need to do as far as resources to accomplish that mission?

KING: You were there and you met with the ambassador and you met with the general on this same international trip with Senator Collins, Senator McCain, Senator Graham. How many more troops is he going to need, sir?

LIEBERMAN: That we didn’t talk about in detail. But it’s very clear that General McChrystal is going to ask for more troops.

Incidentally, I think, John, that President Obama has been strong and clear in Afghanistan. Obviously there has been a lot else going on in Washington and in American politics.

LIEBERMAN: The recession, health care reform, et cetera, but the president came in and basically recommitted to what he had said during the campaign last year, that this was a war of necessity. That we were struck from Afghanistan when the Taliban was in charge on 9/11 ‘01. We can’t let the Taliban come back. This is as if we were in the end of the second world war, democracy was beginning to take route in Germany and the Nazis started an offensive to take the country back. That’s what the Taliban is doing. So right now, the president has put a new team in charge, and they’re good. General McChrystal, Ambassador Eikenberry, he’s committed to 21,000 more troops. They’re beginning to arrive. They’re making a difference, those marines, in southern Afghanistan under General Larry Nicholson, doing a great job in turning the tide.

KING: Do you see any political pressure on General McChrystal to ratchet down those numbers, to not ask for a significant number of more troops?

LIEBERMAN: I haven’t seen any. I sure hope there’s not. If there’s a lesson we should’ve learned from Iraq, some of the pressure that was put on our generals there not to ask for what they thought they needed to win meant that we lost a lot of lives, spent a lot of money. My own opinion coming back from Afghanistan with a new team, new strategy, we ought to take the option that General McChrystal gives us that has the least risk.

In other words, don’t dribble it out, don’t go for incrementalism. That’s a lesson we learned in Iraq. Frankly it’s a lesson we learned a long time ago in Vietnam that give our troops and our civilians there State Department, economic assistance, people, the support that they need as quickly as we can get it to them, and then demand that the Afghan government do the same. Raise the number of security forces that they have in the battle and produce a good government for their people.

KING: I want to move on domestic issues. Senator Lugar lastly on the international, how long do the American people need to be prepared for significant U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan?

LUGAR: Well, that’s the question the president will have to try to define much better. For example, we heard on your program this morning about the politics of the country, maybe taking several years to work out.

They have various other institutions in the economy, agriculture, the drug business and so forth. How many of these missions, leaving aside the Taliban and the al Qaeda being chased over to Pakistan, what have you. I think General McChrystal can’t answer all that. He can give some military guidance, but the political guidance of why Afghanistan should be reformed and how long we stay with it is a presidential, and it’s likely to last many, many years beyond this particular term.

KING: Many, many years, a sober assessment.

EA Video: Egypt's Mubarak Visits Washington

Our University of Birmingham colleague Adam Quinn was on Al Jazeera's Inside Story on Wednesday assessing the significance of the talks between Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and the Obama Administration in Washington. He was joined by Professor Abdullah al-Ashal, former assistant to the Egyptian Foreign Minister, and Christopher Preble, the director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute in Washington.

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y0MsbzPKr9E[/youtube]

EA Soundcheck: Scott Lucas talks to BBC World Service about Lockerbie

Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi, convicted of the 1988 bombing of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, was released from a Scottish jail today. Appearing with David Maddox of The Scotsman, I spoke with the BBC World Service's World Update about American objections to al-Megrahi's release, including the impact on US-UK relations (very little), US-Scotland relations (even less), and the real significance (US domestic politics and Hillary Clinton's move for power within the Obama Administration).

[UPDATE 21 August: Unfortunately, the BBC does not keep archived programmes of World Update so yesterday's programme is now in Broadcast Heaven (or Hell). Thanks to all those who listened!]

Truth and Reconciliation in/for Iran? A Roundtable Discussion

The Latest from Iran (11 August): Rafsanjani’s Decision

On July 31st, a politically diverse group of 31 academics, students, and anti-war protestors published an open letter in The Guardian of London, criticising what they viewed as the western media’s one-sided coverage of the post-election developments in Iran.   Foremost amongst the fallacies they perceived was the portrayal of the election results as “the start of a ‘velvet’ revolution against the Islamic Republic". At the same time, the letter alleged that the US State Department has used the crisis to “justify its continuation of Bush-era policies of financing anti-Iranian government organisations". Not only was this an act of political opportunism on the part of advocates of regime change, this interference and propaganda campaign aided the Iranian Government’s crackdown on the opposition and slowed the pace of democratic progress.

The authors contend that is only without foreign threats and interference that “the Iranian people [can] reach their aspirations of freedom and establish their unity in a framework of independence and national sovereignty.” For the reformist and Green Movement to affect real change in Iran, there must be a reversal of the West’s opposition to Tehran’s nuclear program and an “end [to] all their illegitimate economic, political and military pressures aimed at the internal destabilization of Iran".

Beyond this critique of Western policy towards Iran, the authors issued suggestions for finding a “reasonable solution for the conflict”. They demanded of the Government an end to attacks upon activists and the immediate release of political detainees. The letter also calls for a spirit of national conciliation facilitated by the establishment of an “independent truth and national reconciliation commission with representation from all candidates, such that it can gain the trust of the people of Iran". Addressing the leaders of the reformists and the Green movement, the authors suggest that “in order to prevent exploitation of the current crisis by western propaganda and opportunist groups, they unambiguously oppose all sanctions and condemn regime change. operations and any foreign support for the anti-Islamic Republic opposition".

The publication of this letter provoked a spirited debate within academic circles, so Enduring America invited interested parties to participate in a roundtable discussion. The exchanges touched upon all the issues raised in the letter but also spread to a wider debate on how the academic and media approach critical analysis of Iran. Participants included: Siavush Randjbar-Daemi, a Doctoral Candidate in Contemporary Iranian History at Royal Holloway, University of London. Holding dual Iranian citizenship, he has reported extensively on Iranian affairs for national Italian newspapers; Dr Farideh Farhi, a leading US-based scholar of Iran and co-author of the letter; Chris Emery, a British-based Doctoral Candidate who has written on Iranian affairs for The Guardian and contributes regularly to Enduring America; and Nathan Coombs, a Doctoral Candidate in London who specialises in revolutionary politics and is co-editor of the Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies.

SIAVUSH RANDJBAR-DAEMI: The authors introduce themselves as “anti-war activists” and proudly highlight their recent efforts against the “the pervasive deception created by western and Israeli-influenced media”. The group further attempts to remember that it does not wish to see a particular faction in Iran advance its goals, rather they wish to see the country’s “national rights” to be respected and be borne to fruition.

Like many Iranians across the globe, this group has been taken aback from the aftermath of the heady June 12 elections. They state that they wish to “help develop realistic solutions for the benefit of all our compatriots of whatever political persuasion” and particularly propose the creation of a South African-styled “Truth and Reconciliation Commission” to solve the current divergence internal to the regime and express hope that the large number of political activists and civil society practitioners currently imprisoned and facing trial will be freed soon.

What makes the “Open Letter” unappealing for informed readers are the frequent generalisations contained in some of its salient points. Particularly of concern is the lampooning of the Western media. While it is certainly true that segments of the European or American press have been incorrect if not entirely libellous in their respective Iranian coverage in past years - as unconfirmed scoops on the supposed military capabilities of the Iranian nuclear programme or the fake Yellow star story published by Canadian National Post in 2006 suggest - the concept that Western media as a whole has acted in unison to portray a constant skewed, biased and negative image of Iran is questionable. Even more alarming are sweeping judgements such as “The western media, by their one-sided coverage of the post-election developments, portrayed the street demonstrations protesting the election results as the start of a "velvet" revolution against the Islamic Republic”.

At the heart of this particular issue lies a more tangible definition of the “Western media”. The tendency to identify the latter with a few well known villains of the piece, such as BBC, CNN, Fox or Al Jazeera runs into serious trouble if one were to be present in media events in Tehran in the week preceding and following June 12. Nothing less than hundreds of reporters were accredited by the Iranian Culture Ministry for the elections, and most of whom catered for audiences that went in to the hundreds of thousands, if not millions. Coordination across several time-zones, languages as well as experience in direct reporting from Iran that went from journalists on their first assignment in Tehran to experienced hands who pointed out to sign-posts left unchanged since 1979 to produce any sort of “one-sided coverage” was well-nigh impossible. Rather than preach the ills of an inherently diverse group of reporters, the authors could have spent more time detailing the specific parts of the western media that engaged in deception and wrong-doing.

The analysis of the internal situation offered by the open letter also raises some questions. The bulk of the current political-legal quandary faced by the reformists internal to the Islamic Republic is essentially blamed upon the “provocative and confrontational policies” of George Bush, which, according to the authors, “played a key role in the defeat of Iranian reformists in the parliamentary elections of 2003 [sic] and the presidential election of 2005”. Whereas there are no grounds to dispute the erroneous and inhumane traits of Bush’s Middle East policy, the attribution of the conservative victories in 2004 - when the Guardian Council, a distinctively hawkish body, disqualified thousands of would-be reformist candidates from the Majlis race - and 2005, when the reformists and pragmatists such as Hashemi Rafsanjani paid the price of an extremely lacklustre political performance in preceding years, to foreign political meddling is a conjecture that would most likely baffle even the more staunch reformists in Tehran. While it is certainly true that the perception of increased outside intervention made life difficult for Khatami’s camp, one is left wondering why the latter successfully convinced the Supreme Leader to accept to a series of major overtures to the West in that same time frame, such as the wide-ranging settlement proposal sent to Washington soon after the Iraq war in 2003 ,which included a radical overhaul of Iran’s entire regional foreign policy, or the Tehran Nuclear Agreement between the EU3 and Iran in late 2003.  One is therefore left to ponder whether the reformists have been the target of their own undoing on the national political scene, going as they did from total control of Parliament and the presidency in 2000 to the almost total exclusion from institutional participation of present.

The analysis provided within the open letter as to the cause of present disturbances raises some questions. Most peculiar is the attribution of the decision by millions of Iranians to flood the streets of Tehran within hours of the election results to “various irregularities [...] including the suspension of reformist newspapers and mobile telephone SMS service on election day”. It would have been perhaps ideal at this stage to recall the main slogan of the protesting masses: “Where is my vote?” Iranians did not take to the streets to reclaim the distribution of reformists’ dailies or request the resumption of the ability to send text messages. Rather, they felt that an undeniable right of any modern society, and most particularly their own, that has spent the best part of the past century inconclusively engaging in a long-drawn state-building exercise, the chance to choose an official candidate of its liking, had been abruptly taken away from them. Far from being an irregularity whose classification can be cloaked under the term “various”, this request stands at the heart of the unparalleled tension between the different wings of the political elite of the Islamic Republic. Its omission from the discourse of the “open letter” is therefore surprising and of concern.

The open letter ends on a number of valid points, including the invocation to allow Iranians to be masters of their own destiny and the invitation, to Western governments, to avoid a repeat of the 1953 coup or any other sort of interference. However, in their role of informed and esteemed academics, the signatories should perhaps adopt a less generalising approach and one more inclined to grasp the complexity of the dynamics of the Islamic Republic’s relationship with the West and its domestic politics, whose insularity to winds of change occasionally blown from abroad appears to be remarkably resistant three decades after the Revolution that sought to end Western interference in Iran once and for all.

CHRIS EMERY: Although I found myself agreeing with large segments of this letter, I found its overall message confusing. This letter seems to have three aims: to criticise Western policy in Iran, to condemn Western media coverage of the current crisis, and to make suggestions to resolve the impasse. The first two assertions require a more detailed interrogation than is possible here and thus fall flat. The third aim requires MUCH more detailed elaboration, especially regarding the composition, remit, time frame and powers of the "national reconciliation commission". Without this, the purpose of this letter is as unclear as its intended audience. It reads more like a collection of academics trying to get something off their chests than a serious roadmap for solving the impasse.

Though I agree with many of the letter’s critiques of Western policy, several analyses are less persuasive. Firstly, the authors contend that the only thing standing between President Khatami's successful reformist agenda (1997-2005) and rehabilitation of Iran's relations with the West was Bush. This is simply false; Khatami had already faced a hard-line backlash in 1999 following the student riots and there is little to suggest the Supreme Leader was as equally committed to normalised relations. Even Khatami’s overtures were carefully pitched as a dialogue between faiths and peoples rather substantive talks between two governments. I think it is also disingenuous to suggest that Iran’s cooperation with the US in toppling the Taliban was a personal gesture by Khatami aimed more at rapprochement with the US than as an action clearly in Iran's security interests.

Whilst recognising the counter-productive nature of Western policies, I disagree that the final success of democracy and reform in Iran is dependent on the actions of the West. This, in my view, absolves the Iranian authorities of their primary responsibility for their actions.

FARIDEH FARHI: Siavush's criticism is certainly well-taken and there is no doubt that not all Western reporting has been as the statement describes, although much has. But I don't see how Chris' point about the understanding of  Khatami's gestures can be construed from the statement. The point is simply that Bush's policies helped to undermine the reform movement (I believe the sentence says it played "a key role" and not "the" key role). Is this a wrong point? As to the West’s responsibility, show me a state that has not moved in the direction of securitization and away from democratic practices when under foreign threat.

Are there objections to our suggestions? Are they problematic or wrong suggestions? I will be delighted if this statement begins a conversation in this regard even if all the suggested ideas are rejected and replaced

NATHAN COOMBS: The authors’ focus on the Western media’s portrayal of the post-election insurrection follows two recognizable trends that we have witnessed since the elections in Iran.

First is the reformists' rhetorically convenient emphasis on the opinion of the unreconstructed (and-ill informed) anti-imperialist Left in the West, for whom Ahmedinijad is seen as the representative of the poor and a bulwark against American ambitions in the region. Need it be said, this is a distorted and caricatured portrayal; based as it is on a marginal strand of the Left’s take on the situation, never mind the Western media as a whole.

All the Western media, barring some exceptions that stand out precisely for their rarity, were firmly behind the uprising; not just in the sense of uncritical cheerleading for [Presidential candidate] Mir Hossein Mousavi, but in portraying the events as a broadly class-composed popular uprising. This impression was established through the reliance on English-speaking Tehranese ‘informants’ and Iranian scholars based in the West such as Professor Ali Ansari. It was not a critically examined proposition, whatever the truth of the matter.

As such the claim that the Western media portrayed the uprising as a “velvet revolution” by anti-Islamic Republic forces (implying that it was doing so for the benefit of foreign regime-change advocates) does not hold water at all. If anything, there was a clear recognition by the likes of the BBC that what was unfolding was an intra-establishment power play, to which Western commentators predominantly came down firmly on the side of Mousavi, to the exclusion of more radical currents.

Second, the overall framing of the letter is firmly nationalist. In its thorough conflation of anti-Islamic Republic forces with pernicious foreign influence, the letter amounts to essentially a whitewash of the realities of the Islamic Republic and an elaborate piece of apologism. The sub-text is status quoist. From the opening paragraphs to the last, the woes of the IRI [Islamic Republic of Iran] are firmly lumped at the feet of imperialist forces and the policies of the specific government of Ahmadinejad, rather than the Islamic system itself. In its call for a premature truth and reconciliation commission, the authors’ seek to co-opt the spirit of the uprising to refine and buttress the Islamic Republic.

This is justified in terms of seeking to bring in the interests of the bourgeoisie more firmly within the apparatus and juridical norms of the state. As the letter puts it, “These social and political pressures, along with government mismanagement caused by the removal of competent technocrats, have negatively impacted the public interest and put enormous pressure on the middle class, the educated class, journalists and artists. These people must be allowed a more open and free environment in order to fulfil their instrumental roles in service of the country.” And in the spirit of national unity, under the justification of representing the interests of the middle class, the authors applaud the fact that: “extremist elements who used the opportunity to create chaos and engaged in the destruction of public property were condemned by Mousavi". Finally, in a total denunciation of any authentic revolutionary anti-IRI ambitions: “We call on the political forces of both sides to move toward building such a constructive climate and toward creation of an economic, political, and cultural agenda that can respond to all social needs.”

One can only hope that the siren call of this letter is not heeded, and that the workers, students, and radicalized of Iran can build some sort of organization to surpass the inhibiting reformism of Mousavi and his nationalist supporters of the IRI. The Western media has little, if anything, to do with it.

EMERY: Farideh, I do not deny the damage Bush's policies have wrought. However, I think this letter overemphasized Khatami's ability to reconfigure Iran's relations with the West. Certainly, Bush's policies didn't help, but in many ways the instruments of the state were more arbitrary and 'rogue' in the 1990s.

As you say, the main point is that we talk about these issues. Given the enormously broad spectrum of political beliefs and perspectives amongst the authors of this letter, I do wonder how this can be coherently achieved.

FARHI: Chris, if you are reading the statement as though it is trying to discount the overall responsibility of Iran's leaders for political, economic and judicial failures, then that is a shortcoming that was not the intent of the statement. At least in one paragraph tries to deal clearly with those failings (and note that there is a reason the first recommendations address the domestic situation and forces).

At the same time, the intent was also not to shy away from discussing the context of the past two decades of containment and regime change policies on the part of the US and the impact of those policies on distorting Iran's body politic, making many already paranoid officials even more paranoid. Does this mean that the US is the cause for the mess Iran is in today? Of course not. Ultimately culpability lies with those who have other choices but choose to stunt their people's citizenship.

Did Iran have many rogue elements in the 90's? Yes, but Iran was also gradually moving in a direction that could be considered positive even during the Rafsanjani presidency (1989-1997). I have no difficulty acknowledging that the trend was deemed dangerous by hardliners and hence their resistance and reaction. But I don't see any useful purpose in not placing that resistance and reaction in the context of external pressures and threats that by the way were not limited to the Bush Administration.

FARHI: Are the hard-line forces wrong in using these props to justify their authoritarian policies? Of course they are, and they should be condemned as the statement does. But I do not see any useful purpose in toning down the discussion of the instruments they were given, which they have recklessly used and should be held responsible for, since they had the option of not using them.

Frankly, I do not see any reason for anyone interested in the expansion of civil liberties and equal treatment of citizens as well as a somewhat independent foreign policy (yes I am a shameless and hopeless liberal) to shy away from attempting a balanced view, even if that attempts ends up being flawed as you suggest.

EMERY: These are very compelling clarifications. However, I feel the fact that such detailed elaboration is required reinforces my point. The above debate is enormously complex and, I think, treated in much less measured terms in the letter. Likewise, the issue of how the West has covered the current crisis requires examples, comparisons, and historical and political context.

As Siavush pointed out, there has been some fantastic reporting of current events by some outstanding journalists, if of course there have also been some awful, politically motivated, and historically ignorant pieces. It strikes me as a) unfair to tar the former with the latter b) slightly naive to issue a call for the latter to end. It won't, anymore than the ridiculous reporting by the Iranian media.

So I am still unsure what the overall focus and intended audience of the letter was. It seems to be doing quite a lot, often with a slightly complacent reliance on an anti-imperialist framework. Your fundamental point is that the West should butt out and give the reformists space. I think this is essentially what the US Government has done. Obama was resolute in his insistence that this could not become a US-Iranian issue. He has not vocally supported the Green Movement and has not even alleged fraud in the elections.

You say that Obama has kept 'many of his predecessors' policies'. I think Bush would have claimed the Green Movement for himself, immediately condemned the elections as a sham, and would have used all of this as a platform to ramp up his confrontational policies.

If we are emphasising the need for external forces to moderate their policies to allow the political space for domestic change, why are there no suggestions for the Iranian Government to moderate its rhetoric and policies vis- a-vis the West, particularly in the Middle East?

I agree that there probably is a link between external threats and democratisation. I would disagree, however, with the implications of the statement, “Only under these conditions, without any foreign threats, can the Iranian people reach their aspirations of freedom.” Many non-democracies strengthen or uphold this state with or without facing external threats (Saudi Arabia, Burma, Guinea, China). In fact, the Central Asian region is littered with such states. The fact remains that the IRI's attitude to political and human rights has ebbed and flowed, but has never really shown a structural capability to tolerate dissent. Structural and bureaucratic obstacles are MUCH more significant than the external strategic environment.

FARHI: Chris, as to your point about the US government butting out, the statement did point out the difference between Obama's and Bush's approaches and noted the trend was positive, but it also pointed out that the general framework of US policy regarding Iran's nuclear program has remained the same, at least so far. Obama has continued to be interested in a sticks-and-carrots approach, so has his Secretary of State who has talked about "crippling sanctions" if Iran doesn't abandon its pursuit of a weapons program (The US Senate just passed legislation to that effect as well). To be sure, the linguistic shift to a "weapons program" and away from "enrichment suspension" is an important shift, but so far I have not seen any concrete manifestation of what that shift will mean in terms of policy. Suspension as a pre-condition has been removed, but that demand as an outcome has not necessarily been abandoned).

As to the equivalence you imply we should have endeavored to pursue regarding both the US and Iran's immoderate foreign policies, it just doesn't make sense in terms of the purpose of the statement written by people who identify themselves anti-war. Such people are worried about a US attack on Iranian territory, about which there has been not only a whole lot of loose talk but actual threats and policies

Finally, the IRI has been criminal and rigid more often than not but what has distinguished it from many other countries in the region and also other post-revolutionary societies is the level of conflicts and disagreements within it among various groups contesting for power. There is a reason the search for one revolutionary party was abandoned in Iran in the 1980s, and there is a reason you have such heated and violent confrontation about the direction of the country at this point. These conflicts are structural in so far as they represent different interests and ideas. The writers of the statements, despite their ideological diversity, believe that the contending forces --- and there are more than two --- need to find democratic and non-violent rules to live with each other, rather than attempt to purge the other from Iran's body politic.

From my point of view, there is nothing utopian or ideal about the Islamic Republic, but representing the conflict in Iran as many in the West --- or inside Iran --- have done as being between the "people" and the Islamic State, as though the people of Iran are one unit collectively engaged in an endeavor to transform a hated state, is both incorrect and I believe dangerous. It is part and parcel of the hope that a simple wishing away of the Islamic Republic or the street mobilization we have seen will do the trick.

The statement, by the way, is also written in Persian, and its intent for multiple addressees, I think, is clear in the five suggestions.

COOMBS: Farideh, let me take just two of your responses:

"There is a reason the search for one revolutionary party was abandoned in Iran in the 1980s and there is a reason you have such heated and violent confrontation about the direction of the country at this point.”

Could this also not have something to do with the fact that Mousavi, then Prime Minister, presided in 1988 over one of the most brutal mass executions of political opposition in the 20th century? The search for a revolutionary party to overthrow the IRI was not abandoned as much as extinguished.

Ultimately, what you write here, that people basically need to learn to live together, is a confirmation of my reading of the letter: the denunciation (in the contemporary lingo of democracy and pluralism) of the need for the overthrow of the IRI, and advocacy of the recuperation of the bravery of some of the protestors into a status-quoist regime realignment in favour of the reformists.

"There is nothing utopian or ideal about the Islamic Republic, but representing the conflict in Iran as many in the West --- or inside Iran --- have done as being between the "people" and the Islamic State, as though the people of Iran are one unit collectively engaged in an endeavor to transform a hated state is both incorrect and I believe dangerous."

I would of course reject any crass resource to the populist language of "the people". Likewise, I would also reject the naive belief (unfortunately promoted by many of the reformists supporters and sympathizers) that you can do away with the state through a "simple wish" or just "street mobilization". Here we at least can find some agreement. No, to bring down a system is a monumental affair. The idea that the IRI will just crumble when faced by street protest and intra-regime dissent is a laughable fallacy of our post-1989 world; informed by the entirely unhelpful analogy of the fall of Communism in the Eastern bloc. What is needed is genuine organization and the rebuilding of revolutionary organizations that can play the long game.

Politics, and more so revolution, needs to be constituted through a long ideological struggle. What the reformists and young liberals on the streets have as now failed to do (at least to my knowledge) is start to build these principled organizations, autonomous from the regime.

Boiling Point for US-Israeli Relations: The Warning to Israel from Within

UPDATE (9 August, 1920 GMT): The Israeli Government is bringing the hammer down on Nadav Tamir after his criticism of the Netanyahu Government and its endangerment of US-Israeli relations. He has been summoned home and disciplined for his "very regrettable" memorandum.

You want to know how much trouble is Tamir in? Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon not only went public on Army Radio with criticism of the diplomat. He took the trouble to Twitter, "Nadav Tamir's document was not the work of a professional and contained more opinion than data."

How serious is the effect on US-Israeli relations of Israel’s uncompromising hard line on Palestine?

According to the Israeli daily newspaperHaaretz, Israel's consul general in Boston, Nadav Tamir, wrote a warning letter to the Israeli Foreign Ministry. Tamir accused the Netanyahu Government of endangering relations with Washington and risking the alienation of the Jewish lobby in the United States:

The manner in which we are conducting relations with the American administration is causing strategic damage to Israel. The distance between us and the US administration has clear consequences for Israeli deterrence.

There are American and Israeli political elements who oppose Obama on an ideological basis and who are ready to sacrifice the special relationship between the two countries for the sake of their own political agendas.

There has always been a discrepancy in the approaches of both states [on the issue of settlements], but there was always a level of coordination between the governments. Nowadays, there is a sense in the United States that Obama is forced to deal with the obduracy of the governments in Iran, North Korea, and Israel.

The administration is making an effort to lower the profile of the disagreements, and yet it is [Israel] that...is highlighting the differences.

The letter of Israel's Consul General is an explicit rejection of Israeli political language, which has been intensifying around the importance of Israeli ethnicity and Judaism, especially on the issue of settlements in East Jerusalem and the West Bank. Moreover, it underlines the effect on US perceptions. Israel’s image is shifting from a democratic and modern ally to “the source of obduracy” in the region as Israeli politicians dig in their heels on the issue of a freeze on settlements.

Indeed, the wider context bears out the pertinence of Tamir’s warning, with Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman’s ultra-nationalism and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s selective reading of political history.

In an interview with The Times of London in June, Lieberman  applied the “clash of civilizations” theory to the Middle East. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict was part of a broader "clash of values between civilizations" and was not the key for bringing peace to the region. He asserted, "With 9/11 and terrorist acts in London, Madrid, Bali, in Russia, I can't see any linkage with the Israeli-Palestinian problem."

In his major foreign policy speech in June, Netanyahu rejected an open approach to negotiations for a one-sided presentation of history:

Those who think that the continued enmity toward Israel is a product of our presence in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, is confusing cause and consequence… The attacks against us began in the 1920s, escalated into a comprehensive attack in 1948 with the declaration of Israel’s independence, continued with the fedayeen attacks in the 1950s, and climaxed in 1967, on the eve of the six-day war, in an attempt to tighten a noose around the neck of the State of Israel… All this occurred during the fifty years before a single Israeli soldier ever set foot in Judea and Samaria.

Palestine, for the Prime Minister, is always “the other” Israel's “universal, modern and right” values…

It is these statements that are the target of Tamir’s letter. Can Lieberman and Netanyahu sustain these statements when there are increasing doubts in Washington --- both because of the direct consequences for Palestine and the wider efects in the region --- over whether the political situation issustainable?