The Latest from Iran: Momentum against a Sinking President? (22 December)

2310 GMT: Moving Towards Qom. More chatter on the post-funeral tension in Qom --- Norooz claims people are moving from Isfahan and Najafabad to "defend" the house of Grand Ayatollah Montazeri.

2300 GMT: Mahmoud Fights Back? On a day which began with our analysis that the President is scrambling to maintain any legitimacy, it appears he tried to send out a signal tonight with the dismissal of Mir Hossein Mousavi as head of the Arts Institute. Salaam News reports that Ahmadinejad flew back from Shiraz just for the meeting deciding on the sacking of Mousavi and will now return to Shiraz.

Then again, one wonders if that will be enough to show Mahmoud's muscle. According to Peyke Iran, only 40 people were on hand to greet Ahmadinejad at Shiraz's airport this morning.

NEW Latest Iran Video: University Demonstrations for Montazeri (22 December)
NEW Iran Special Analysis: After Montazeri — From Protest to Victory?
NEW Latest Iran Video: The Last Goodbye to Montazeri (21 December)
Latest Iran Video: Mourning Montazeri (21 December — 2nd Set)
Latest Iran Video: Mourning Montazeri (21 December — 1st Set)
Iran & The Nuclear Talks: The View from Tehran
Iran Video & Text: Montazeri’s Son Saeed On His Father’s Views, Last Words
The Latest From Iran (21 December): The Montazeri Funeral

2230 GMT: Back from break to find discussion still going on about possible paramilitary/security forces threat to Ayatollah Sane'i, with Rouydad saying that followers have declared their readiness to defend the cleric.

1930 GMT: Rahesabz.net is reporting that Mir-Hossein Mousavi has been finally removed from the directorship of the Farhangestan Institute of Arts - Ali Moallem has been selected as his replacement. The move was decided by the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, which decides on major cultural issues.

1730 GMT: The Internet is buzzing with stories that Government supporters and plainclothes officers have attacked the offices of Ayatollah Sane'i, following vandalism against Grand Ayatollah Montazeri's house and image yesterdat. There is also chatter that a permit has been given for a Basiji march on Sane'I's offices on Wednesday. A story in Radio Zaamaneh summarises the chatter.

Given the volatile situation in Qom, we are being very careful with the reports, which we cannot verify.
1645 GMT: We're off for a holiday break this evening, returning for a wrap-up of the day's events later. Thanks to all for ideas and contributions today.

1545 GMT: Hitting Back. More on that "Ayatollah" we mentioned briefly earlier (1208 GMT), who was taking a shot at both Grand Ayatollah Montazeri and those who mourned him yesterday: it's the Supreme Leader's representative to the Revolutionary Guard, Mojtaba Zolnour.

Zolnour said, "Ayatollah Montazeri was a deputy to Imam Khomeini who misused his power...and meddled in the country's affairs and this served as one of the reasons for his dismissal." As for the crowd in Qom, Zolnour snapped, "Certain individuals...have engaged in confronting the religious leadership...These opportunistic individuals ... engaged in creating chaos, breaking car windows and chanting anti-leadership slogans to destroy the Islamic establishment."

1530 GMT: Regime Tensions? An article in the reformist Rooz Online claims to document unease between Iran's armed forces and the Revolutionary Guard.

1430 GMT: Karroubi Spreads His Message. Another interview with Mehdi Karroubi in the "Western" media, this time in The Times of London. Karroubi, answering written questions, maintains both his defiance and his criticism of the regime while seeking a return to the "right" path of the Islamic Republic and Ayatollah Khomeini:

In today’s Iran, republicanism and Islamism are severely damaged and a lot of the revolution’s principles and the Imam’s have been undermined....If the Imam were alive, without doubt this would not have happened....As one of the Imam’s students and close friends I frankly say that those who claim to act on his thoughts had the least personal, emotional and intellectual closeness to him.

The significance of the statement is almost lost, however, amidst near-farcical ineptitude by Times journalists. They fail to set the interview in the context of the developments since the weekend. Far worse, they headline the article with a "surprising twist": "Mehdi Karroubi warned the West against exploiting the regime’s weakness to strike a deal to halt a nuclear programme that was, he insisted, for peaceful purposes." This is based on the following Karroubi quote:

Nuclear science and achieving peaceful nuclear technology is a right reserved for all NPT [Nuclear Proliferation Treaty] members. We ask Western governments not to use this internal situation as a bargaining chip with the present Iranian Government to reach agreements which would undermine the rights of the Iranian people.

Far from outing himself as a nuclear hardliner (which is a dreadful misrepresentation that has led some in the US to keep the Green movement as arm's length), Karroubi is simply asserting that nuclear power (not nuclear weapons) is a sovereign right. More importantly, his message is that the "West" should not give the Iranian Government legitimacy --- a legitimacy it has failed to establish at home --- through a high-profile agreement.

So a valuable opportunity wasted. Pearls before swine, as my grandmother used to say....

1330 GMT: We're Watching You. An Iranian blogger has posted photographs of Government operatives filming and photographing yesterday's crowd in Qom.

1215 GMT: Today's Protests. We've posted the first claimed video of demonstrations at Elm-o-Sanat and Kurdistan Universities.

1208 GMT: Propaganda of Day. There is the same exact story in both IRNA and Fars News of an Ayatollah denouncing yesterday's demonstrations in Qom, but that's a trifle compared to Fars' attempted top story. Apparently there will be a "large gathering" of people in Qom this afternoon to denounce the recent treatment of the image of Ayatollah Khomeini.

To illustrate the story, Fars has a photo of a recent "large gathering", presumably from last :



1200 GMT: Similar coverage of the Ahmadinejad speech, albeit with a lot more extracts from the speech, by Islamic Republic News Agency.

1155 GMT: And Here's Mahmoud. A massive surprise here: according to Press TV, the President avoided any reference to internal events in his speech in Shiraz and kept it international by attacking the US:

The problem is that the US seeks to dominate the Middle East but the Iranian nation is an obstacle....The nuclear game is repetitious, old-fashioned and boring. Say publicly that you are seeking dominance over the Middle East but Iran does not allow [you]....The world should know that the Iranian nation and the regional countries will make it impossible for the US to dominate the Middle East.

There was more tough talk for Washington on Iran's nuclear potential:

[You should] know that if we wanted to build bombs, we had enough courage to announce that we were making bombs. We are a great and brave nation. We told you that we will launch the [nuclear] fuel cycle and we did it. We told you that we will industrialize the fuel production and we did it....We told you that we will launch a new generation of centrifuges and we did.

No indication in the Press TV article, either in text or photographs, to the size of the crowd, let alone the events of the last 48 hours.

1150 GMT: Sideshows. In case you want a diversion from the main event, here's Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki being tough with France on the nuclear issue: "The French must try to avoid the failed policies that Washington and London have employed during the past few years. It is better for Paris to adopt a policy that is in accordance with the country's prestige."

Or you can tune in to Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, waving his fist: "My belief remains that political means are the best tools to attain regional security and that military force will have limited results. However, should the president call for military options, we must have them ready."

1140 GMT: Claims of student protests at Tehran Azad University and at Oloom Tahghighat University.

1130 GMT: No clashes reported at the Beheshti University protest. Meanwhile, reports that more than 50 (one report says 230) Najafabad University students have been summoned for disciplinary action, presumably in connection with protests surrounding the death of Grand Ayatollah Montazeri.

There is also a report that electricity was cut off to a student residence at Razi University in Kermanshah, with students ordered to remain in their rooms, to prevent protests.

1100 GMT: Demonstrations v. The President. News is emerging of a protest at Shahid Beheshti University in Tehran, with students demanding the release of classmates arrested on 16/17 Azar (7-8 December). There are also reports of demonstrations at Elm-o-Sanat University in the capital. Reports indicate that security forces have surrounded the campuses to prevent protest moving to Tehran streets.

Meanwhile, we are looking for news on President Ahmadinejad's appearance in Shiraz. Activists are claiming that the regime struggled to get an audience of 10,000.

0945 GMT: From Protest to Victory? We've posted a special analysis, in light of the events of the last 48 hours: "Is there any possibility of a 'movement from below' that frames and presses demands to a satisfactory conclusion?"

0803 GMT: The Iconic Video? We've posted a lengthy (4+ minutes) video of yesterday's crowd in Qom. Words cannot summarise it.

(But, to raise a smile, set this footage against the claim in the pro-regime newspaper Kayhan, noted in yesterday's updates, that "a maximum of 5000 people" turned out.)

0800 GMT: The President's Test. Ahmadinejad is now in Shiraz. We're monitoring carefully both for his statement and any news on the size and mood of the crowd.

0745 GMT: A later and quieter start to the morning after the drama, sorrow, anger, and hope of the last 48 hours. We're working on a special analysis evaluating the significance of the events surrounding Grand Ayatollah Montazeri's death: is this now the next great Green wave of change?

In this context, there is an unintentionally funny sideshow exposing both the weakness of a President and his best (if unintentional) friend yesterday: the American ABC News. Last night Ahmadinejad appeared on the channel which, for days, had been shouting about its "exclusive" interview with the US Public Enemy Number One.

Here are ABC's self-promoting highlights of the discussion: 1) "Iran Prez Won't Say Yes-or-No to Nuclear Bomb"; 2) "Obama Didn't Deserve Nobel Prize"; 3) "Ahmadinejad Defiant Over Sanctions Threat"; 4) "Hiker's Mom Made Christmas Appeal to Ahmadinejad" [three US citizens, detained after they entered Iranian territory this autumn, remain under threat of trial for espionage]. Because the story was written soon after the interview was taped last week, there was no reference to Grand Ayatollah Montazeri or any considered question about the political challenge to the President and the regime.

(In grudging fairness, it appears that ABC re-positioned the clips they showed last night to get some connection with developments. Diane Sawyer's lead question, over archive shots of mass demonstrations this summer, was whether Ahmadinejad would guarantee that protesters would be safe. Ahmadinejad's response: "Can the people in America come on the streets anytime they want?"

That --- again to give some redemption to ABC --- brought out a telling moment. When Sawyer assured Ahmadinead that, yes, with a permit Americans could demonstrate, the President looked a bit uncertain, "Are you sure?" before declaring, "In Iran we have got freedom, more than there is in America.")

A classic example, therefore, of the blinkers of sensationalism but, more importantly, an illustration of Ahmadinejad's fragile position: who amongst the crowd in Qom yesterday really cared about the words he put out on American television screens last evening?

Afghanistan-Pakistan Transcript/Analysis: Clinton & Gates on ABC News (6 December)

Video of the interview:

Get beyond the headline of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates' admission, "I think it has been years" since the US had good intelligence on Osama bin Laden's, and here are the important points from this interview:

1. The Obama approach on Afghanistan, no matter how many times Gates says "transition strategy", is to "kick the can down the road", putting off the deadline for another significant decision to mid-2011.

2. The Obama Administration still has no confidence that it can rely on a political center in Kabul. Look at Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's far-from-ringing endorsement of Afghan President Hamid Karzai: "The proof is in the pudding. We're going to have to wait to see how it unfolds."

A Gut Reaction to Obama’s Afghanistan-Pakistan Speech: The Halfway House of Long War (Part 1)
A Hail Mary Strategy in Pakistan: The Gut Reaction to Obama’s Speech (Part 2)

3. There is not a hint of an approach in Pakistan other than the Pakistani military being told to go and beat up the "Taliban".

4. The Obama Administration has no real idea how to deal with the economic strain of this increased commitment, other than to hope that it goes away sooner rather than later.

5. So how to proceed, given all these obstacles? Repeat: Al Qa'eda, Al Qa'eda, Al Qa'eda.

GEORGE STEPHANOPOULOS, HOST: And we begin with the cornerstones of President Obama's national security cabinet, the secretary of state, Hillary Clinton; secretary of defense, Robert Gates. Welcome to you both.

This is the first time you're here together on "This Week". Thanks for doing it.

HILLARY CLINTON, SECRETARY OF STATE: The first time we've been called cornerstones.

(LAUGHTER)

STEPHANOPOULOS: Secretary Gates, let me begin with you, because there has been so much focus since the president's speech on this call to begin an exit strategy in July 2011. I want to show you what Senator McCain said earlier this week.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

SEN. JOHN MCCAIN (R), ARIZONA: When conditions on the ground have decisively begun to change for the better, that is when our troops should start to return home with honor, not one minute longer, not one minute sooner, and certainly not on some arbitrary date in July 2011.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

STEPHANOPOULOS: Just two months ago, you seemed to agree with that sentiment. You called the notion of timelines and exit strategies a strategic mistake. What changed?

ROBERT GATES, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE: Well, first of all, I don't consider this an exit strategy. And I try to avoid using that term. I think this is a transition...

STEPHANOPOULOS: Why not?

GATES: This is a transition that's going to take place. And it's not an arbitrary date. It will be two years since the Marines went into southern Helmand and that two years that our military leaders believe will give us time to know that our strategy is working.

They believe that in that time General McChrystal will have the opportunity to demonstrate decisively in certain areas of Afghanistan that the approach we're taking is working. Obviously the transition will begin in the less contested areas of the country.

But it will be the same kind of gradual conditions-based transition province by province, district by district, that we saw in Iraq.

STEPHANOPOULOS: We've heard that phrase a lot...

GATES: But it begins -- but it begins in July 2011.

STEPHANOPOULOS: No, I understand that. But you about this conditions-based decision-making. And I guess that it's fairly vague term. So if the strategy is working, do the troops stay? If it's not working, do they leave? How -- how is the decision-making process going to go?

GATES: Well, from my standpoint, the decision in terms of when a district or a cluster of districts or a province is ready to be turned over to the Afghan security forces is a judgment that will be made by our commanders on the ground, not here in Washington.

And we will do the same thing we did in Iraq, when we transitioned to Afghan security responsibility. We will withdraw first into tactical overwatch, and then a strategic overwatch, if you will, the cavalry over the hill in case they run into trouble.

STEPHANOPOULOS: And this certainly increases the leverage on President Karzai and his government, Secretary Clinton, which brings up questions similar to questions that were raised by a lot of Democrats during -- after the Iraq surge, including President Obama when he was a senator.

He asked Secretary Rice basically what happens if the Maliki government doesn't live up to its promises.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

BARACK OBAMA, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, THEN SENATOR: Are there any circumstances that you can articulate in which we would say to the Maliki government that enough is enough, and we are no longer committing our troops.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

STEPHANOPOULOS: A lot of people asking the same exact question today about President Karzai, at what point do we say enough is enough, we're no longer going to commit troops?

CLINTON: Well, George, I understand the desire to ask these questions which are all thrown into the future, they're obviously matters of concern about how we have a good partner as we move forward in Afghanistan.

But I think you have to look at what President Karzai said in his inaugural speech where he said that Afghan security forces would begin to take responsibility for important parts of the country within three years, and that they would be responsible for everything within five years.

And from our perspective, we think we have a strategy that is a good, integrated approach, it's civilian and military. It has been extremely thoroughly analyzed. But we have to begin to implement it with the kind of commitment that we all feel toward it.

I can't predict everything that is going to happen with President Karzai. I came away from my meeting with him around the inauguration heartened by a lot of what he was saying. But you know, the proof is in the pudding. We're going to have to wait to see how it unfolds.

STEPHANOPOULOS: But if you're really going to have maximum leverage, doesn't he have to know that if he doesn't live up to the commitment, we're going to go?

CLINTON: Well, I think he knows that we have a commitment to trying to protect our national security. That's why we're there. We do want to assist the people of Afghanistan and to try to improve the capacity of the Afghan government.

But I think it's important to stress that this decision was based on what we believe is best for the United States. And we have to have a realistic view of who we're working with in Afghanistan, and it's not only President Karzai, it's ministers of various agencies that -- some of which are doing quite well and producing good results, provincial and local leaders.

So it's a much more complicated set of players than just one person.

STEPHANOPOULOS: There is also the question of Pakistan, the neighbor, and whether they're living up to their commitments. You got in a little hot water in Pakistan when you suggested that they hadn't been doing enough in the past to go after the Taliban.

And, Secretary Gates, let me turn a question about this to you, it's connected to a report that Senator Kerry, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee released this week about Osama bin Laden. He suggested that the failure to block his exit from Tora Bora has made the situation there much worse.

In this report, he actually wrote that the decisions that opened the door for his escape to Pakistan allowed bin Laden to emerge as a potent symbolic figure who continues to attract a steady flow of money and inspire fanatics worldwide.

The Pakistani prime minister sort of shrugged off any concerns about that this week, about whether or not he had gone -- done enough to go after Osama bin Laden. He said he doesn't believe Osama is in Pakistan. Is he right? And do you think the Pakistanis have done enough to get him?

GATES: Well, we don't know for a fact where Osama bin Laden is, if we did, we'd go get him. But...

STEPHANOPOULOS: When was the last time we had any good intelligence on where he was?

GATES: I think it has been years.

STEPHANOPOULOS: Years?

GATES: I think so.

STEPHANOPOULOS: So these reports that came out just this week about a detainee saying he might have seen him in Afghanistan earlier this year?

GATES: No, that's...

STEPHANOPOULOS: We can't confirm that.

GATES: No.

STEPHANOPOULOS: So do you believe that one of the reasons we haven't had good enough intelligence is because the Pakistani government has not been cooperating enough?

GATES: No. I think it's because if, as we suspect, he is in North Waziristan, it is an area that the Pakistani government has not had a presence in, in quite some time. The truth of the matter is that we have been very impressed by the Pakistani army's willingness to go into places like Swat in South Waziristan, if one had asked any of us a year or more ago if the Pakistani army would be doing that, we would have said no chance.

And so they are bringing pressure to bear on the Taliban in Pakistan, and particularly those that are attacking the Pakistani government. But frankly, any pressure on the Taliban, whether it's in Pakistan or in Afghanistan is helpful to us because al Qaeda is working with both of them.

STEPHANOPOULOS: You mentioned the actions the Pakistani government has taken. Is Balochistan next? Is that where they have to go next to take out the Taliban?

GATE: Well, I think that the Pakistani government, we sometimes tend to forget that Pakistan, like Afghanistan, is a sovereign country. And Pakistani -- the Pakistani army will go where the Pakistani army thinks the threat is. And if they think that threat is Balochistan, that's where they'll go. If they think it's in North Waziristan, they may go up there. Or they may just winter in where they are right now.

But these are calls that the Pakistanis make. We are sharing information with them. We have had a steadily developing, better relationship between our militaries.

And we will help them in any way we possibly can, but that's their call.

STEPHANOPOULOS: Back to Afghanistan, Secretary Clinton, some have suggested that one of your envoys -- the president's envoy, Richard Holbrooke -- should begin negotiations with those elements of the Taliban who are willing to talk to him.

Do you agree with that?

CLINTON: Well, George, we have said -- and the president made it clear in his speech at West Point -- that, you know, there are two different approaches here.

One is what could be called reintegration. And that is really looking at the lower-level members of the Taliban, who are there through intimidation and coercion, or, frankly, because it's a better living than they can make anywhere else.

We think there's a real opportunity for a number of those to be persuaded to leave the battlefield.

Now, the problem, of course, once they leave -- and we have a lot of evidence of this -- they'll get killed if they're not protected. And that's one of the reasons why we're trying to get these secure zones.

STEPHANOPOULOS: In other words, they don't believe we'll stay.

CLINTON: Well, and also, just, we need to secure the population. It's one of General McChrystal's principal objectives.

Then the upper levels of the Taliban -- you know, look. They have to renounce al Qaeda, renounce violence. They have to be willing to abide by the constitution of Afghanistan and live peacefully.

We have no firm information whether any of those leaders would be at all interested in following that kind of a path. In fact, I'm highly skeptical that any of them would.

So, we're going to be consulting with our Afghan partners. It's going to be a multiply-run operation to see who might come off of the battlefield, and who might possibly give up their allegiance to the Taliban and their connection with the...

STEPHANOPOULOS: But high-level negotiations are possible?

CLINTON: We don't know yet. And again, I think that -- we asked Mullah Omar to give up bin Laden before we went into Afghanistan after 9/11, and he wouldn't do it. I don't know why we think he would have changed by now.

GATES: I would just add, I think that the likelihood of the leadership of the Taliban, or seniors leaders, being willing to accept the conditions Secretary Clinton just talked about depends in the first instance on reversing their momentum right now, and putting them in a position where they suddenly begin to realize that they're likely to lose.

STEPHANOPOULOS: How is this offensive in Helmand Province going?

GATES: It's actually going very well. And the Marines have already had -- I think one of the reasons that our military leaders are pretty confident is that they have already begun to see changes where the Marines are present in southern Helmand.

STEPHANOPOULOS: Let me (UNINTELLIGIBLE) the question of costs, which has been raised by our next guest, Senator Russ Feingold. As you know, he's against the escalation announced by the president.

But he's also gone (ph) and wrote a letter to the president where he raises -- where he says, we request that you not send any additional troops to Afghanistan until Congress has enacted appropriations to pay for the cost of such an increase, and that you propose reductions in spending to pay for the costs of any military operations in Afghanistan -- a concern shared by many of the American people.

Secretary Clinton, shouldn't this war, if we're going to fight it, be paid for?

CLINTON: Well, the president has said that the costs are going to be accounted for, that the Office of Management and Budget, the Defense Department, the State Department, you know, are going to be working to make sure that we give the best projections of costs we can.

I think that we're going to have to address our deficit situation across the board. There's no doubt about that, and I certainly support that.

But I think we have to look at the entire budget, and we have to be very clear about, you know, what the costs are, as Secretary Gates has said a couple of times in our testimony together. We are drawing down from Iraq. There will be savings over the next two to three years coming from there. And the addition of these troops is going to put a burden on us, no doubt about it.

It is manageable, but we have to look at all of our fiscal situation and begin to address this.

STEPHANOPOULOS: There's also the question of the cost-benefit analysis. And a lot of people look at our own U.S. government intelligence estimates, saying there are fewer than 100 active al Qaeda in Afghanistan and say, why is that worth putting $30 billion more this year into Afghanistan?

GATES: It is because in that border area, Afghan-Pakistani border, that is the epicenter of extremist jihad. And al Qaeda has close relationships with the Taliban in Afghanistan, and they have very close relationships with the Taliban in Pakistan.

The Taliban in Pakistan have been attacking Pakistani civilians, Pakistani government officials, military officials, trying to destabilize the government of Pakistan.

Any success by the Taliban in either Afghanistan or Pakistan benefits al Qaeda. And any safe haven on either side of the border creates opportunities for them to recruit, get new funds and do operational planning.

And what's more, the Taliban revival in the safe havens in western Pakistan is a lesson to al Qaeda that they can come back, if they are provided the kind of safe haven that the Taliban were.

This is the place where the jihadists defeated the Soviet Union, one superpower. And they believe -- their narrative is that it helped create the collapse of the Soviet Union. If they -- they believe that if they can defeat us in Afghanistan, that they then have the opportunity to defeat a second superpower.

STEPHANOPOULOS: But you look at that...

GATES: And it creates huge opportunities for them in that area, as well as around the world.

STEPHANOPOULOS: You were the deputy director of the CIA back in 1985, when Gorbachev made the decision to expand. Eighteen months later, he was pulling out.

What's to prevent that from happening again?

GATES: Well, what he did was agree with his generals to make one last push.

But the parallel just doesn't work. The reality is, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. They killed a million Afghans. They made five million refugees out of Afghanis.

They were isolated in the world in terms of what they were doing there.

We are part of an alliance of 42 countries with us, in addition to us, that are contributing troops. We have a U.N. mandate. We have a mandate from NATO.

So, you have broad international support for what's going on in Afghanistan. And the situation is just completely different than was the case with the Soviet Union.

STEPHANOPOULOS: We're just about out of time.

Secretary Clinton, I want to ask you about the case of Amanda Knox, the American college student, who was convicted of murder in Italy, just on Friday.

Senator Cantwell of Washington has expressed a lot of concerns about this conviction. She said she wants to talk to you about it. Here's what she said.

I have serious questions about the Italian justice system and whether anti-Americanism tainted this trial. The prosecution did not present enough evidence for an impartial jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Knox was guilty. Italian jurors were not sequestered, and were allowed to view highly negative news coverage about Ms. Knox.

She goes on to lay out several of the concerns she had with the trial. She did say, as I said, she's going to be in contact with you, so you can express the concerns to the Italian government.

Do you share her concerns about this trial?

CLINTON: George, I honestly haven't had time to even examine that. I've been immersed in what we're doing in Afghanistan.

Of course, I'll meet with Senator Cantwell, or anyone who has a concern, but I can't offer any opinion about that at this time.

STEPHANOPOULOS: So you have not expressed any concerns to the Italian government?

CLINTON: I have not, no.

STEPHANOPOULOS: Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, thank you both very much.

GATES: Thank you.