Who would want to be in Barack Obama’s shoes? Whilst it must be fun to have a Boeing 747 at your beck and call, flying on it pretty well free of charge, the novelty soon wears off. And although dashing around the globe collecting Nobel Prizes and saving climate conferences has to be the buzz of buzzes, he has to wonder whether two trips to Scandinavia equate to one trip too far.
Obama's reputation and popularity abroad is still high 11 months into his Presidency, but back home, things aren’t so rosy. Supposed allies like Senator Joseph Lieberman suddenly act like attack dogs as the healthcare bill rests on a knife edge in the US Senate. The economy still won’t move in the right direction for millions of Americans. More than 30,000 American troops will soon be deployed to Afghanistan in what will surely become Obama’s war. And the American voter is showing signs of impatience and dissatisfaction with the President because there are no results on any of these fronts.
Considering this bleak outlook, I wonder whether Europeans have a better grasp on the reality of politics than our American cousins, recognising that this is “the art of the possible”. In reality, what could Obama do in a year to improve America’s situation markedly in all these areas? Did Americans truly believe the current economic depression would end instantly, that universal healthcare would become a reality for all Americans, and that foreign entanglements would end in victory? The sad fact is that such high expectations could not be met, and the blame is surely not Obama’s.
Let’s look at big picture issues. Obama took the reins in January this year when the commercial world was suffering the worst economic depression since the 1930s. He decided to do something about the 47 million uninsured Americans who had no access to healthcare insurance and relied on limited federal facilities. America was at war in Iraq and Afghanistan with no developed strategy for a quick exit. The policies of the Bush administration had estranged America from pretty well all its former allies, especially in Europe.
By my reckoning, Obama has done pretty well. The American economy is showing signs of improvement. The first Obama health-care bill will be just a start, but a new law has to be incremental. Too many Americans are hidebound by the ideology of self and have to dragged into accepting an ideal that all citizens should have the right to medical treatment, regardless of economic circumstances.
As for Afghanistan, Obama has now made it his war. However, he has made it clear there is no blind acceptance in fulfilling demands of US military commanders, and Obama has engineered an in-built exit strategy. He has a different approach than that of the previous gung-ho administration. One wonders about the extent to which Obama will press a policy of buying the Afghanistan poppy crop at market prices and to trade with farmers so they are encouraged to grow other crops at similar prices.
Finally, America has patched up relations with its allies. Obama may not like British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, but Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is enjoying a better relationship with Foreign Secretary David Miliband than that between their predecessors. Obama seems to be building coalitions, although this week at Copenhagen will test his patience and political skills.
Governing is never easy, and this is especially so in America where separation of powers means a President needs a deft hand and strong persuasive powers, even when his party enjoys a majority in both Houses of Congress. This year, Obama has demonstrated that he has a pretty clear understanding of Washington politics and its workings. He has also charmed his way onto the centre of the world stage.
I am encouraged by this start, but there is a long time to go until the 2010 mid-term Congressional elections, and there are dangers for Obama, foreign and domestic. Sadly, all wheels could come off his bandwagon by November.
2200 GMT: Burning Khomeini's Picture? All day long, we have been following Iran state media's exploitation of a video allegedly showing the burning of Ayatollah Khomeini's picture during the 16 Azar protests. (At one point, the top four stories on Fars News' website were devoted to the supposed incident.) Readers may recall that we had posted the video in question on Monday but pulled it after two hours because we thought it may have been staged, possibly as a disinformation ploy to discredit the opposition.
Tonight Mir Hossein Mousavi has issued this statement:
Those who respect me would never allow the slightest insult to Imam Khomeini and they always respect him. I am sure that the students would never do such a defiant act....I don’t have the information if this event happened or not, additionally there is no clear information about those who committed this act, but if such an event really happened, it is a suspicious act and showing such an anti-revolutionary footage from the national TV was wrong.
It would be expected from those foreign media who are hostile toward the Islamic Republic to take advantage of such event and broadcast the footage but showing this footage on the national TV that owes its very existence to the revolution that was won with the leadership of Imam Khomeini, is not acceptable at all.
2040 GMT: Some Friday-Night Posturing. Continuing the thump-thump-thump of American rhetorical pressure on Iran over the nuclear negotiations (see separate entry), as well as trying to keep Tehran out of America's backyard, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton laid it on thick in a press conference:
Really? You've spent all week telling the world that Afghan-Pak-istan is harbouring the Al Qa'eda menace, and it's Iran that is #1 Terrorist supporter? I understand it's power politics, but try to keep it believable.
Iran and Syria have signed an agreement to improve defense cooperation as the two sides are faced with “common enemy and challenges.”
The agreement was signed between Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi and his Syrian counterpart Lt. General Ali Mohammad Habib Mahmoud in Damascus on Friday.
2025 GMT: Parliament, the Guards, and "Questionable" Financial Arrangements. This in from an EA source in Iran:
On Tuesday, Mr. Omidvar Rezaei, a member of the supervisory committee of the Parliament (and brother of Presidential candidate Mohsen Rezaei), called the establishment of a new Bank of Iran-Venezuela (following Hugh Chavez's trip to Iran earlier this year) very questionable. Mr. Rezaii said that the political maneuvring of some security organizations in order to participate in the management of this bank is against the economic interests of the country and added that the enemies will interpret these tendencies under the "holy uniform of the 12th Imam soldiers" as abuses, and it will add fire to the rumors that some organizations are transferring all oil money out of the country.
During this meeting, MP Elias Naderan said that a company called Mehr Iran belonging to the Revolutionary Guards has been established in Venezuela with a billion dollar investment in visual networks and this is inappropriate because of current situation in the country.
1845 GMT: A Friday Treat. It seems that Kermit the Frog has updated his "It's Not Easy Being Green" to take account of the last six months in Iran. We've got the video.
1835 GMT: Here's Your Medal, As For Your Rights.... The Norwegian and Swedish Foreign Ministers said yesterday that Iranian authorities have returned the Nobel Peace Prize medal and diploma of lawyer and activist Shirin Ebadi; however, they added:
Her situation continues to be serious. Ms Ebadi is prevented from working as a defender of human rights in her home country and the Iranian authorities have closed the Defenders of Human Rights Centre of which she was co-founder. The confiscation of the medal and the numerous threats directed at her, her family and her colleagues give cause for great concern and are yet another example of the worsened human rights situation in Iran since the election in June this year.
Norway and Sweden urge the Iranian authorities to allow Ms Ebadi’s safe return to Iran and to allow the Defenders of Human Rights Centre to reopen so that she can resume her important work for human rights in the country.
1625 GMT: Your Friday Prayer Summary. Hojatoleslam Kazem Seddiqi taking care of business today and, according to Press TV, he was not too fussed about 16 Azar. For Seddiqi, it's all about the nukes:
The Iranian nation will never give up its nuclear right at any price. [The West] cannot prevent us from using nuclear energy for peaceful aims by lies and propaganda....The enemy will concede another defeat in this propaganda war.
1605 GMT: Hmm, those Anti-16 Azar Rallies.... Not quite sure how significant they are. Fars News so far only has an item on a march in Rasht. The Islamic Republic News Agency has a lengthier piece on a gathering after Friday Prayers complaining about the alleged burning of Imam Khomeini's picture by opposition protesters. For unknown reasons, IRNA has blurred the photograph of those who were supposedly involved in today's rally.
1455 GMT: The Anti-16 Azar Rallies? Iranian state television is reporting that "thousands" of pro-Government students have demonstrated in Tehran and other cities after Friday prayers. They reportedly chanted, "Down with the U.S." and "Down with Israel" and read out statements saying the opposition could not "achieve their miserable aims by insulting" the Supreme Leader.
1430 GMT: An inspection team from the International Atomic Energy Agency arrived in Iran on Thursday for its third visit to the "second enrichment plant" at Fordoo near Qom.
1100 GMT: Interpreting the Attack on Rafsanjani. EA correspondent Mr Azadi thinks that Minister of Intelligence Heydar Moslehi's criticism of Hashemi Rafsanjani on Thursday marks the renewal of President Ahmadinejad's battle with Rafsanjani, even though the Supreme Leader has warned against such a conflict:
It appears that the pro-Ahmadinejad newspapers, sites, and clerics are attacking Rafsanjani not only to limit his political influence but to provoke him to oppose the Supreme Leader. But Ayatollah Khamenei has emphasised his respect for Rafsanjani. The defense of Rafsanjani by the Friday Prayer Leader in Mashaad, Ayatollah Alamalhuda, was due in part to the Supreme Leader's approach.
Now with Moslehi’s speech, it seems that the crisis between Ahmadinejad and Hashemi is in a new stage. Indeed, in giving the speech, he appears to have opposed the Supreme Leader.
Moslehi criticised Hashemi Rafsanjani for two reasons: 1) Rafsanjani's views on the election result and post-election events, including his support of leaders of the Green movement and demand for the release of political prisoners; 2) Rafsanjani's recent speech in Mashhad, which Moslehi portrayed as asserting that the Supreme Leader's ultimate authority (Velayat-e-Faqih) exists only as long as it is supported by the people.
Jomhoori Islami newspaper, backing Rafsanjani, immediately responded by publishing his book in which he analysed velayat-e-faqih.
1000 GMT: We've converted a lengthy update on developments in the US media, President Obama's Nobel Peace Prize speech, and American statements on sanctions into a separate entry, "A Renewed Washington Love Affair With The Green Movement?"
0915 GMT: So much for a quiet Friday. Although it is the Iranian weekend, a series of developing and breaking stories has churned political waters. There is excitement, concern, and uncertainty as people try to assess whether those ripples will spread and strengthen. And all of this is occurring as we move into the week before the sacred month of Moharram.
The Government contributed to the tension yesterday, turning Minister of Intelligence Heydar Moslehi loose in a frontal assault on former President Hashemi Rafsanjani. Moslehi told student clerics in Qom (and, yes, the choice of venue and audience is significant, given that the religious community is split over the post-12 June actions of the Government), “[Mr Rafsanjani] believes if people do not accept the velayat-e-faghih [the rule of the Supreme Leader], he has to step down." Moslehi also sustained the ongoing warning that Rafsanjani's son Mehdi Hashemi faces prosecution for stirring of post-election conflict.
From the opposition, the arrest of student leader Majid Tavakoli on 16 Azar is spurring new forms of protest. The regime's attempt to humiliate Tavakoli by displaying him "in disguise as a woman" seems to have backfired, as supporters rally behind Tavakoli by dressing in hejab and posting satirical photographs of the Supreme Leader. The video of the activist's last speech is also racing around the Internet.
The biggest ripple this morning, however, may have come out of the Iranian military. After months of rumours of unhappiness and even divisions over the Government's actions, a letter and audio which is allegedly from eight Army and Air Force regiments, declares that they will "stand with the Iranian people" if violence against dissenters. continues.
This interview is not as useful as that on ABC News, which we posted and analysed earlier. There's very little beyond the Administration spin. (The duo were also interviewed on CBS News, but frankly I can't be bothered to post the same rhetoric thrice over.)
It's what is missing that is most interesting. How many words in this transcript concern non-military measures?
DAVID GREGORY: Welcome, both of you, back to MEET THE PRESS.
SEC'Y ROBERT GATES: Thank you.
SEC'Y HILLARY CLINTON: Thank you.
MR. GREGORY: So much of the heat of this debate this week was not about the going in, but about the getting out. This is what the president said about the scope of this mission.
(Videotape, December 1, 2009)
PRES. OBAMA: These additional Americans and international troops will allow us to accelerate handing over responsibility to Afghan forces and allow us to begin the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan in July of 2011.
(End videotape)
MR. GREGORY: Secretary Gates, is this a deadline?
SEC'Y GATES: It's the beginning of a process. In July 2011, our generals are confident that they will know whether our strategy is working, and the plan is to begin transferring areas of responsibility for security over to the Afghan security forces with us remaining in a tactical and then strategic overwatch position, sort of the cavalry over the hill. But we will begin to thin our forces and begin to bring them home. But the pace of that, of bringing them home, and where we will bring them home from will depend on the circumstances on the ground, and those judgments will be made by our commanders in the field.
MR. GREGORY: Regardless of the circumstances, though, what you're saying is that withdrawal will take place at that point.
SEC'Y GATES: It will begin in July of 2011. But how, how quickly it goes will very much depend on the conditions on the ground. We will have a significant number of forces in there...
MR. GREGORY: Mm-hmm.
SEC'Y GATES: ...for some considerable period of time after that.
MR. GREGORY: You both, of course, this week have taken tough questions about this issue of a deadline and whether that's a bad thing to signal up front. Three years ago, Secretary Gates, you were asked on Capitol Hill about another war, another debate, another timeline. That was about Iraq. And, Secretary Clinton, you were asked as senator back in 2005 the same question about Iraq and timelines for withdrawal. This is what you both said back then.
(Videotape, December 5, 2006)
SEN. LINDSEY GRAHAM (R-SC): Do you believe if we set timetables or a policy to withdraw at a date certain, it would be seen by the extremists as a sign of weakness, the moderates would be disheartened and it would create a tremendous impediment to the moderate forces coming forward in Iraq?
SEC'Y GATES: I think a specific timetable would give--would essentially tell them how long they have to wait until we're gone.
(End videotape)
(Videotape, February 20, 2005)
SEC'Y CLINTON: We don't want to send a signal to the insurgents, to the terrorists, that we are going to be out of here at some, you know, date certain. I think that would be like a green light to go ahead and just bide your time.
(End videotape)
MR. GREGORY: That was about Iraq. Why are your views different when it comes to Afghanistan?
SEC'Y CLINTON: Because we're not talking about an exit strategy or a drop-dead deadline. What we're talking about is an assessment that in January 2011 we can begin a transition, a transition to hand off responsibility to the Afghan forces. That is what eventually happened in Iraq. You know, we're going to be out of Iraq. We have a firm deadline, because the Iraqis believe that they can assume and will assume responsibility for their own future. We want the Afghans to feel the same sense of urgency. We want them to actually make good on what President Karzai said in his inaugural speech, which is that by five years from now they'll have total control for their defense.
MR. GREGORY: But this is a time [which is] certain. Secretary Gates, you just said that the withdrawal will begin regardless of conditions, the pace of withdrawal could be affected. This is a date [which is] certain. And when it came to Iraq, you thought that was a bad idea.
SEC'Y GATES: I was opposed to a deadline in Iraq and, if you'd listen to what I said, that that was a date certain to have all of our forces out of Iraq. I'm opposed to that in Afghanistan as well. But I believe that there is an important element here of balancing, sending a signal of resolve, but also giving the Afghan government a sense of urgency that they need to get their young men recruited, trained and into the field partnering with our forces and then on their own. And so I think that the beginning of this process in July 2011 makes a lot of sense, because the other side of it is open.
MR. GREGORY: What kind of casualties should Americans be prepared to suffer in Afghanistan with this new strategy?
SEC'Y GATES: Well, the tragedy is that the casualties will, will probably continue to grow, at least for a time being. This is what we saw in the surge in Iraq. But it's because they're going into places where the Taliban essentially have controlled the territory and upsetting the apple cart, if you will. And what, what, what happened in Iraq is what we anticipate will happen here; we'll have an increase in casualties at the front end of this process, but over time it will actually lead to fewer casualties.
MR. GREGORY: Secretary Clinton, what happens if the strategy isn't working in 18 months' time?
SEC'Y CLINTON: Well, first, David, we obviously believe that it will work. We've spent a lot of time testing all the assumptions, our commanders have a, a lot of confidence that it will work. But the president has said, and we agree, that we will take stock of where we are every month. We're not going to wait, we're going to be looking to see what's happening. Now, we've had the Marines that were sent in--remember, this president inherited a situation where we had basically lost ground to the Taliban. The war in Afghanistan, unfortunately, was lost in the fog of the war in Iraq. And the president put in troops when he first got there and then said, "But let's make sure we know kind of where we're headed and how to get there." And so we're going to continue to evaluate as we go. But the Marines went into Helmand province last July and, you know, Bob can tell you that the reports are that they're making real headway. So we have confidence in this strategy.
MR. GREGORY: The, the issue of what was inherited came up this week. The president very pointedly said, Secretary Gates, that reinforcements that were requested of the Bush administration on your watch were not provided, and that he provided them when he came into office. Is that true?
SEC'Y GATES: There was, there was, throughout my, my time as secretary of Defense under President Bush, an outstanding request from General McKiernan. And as Admiral Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified repeatedly, we just--because of the commitment of forces in Iraq, we did not have the, the ability to meet the resource needs in Afghanistan.
MR. GREGORY: So you don't have any problem with that statement?
SEC'Y GATES: I--no, there was an outstanding troop request, and on my watch.
MR. GREGORY: Let's talk about the mission, and I want to chart a little bit of the evolution of the president's public statements about this. Going back to July of 2008, during the campaign, when he talked about America's commitment to Afghanistan. Watch this.
(Videotape, July 15, 2008)
PRES. OBAMA: The Afghan people must know that our commitment to their future is enduring, because the security of Afghanistan and the United States is shared.
(End videotape)
MR. GREGORY: And yet Tuesday when he spoke to the country, he seemed to dismiss the notion of what he called an open-ended commitment or an "enduring commitment" to Afghanistan, saying this.
(Videotape, December 1, 2009)
PRES. OBAMA: Some call for a more dramatic and open-ended escalation of our war effort. I reject this course, because it sets goals that are beyond what can be achieved at a reasonable cost and what we need to achieve to secure our interests.
(End videotape)
MR. GREGORY: Secretary Clinton, has the president concluded, as president now, that in Afghanistan the war on terrorism needs to be downsized?
SEC'Y CLINTON: No. And, and I think, David, there is no contradiction between the two statements you just played. We will have an enduring commitment to Afghanistan. We're going to be putting in combat troops. We are going to be joined by 42 partners. We just got a commitment of an additional 7,000 troops from our NATO-ISAF allies. And we will most likely be continuing once our combat responsibilities have ended in whatever support for the Afghan security forces in terms of training, logistics, intelligence, that will enable them to do what they need to do. At the same time, we will have an ongoing civilian commitment to Afghanistan. So yes, we don't have an open-ended combat commitment. We think we have a strategy that will create the space and time for the Afghans to stand up their own security forces and take responsibility. But we're not going to be, you know, walking away from Afghanistan again. We, we did that before, it didn't turn out very well. So we will stay involved, we will stay supportive, and I think that's exactly the right approach.
MR. GREGORY: But if you have a situation where you're going to begin the withdrawal of troops regardless of conditions on the ground, some critics see that as weakness and a bad sign to the enemy. One of your former colleagues, the former Vice President Dick Cheney, said this to Politico this week about the president's speech:
Cheney said the average Afghan citizen "sees talk about exit strategies and how soon we can get out, instead of talk about how we win. Those folks ... begin to look for ways to accommodate their enemies," Cheney said. "They're worried the United States isn't going to be there much longer and the bad guys are."
And if you look at some of the response from Pakistan, the very country we need to get to the baddest of the guys who are over in their country with al-Qaeda, there's this, as reported by The New York Times:
Washington's assertion that American troops could begin leaving in 18 months provoked anxiety in Afghanistan and rekindled long-standing fears in Pakistan that America would abruptly withdraw, leaving Pakistan to fend for itself. Both countries face intertwined Taliban insurgencies. "Regarding the new policy of President Obama, we're studying that policy," [Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf] Gillani said. "We need more clarity on it, and when we get more clarity on it we can see what we can implement on that plan."
Is what former Vice President Cheney's warning about, is that already starting to take place in terms of the attitude in Pakistan?
SEC'Y GATES: Well, first of all, we're not talking about an abrupt withdrawal. We're talking about something that will take care--take place over a period of time. We--our commanders think that these additional forces, and one of the reasons for the president's decision to try and accelerate their deployment, is, is the view that the this extended surge has the opportunity to make significant gains in terms of reversing the momentum of the Taliban, denying them control of Afghan territory and degrading their capabilities. Our military thinks we have a real opportunity to do that. And it's not just in the next 18 months, because we will have significant--we will have 100,000 forces, troops there, and they are not leaving in July of 2011. Some, handful, or some small number, or whatever the conditions permit, will begin to withdraw at that time.
The piece of this people need to keep in mind that's different from Iraq is our need to communicate a sense of urgency to the Afghans of their need to begin to accept responsibility. The Iraqis, after it was clear that the surge was working, clearly wanted us out of the country as fast as possible. In the case of the Afghans, there are those--not everybody, and not a lot of the people--but there are those who would love to have the United States Army stay there in this very rough neighborhood indefinitely. And we want to communicate the message we will not provide for their security forever. They have to step up to that responsibility.
MR. GREGORY: The--it seems to be an important point. Beyond July of 2011, there's going to be a significant amount of, of U.S. troops there. There's going to be about 100,000 once this surge is finished. How many more years should Americans expect to have a significant force presence in Afghanistan?
SEC'Y GATES: Well, I think that, you know, again, I don't want to put a deadline on it, OK? But, but I think that just picking up on President Karzai's statements in his inaugural address, he talked about taking over security control in three years of important areas of Afghanistan, and all of Afghanistan in five years. I think that we're in that, we're in that neighborhood.
MR. GREGORY: Mm-hmm.
SEC'Y GATES: Two to three to four years. But again, during that period we will be, just as we did in Iraq, turning over provinces to Iraq--Afghan security forces, and that will allow us to bring the number of our forces down in a steady but conditions-based circumstance.
MR. GREGORY: We are also, in a more covert way that's not very well kept as a secret, at war in Pakistan as well. The real al-Qaeda figures, Osama bin Laden, Mullah Omar, the Haqqani network, the baddest of the bad are in Pakistan and not Afghanistan. What are the Pakistanis prepared to do to destroy them?
SEC'Y CLINTON: Well, David, I think what we've seen over the course of this year is a sea change in attitude by the Pakistanis. If we'd been sitting here a year ago and you'd asked what they were going to do, there wouldn't be much of an answer. Now we can say they're beginning to go after the terrorists who are threatening their very existence as a sovereign nation. They've had two military campaigns in the space of the last eight months, and they are making real progress. What we are discussing and consulting with them over is how all of these groups are now a threat to them. There is a syndicate of terrorism, with al-Qaeda at the head of it. So we're doing everything we can to support them in what is a really life or death struggle. I mean, they just blew up--the terrorists just blew up a mosque in Rawalpindi filled with military officers. These terrorists, with al-Qaeda's funding, encouragement, training, equipping, is going right at the Pakistani government.
MR. GREGORY: Can, can a mission be accomplished without capturing Osama bin Laden?
SEC'Y CLINTON: Well, I, I really believe it's important to capture and/or kill Osama bin Laden, Zawahiri, the others who are part of that leadership team. But certainly, you can make enormous progress absent that.
MR. GREGORY: I want to talk a little bit about history, a history you know well, Secretary Gates, with your work in this region going back decades. This was the editorial in The New York Times days after the Soviet invasion in 1979, I'll put it up on the screen: "Moscow's Backyard Quagmire. By intervening so strongly on behalf of a wobbly Afghan client, the Soviet Union appears to be sinking deeper into a backyard quagmire." A lot of questions about the Afghan client today. You have said, along this process, you were worried about putting more troops in. You said the Soviets had 110,000 committed there and they couldn't win. Why is it different now? Isn't this mission impossible?
SEC'Y GATES: It's pretty straightforward. First of all, the Soviets were trying to impose an alien culture and, and political system on, on Afghanistan. But more importantly, they were there terrorizing the Afghans. They killed a million Afghans. They made refugees out of five million Afghans. They were isolated internationally. All of those factors are different for, for us, completely different. We have the sanction of the U.N. We have the sanction of NATO. We have the invitation of the Afghan government itself. We have 42 military partners in Afghanistan. We are supporting and protecting the Afghan people. One of the central themes of General McChrystal's strategy is to reduce and keep civilian casualties low. And, and so it's a, it's a very different situation. And what General McChrystal persuaded me of was that the size of the footprint matters a lot less than what they're doing there. And the new strategy that he's put in place, in terms of how we deal with the Afghans and how we behave, I think will make a big difference.
MR. GREGORY: I want to bring it back home and ask you a very important political question, Secretary Clinton. You have heard the reaction from the Democratic Party; liberals using terms like "echoes of Vietnam," that this is risky, that this is a gamble. Vietnam War protestor Tom Hayden talked about the immorality of fighting for regime like--that is currently in place in Afghanistan. You've been on the campaign trail running for president, you're a former senator, you know the politics of your party well. What is the message of this president to those Democrats who are not on board? And can you effectively prosecute this war without the base of the party behind it?
SEC'Y CLINTON: Well, David, I think it's clear that anyone who has followed this that President Obama has done what he thinks is right for the country. He is well aware of the political concerns raised that you have just described. I think he deserves a lot of credit for not only delving into this and asking the hard questions, but coming to a decision that has both political and economic costs, but which he has concluded is in our vital national security interest.
I think that we have to look more broadly at what has gone on in Afghanistan. Yes, are there problems with the current government? Of course there are, as there are with, you know, any government. We deal, we deal with a lot of governments that are hardly poster children for, you know, good governance. But look at what has happened. When President Karzai came into office, there were about a million kids in school and they were all boys. There are now seven million and they're 40 percent girls. There's all of a sudden a wheat harvest because of better seeds and fertilizer that is giving people, once again, income from their land. There are so many positive examples of what has changed. Of course there's a lot of work to be done. I mean, good grief, this country was devastated by three decades of the most brutal kind of war. It's recovering. And as Bob as said, you know, they really do want a different future.
MR. GREGORY: But is the, the politics of this, the cost of this, will there have to be a war tax? What will you do to keep the Democrats in line on this?
SEC'Y CLINTON: Well, the president has said he will make sure that the cost of the war is accounted for in the budget. Of--it is, it is an additional expense. Everybody knows that. And we have so many important demands here at home. We would not be pursuing this strategy if we did not believe it was directly connected to the safety of our people, our interests, our allies around the world. And I just hope that a lot of my friends who are raising questions, Bob and I heard them when we were up there testifying, will really pay attention to, you know, the rationale behind the president doing this.
MR. GREGORY: Secretary Gates, you are a hard-nosed realist about this region and about this struggle, going back decades. Is failure an option in Afghanistan?
SEC'Y GATES: No, I don't think it can be, given the, the nature of the terror network that Secretary Clinton referred to. But we will be monitoring our progress and, and be willing to adjust our strategy if there are, if there are issues. We're not just going to plunge blindly ahead if it, if it becomes clear that what we're doing isn't working. I mean, there are some other alternatives. We, frankly, didn't think that the outcome of the long discussions that we had was that those, those outcomes were probably less likely to work than what we've chosen. We think and recommended to the president a strategy that, that he has decided on, that we believe, all of us--including the uniform military and our commanders in the field--offers the very best chance for our success. And we're--and that's what we're going to count on.
MR. GREGORY: But you say failure's not an option. The president has said, "We will fight this fight and fight it hard only up to a certain point."
SEC'Y GATES: And then we begin to transfer the responsibility to the Afghans.
MR. GREGORY: Right.
SEC'Y GATES: And a lot can happen in 18 months.
MR. GREGORY: You said, when you were last on this program back in March, that you considered it a challenge, the notion that you might stay on for the entire first term as secretary of Defense. What do you say now?
SEC'Y GATES: I'd say that's a challenge.
MR. GREGORY: Will you see this war through, the withdrawal of troops through?
SEC'Y GATES: I, I think that's probably up to the president.
Get beyond the headline of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates' admission, "I think it has been years" since the US had good intelligence on Osama bin Laden's, and here are the important points from this interview:
1. The Obama approach on Afghanistan, no matter how many times Gates says "transition strategy", is to "kick the can down the road", putting off the deadline for another significant decision to mid-2011.
2. The Obama Administration still has no confidence that it can rely on a political center in Kabul. Look at Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's far-from-ringing endorsement of Afghan President Hamid Karzai: "The proof is in the pudding. We're going to have to wait to see how it unfolds."
3. There is not a hint of an approach in Pakistan other than the Pakistani military being told to go and beat up the "Taliban".
4. The Obama Administration has no real idea how to deal with the economic strain of this increased commitment, other than to hope that it goes away sooner rather than later.
5. So how to proceed, given all these obstacles? Repeat: Al Qa'eda, Al Qa'eda, Al Qa'eda.
GEORGE STEPHANOPOULOS, HOST: And we begin with the cornerstones of President Obama's national security cabinet, the secretary of state, Hillary Clinton; secretary of defense, Robert Gates. Welcome to you both.
This is the first time you're here together on "This Week". Thanks for doing it.
HILLARY CLINTON, SECRETARY OF STATE: The first time we've been called cornerstones.
(LAUGHTER)
STEPHANOPOULOS: Secretary Gates, let me begin with you, because there has been so much focus since the president's speech on this call to begin an exit strategy in July 2011. I want to show you what Senator McCain said earlier this week.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
SEN. JOHN MCCAIN (R), ARIZONA: When conditions on the ground have decisively begun to change for the better, that is when our troops should start to return home with honor, not one minute longer, not one minute sooner, and certainly not on some arbitrary date in July 2011.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
STEPHANOPOULOS: Just two months ago, you seemed to agree with that sentiment. You called the notion of timelines and exit strategies a strategic mistake. What changed?
ROBERT GATES, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE: Well, first of all, I don't consider this an exit strategy. And I try to avoid using that term. I think this is a transition...
STEPHANOPOULOS: Why not?
GATES: This is a transition that's going to take place. And it's not an arbitrary date. It will be two years since the Marines went into southern Helmand and that two years that our military leaders believe will give us time to know that our strategy is working.
They believe that in that time General McChrystal will have the opportunity to demonstrate decisively in certain areas of Afghanistan that the approach we're taking is working. Obviously the transition will begin in the less contested areas of the country.
But it will be the same kind of gradual conditions-based transition province by province, district by district, that we saw in Iraq.
STEPHANOPOULOS: We've heard that phrase a lot...
GATES: But it begins -- but it begins in July 2011.
STEPHANOPOULOS: No, I understand that. But you about this conditions-based decision-making. And I guess that it's fairly vague term. So if the strategy is working, do the troops stay? If it's not working, do they leave? How -- how is the decision-making process going to go?
GATES: Well, from my standpoint, the decision in terms of when a district or a cluster of districts or a province is ready to be turned over to the Afghan security forces is a judgment that will be made by our commanders on the ground, not here in Washington.
And we will do the same thing we did in Iraq, when we transitioned to Afghan security responsibility. We will withdraw first into tactical overwatch, and then a strategic overwatch, if you will, the cavalry over the hill in case they run into trouble.
STEPHANOPOULOS: And this certainly increases the leverage on President Karzai and his government, Secretary Clinton, which brings up questions similar to questions that were raised by a lot of Democrats during -- after the Iraq surge, including President Obama when he was a senator.
He asked Secretary Rice basically what happens if the Maliki government doesn't live up to its promises.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
BARACK OBAMA, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, THEN SENATOR: Are there any circumstances that you can articulate in which we would say to the Maliki government that enough is enough, and we are no longer committing our troops.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
STEPHANOPOULOS: A lot of people asking the same exact question today about President Karzai, at what point do we say enough is enough, we're no longer going to commit troops?
CLINTON: Well, George, I understand the desire to ask these questions which are all thrown into the future, they're obviously matters of concern about how we have a good partner as we move forward in Afghanistan.
But I think you have to look at what President Karzai said in his inaugural speech where he said that Afghan security forces would begin to take responsibility for important parts of the country within three years, and that they would be responsible for everything within five years.
And from our perspective, we think we have a strategy that is a good, integrated approach, it's civilian and military. It has been extremely thoroughly analyzed. But we have to begin to implement it with the kind of commitment that we all feel toward it.
I can't predict everything that is going to happen with President Karzai. I came away from my meeting with him around the inauguration heartened by a lot of what he was saying. But you know, the proof is in the pudding. We're going to have to wait to see how it unfolds.
STEPHANOPOULOS: But if you're really going to have maximum leverage, doesn't he have to know that if he doesn't live up to the commitment, we're going to go?
CLINTON: Well, I think he knows that we have a commitment to trying to protect our national security. That's why we're there. We do want to assist the people of Afghanistan and to try to improve the capacity of the Afghan government.
But I think it's important to stress that this decision was based on what we believe is best for the United States. And we have to have a realistic view of who we're working with in Afghanistan, and it's not only President Karzai, it's ministers of various agencies that -- some of which are doing quite well and producing good results, provincial and local leaders.
So it's a much more complicated set of players than just one person.
STEPHANOPOULOS: There is also the question of Pakistan, the neighbor, and whether they're living up to their commitments. You got in a little hot water in Pakistan when you suggested that they hadn't been doing enough in the past to go after the Taliban.
And, Secretary Gates, let me turn a question about this to you, it's connected to a report that Senator Kerry, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee released this week about Osama bin Laden. He suggested that the failure to block his exit from Tora Bora has made the situation there much worse.
In this report, he actually wrote that the decisions that opened the door for his escape to Pakistan allowed bin Laden to emerge as a potent symbolic figure who continues to attract a steady flow of money and inspire fanatics worldwide.
The Pakistani prime minister sort of shrugged off any concerns about that this week, about whether or not he had gone -- done enough to go after Osama bin Laden. He said he doesn't believe Osama is in Pakistan. Is he right? And do you think the Pakistanis have done enough to get him?
GATES: Well, we don't know for a fact where Osama bin Laden is, if we did, we'd go get him. But...
STEPHANOPOULOS: When was the last time we had any good intelligence on where he was?
GATES: I think it has been years.
STEPHANOPOULOS: Years?
GATES: I think so.
STEPHANOPOULOS: So these reports that came out just this week about a detainee saying he might have seen him in Afghanistan earlier this year?
GATES: No, that's...
STEPHANOPOULOS: We can't confirm that.
GATES: No.
STEPHANOPOULOS: So do you believe that one of the reasons we haven't had good enough intelligence is because the Pakistani government has not been cooperating enough?
GATES: No. I think it's because if, as we suspect, he is in North Waziristan, it is an area that the Pakistani government has not had a presence in, in quite some time. The truth of the matter is that we have been very impressed by the Pakistani army's willingness to go into places like Swat in South Waziristan, if one had asked any of us a year or more ago if the Pakistani army would be doing that, we would have said no chance.
And so they are bringing pressure to bear on the Taliban in Pakistan, and particularly those that are attacking the Pakistani government. But frankly, any pressure on the Taliban, whether it's in Pakistan or in Afghanistan is helpful to us because al Qaeda is working with both of them.
STEPHANOPOULOS: You mentioned the actions the Pakistani government has taken. Is Balochistan next? Is that where they have to go next to take out the Taliban?
GATE: Well, I think that the Pakistani government, we sometimes tend to forget that Pakistan, like Afghanistan, is a sovereign country. And Pakistani -- the Pakistani army will go where the Pakistani army thinks the threat is. And if they think that threat is Balochistan, that's where they'll go. If they think it's in North Waziristan, they may go up there. Or they may just winter in where they are right now.
But these are calls that the Pakistanis make. We are sharing information with them. We have had a steadily developing, better relationship between our militaries.
And we will help them in any way we possibly can, but that's their call.
STEPHANOPOULOS: Back to Afghanistan, Secretary Clinton, some have suggested that one of your envoys -- the president's envoy, Richard Holbrooke -- should begin negotiations with those elements of the Taliban who are willing to talk to him.
Do you agree with that?
CLINTON: Well, George, we have said -- and the president made it clear in his speech at West Point -- that, you know, there are two different approaches here.
One is what could be called reintegration. And that is really looking at the lower-level members of the Taliban, who are there through intimidation and coercion, or, frankly, because it's a better living than they can make anywhere else.
We think there's a real opportunity for a number of those to be persuaded to leave the battlefield.
Now, the problem, of course, once they leave -- and we have a lot of evidence of this -- they'll get killed if they're not protected. And that's one of the reasons why we're trying to get these secure zones.
STEPHANOPOULOS: In other words, they don't believe we'll stay.
CLINTON: Well, and also, just, we need to secure the population. It's one of General McChrystal's principal objectives.
Then the upper levels of the Taliban -- you know, look. They have to renounce al Qaeda, renounce violence. They have to be willing to abide by the constitution of Afghanistan and live peacefully.
We have no firm information whether any of those leaders would be at all interested in following that kind of a path. In fact, I'm highly skeptical that any of them would.
So, we're going to be consulting with our Afghan partners. It's going to be a multiply-run operation to see who might come off of the battlefield, and who might possibly give up their allegiance to the Taliban and their connection with the...
STEPHANOPOULOS: But high-level negotiations are possible?
CLINTON: We don't know yet. And again, I think that -- we asked Mullah Omar to give up bin Laden before we went into Afghanistan after 9/11, and he wouldn't do it. I don't know why we think he would have changed by now.
GATES: I would just add, I think that the likelihood of the leadership of the Taliban, or seniors leaders, being willing to accept the conditions Secretary Clinton just talked about depends in the first instance on reversing their momentum right now, and putting them in a position where they suddenly begin to realize that they're likely to lose.
STEPHANOPOULOS: How is this offensive in Helmand Province going?
GATES: It's actually going very well. And the Marines have already had -- I think one of the reasons that our military leaders are pretty confident is that they have already begun to see changes where the Marines are present in southern Helmand.
STEPHANOPOULOS: Let me (UNINTELLIGIBLE) the question of costs, which has been raised by our next guest, Senator Russ Feingold. As you know, he's against the escalation announced by the president.
But he's also gone (ph) and wrote a letter to the president where he raises -- where he says, we request that you not send any additional troops to Afghanistan until Congress has enacted appropriations to pay for the cost of such an increase, and that you propose reductions in spending to pay for the costs of any military operations in Afghanistan -- a concern shared by many of the American people.
Secretary Clinton, shouldn't this war, if we're going to fight it, be paid for?
CLINTON: Well, the president has said that the costs are going to be accounted for, that the Office of Management and Budget, the Defense Department, the State Department, you know, are going to be working to make sure that we give the best projections of costs we can.
I think that we're going to have to address our deficit situation across the board. There's no doubt about that, and I certainly support that.
But I think we have to look at the entire budget, and we have to be very clear about, you know, what the costs are, as Secretary Gates has said a couple of times in our testimony together. We are drawing down from Iraq. There will be savings over the next two to three years coming from there. And the addition of these troops is going to put a burden on us, no doubt about it.
It is manageable, but we have to look at all of our fiscal situation and begin to address this.
STEPHANOPOULOS: There's also the question of the cost-benefit analysis. And a lot of people look at our own U.S. government intelligence estimates, saying there are fewer than 100 active al Qaeda in Afghanistan and say, why is that worth putting $30 billion more this year into Afghanistan?
GATES: It is because in that border area, Afghan-Pakistani border, that is the epicenter of extremist jihad. And al Qaeda has close relationships with the Taliban in Afghanistan, and they have very close relationships with the Taliban in Pakistan.
The Taliban in Pakistan have been attacking Pakistani civilians, Pakistani government officials, military officials, trying to destabilize the government of Pakistan.
Any success by the Taliban in either Afghanistan or Pakistan benefits al Qaeda. And any safe haven on either side of the border creates opportunities for them to recruit, get new funds and do operational planning.
And what's more, the Taliban revival in the safe havens in western Pakistan is a lesson to al Qaeda that they can come back, if they are provided the kind of safe haven that the Taliban were.
This is the place where the jihadists defeated the Soviet Union, one superpower. And they believe -- their narrative is that it helped create the collapse of the Soviet Union. If they -- they believe that if they can defeat us in Afghanistan, that they then have the opportunity to defeat a second superpower.
STEPHANOPOULOS: But you look at that...
GATES: And it creates huge opportunities for them in that area, as well as around the world.
STEPHANOPOULOS: You were the deputy director of the CIA back in 1985, when Gorbachev made the decision to expand. Eighteen months later, he was pulling out.
What's to prevent that from happening again?
GATES: Well, what he did was agree with his generals to make one last push.
But the parallel just doesn't work. The reality is, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. They killed a million Afghans. They made five million refugees out of Afghanis.
They were isolated in the world in terms of what they were doing there.
We are part of an alliance of 42 countries with us, in addition to us, that are contributing troops. We have a U.N. mandate. We have a mandate from NATO.
So, you have broad international support for what's going on in Afghanistan. And the situation is just completely different than was the case with the Soviet Union.
STEPHANOPOULOS: We're just about out of time.
Secretary Clinton, I want to ask you about the case of Amanda Knox, the American college student, who was convicted of murder in Italy, just on Friday.
Senator Cantwell of Washington has expressed a lot of concerns about this conviction. She said she wants to talk to you about it. Here's what she said.
I have serious questions about the Italian justice system and whether anti-Americanism tainted this trial. The prosecution did not present enough evidence for an impartial jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Knox was guilty. Italian jurors were not sequestered, and were allowed to view highly negative news coverage about Ms. Knox.
She goes on to lay out several of the concerns she had with the trial. She did say, as I said, she's going to be in contact with you, so you can express the concerns to the Italian government.
Do you share her concerns about this trial?
CLINTON: George, I honestly haven't had time to even examine that. I've been immersed in what we're doing in Afghanistan.
Of course, I'll meet with Senator Cantwell, or anyone who has a concern, but I can't offer any opinion about that at this time.
STEPHANOPOULOS: So you have not expressed any concerns to the Italian government?
CLINTON: I have not, no.
STEPHANOPOULOS: Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, thank you both very much.
I'm not sure we had to wait 92 days --- from the delivery of the recommendations of General Stanley McChrystal, the US commander in Afghanistan, to President Obama's speech tonight at the US Military Academy --- to get this outcome. It's pretty much, in substance and in rhetoric, what we've predicted throughout the autumn. But politics is politics, especially when the "easy" solution of an Afghan election to hold up as a beacon of progress didn't materialise.
So here's what America and the world gets this evening:
1. SEND IN THE TROOPS: McChrystal asked for 40,000 more troops (though he wanted even more). He gets 30,000.
Obama will frame this as a carefully-considered compromise. He shows Presidential strength 1) in not simply giving the military its full demands and 2) delivering most of that demand as a sign of US resolve and commitment. The President carried out the same manoeuvre --- really, the very same manoeuvre --- in March.
In fact, this is effectively an adoption of McChrystal's proposal, albeit through a bit of staging. Obama will also declare that NATO is going to put in 6000 more forces. Though this is more for show than substance --- think of Britain's total of 500 additional troops --- it gets the number close to 40,000, and I suspect there will be some US "support forces" that will make their way into the package.
2. SOFT POWER, SOFT POWER, SOFT POWER: Obama will then need to skip quickly past the troop numbers, because there are a lot of folks (and not just on the "left" of the Democratic Party) who are not happy about escalation. So he will dedicate a long section of his speech to the US civilians who will be working in important sectors from agriculture to education to health care to assist Afghanistan's development.
Obama will be careful not to give numbers because someone might check the back story. Yes, this was also in the March speech, and since then, the US has only been able to get several hundred people into the field.
3. MR KARZAI, DO YOUR JOB: Obama will emphasise that the US additional effort must be matched by a sustained effort by the Afghanistan Government to cleanse itself of corruption as it takes over responsibility for security and other operations. He will say that the the US is a dedicated partner but that Kabul must be just as dedicated.
The sleight-of-hand here will be that this is a new theme in American policy. It's not: Obama made the same demands on Kabul in March, and they were repeated by his officials, notably Secretary of State Clinton, throughout the spring. But, of course, the summer was filled with stories of money going astray, political intrigue, and the failure at the show of democracy.
So this will be a "Political Ground Zero" moment: all starts anew.
4. YOU TOO, PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT (AND YOU KNOW WHO YOU ARE). The political shift behind this speech, although it will not get a direct reference, is that Washington thinks it's on firmer ground with the Government in Islamabad. This is because President Zardari, after months of US effort, has effectively been pushed aside. The US wants to deal with Prime Minister Gillani and the Pakistani military, and it seems that the alliance is developing.
With this apparent political evolution, Obama will lay down the challenge for Pakistan to keep moving against the "Taliban", as it has appeared to down with summer offensives. He may even make direct reference to the Bin Laden spectre, suggesting that Pakistani forces can complete a job that was botched in 2001.
No reference, by the way, to the US drone and missile attacks: those might be effective in Washington's eyes, but it gives the appearance that Washington's military is running Pakistan's war.
5. EXTREMIST, EXTREMIST (WHO'S AN EXTREMIST?). Lots of that word in Obama's speech tonight. It's how you sell an escalation when the political and military situation is far from clear and far from winnable. So Al Qa'eda will pop up all over the rhetorical map this evening, even though it's not much of a presence in Afghanistan.
Obama's trick will be to move from Pakistan, where there are the Al Q bad guys, to the sanctuary/haven/breeding ground for extremism in Afghanistan. And there I think even his skills will be challenged: who exactly is the US fighting in the country? The word "Taliban" is the catch-all for a variety of insurgent groups: does Obama dare say that the US strategy is to split off some of those groups by negotiating with "extremists"?
WHAT HE WON'T SAY:
"We're screwed."
Sorry. No deep analysis here. Just being blunt. Even before Enduring Americawe were writing on "Watching America" on the Libertas website that the problem for Washington was the lack of a political centre to its efforts. The "hole in the doughnut" was the weakness of President Zardari and the shakiness of an Afghan Government whose authority didn't extend much beyond Kabul.
While the hole may have been filled in Pakistan, Obama is still trying to cover it with distractions in Afghanistan. If he was being real, he would declare to the US public that President Karzai might be on difficult ground in his own country but he has out-manoeuvred Washington in the last few months to assure power in Kabul, if not beyond. Those deals have kept Karzai in power, but they of course are not the battle against the "extremists".
The great and glorious myth of the American "surge" in Iraq is that throwing in more boots on the ground suddenly rescued a country from civil war. What that myth never acknowledges is that the most important political development was of a stronger central government emerging in Baghdad in 2007/8. So the US Government could bolster, with money as well as discussions, "local" Sunni militias and groups against "Al Qa'eda". All of this might be building later conflict --- what happens when those local groups and the national government compete for authority and profits? --- but by then US forces hopefully would have been able to draw down and call it victory.
No such scenario exists in Afghanistan. There is no "Al Qa'eda" spectre that can be used for the US strategy with local groups --- the contest is between an assortment of indigenous factions. There is no strong national authority.
So Washington either puts forth or supports a wondrous solution in which those factions reach an accommodation over power, one which hopefully means they won't kill each other and anyone who gets in the way (that is the option put forward by Karzai and by the Pakistani Government, though it is not clear how they would achieve this), or the US Government treads military and political water and hopes they don't get sucked down if the undertow of violence gets stronger.
I don't think the Obama Administration has a way forward on the first option, which is why the President after 92 days has finally decided to put on the public face of more troops and a largely-mythical non-military effort. Welcome then ---- over months and over years --- to the second option.
Saturday, December 19, 2009 at 7:14 
Who would want to be in Barack Obama’s shoes? Whilst it must be fun to have a Boeing 747 at your beck and call, flying on it pretty well free of charge, the novelty soon wears off. And although dashing around the globe collecting Nobel Prizes and saving climate conferences has to be the buzz of buzzes, he has to wonder whether two trips to Scandinavia equate to one trip too far.
I'm not sure we had to wait 92 days --- from the delivery of the recommendations of General Stanley McChrystal, the US commander in Afghanistan, to President Obama's speech tonight at the US Military Academy --- to get this outcome. It's pretty much, in substance and in rhetoric, what we've predicted throughout the autumn. But politics is politics, especially when the "easy" solution of an Afghan election to hold up as a beacon of progress didn't materialise.