Iran Special Analysis: After Montazeri --- From Protest to Victory?

For an observer 1000s of miles away, the movement of events was dream-like. Initially, as Grand Ayatollah Montazeri's body was moved from his house to the Imam Hassan Mosque, the report were "30,000 to 40,000" on the streets. An hour later, as the procession moved from the mosque to the Massoumeh Shrine, where Montazeri would be buried, the news came of "more than 100,000".

Then it was hundreds of thousands. Not just claims of hundreds of thousands but the first pictures, with an aerial shot of of Qom filled with mourners and demonstrators. Then the videos, first in a trickle, soon a torrent, from Montazeri's house, from the mosque, from the shrine, throughout the city, in Najafabad (Montazeri's birthplace), and in other cities.

Just put two images side-by-side. Three days before Montazeri's burial, the regime struggled (and possibly manipulated) to fill Tehran's Enghelab Square with supporters. Yesterday, there was no need for PhotoShop: this was the genuine expression of emotions from anguish to anger to hope, in numbers not seen since the first days after the Presidential election.

For me, there was one key sign that this was beyond even the moments of the mid-July Rafsanjani Friday Prayer, the "40th Day memorial" of 30 July, the Qods Days demonstration of September, the 16 Azar protests two weeks ago. At no point, even as "Western" media were going Page 1 with their discovery that Iranian post-election resistance had not died, could I step back to evaluate the political significance. This was too big for snap judgements of the type that I could venture a few hours into the protests of previous occasions.

For this was a combination not only of a movement of the past six months but of political and religious sentiments of decades. Montazeri --- the pariah of 1989, dismissed as the next Supreme Leader and shunned by Ayatollah Khomeini, placed under house arrest, condemned as an irrelevancy by the regime --- was now Iran's hope.

Perhaps the most eye-catching testimony to that came not from an admirer of Montazeri or a member of the Green Wave but from a critic and defender of the current regime. Tehran Unversity academic Seyed Mohammad Marandi --insisted Montazeri "said the same thing" for 25 years, Montazeri was an insignificance, Montazeri was linked to "terrorism". What was meant to be a dismissal turned into a tribute: Marandi's words just did not match up to the videos that were reaching our desk at the same moment.

How much of yesterday's sentiment was sympathy, affection, and admiration of an important but singular figure, and how much was a well-spring of wider beliefs about the current state of an Islamic Republic, two decades after Montazeri's ostracism? And does this mean that the movement for fundamental change in the Iranian system, a movement put aside by many observers only weeks ago (note the lack of attention outside Iran to the significance of demonstrations of 4 November), is now unstoppable?

I'm not sure this morning. I'm not sure primarily because, even acknowledging that the mass sentiment yesterday was not only for Montazeri but for Montazeri as a symbol of what could and should be in Iran, a ground-swell still needs focus, direction, objectives.

The practical demands of politics are messy and long-term, compared to the sudden, clear expression we saw yesterday. So, even in the run-up to the ceremonies of Ashura on Sunday --- now how large the demonstrations? --- in the background will be all the legal, political, and religious calculations and manoeuvres that have both preoccupied and frustrated since June. Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi made their appearances yesterday, but the reconcilation now has to be not only with a crowd of mourning but of a movement that seeks a significant victory for its demands of recognition and justice.

So, no easy answers. However, I will venture one far-from-tangential conclusion. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, six months after his claims of victory over the "dust" of opposition, is now a President of the past. I am not sure he was even prominent enough yesterday to get a specific chant from the demonstrators, but he was swept away in the cry, "Montazeri is not dead; the coup Government is dead."

It is surreal but essential ---the relevance of the irrelevant, so to speak --- to watch the interview of Ahmadinejad broadcast by America's ABC News last night. Because the encounter took place last week, both the President and the interviewer, trading punches over the nuclear issues and the detained US hikers, are unconcerned with Grand Ayatollah Montazeri and (in the interviewer's case) the political state of the opposition. So the interview now becomes testimony to a discussion taking place outside the realities of the conflict, both over the last six months and as they have evolved over the last 48 hours.

Ironically, however, Ahmadinejad's marginal position is important. Combined with the "marginal" on the other side --- the failure of Mousavi and Karroubi to get any concessions from the regime on their core demands, being met instead by more threats, the failure of others to establish a National Unity Plan --- it has led to the sharpening of the conflict between the Supreme Leader and a "radicalised" opposition. That, in turn, has led to a muddling, rather than clarifying, of the issues at hand: "radicalised" is at that point laid on certain symbolic acts such as "Death to the Dictator" chants and the omission of the Islamic Republic's coat of arms on the Iranian flag.

It is from that muddle that the next steps and possibilities will emerge. Is Ayatollah Khameini really willing to take this to a battle to the death with the Green movement or will he offer any way back from his threat to arrest them all? Does any space remain for those "within the Establishment" --- a Rafsanjani, a Larijani, other high-profile members of Parliament and Ministers --- to craft a settlement? Does the mantle of Montazeri lead Mousavi, Karroubi, or other opposition figures back to prominence not just through periodic statements but through a sustained public presence, accompanied by clear demands for changes in the Islamic Republic? Is there any possibility of a "movement from below" that frames and presses those demands to a satisfactory conclusion?

After emotions has to come political calculation. But right now, I don't have an answer to those sums and equations. I'm not sure anyone else --- Khameini, Mousavi, Karroubi, or anyone in that crowd at Qom --- does either.

Iran Video & Text: Montazeri's Son Saeed On His Father's Views, Last Words

Our gratitude to an EA reader for finding the video and providing an English translation:

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OSv0YXWI_bU[/youtube]

The Latest from Iran (21 December): The Montazeri Funeral
Latest Iran Video: Montazeri’s Criticism of Supreme Leader Khamenei (1997; redistributed October 2009)
Latest Iran Video: Demonstrations in Memory of Montazeri (20 December)
Iran Special LiveBlog: Ayatollah Montazeri Has Died

Anchorman: Mr. Montazeri, do you expect any obstacles for tomorrow's ceremonies?

Montazeri: We hope not, but because of our past experiences with these gentlemen [the regime] we expect obstacles, since they also had interfered in [other] ceremonies. But maybe these gentlemen have come to their minds by now and will show enough respect to let us carry out [the ceremonies]. Hopefully they won't make our lives harder.

Anchorman: What were your father's last words?

Montazeri: I was in Tehran and returned to my father's house at midnight. He asked if my "mission" was successful [apprently Saeed Montazeri had tried to meet families of political detainees and help them]. But I replied that unfortunately I couldn't help. My father was one of the few Marjas who really cared for these families and generally for the people and gave his heart and soul for them. Now my father passed away and is free from any sorrow.

Anchorman: What were your father's hopes? What was the view on the Green Movement and Iranian youth?

Montazeri [summarised]: His opinion was that people should stick together and solve their problems together.

Anchorman: Was your father under house arrest? And if so, how did the regime treat him? Did the regime's officials respect him and treat him well, compared to the first few years of his house arrest, or did they continue putting pressure on him?

Montazeri: It was a bit easier recently, but from what I know the gentlemen have ordered the press not to mention his death in the news. Only God knows if they will let us wash his dead body[?]. But as I said, I'm still hopeful that they came to their minds and that everything goes well the next few days, so that the society doesn't suffer anymore.

Anchorman: What was the reason for his death? What did the doctors say?

Montazeri: They said he had a heart attack while he was asleep. But I think one of the main reasons was his grief for the post-election events which troubled my father a lot.

Anchorman: Was there an extraordinary disciple [scholar] whom your father had chosen to replace him ?

Montazeri: No. Not officially. The people will chose whom they want to follow.

Anchorman: How was the relationship to [Mehdi] Karroubi, [Mir Hossein] Mousavi, and other leaders of the Green movement?

Montazeri: There was not a direct relationship but exchange of letters. But they also had common friends so they were in contact through messages they sent to each other. All in all, I can say that my father supported the leaders of the Green movement and prayed for them to succeed.

Anchorman: Mr. Montazeri, you father has often talked about the person of [Supreme Leader Ali] Khamenei and it's not a secret that he was very critical to him. Do you know about any speech were he was also critical of the system of velayat-e-faqih [ultimate clerical authority]?

Montazeri: He always had the same view about the system of velayat-e-faqih. Nothing has changed. A vali-e-faqih must be chosen by people's vote. He wanted the people to decide who is vali-e-faqih and who is not. The term of his rule must also be limited and if he doesn't behave in a proper way, he must be removed from office.

So you see that my father's view of the system of velayat-e-faqih is different from these gentlemen's [the regime's] conception. My father strongly opposed the life-long rule of one leader. My father always believed that you might have a republic where everyone lives under massive hardship and oppression, and you might have a monarchy where everyone lives under good conditions and in harmony. The names "republic", "system of velayat-e-faqih" or "monarchy" are only names and have nothing to do with the real circumstances of peoples' lives. People must chose what's good for them. The name of the system is not important as long people decide.

Anchorman: It is said that Ayatollah Montazeri strongly opposed the execution of leftists and MKO members during Imam Khomeini's rule. But it is also said that he cried a lot because of the destiny of these executed men. Did you witness his grief about the post-election events, when people were tortured at Kahrizak [Prison] and when people like Neda Agha Soltan died in the streets? What were your father's reactions?

Montazeri: Yes, my father suffered a lot. He was speechless and couldnT understand why certain people who sacrificed their hearts and souls for the revolution are now jailed. We joked with him and said that at least we are not jailed and wondered why he suffered that much for other peoples tragic destinies.

Anchorman: Did your father see Neda Agha Soltan's tragic death?

Montazeri: Yes, he was very up to date. He was one of the few Marjas who knew the daily news since we showed him satellite broadcasts and also the news in the Worldwide Web. He was very up-to-date and interested in the recent developments.

Anchorman: Mr. Montazeri, thank you for your time and again i want to offer you and your family my deepest condolences.

Montazeri: Thank you and God bless you.

Latest Iran Video: Mehdi Karroubi Interview with BBC (17 December)

A rather strange "interview" of Mehdi Karroubi on BBC's flagship news programme Newsnight last evening. The correspondent, Jon Leyne, frittered away the first minutes talking about how "extraordinary" it was that Karroubi was able to speak to a Western media outlet, surfing on the cleric's own words about the Iranian regime's clamp-down on communications.

In fact, Karroubi has been interviewed by the Los Angeles Times and Le Monde in recent weeks, so the situation is more complicated than presented here. The regime will allow a window for Karroubi to speak to the "outside" world; it is his profile inside Iran that is of more concern to them. So Leyne's "headline" on the interview --- that this was just Ayatollah Khomeini speaking to the Western media on the eve of the 1979 Islamic Revolution --- seems to be hyperbolic.

The second half of the clip is better, with Karroubi's (too-brief, as edited by the BBC) reflections on the abuse of detainees, as well as his comments on President Ahmadinejad and the possible emergence of a "radical" Green Movement.

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ocw2tB0G3jM[/youtube]

Today on EA (17 December)

Iran: We're keeping track of the latest developments on our LiveBlog. Today, however, is quieter so far than yesterday, when threats and responses are flying between the regime, Hashemi Rafsanjani, and the Green movement. We've assessed the significance in a special analysis.

One of the threats came from the head of Iran's judiciary, Sadegh Larijani, who said he had enough evidence to bring charges against opposition figures. We've got the video of his speech.

We've also got video of an interview with a purported Basiji militiaman, who has fled to Britain, alleging abuse of detainees and rigging of the Presidential vote. And we've posted lawyer and activist Shirin Ebadi's special comment on the "We are All in Hejab" movement sparked by the arrest of Majid Tavakoli.

Israel: Ali Yenidunya picks up on the effective confirmation of Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas as indefinite President of the West Bank. He also asks if the Britain Government's apology over the arrest warrant issued against former Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni is a de facto endorsement of the Israeli war in Gaza a year ago.

Iran Analysis: The Regime's Sword Wavers

Enduring America, 14 December: "What can the Supreme Leader and the Revolutionary Guard do with a Sword which, for all the detentions and all the propaganda, dangles not as a sign of its threat but of (for now) its impotence?"

Even by the standards of this post-election conflict, the last 48 hours have been extraordinary for their rhetoric. At one point, there were no less than five regime officials (head of judiciary Sadegh Larijani, Minister of Intelligence Heydar Moslehi, Supreme Leader representative Mojtaba Zolnour, Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, Tehran Governor Morteza Tamedon) throwing around threats of arrests. Yet the opposition was even more spirited and even more high-profile: both Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mehdi Karroubi met the threats with defiance and more than a little humour (both were quite concerned about Yazdi's health, physical and mental), MPs offered public support, Mir Hossein Mousavi's Alireza Beheshti challenged the regime's continuous "lies about imperialism", and Mousavi's wife, Zahra Rahnavard, held up the Green Movement as the representative of the ideals of Imam Khomeini.

The Latest from Iran (17 December): An Uncertain Regime

And the outcome today, on the eve of the holy month of Moharram? A regime, nervous and possibly a bit frightened, which can neither swing its Sword of Damocles nor keep it steady.



Yesterday afternoon EA correspondent Mr Azadi began putting the pieces together. On Tuesday, Yazdi had put out his scathing ridicule of the "joke" of Karroubi and threatened Hashemi Rafsanjani's son, Mehdi Hashemi, with arrest if he stepped foot in Iran, Tamedon had talked both of security forces on alert for troublemakers on Friday and of Rafsanjani, and Zolnour apparently said all the opposition leaders should be rounded up. Then yesterday, it emerged that both Larijani and Moslehi were telling important groups of officials and clerics that the evidence was in place to hold trials; the Minister of Intelligence was now spinning a conspiracy tale in which representatives of Hashemi Rafsanjani had planned the post-election conflict in Britain with foreign agents.

The speeches were not necessarily co-ordinated. Indeed, because they probably weren't, they were far short of successful. Larijani's statement, which should have been the most significant given his official position, was a bit lost in crowded airspace, while Moslehi's speech --- at least to my outside eyes --- comes across as extreme. Is the regime really saying that Mehdi Hashemi and Rafsanjani's daughter, Faezeh Hashemi (who is in Iran), go on trial as part of the inner circle of the "velvet revolution"?

Instead of cowing the opposition into submission, the volley of regime shots were met by a furious counter-attack. Karroubi was careful, in a well-crafted response, to focus on Yazdi rather than swinging at officials such as Larijani and Moslehi, but Rafsanjani, durig the course of the day, took on not only Yazdi ("Get Help", "Get Cured") but the regime in general. Perhaps the former President was planning, after months of relative silence and uncertain manoeuvres, to surface but it appears that the attacks on him and his family helped make up his mind.

The irony is that, if the regime had kept its mouth shut or at least been more measured in its attacks, it could have left the opposition, rather than itself, in wobbling confusion. The Green movement seemed to be undecided, or even split, over tactics for the first day of Moharram. Should it join the Government-authorised marches, behind the message of "The Ideals of Khomeini are Our Ideals", or should it stand aside and let the regime have the field of demonstrations to itself for the first time in six months?

Supporters of Mir Hossein Mousavi put out a letter, with a picture of Mousavi, favouring a public appearance but other activists balked: 1) some feared this would lead to violent clashes; 2) some did not want to associated with any march in honour of Khomeini, even if it had the symbols of resistance of Imam Hossein, whose death is marked by Moharram; 3) some argued that staying away would embarrass the regime when the outcome of a relatively small demonstration showed the lack of support for the Government. This morning, the argument is still unresolved.

Yet this debate in the opposition camp is secondary to the image of the regime's fist-shaking being met by a smack from Karroubi, who had been muted in recent weeks, Rafsanjani, and others. So why did it make such an inept move?

The more I look at events, the more I think that in part the answer is a fear of Rafsanjani. It was notable, for example, that Moslehi's attack did not name any other leader apart from the former President: Mousavi, Karroubi, and Mohammad Khatami were all absent from the speech. And it may be equally notable that Tehran Government Tamedon specifically referred to Rafsanjani's 6 December speech in Mashhad as an unacceptable challenge to the regime.

At the time of the speech, we published not only an extract from the speech but an analysis pointing to discussions between senior clerics and Rafsanjani as part of a renewed effort for a "National Unity Plan" or similar political compromise between the regime and the Green opposition. This prospect was challenged by others as an illusory hope but we still maintained this: what mattered was whether the regime thought the initiative was serious, causing it discomfort and prompting a response.

The last 48 hours mark that response: the Government is worried about Rafsanjani, possibly even more than the protests on the streets or the Mousavi-Karroubi-Khatami alliance. My hunch --- and it is only a hunch --- is that regime officials think Rafsanjani might have planned a high-profile appearance, if not tomorrow than at some point leading up to or on  the special day of Ashura (27 December), to mark his defiance of the Ahmadinejad Government. For the first time since his Friday Prayer of mid-July, the trumpet (or alarm, in the ears of the regime) would be sounded: Hashemi's Back, Hashemi's Here.

If true, that's a pretty significant development in the ongoing battle. But I think the threats also come from a second fear, and this one may be more important.

The regime is worried about its own supporters. Uncertainty and fright comes from the prospect that the large numbers won't show up tomorrow. The Friday Prayer congregation at Tehran University will be full, but how many will then go on the streets? And, if they are on the streets, how loud will they be for Khamenei and Ahmadinejad rather than Imam Hossein?

For six months, from the day-after-election "they are all dust" victory speech of Ahmadinejad to the 19 June Friday Prayer speech of the Supreme Leader to this Sunday's reprise of Ayatollah Khamenei --- not to mention the actions beyond the speeches from detentions to security presence to the steady propaganda brumbeat --- the regime has relied on attack.

But a swinging sword does not necessarily find its target. And it does not necessarily bring legitimacy (irrespective of the words of Machiavelli). So tomorrow's test is not of how many come for the opposition but, arguably for the first time since 12 June, how many come out for the Supreme Leader, for the President, and for current regime and its actions.