Iran Special Analysis: After Montazeri --- From Protest to Victory?

For an observer 1000s of miles away, the movement of events was dream-like. Initially, as Grand Ayatollah Montazeri's body was moved from his house to the Imam Hassan Mosque, the report were "30,000 to 40,000" on the streets. An hour later, as the procession moved from the mosque to the Massoumeh Shrine, where Montazeri would be buried, the news came of "more than 100,000".

Then it was hundreds of thousands. Not just claims of hundreds of thousands but the first pictures, with an aerial shot of of Qom filled with mourners and demonstrators. Then the videos, first in a trickle, soon a torrent, from Montazeri's house, from the mosque, from the shrine, throughout the city, in Najafabad (Montazeri's birthplace), and in other cities.

Just put two images side-by-side. Three days before Montazeri's burial, the regime struggled (and possibly manipulated) to fill Tehran's Enghelab Square with supporters. Yesterday, there was no need for PhotoShop: this was the genuine expression of emotions from anguish to anger to hope, in numbers not seen since the first days after the Presidential election.

For me, there was one key sign that this was beyond even the moments of the mid-July Rafsanjani Friday Prayer, the "40th Day memorial" of 30 July, the Qods Days demonstration of September, the 16 Azar protests two weeks ago. At no point, even as "Western" media were going Page 1 with their discovery that Iranian post-election resistance had not died, could I step back to evaluate the political significance. This was too big for snap judgements of the type that I could venture a few hours into the protests of previous occasions.

For this was a combination not only of a movement of the past six months but of political and religious sentiments of decades. Montazeri --- the pariah of 1989, dismissed as the next Supreme Leader and shunned by Ayatollah Khomeini, placed under house arrest, condemned as an irrelevancy by the regime --- was now Iran's hope.

Perhaps the most eye-catching testimony to that came not from an admirer of Montazeri or a member of the Green Wave but from a critic and defender of the current regime. Tehran Unversity academic Seyed Mohammad Marandi --insisted Montazeri "said the same thing" for 25 years, Montazeri was an insignificance, Montazeri was linked to "terrorism". What was meant to be a dismissal turned into a tribute: Marandi's words just did not match up to the videos that were reaching our desk at the same moment.

How much of yesterday's sentiment was sympathy, affection, and admiration of an important but singular figure, and how much was a well-spring of wider beliefs about the current state of an Islamic Republic, two decades after Montazeri's ostracism? And does this mean that the movement for fundamental change in the Iranian system, a movement put aside by many observers only weeks ago (note the lack of attention outside Iran to the significance of demonstrations of 4 November), is now unstoppable?

I'm not sure this morning. I'm not sure primarily because, even acknowledging that the mass sentiment yesterday was not only for Montazeri but for Montazeri as a symbol of what could and should be in Iran, a ground-swell still needs focus, direction, objectives.

The practical demands of politics are messy and long-term, compared to the sudden, clear expression we saw yesterday. So, even in the run-up to the ceremonies of Ashura on Sunday --- now how large the demonstrations? --- in the background will be all the legal, political, and religious calculations and manoeuvres that have both preoccupied and frustrated since June. Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi made their appearances yesterday, but the reconcilation now has to be not only with a crowd of mourning but of a movement that seeks a significant victory for its demands of recognition and justice.

So, no easy answers. However, I will venture one far-from-tangential conclusion. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, six months after his claims of victory over the "dust" of opposition, is now a President of the past. I am not sure he was even prominent enough yesterday to get a specific chant from the demonstrators, but he was swept away in the cry, "Montazeri is not dead; the coup Government is dead."

It is surreal but essential ---the relevance of the irrelevant, so to speak --- to watch the interview of Ahmadinejad broadcast by America's ABC News last night. Because the encounter took place last week, both the President and the interviewer, trading punches over the nuclear issues and the detained US hikers, are unconcerned with Grand Ayatollah Montazeri and (in the interviewer's case) the political state of the opposition. So the interview now becomes testimony to a discussion taking place outside the realities of the conflict, both over the last six months and as they have evolved over the last 48 hours.

Ironically, however, Ahmadinejad's marginal position is important. Combined with the "marginal" on the other side --- the failure of Mousavi and Karroubi to get any concessions from the regime on their core demands, being met instead by more threats, the failure of others to establish a National Unity Plan --- it has led to the sharpening of the conflict between the Supreme Leader and a "radicalised" opposition. That, in turn, has led to a muddling, rather than clarifying, of the issues at hand: "radicalised" is at that point laid on certain symbolic acts such as "Death to the Dictator" chants and the omission of the Islamic Republic's coat of arms on the Iranian flag.

It is from that muddle that the next steps and possibilities will emerge. Is Ayatollah Khameini really willing to take this to a battle to the death with the Green movement or will he offer any way back from his threat to arrest them all? Does any space remain for those "within the Establishment" --- a Rafsanjani, a Larijani, other high-profile members of Parliament and Ministers --- to craft a settlement? Does the mantle of Montazeri lead Mousavi, Karroubi, or other opposition figures back to prominence not just through periodic statements but through a sustained public presence, accompanied by clear demands for changes in the Islamic Republic? Is there any possibility of a "movement from below" that frames and presses those demands to a satisfactory conclusion?

After emotions has to come political calculation. But right now, I don't have an answer to those sums and equations. I'm not sure anyone else --- Khameini, Mousavi, Karroubi, or anyone in that crowd at Qom --- does either.

Iran Analysis: RegimeFail?

If a demonstration occurs in the square but no one really notices, does it make a sound?

It is less than 24 hours after the Iranian regime tried to build up a mass rally on the first day of  the religious month of Moharram, not only for the pretext of protesting the burning of Ayatollah Khomeini's photograph but for the wider goal of showing the Government's political superiority over its opposition. Yet this morning, Iranian state medium Press TV, which was proclaiming that "millions" were on the streets of Iran, is not even bothering to mention the story, let alone update it. Fars News is now on the nuclear issue and promoting art about martyrs.  The Islamic Republic News Agency is trying to boost President Ahmadinejad, after his appearance at the climate change talks in Copenhagen, with his rhetoric on how Iran --- unlike European countries --- supports freedom and democracy around the world. (IRNA, further down its page, has a short, rather limp story that a million people marched in support of Khomeini and the Supreme Leader.)

Iran on Moharram, Day 1: The Regime Flops?
The Latest from Iran (18 December): Moharram Begins

We tentatively suggested yesterday afternoon that the attempted demonstrations in Tehran, let alone in other parts of  Iran where I have still not seen visual evidence, were a regime "flop". No need to be tentative now: this was a clear picture, after six months, not of a regime asserting its political strength but of a Government and even Supreme Leader struggling to maintain even a 24-hour appearance of political legitimacy. The sensational cries of "Death to Mousavi", whipped up by an Ayatollah Khamenei ally, made little more than fleeting headlines; indeed, I don't think even the base charge of "insult to Khomeini" was successfully stuck upon the opposition.

This, however, is the easy analysis to make this morning. Now the ball bounces back into the court of the opposition, be that Hashemi Rafsanjani, senior clerics, or the Green movement. Once more they have both the initiative and the burden of showing that their supporters are still ready to press their demands.

So on to Ashura (27 December), the key day of mourning and commemoration in Moharram marking the death of Imam Hossein. The Green movement rallied on Qods Day (18 September), which traditionally had been a regime day as it displayed its support of the Palestinians and their claim on Jerusalem. It rallied on National Students Day (7 December), which had marked the supremacy of the Islamic Republic over the Shah with the memory of the killing of three students in 1953. Can the opposition now mark one of the most important days on the Iranian and Shi'a Islam calendar as their own?

The regime failed yesterday, but that is far from enough to argue that it has lost. Those challenging the regime now have to prove they can make a meaningful, otherwise many Iranians (how many?) may sit on their hands in passivity and resignation.

It is eight days to Ashura.

Iran 16 Azar Analysis: "Something is Happening"

Earlier today we posted an analysis by our Mr Smith of the significance of 16 Azar and the possibilities for the future. His points are complemented by those made by Masoud at The Newest Deal, who has kindly sent us a copy of the blog:

Though impossible to tell with the blanket censorship draped over Iran at present, it appears that the size of yesterday's protests were smaller than what was seen on 13 Aban, and on Qods Day before it. No matter. The demonstrations of 16 Azar signaled a shift -- if not response -- on the part of the Green movement to the tyranny and brutality that the regime has come to represent. The message was clear: there is no turning back. In fact, the Islamic Republic's future has never been more uncertain.

Iran Special: Putting 16 Azar In Context
The Latest from Iran (8 December): The Half-Full Victory?

As things stand now, this movement is no longer about a stolen election. Truthfully, it hasn't been for quite some time, but that conclusion only became crystalline today. Only four months ago, this was hardly the case. At that time, the Greens represented a peaceful, non-violent movement asking "Where is my vote?" and led by a Prime Minister [Mir Hossein Mousavi] who stressed -- no, urged -- the need to stay true to the Islamic Republic's framework and constitutional structure, not to mention the wisdom and guidance of the late Ayatollah Khomeini.

No longer. Yesterday's demonstrations were organized by a fractal grassroots whose structure is horizontal rather than hierarchical. That is to say, it has no leader. (Incidentally, neither Mousavi, Karoubi, or Khatami apparently took part in yesterday's marches.) These were protests that saw Iranian flags whose white centers were bare, missing the iconic 'Allah' written in form of a red, martyr's tulip. Gone was the silent marching of peaceful demonstrators holding up 'V's' in the air. Instead, pockets of protesters confronted the Basij physically, and at times, overwhelmingly. And protests were not just limited to Tehran, either. Demonstrations have been verified in Mashhad, Shiraz, Rasht, Kermanshah, Hamedan, Arak, Kerman and Najafabad.

Most telling of all, chants of "Death to Khamenei" have now become a demonstration fixture, no longer the sacred red-line that protesters never dared to cross. Indeed, cross they have as his name was cursed repeatedly and as often as Ahmadinejad's yesterday. Only a few months earlier, [Supreme Leader Ali] Khamenei could have caved in, given up Ahmadinejad as a sacrificial lamb, and saved himself, if only to survive in a weaker capacity. He no longer has the luxury of that option. Through his political ineptitude, the Islamic Republic has itself become illegitimate, and that inevitably means that at the very least, the doctrine of Velayat-e-Faqih must go. The regime has essentially placed itself in an unsustainable dynamic: it insistingly continues to alienate a larger and larger portion of the base from which it derives its legitimacy (the clerical class) while at the same time takes actions against the people that are far too unforgivable to allow for any future possibility of reconciliation, as [Hashemi] Rafsanjani was pushing for in September.

Which makes the timing of Rafsanjani's sudden reappearance the day before the protests all the more significant. In a meeting with students in the city of Mashhad, Rafsanjani addressed criticisms of his recent silence by issuing his strongest and most pointed rebuke of the regime yet. Stating that the demands of his July sermon had gone unheeded, Rafsanjani issued a not-so-thinly veiled and ominous warning: "If the people of Iran want us we to govern them, then we may stay. If not, then we should step aside."

Rafsanjani went on to state that the Basij and Revolutionary Guard should have never stood against the people and confirmed the Green movement's right to protest. Though the finger was not directly pointed and Khamenei's name was never spoken, the message was clear: this crisis is the Supreme Leader's doing, and it is only he who can resolve it. Rafsanjani, it should not be forgotten, is Iran's de facto number-two as well as the head of the Assembly of Experts, the constitutional body that is assigned with the task of selecting the next Supreme Leader, and if need be, disposing of the current one. His statement -- and indeed, warning to Khamenei -- was essentially a declaration that if the Islamic Republic's constitutional law and structure is going to be discarded, then he will not stand in the way of its inevitable demise.

Which with yesterday's protests should give the Islamic Republic even more cause for concern. Although state television still broadcasts a confident (read: propagandist) self-image, the regime is undoubtedly scared. Mohammad Reza Naghdi, the Revolutionary Guards General who was recently appointed the new head of the Basij, apparently even shot Tehran's Traffic Control Chief in the foot when he was told in a meeting last week that it would be "impossible" to neutralize widespread attempts to bring Tehran's traffic to a halt. Incidents such this -- likely one of many occurring behind closed doors -- speaks of the panic and desperation that is surely beginning to settle into the minds of those in power. It has been seen before, some thirty years ago.