Our colleague Chris Emery offers this incisive assessment of former President Mohammed Khatami's declaration that he will stand in June's Presidential Election in Iran, taking us beyond the simplistic formula of Ahmadinejad v. Khatami:Former two-term Iranian President Mohammed Khatami waited until almost the last possible minute before deciding to put his name on the ballot for the presidential elections in June. He only declared after a careful examination of the political environment and, more importantly, his electoral chances.
This scrutiny was not matched by the western media.
Their haste was perhaps predictable: Khatami is well-known and respected in the West. It was just too tempting to paint him as the reformist liberal who, in conjunction with the new saviour of American diplomacy, could genuinely transform US-Iranian relations. So it will now hold its collective breath that he will prevail against the hard-line incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
The context of renewed hopes for rapprochement is, I suspect, of much less significance to the Iranian public’s perception of Khatami’s decision to run. And it is unlikely, though still unclear, that Khatami's decision was relatded President Ahmadinejad’s reciprocation of Barack Obama's offer for dialogue with America.
Whilst the prospect of a more moderate leadership in Washington and Tehran is gratifying, the characterisation of Khatami as "the Iranian Obama" or, even more erroneously, that Obama’s election provoked Khatami’s decision to run is patently false. Khatami’s decision to run rests on internal Iranian politics, the complex dynamics of which are hard to penetrate.
For example, it had been widely reported that Khatami would not run if former Prime Minister Mir-Hussein Mousavi chose to. Prior to his announcement, Khatami met with Mir Hossein Mousavi at the office of reformist politician and cleric Abdollah Nouri in northeast Tehran. So all Iranian eyes will now watch if Mousavi, another popular reformist, is now the one to withdraw.
Another egregious error, as typified by
the BBC article that announced Khamtami’s decision, is the assumption that Iranians now face a choice between one hard-line conservative candidate (Ahmadinejad) and one liberal reformist (Khatami). Quite apart from failing to qualify terms such as "reformist", "liberal", and "conservative2, which have very different and dual meanings in Iran than in the West, it is rash to immediately reduce the election to a two horse race. Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the popular Tehran mayor and veteran, remains firmly in the race and the chances of Mehdi Karoubi, who heads the reformist E'temad Melli Party, or former Prime Minister Mousavi cannot simply be discounted.
It is perhaps tempting, given the generally constructive rhetoric emerging from Washington, to link Khatami’s entry to the tentative prospect of normalised relations between Iran and the US. This is also an error. Firstly, Khatami's electoral prospects are not going to stand or fall on current developments in US-Iranian relations. Secondly, both sides will probably refrain from meaningfully pushing rapprochement until the election in Iran is finished. Thirdly, Khatami does not have a radically different attitude to Ahmadinejad on the main American concerns of Iran’s nuclear programme and its support for Hamas and Hezbollah. Fourthly, the final decision on rapprochement will not be made, in Tehran, by the president’s office- whoever is occupying it.
In any case, the election in June will not be fought over rapprochement with the US. Instead, if the contest comes down to a battle between Khatami and Ahmadinejad, it will be over presidential legacies and broken promises. Ahmadinejad’s failure to deliver on his promise to improve economic and employment conditions, at a time of increased oil revenue, has led to widespread disillusionment. Khatami has claimed a better economic record as president, yet he failed to deliver the reforms and greater openness his supporters sought.
Many questions, however, remain. Will Khatami’s entry damage the reformists’ prospects, uniting the conservatives against him, as Khatami must have feared? What will be the response of the influential former President Hashemi Rafsanjani who, according to different sources, is either refusing to support Khatami or trying to persuade Karoubi to step aside in favour of him?