Damascene Conversions: The Engagement of Syria

Joshua Landis has a complementary (and complimentary) perspective on Tisdall's analysis on Syria Comment.

Simon Tisdall, writing in The Guardian of London on Monday, offered a valuable analysis of the recent dynamics surrounding US-Syrian relations and events in the Middle East. Tisdall noted (rightly, in my opinion) the "realist" outlook of Obama and Co. and suggested that "improved US relations with Syria could hold the key" three vital issues: avoidance of military confrontation with Iran, management of the Iraq withdrawal, "and some kind of half-credible peace process between Israel and its Arab neighbours". He supported this reading with the signals of engagement: Syrian President Bashir al-Assad's interviews welcoming a US "re-entry" into the Middle East peace process, Senator John Kerry's visit to Damascus last week, and conciliatory words from Arab states such as Saudi Arabia.

What can and should be added to Tisdall's analysis are the recent events that have not only promoted this engagement but strengthened Syria's position in negotiations. In December 2008, the foundations for direct Israel-Syria talks had been laid but the wider context for the diplomacy was still the call for Damascus to end its support of groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas and to limit, if not cut, its ties with Iran.

Then the Olmert Government decided to gamble with the invasion of Gaza. The direct talks with Syria were suspended of course, alienating Turkey in the process, as Tel Aviv effectively hand-in-hand with Egypt and probably Saudi Arabia on the challenge to Hamas.

The significance was not only that this challenge failed but that it spurred a re-alignment which put Syria in the Middle Eastern ascendancy. By giving vocal and visible support to Hamas, Assad set himself up as the defender of Arab resistance to Israeli aggression, a position buttressed by the damage to Egypt's reputation. With Turkey and Iran recognising that position, as they quickly sent representatives to Damascus, and with platforms such as the Qatar Summit, the Syrians could look to a reconfigured diplomatic scene in the aftermath of Gaza.

Few have noted, for example, that there is no more talk of bringing Syrian leaders to account for the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri in 2005. It is also notable that no one, especially the US, is making a fuss about the alleged Syrian nuclear facility destroyed by Israel in October 2007, even though an International Atomic Energy Agency report last week pointed to the presence of uranium.

Instead, renewed Israeli-Syrian talks are being pursued so vigorously that Uzi Mahnaimi, who should be considered more a conduit for the Israeli military and intelligence services than a journalist for The Sunday Times, is writing: "Reports compiled by Mossad, the overseas spy agency, and by military intelligence, that strongly advocate opening negotiations with President Bashar al-Assad of Syria."

Which brings us back to the wider of the Damascene conversion of Gaza into a re-aligned position not only on its direct relations with Tel Aviv but on relations with Hamas, Hezbollah, and Tehran. Tisdall sees a trade-off: a new Israeli Government will have to engage in meaningful talks with Syria to maintain its isolation of Hamas: "If, as seems likely, [Benjamin Netanyahu] obstructs the Palestinian track, the Likud leader may have to give ground elsewhere, literally."

That might have been possible up to December, but no longer. Syria now has the cards for its territorial aims vis-a-vis Israel but for an inclusion of Hamas in the discussions on Palestine. The attempt to curb Hezbollah through talks with Damascus, which always was a curious exercise mssing the complexities of Lebanese politics and society, will now be kicked into touch. And the breaking of a supposed Syria-Iran axis is now less likelu than a dynamic in which engagement with both Damascus and Tehran takes place.

In 2003, chatter in Washington was "Baghdad, Then Turn Left". That thought of rolliing regime change can now be consigned to the dustbin of George W. Bush's history. It's envoys, not tanks, that are the talismen of this New Middle East Order.

Has the Obama Administration Brought Hamas into A Palestine Unity Government?

Last Thursday George Mitchell, the US envoy in the Middle East, in a conference calls with Jewish-American leaders, stated the full support of the Obama Administration for a Palestinian unity government. That in itself is a long-standing American policy; what was significant was that Mitchell indicated the unity government could include not only Fatah, the party behind the Palestianian Authority, but also Hamas.

The timing of Mitchell’s intervention was even more important. As of last Thursday, Egypt’s efforts to bring Fatah and Hamas together in “reconciliation” talks, scheduled for 22 February, appeared to be going nowhere. Although Fatah leader Mahmoud Abbas had praised Cairo’s initiative but Hamas had refused unless the Palestinian Authority released its members from jails in the West Bank. This weekend, after Mitchell’s statement was widely publicised by the Obama Administration (and after British and French delegations had met with Hamas representatives in Beirut and Damascus and after three US Congressmen visited Gaza), Egypt was able to announce that the talks would proceed on Wednesday.

Of course, Mitchell continued to emphasise the long-standing conditions of the “Quartet” of the US-European Union-United Nations-Russia for Hamas’ political participation: halting violence, recognizing Israel, and accepting previous Palestinian-Israeli agreements. But these demands have already been accepted, at least in their rhetoric, by the officials of Hamas, as the organisation moves away from its 1988 Charter. What has been needed, given the double standards applied to Israeli behaviour and that of Hamas, has been some sign of goodwill which would permit legitimacy for the Hamas leadership.

It is unclear what that sign, for Mitchell, was. On the surface, there was no need to recognise a “victorious” Hamas, because the party has been weakened by the Gazan conflict. While Hamas was not defeated militarily by Israel or even significantly damaged, and while it has had a short-term political boost --- especially compared with Fatah and the Palestinian Authority --- as the defender of Palestinians, it cannot turn this to a decisive advantage against Tel Aviv, as Hezbollah did in the Lebanon War in 2006. Politically, with its ostracism by the West, it still lacks the image of an established “authority”, in contrast to that given to the Palestine Liberation Organization from the 1980s.

However, Hamas’ inability to project “victory” --- at least to the West and Israel, if not its own people --- may have actually worked to its advantage and brought Mitchell’s signal. Because the group might be represented as needing to moderate its views in order to get any role in the peace process, the Obama Administration can contain the notion of Hamas as imminent threat to a new Israeli Government.

Indeed, with Israel itself in transition, Mitchell could put the challenge to Tzipi Livni and Benjamin Netanyahu rather than Khaled Meshaal or Ismail Haniya: “Form a government that is ready for dialogue and cooperation in solving the Palestinian-Israeli problem.”

So the hand has been extended, very indirectly and at a distance but still extended, to Hamas by Obama. The 44th President of the United States of America, unlike his predecessor, has given priority to an meaningful peace process rather than the rigid mantra of “Israeli security”. If Hamas got the second of its nine lives through survival in the Gaza War, it now has a third political life. Whether that continues may be conditioned on whether it can find some consensus with Fatah now.

The Latest on Israel-Gaza-Palestine (21 February)

Evening Update: Egypt has said that the Palestinian "reconciliation" talks will take place on 25 February. Hamas has been holding against attendance at the discussions, which originally were to take place tomorrow.

The Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz uses first-hand evidence to report, "Gazans: IDF [Israeli Defense Forces] used us as 'human shields' during offensive".

Afternoon Update: A spokesman has said Hezbollah is not behind the rocket attack from Lebanon into northwestern Israel this morning.

Morning Update (9:20 a.m. GMT; 11:20 a.m. Israel/Palestine): Benjamin Netanyahu (pictured), the Likud Party leader asked on Friday to form the next Israeli Government, has called for unity with other political parties such as Kadima and Labor and declared that Iran "is developing nuclear weapons and poses the biggest threat to Israel since the war of independence".

Three Israeli medics were injured in northwestern Israel, by one of two rockets fired from Lebanon on Saturday. Israel fired artillery into Lebanon near Tyre.

Two Gazan militants were killed on Saturday. Local medics claim they died from Israeli shellfire, but the Israeli military denied that they launched any attack.

The Latest on Israel-Gaza-Palestine (17 February)

Evening Update (8 p.m.): Another obstacle to the Egyptian-brokered talks, this time over Palestinian unity. Reuters claims the "efforts may be doomed by Western powers' reluctance to accept ministers from the Islamist party. Neither the Obama administration nor the European Union is ready to offer more than vague and conditional encouragement to a coalition intended to heal the schism in Palestinian politics."

The BBC are reporting that the UN has protested the removal of unexploded munitions from its warehouses in Gaza. The facilities were being guarded by Hamas personnel, and it is suspected that the organisation has revolved the ordnance.

The UN was waiting for Israel to allow technical support into Gaza to defuse the ordnance (see 6 a.m.)

3:30 p.m. How little political movement has there been today? More than nine hours ago, we wrote, "The question is whether Tel Aviv will accept the [prisoner swap] arrangement, and we won't have any indication of that until Wednesday's Security Cabinet meeting."

This from Agence France Presse:

"We want first to resolve the Shalit issue and then will look into the reopening of crossings and the rehabilitation of the Gaza Strip," [Israeli Prime Minister Ehud] Olmert said. His demand was swiftly rejected by Hamas's exiled leader Khaled Meshaal, who again accused Israel of backtracking on the terms of a proposed long-term truce by linking the lifting of the blockade to the soldier's release.

6:50 a.m. An interesting political development, however, which may have long-term significance in Israeli politics and Israel-Palestine relations. Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, still trying to form the next Israeli Government in which she would be Prime Minister, told US Jewish leaders in Jerusalem yesterday that Tel Aviv would have to "give up parts of the Land of Israel" in a settlement.

The comments are in sharp contrast to those of Livni's rival, Benjamin Netanyahu, who insists on "biblical borders" including parts of Gaza and the West Bank.

Livni put her support for the two-state solution in a wider regional perspective: ""If we don't continue with the plan, we will not be able to count on the support of the international community against Iran, Hezbollah, or Hamas."

Morning Update (6 a.m. GMT; 8 a.m. Israel/Palestine): A relatively quiet day yesterday and likely to be so again today. News services are reporting that Hamas is ready to consider prisoner swap, which in fact is not news --- the Gazan leadership have been discussing this for some days. The issue is whether a prisoner swap will be agreed in advance of any settlement of issues such as border crossings, setting up a two-stage process. Hamas wants to keep the strands separate: the release of kidnapped Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit (pictured) must not be "part of a broader cease-fire agreement with Israel".

No, the question is whether Tel Aviv will accept the arrangement, and we won't have any indication of that until Wednesday's Security Cabinet meeting.

Meanwhile safety, let alone reconstruction, is being held up by continued restrictions on supplies and movement in Gaza:

A team trained to remove and destroy unexploded ordnance has been operating in the Gaza Strip for three weeks, but its work is being held up because Israel has not approved the entry of its equipment nor an area for storing and neutralizing ordnance. For now some of the latter, located by the Palestinian police, is being stored in locations that are dangerously close to population centers in Rafah, Khan Yunis and Gaza City.

One Gazan died and five were wounded yesterday when unexploded munitions were thrown onto a fire melting scrap metal.

Questioning the Annual Threat Assessment: The Difficulties for Washington's Diplomatic Engagement with Tehran

Last week the US intelligence community released The Annual Threat Assessment 2009, presented by Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

The report not only underlined Iran’s past attempts in acquiring nuclear weapons but also pointed to Iran’s ongoing uranium enrichment efforts. Blair stated that "Israel and Iran are liable to enter into a confrontation or crisis" some time this year because of the Iranian nuclear programme. Blair also expressed his specific concern regarding a possible Iran-Israel war with Iran-backed Hezbollah reinforcing its weapons in southern Lebanon.



It is difficult for Blair to assume that Iran may not restart its nuclear weapons program when the report Blair signed states:

We do not have sufficient intelligence reporting to judge confidently whether Tehran is willing to maintain indefinitely the halt of its previously enumerated nuclear weapons-related activities while it weighs its options, or whether it will or already has set specific deadlines or criteria that will prompt it to restart those activities.

Moreover, how can Blair not foresee that Iran, which has been enriching uranium since 2006 and is capable of delivering nuclear weapons through medium-range balistic missiles, can use its potential possession of nuclear weapons as the key bargaining point during diplomatic engagement with the US?

When we look closer to the document, it is not that difficult to see how fragile any assertion that Iran is not pursuing nuclear capability is, given the raison d'etat of Tehran's regional and global position. The report states: “Iran’s longstanding foreign policy goals are to preserve the Islamic regime, safeguard Iran’s sovereignty, defend its nuclear ambitions, and expand its influence in the region and the Islamic world.” This is to be expected given that Iran, as a revisionist state, is supporting Hezbollah, Hamas, and other organizations in the region.

Dan Gillerman, Israel’s former envoy to the United Nations, stated his concerns over Iran’s capacity to restart its nuclear program on Fox News. Indeed, he equated the 2007 US Nuclear with the piece of paper Chamberlain waved on the eve of the Second World War in 1938. He implied that the US should watch Iran, sanction Iran, and make sure that the capability of the extreme fundamentalist regime of Iran is far away from destructing the region.

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KlNwT3CbtiI[/youtube]

The report states: "In our judgment, only an Iranian political decision to abandon a nuclear weapons objective would plausibly keep Iran from eventually producing nuclear weapons..." Therefore, it suggests giving priority to diplomatic engagement to encourage such a decision.

However, this US-led diplomatic effort is also a thorny process which is expected to take much more time than some can tolerate. The most terrifying scenario is Iran's readiness to restart its nuclear weapons program during negotiations. According to the report:

We assess Iran has the scientific, technical, and industrial capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons....We judge Iran probably would be technically capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for a weapon sometime during the 2010-2015 time frame, [although State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research] judges Iran is unlikely to achieve this capability before 2013 because of foreseeable technical and programmatic problems.

Because of the obstacles faced by the Obama Administration to dissuade Iran from developing nuclear weapons, a possible Israeli airstrike --- similar to the attack on Osirak in Iraq in 1981 --- could come to fruition in prior to 2013.

For now, Washington is focused on 2009, not 2013. The course of discussions with Iran should determine whether The Annual Threat Assessment 2010 highlights a crisis averted or a crisis which is impending.