Has the Obama Administration Brought Hamas into A Palestine Unity Government?

Last Thursday George Mitchell, the US envoy in the Middle East, in a conference calls with Jewish-American leaders, stated the full support of the Obama Administration for a Palestinian unity government. That in itself is a long-standing American policy; what was significant was that Mitchell indicated the unity government could include not only Fatah, the party behind the Palestianian Authority, but also Hamas.

The timing of Mitchell’s intervention was even more important. As of last Thursday, Egypt’s efforts to bring Fatah and Hamas together in “reconciliation” talks, scheduled for 22 February, appeared to be going nowhere. Although Fatah leader Mahmoud Abbas had praised Cairo’s initiative but Hamas had refused unless the Palestinian Authority released its members from jails in the West Bank. This weekend, after Mitchell’s statement was widely publicised by the Obama Administration (and after British and French delegations had met with Hamas representatives in Beirut and Damascus and after three US Congressmen visited Gaza), Egypt was able to announce that the talks would proceed on Wednesday.

Of course, Mitchell continued to emphasise the long-standing conditions of the “Quartet” of the US-European Union-United Nations-Russia for Hamas’ political participation: halting violence, recognizing Israel, and accepting previous Palestinian-Israeli agreements. But these demands have already been accepted, at least in their rhetoric, by the officials of Hamas, as the organisation moves away from its 1988 Charter. What has been needed, given the double standards applied to Israeli behaviour and that of Hamas, has been some sign of goodwill which would permit legitimacy for the Hamas leadership.

It is unclear what that sign, for Mitchell, was. On the surface, there was no need to recognise a “victorious” Hamas, because the party has been weakened by the Gazan conflict. While Hamas was not defeated militarily by Israel or even significantly damaged, and while it has had a short-term political boost --- especially compared with Fatah and the Palestinian Authority --- as the defender of Palestinians, it cannot turn this to a decisive advantage against Tel Aviv, as Hezbollah did in the Lebanon War in 2006. Politically, with its ostracism by the West, it still lacks the image of an established “authority”, in contrast to that given to the Palestine Liberation Organization from the 1980s.

However, Hamas’ inability to project “victory” --- at least to the West and Israel, if not its own people --- may have actually worked to its advantage and brought Mitchell’s signal. Because the group might be represented as needing to moderate its views in order to get any role in the peace process, the Obama Administration can contain the notion of Hamas as imminent threat to a new Israeli Government.

Indeed, with Israel itself in transition, Mitchell could put the challenge to Tzipi Livni and Benjamin Netanyahu rather than Khaled Meshaal or Ismail Haniya: “Form a government that is ready for dialogue and cooperation in solving the Palestinian-Israeli problem.”

So the hand has been extended, very indirectly and at a distance but still extended, to Hamas by Obama. The 44th President of the United States of America, unlike his predecessor, has given priority to an meaningful peace process rather than the rigid mantra of “Israeli security”. If Hamas got the second of its nine lives through survival in the Gaza War, it now has a third political life. Whether that continues may be conditioned on whether it can find some consensus with Fatah now.

What Israel Lost in Gaza: Talks with Syria, A Relationship with Turkey?

To my knowledge, this story from Ha'aretz on Friday has received little notice outside Israel:

Israel and Syria were about to announce that they would speak directly a week before the fighting in Gaza broke out, a Turkish official said. Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan had spoken with Syrian President Bashar Assad (pictured) during Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's visit to Ankara, and had mediated in crafting a joint statement.

But a few days later, while still awaiting Olmert's approval for the statement, Israel launched Operation Cast Lead in Gaza and Erdogan felt betrayed.

Now it could well be that Turkey is playing up the story to cover Erdogan's very public denunciation of Israeli actions. And it may be the case that, after making political calculations, Damascus will decide that the benefits of coming back to the negotiating table with Israel outweigh or even balance its backing of Hamas. As my colleague Ali Yenidunya has argued, there may be no long-term cost to the Israeli-Turkish alliance.

For the moment, however, let's note that the Israeli Government was so driven to take action in Gaza that it was willing to risk a peace process to ease tensions on its northern border and a strategic relationship with Ankara. It will be some time before we know what motives lay behind this gamble --- regime change? a strike at Hamas as a strike against Tehran? a grand scheme in collusion with the Palestinian Authority, Egypt, and, possibly, Saudi Arabia? Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's attempt to wipe away the stain of Lebanon 2006?

It is almost definite, however, that given the stakes involved, Operation Cast Lead was never just a response to rocket fire.B

Anticipating the New Israeli Government: Netanyahu or Livni?

According to the Associated Press, the Obama Administration has praised the Israeli elections and has called the voting by millions of Israelis the sign of a strong democracy. The White House spokesman Robert Gibbs stated that the President Obama was excited to work with the new Israeli government, and on Wednesday, Obama called Israeli President Shimon Peres to express his gratitude for American and Israeli model democracies and to emphasise his personal efforts for a two-state Israel-Palestine solution.

The question is how much room there is for such a solution. While relatively moderate Tzipi Livni, the leader of the Kadima Party is ready to pursue peace talks with the Abbas Government, Benjamin Netanyahu, the leader of Likud, considers the US-backed negotiation process as a waste of time.

Meanwhile, Livni has demonstrated her "hawkish" reflexes in the name of "Israeli interests" during Operation Cast Lead in Gaza. This was reminiscent of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's 2006 Lebanon War when there were serious questions in Israelis' minds whether the inexperienced Olmert was able to handle the weight of the Israeli politics after his predecessor Ariel Sharon's illness. The only difference is that Olmert had to prove himself after Sharon was no longer able to be the Prime Minister, while Livni had to sharpen her position against Hamas, "the common enemy" of all Israelis, to increase Kadima`s votes. Waging war against Hamas while giving priority to the peace process with Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas --- including giving up land, dismantling settlements in West Bank, and sharing Jerusalem --- indicate the balance of her expected policies. Livni`s position is closer to peace when compared to that of Netanyahu, but the Iron Lady offers no concession on the most sensitive notion of the Israeli society: "security".

For Netanyahu, as we see in his election motto (“Likud: Because the state needs to be run”), Kadima has been incompetent in its rule, including its conduct of the Lebanon War and the most recent Gaza War. Netanyahu has criticized the government for being insufficiently strong against Hezbollah and Hamas in these two wars and insisted on the continuation of Operation Cast Lead. Netanyahu`s "security pack", which includes toppling Hamas in Gaza, keeping the Golan Heights, and expanding current settlements in the West Bank, is much more important than giving priority to the peace process.

It is clear that a peace agreement is unlikely to come under an Netanyahu administration, but his agenda is wide enough to keep peace proponents busy, at least in the mid-term. What is missing in this analysis, however, are the Obama Administration`s regional policies the application of these to Israel and its new Gvoernment, as it seeks a "secure" Israeli society and/or "strong" steps for peace.

B'Tselem Report: Israel's Violations of Human Rights in Gaza and the West Bank

B’Tselem, the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, has released its 2008 annual report regarding the human rights violations took place in Palestinian lands and Israel. (The report, unfortunately, was compiled before Operation Cast Lead started in Gaza on 27 December.)

Since 2000, Israeli security forces in the Occupied Territories have killed more than 2,200 Palestinians who were not taking part in the hostilities and have wounded thousands more....

At the beginning of the second intifada, however, the Judge Advocate General’s Office stopped automatically opening investigations into cases of death and injury of Palestinians who were not involved in the hostilities, other than in exceptional cases. Between 2000 and the end of 2008, only 287 Military Police investigations were opened into cases of firing in the Occupied Territories, including cases that did not result in death or injury. In addition, in 2002, the Knesset passed a law denying Palestinians the possibility of obtaining compensation in most cases in which they have suffered injury as a result of illegal acts by security forces. Thus, Israel has almost completely blocked the two principal ways to ensure accountability.

The report offers significant points regarding casualties caused by the Israeli security forces:

Throughout 2008, until 26 December, Israeli security forces killed 455 Palestinians, 87 of them minors. Of the total, 413 (more than 90 percent) were residents of the Gaza Strip; the other 42 (less than 10 percent) were residents of the West Bank....At least 175 of the Palestinians killed in 2008 (approximately 38 percent) did not take part in the hostilities.

The report evaluates the frequently use of ‘security’ discourse by the Israeli officials:

Israel justifies many of its actions in the Occupied Territories on grounds of security. Over the years, the army has demolished hundreds of houses "for imperative military needs", has held thousands of Palestinians in administrative detention for allegedly "endangering the security of the region", and has declared thousands of acres of land a "special security area" in which Palestinian entry is forbidden, claiming the measure is necessary to protect settlements.

And, despite its completion before the recent war, the report gives important information about "the siege on Gaza":

In 2008, Israel continued its closure on the Gaza Strip, placing extreme restrictions on the Strip’s foreign trade. The closure began in June 2007, following Hamas’s takeover of the area. At the time, Israel closed the crossings into Gaza and placed major restrictions on the entry of goods into it, including fuel, medical equipment, and replacement parts. Israel allowed in only goods it deemed “humanitarian,” such as food, sugar, cooking oil, rice, and salt. In November 2007, the government of Israel declared Gaza a “hostile entity” and intensified its siege policy.

In 2008, the tunnel economy between southern Gaza and Egyptian Rafah greatly expanded. Many goods of various kinds were brought into Gaza through the tunnels, with Hamas supervising the movement and collecting taxes from tunnel operators. In addition to consumption goods, Palestinians smuggled in weapons, including rockets.

Unemployment in the Gaza Strip continued to rise in 2008. In the second quarter of the year, it reached 50 percent. 79 percent of Gazan households live under the poverty line and 70 percent live in deep poverty. 80 percent of the water supplied to Gazans this year did not meet the drinking-water standard of the World Health Organization.

The report assesses the restrictions on movement in West Bank:

2008 saw a rise in the number of flying checkpoints, which the army set up between permanent checkpoints. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), flying checkpoints averaged at 89 per week from the end of April to September 2008, compared to an average of 66 a week from September 2007 to the end of April 2008.

Finally, the report gives information about the Palestinians held in administrative detention:

In January 2009, the Israeli Prison Service informed B'Tselem that out of 548 administrative detainees being held by the army, 42 have been in prison for more than two years.