Selling the War: NATO's "Master Narrative" for Afghanistan

Update: Wikileaks has now decrypted and released four documents, one of which is the Master Narrative, related to NATO "strategic communications.

I've just learned from a reader of an October 2008 NATO "Master Narrative" for its Media Operations Center. Although it is almost five months ago, some of the "talking points" --- both in terms of policy and propaganda --- are still more than relevant.

Key points include:

1. "Afghanistan remains NATO’s number one priority. This is not an operation of choice, it is one of necessity. We are in Afghanistan for the long term under a United Nations mandate for as long as we are needed and welcomed by the Afghan people."

2. "The Afghan National Security Forces and ISAF are making progress on the ground. The militants* do not and cannot hold ground where they are challenged by ANSF [Afghanistan National Security Forces] and ISAF [International Security Assistance Force]."

*"Opposing Militant Forces" is the correct term but is not suitable for use with the media. Depending on the audience and the group being referred to, the phrases militants/insurgents/extremists/Taleban extremists/enemies of Afghanistan may be used.

3. "NATO has the strategy and forces to succeed over time. If asked: However, we could achieve the mission much faster and more efficiently with more. To that end we are constantly re-assessing the capabilities required to achieve the political goal and to mitigate any shortfalls."

4. "NATO/ISAF fully respects the sovereignty of Pakistan. NATO/ISAF has every right, however, to address issues which might diminish security in Afghanistan, and put its military and civilian personnel at risk.

"Only if pressed: ISAF forces are frequently fired at from inside Pakistan, very close to the border. In some cases defensive fire is required, against specific threats. Wherever possible, such fire is pre-coordinated with the Pakistani military."

5. "Both the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran repeatedly indicated that they will pursue the development of stable and trustful relations.

"Weapons with Iranian markings have been intercepted on Afghan territory. NATO/ISAF has no direct evidence of Iranian government involvement. NATO/ISAF is monitoring the situation."

6. "NOTE: The term 'compensation' is inappropriate and should not be used because it brings with it legal implications that do not apply. ISAF makes every effort to minimise the risk of any damage, injury or loss of life to civilians in the course of its operations in Afghanistan. NATO/ISAF deeply regrets the death or injury of any innocent civilian as a result of its operations."

7. "Jordan has requested not to be mentioned as an ISAF member state in the public domain."

Read the report in full.....

Today's Top Journalism: Torture is OK if It's Sunny

Today intrepid reporter Ben Leach of The Daily Telegraph gives us the inside story on a case involving torture, extraordinary rendition, and deprivation of basic human rights:

Binyam Mohamed, the British resident released from US detention base Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, has told friends that Britain is too cold.

Mr Obama's War: Gareth Porter on the Afghanistan "Mini-Surge"

Gareth Porter, who is emerging as the best observer of the US military manoeuvres on Iraq and Afghanistan, looks behind President Obama's eventual decision to approve only part of the 30,000 extra troops request by US commanders for the Afghan War (Porter says 17,000 sent; we put the figure at just over 20,000). While the President has apparently drawn the line with the military, Porter warns, "Obama now faces the prospect that the Joint Chiefs will renew their support for McKiernan's request for the remaining 13,000 troops next month." And he has an analogy which is just short of terrifying:

Both Obama's decision to agree to just over half of his field commander's request for additional troops and the broader strategic situation offer striking parallels with the decision by President Lyndon B. Johnson in April 1965 to approve 36,000 out of a 49,000 troop request for Vietnam.

 



'What is the End Game?': Why Obama Rejected a Bigger Surge in Afghanistan
Gareth Porter

President Barack Obama decided to approve only 17,000 of the 30,000 troops requested by Gen. David McKiernan, the top commander of U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan, and Gen. David Petraeus, the CENTCOM commander, after McKiernan was unable to tell him how they would be used, according to a White House source.

But Obama is likely to be pressured by McKiernan and the Joint Chiefs to approve the remaining 13,000 troops requested after the completion of an Afghanistan-Pakistan policy review next month.

Obama's decision to approve just over half the full troop request for Afghanistan recalls a similar decision by President Lyndon B. Johnson to approve only part of the request for U.S. troop deployments in a parallel situation in the Vietnam War in April 1965 at a comparable stage of that war. Johnson reluctantly went along with the request for additional troops within weeks under pressure from both the field commander and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The request for 30,000 additional troops, which would bring the U.S. troop level in Afghanistan to more than 60,000, had been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as by Defense Secretary Robert Gates before Obama's inauguration. A front-page story in the Washington Post Jan. 13 reported that Obama was ready to "sign off" on the deployment request.

On Jan. 30 Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, said between 20,000 and 30,000 more troops would "probably" be sent to Afghanistan and the figure would "tend toward the higher number of those two."

But on Feb. 9, Mullen indicated that the Pentagon would soon announce that three brigades, or about 16,000 troops, would be deployed to Afghanistan in the coming months.

What had changed in the nine days between those two statements, according to a White House source, was that Obama had called McKiernan directly and asked how he planned to use the 30,000 troops, but got no coherent answer to the question.

It was after that conversation that Obama withdrew his support for the full request.

The unsatisfactory response from McKiernan had been preceded by another military non-answer to an Obama question. At his meeting with Gates and the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Pentagon Jan. 28, Obama asked the Joint Chiefs, "What is the end game?" in Afghanistan, and was told, "Frankly, we don't have one," according to a Feb. 4 report by NBC News Pentagon correspondent Jim Miklaszewski.

Obama had also learned by early February that earlier assurances from Petraeus of an accord with Kyrygistan on use of the base at Manas had been premature, and that the U.S. ability to supply troops in Afghanistan would be dependent on political accommodations with Russia and Iran.

The rationale from the military leadership for doubling the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan, even without a strategy or a concept of how the war could end, had been to "buy time" for an effort to build up Afghan security forces, as indicated by Mullen's Jan. 30 remarks.

The 17,000 troops, on the other hand, presented the upper limit of what Obama had pledged to add in Afghanistan during the campaign, according to Lawrence Korb of the Center for American Progress, who was an adviser to Obama.

Korb told IPS that Obama's decision not to wait until the key strategic questions were clarified before sending any more troops was based on the belief that he had to signal both Afghans and Pakistanis that the United States was not getting out of Afghanistan, according to Korb. "There are a lot of people in both countries hedging their bets," said Korb.

McKiernan reminded reporters Wednesday that the 17,000 troops represent only about two-thirds of the number of troops he has requested. That complaint suggested that he had been given no assurance that the remainder of the troops would be approved after the policy review.

The Wall Street Journal quoted an administration official Wednesday as saying that the troop authorization addresses the "urgent near-term security needs on the ground," but "does not prejudge or limit the options of what the [Afghanistan] review may recommend when it's completed."

Obama may have become more wary of getting mired down in an unwinnable war in Afghanistan, despite his strong commitment to increasing troops to Afghanistan during the campaign.

Former national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, on whom Obama has reportedly relied for advice on foreign policy, told Sam Stein of the Huffington Post Wednesday, "We have to decide more precisely what is the objective of our involvement. Because we are increasingly running the risk of getting bogged down both in Afghanistan and in Pakistan in pursuit of objectives which we are lacking the power to reach."

Brezinzski said the administration needed "very specific, narrow objectives".

Korb told IPS that the policy review will deal with political-diplomatic as well as military policy issues, including the option of seeking to incorporate at least elements of the insurgents into the government through negotiations. He recalled that Afghan President Hamid Karzai has been advocating negotiations with the Taliban for two years.

Both Obama's decision to agree to just over half of his field commander's request for additional troops and the broader strategic situation offer striking parallels with the decision by President Lyndon B. Johnson in April 1965 to approve 36,000 out of a 49,000 troop request for Vietnam.

Johnson's decision, like Obama's, was made against a background of rapid deterioration in the security situation, worry that the war would soon be lost if more U.S. troops were not deployed, and an unresolved debate over how the troops would be employed in South Vietnam. Some of Johnson's advisers still favored a strategy of protecting the key population centers, whereas the field commander, Gen. William Westmoreland, was calling for a more aggressive strategy of seeking out enemy forces.

Another parallel between the two situations is high-level concern that too many U.S. troops would provoke anti-U.S. sentiment. That was the primary worry of some of Johnson's advisers about the effect of deploying three divisions in South Vietnam.

Similarly, Gates said Dec. 14 he would be "very concerned" about deploying more than the 30,000 troops requested by McKiernan, because, "At a certain point, we get such a big footprint, we begin to look like an occupier." Gates repeated that point in Congressional testimony Jan. 27, in which he again stressed the failure of the Soviet Union with 120,000 troops.

McKiernan, on the other hand, said Wednesday, "There's always an inclination to relate what we're doing with previous nations," he said, adding, "I think that's a very unhealthy comparison."

Johnson was worried about sliding into an open-ended commitment to a war that could not be won. But two months later he gave in, against his better judgment, to a request from Gen. William Westmoreland, the commander in Vietnam, for "urgent reinforcements". The escalation of the war continued for another two years.

Obama now faces the prospect that the Joint Chiefs will renew their support for McKiernan's request for the remaining 13,000 troops next month. And if the full 30,000 troop increase proves to be insufficient, he is likely to face further requests later on for "urgent reinforcements."

Your Daily Update: What Exactly is Dennis Ross in Charge Of?

In today's episode, we try to find Dennis' new office in the State Department, courtesy of The Cable blog at Foreign Policy and ask if he is the now the Super-Envoy for Bahrain. Or Turkmenistan. Or maybe Sylvania.

The State Department, bless them, is trying to reassure folks off-the-record that Ross --- despite the public efforts not to mention the I-word in the description of his duties --- has been really important in the review of Iran policy. He has been in discussions with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Undersecretary of State William Burns, who has been Washington's point man in talks about and with the Iranians, and the Department's staff.

So far, so good. But then "sources" start bringing out other names. There's Puneet Talwar, the senior director on Iran, Iraq, and the Gulf for the National Security Council. Gary Samore, the NSC's nonproliferation coordinator, and Robert Einhorn, the likely Undersecretary of State for nonproliferation, are also in the mix. And maybe Vali Nasr, who is a specialist on Shiism and Iran but wound up as an advisor to Richard Holbrooke on Afghanistan and Pakistan, comes into play.

Let's not say too many cooks (or, heaven help, too many chiefs and not enough Indians), but the Ross episode --- while giving us lots of political chuckles --- indicates that President Obama's clear statement of "engagement" is in tension with a lack of coordination and clarity inside the Administration.

No great harm in that...yet. There's no real breakthrough possible until after June's Presidential election in Iran. The risk, however, is that the muddle at the State Department and beyond leaves the field open for the sniping critics who would like nothing better than fist-shaking at the "mullahs".

President Obama's State of the Nation: As Good as The West Wing?

Two days after the Presidential election, John Matlin ("Publius") posted an advance copy of Barack Obama's "State of the Union" message. Even though the Tuesday speech to Congress was labelled as "State of the Nation", John wasn't far off the mark with sentences like "Americans have faced dark days before. Using our ingenuity, know-how, willingness to work and sheer strength of character, we have won through."

Here is his assessment of the "real" State of the Nation statement by President Obama:

In one of those peculiarities of political protocol, Obama’s speech on Tuesday night to a joint session of Congress was “a Presidential address”, not a State of the Union message. Leaving aside the technical argument for constitutional lawyers --- did the President fulfil his obligations under Article II, Section 3 to “give to the Congress information of the State of the Union”? --- the better analogy might be that Obama gave the American equivalent of the Queen’s Speech to the British Parliament. This was an ambitious legislative programme, but it had little or no detail.

Sometimes observers of US Presidential politics allow themselves flights of fancy. In discussions of who is the best post-World War II Presidents, or indeed any president since 1865, Franklin D. Roosevelt invariably comes top. Since the 1990s, however, the name of Josiah Bartlet has always been high in the rankings. For those unfamiliar with US politics or culture, Bartlet was never one of the 43 men in the White House, but he did play the President on TV in The West Wing.

Both CNN and the New York Times have claimed that Obama’s speech harked back to the days of FDR and Lyndon Johnson, but it had many elements of vintage Jed Bartlet. Martin Sheen, Bartlet's alter ego, might have coached Obama in style and delivery --- at no time did Obama look like he was not in control of this American set-piece drama. Further, Obama’s suggestion that during the next decade, a cure for cancer will be found is, virtually, a direct lift from Series 3 of The West Wing. The only difference is that, at the last minute, President Bartlet decided it was step too far, even for him or scriptwriter Aaron Sorkin.

There is nothing wrong in an administration seeking a cure for cancer. It is a brilliant initiative. After all, one in three people in the West will suffer from the disease at some time in their lives. However, should not Obama have disclosed what resources he will put towards the goal?

Equally important, there are research institutes all over the world who are focused on bringing about the same result. Why not make it an aim for all such institutes to work together? Obama knows the subject is complex and there will be no single cure for all cancers. A combined effort might bring about speedier and less expensive solutions.

Obama pulled no punches in his speech. He proposed an activist government and busy legislative programme, presumably in an effort to position himself as a national leader in the face of continued Republican opposition. He directed much of his venom at the banks and bankers. However, his bromide about not spending a dollar of tax money on bankers was hollow. Bankers will be paid for their work, whether Obama likes it or not.

Obama brought vital issues of the budget deficits, dependence on foreign oil, global warming, the rising cost of healthcare, and the decline in education forward as matters of urgency, both for his administration and the American people. It is proper for him to do so. Previous administrations, dating back to Reagan, have in many respects either caused the problems or behaved like ostriches.

As usual, the devil will be in the detail. Some of the answers to questions of policy detail will be provided in the administration’s budget proposals published. It will be valuable to compare those proposals with Obama’s vision for America.