Wednesday
Feb102010
UPDATED Iran Analysis: The Rafsanjani "Ultimatum" to the Supreme Leader
Wednesday, February 10, 2010 at 15:00
UPDATE 2100 GMT: Another possible twist tonight. Rafsanjani’s website has published an interview in which the former President talks about his letter to the Supreme Leader just before the elections, warning of President Ahmadinejad's "lies" and calling for a "fraudless" ballot. (Rafsanjani claims that that Khamenei did not object to the contents of the letter, but would have preferred it to have been published after the elections.) Rafsanjani also speaks at length about how he gathered funds for the clergy before the Revolution and how, together with others (such as Grand Ayatollahs Montazeri or Sane'i but with no reference to Khamenei), he was trusted by Ayatollah Khomeini to manage the revolutionaries’ funds.
The title of the interview: "In 42 some people were asking, 'Who will account for the blood of the 15 Khordad?'” That is a reference to the uprising of 5 June 1963, protesting the arrest of Khomeini; the protest was put down after six days by the Iranian military.
Perhaps Rafsanjani's question is not just historical recollection but an enquiry for today?
UPDATE 10 FEBRUARY, 1500 GMT: EA is now treated this story as confirmed. A reliable source has said that the Rafsanjani-Khamenei meeting was on Monday. Normally, in his official roles, Rafsanjani sees the Supreme Leaders on Tuesday; in this case, the former President asked for a special discussion.
While the immediate cause for Rafsanjani's intervention was the detention of Mousavi advisor Alireza Beheshti and the reported search by Iranian authorities for Beheshti's wife, Rafsanjani did ask the Supreme Leader to act on all cases involving political prisoners. Our source notes perceptively the "7 Tir families", relatives of those killed in a bombing in the early days of the Revolution, had asked Rafsanjani for help with Beheshti and other cases; other families, learning of this appeal, then approached the former President.
The Rafsanjani intervention should also be connected to another important meeting, days earlier, between the Supreme Leader and Grand Ayatollah Mousavi-Ardebili, one of the most important clerics in Iran and Shi'a Islam. Mousavi-Ardebili, in his first meeting in 17 years with Khamenei, declared that he was "disappointed" in the Supreme Leader's actions and urged him to act decisively for justice in the cases of the detained.
An EA correspondent adds:
--
Let’s assume that the Rah-e Sabz news about the Rafsanjani meeting with Supreme Leader, spurred by the attempt to arrest Alireza Beheshi’s wife, is accurate.
We could say that trying to arrest the daughter-in-law of Shahid Beheshti and traumatizing his grandchildren is just too much for Rafsanjani and he has finally snapped. In this case this could be the first “public” crack in the Rafsanjani-Khamenei relationship. This could create opportunities both for Ahmadinejad & Co. and for the Greens.
On the coup side, they could use this to isolate Khamenei even more and get him to agree to their strategy of further suppression and crackdown. On the Green side, they could use this to draw Rafsanjani (and those within the Iranian establishment who look up to him) away from Khamenei and Ahmadinejad. This would further undermine the legitimacy of Khamenei and the whole Islamic Republic as it stands.
There may be another explanation too....
As you recall just before 16 Azar (the protests of 7 December), Rafsanjani went to Mashhad and said that if the people do not want us, we will leave. At the time that was seen as distancing himself from Supreme Leader, and it may have encouraged more students (especially in smaller towns) to come out. One could argue that he was blowing onto the fire from a distance.
A few days ago, Ayatollah Mousavi-Ardebili went to Tehran to meet Khamenei. This was their first meeting in 17 years. Leaked details of the discussion suggest that Ardebili criticized Khamenei’s handling of the state affairs and asked for Alireza Beheshti to be freed. It is reported that the Supreme Leader dismissed the criticism and refused to help with Beheshti. This information was most probably leaked by someone close to Ardebili (as Khamenei would not want it to be known that he was criticized and is behind Beheshti’s detention).
Now a few days after that meeting and a day after the leaking of the details of the meeting, it is reported that Rafsanjani has criticized the state of affairs and the treatment of Beheshti. And again the news is leaked.
This comes soon after Mir Hossein Mousavi stated that the Revolution has failed to get rid of the roots of tyranny and dictatorship and that he is seeing signs of both in Iran today. Mehdi Karroubi has said that he does not believe in this kind of Islamic Republic. And Mohammad Khatami has indirectly accused Khamenei of being a partial arbiter. (Others like Ayatollah Dashgheib have also criticised the SL). All of these could lead to one logical conclusion: that Khamenei is not fit to lead the Islamic Republic.
Now it may be that Rafsanjani is also putting Khamenei under pressure, not just by his strong protest and “ultimatum” but by allowing the news to be leaked. If this is the case, Rafsanjani would have skilfully used the attempt to arrest Beheshti’s wife to his advantage. In this case, Khamenei should be very mad at the people behind the arrest.
This leaked news may also be an attempt by Rafsanjani to say to the protestors: go out on 22 Bahman, and we (Rafsanjani and his people) will ensure that the regime does not crack down too hard.
If so, this could be a tactic which Iranian insiders call “feshar az paeen, chaneh-zani az bala”: pressure from below, negotiations at the top. Khatami tried this during his Presidency, with limited success. At that time one could argue that there was not much pressure from below, but now it seems the pressure from below is quite strong. It remains to be seen how skilful the negotiators are.
The title of the interview: "In 42 some people were asking, 'Who will account for the blood of the 15 Khordad?'” That is a reference to the uprising of 5 June 1963, protesting the arrest of Khomeini; the protest was put down after six days by the Iranian military.
Perhaps Rafsanjani's question is not just historical recollection but an enquiry for today?
UPDATE 10 FEBRUARY, 1500 GMT: EA is now treated this story as confirmed. A reliable source has said that the Rafsanjani-Khamenei meeting was on Monday. Normally, in his official roles, Rafsanjani sees the Supreme Leaders on Tuesday; in this case, the former President asked for a special discussion.
While the immediate cause for Rafsanjani's intervention was the detention of Mousavi advisor Alireza Beheshti and the reported search by Iranian authorities for Beheshti's wife, Rafsanjani did ask the Supreme Leader to act on all cases involving political prisoners. Our source notes perceptively the "7 Tir families", relatives of those killed in a bombing in the early days of the Revolution, had asked Rafsanjani for help with Beheshti and other cases; other families, learning of this appeal, then approached the former President.
The Rafsanjani intervention should also be connected to another important meeting, days earlier, between the Supreme Leader and Grand Ayatollah Mousavi-Ardebili, one of the most important clerics in Iran and Shi'a Islam. Mousavi-Ardebili, in his first meeting in 17 years with Khamenei, declared that he was "disappointed" in the Supreme Leader's actions and urged him to act decisively for justice in the cases of the detained.
An EA correspondent adds:
It is reported that Ardebili had told Khamenei, “I know the leaders of the protests in Qom and Tehran. I testify that they are after reforming the affairs of the state based on the constitution and are not after toppling you. Your concerns over this are misplaced."
By mentioning “Qom”, the seat of clerical learning in Iran, Ardebili is telling Khamenei that there is a substantial movement against the establishment in its heartland. The mention of “not after toppling you”: either means that Khamenei is very worried about his own position now or it is a threat from one of Shi'a Islam’s few Grand Ayatollahs. Ardebili could mean, "They are not after toppling you, but don’t do something that will force us, the marjas (senior clerics), to have to topple you."
--
Let’s assume that the Rah-e Sabz news about the Rafsanjani meeting with Supreme Leader, spurred by the attempt to arrest Alireza Beheshi’s wife, is accurate.
We could say that trying to arrest the daughter-in-law of Shahid Beheshti and traumatizing his grandchildren is just too much for Rafsanjani and he has finally snapped. In this case this could be the first “public” crack in the Rafsanjani-Khamenei relationship. This could create opportunities both for Ahmadinejad & Co. and for the Greens.
On the coup side, they could use this to isolate Khamenei even more and get him to agree to their strategy of further suppression and crackdown. On the Green side, they could use this to draw Rafsanjani (and those within the Iranian establishment who look up to him) away from Khamenei and Ahmadinejad. This would further undermine the legitimacy of Khamenei and the whole Islamic Republic as it stands.
There may be another explanation too....
As you recall just before 16 Azar (the protests of 7 December), Rafsanjani went to Mashhad and said that if the people do not want us, we will leave. At the time that was seen as distancing himself from Supreme Leader, and it may have encouraged more students (especially in smaller towns) to come out. One could argue that he was blowing onto the fire from a distance.
A few days ago, Ayatollah Mousavi-Ardebili went to Tehran to meet Khamenei. This was their first meeting in 17 years. Leaked details of the discussion suggest that Ardebili criticized Khamenei’s handling of the state affairs and asked for Alireza Beheshti to be freed. It is reported that the Supreme Leader dismissed the criticism and refused to help with Beheshti. This information was most probably leaked by someone close to Ardebili (as Khamenei would not want it to be known that he was criticized and is behind Beheshti’s detention).
Now a few days after that meeting and a day after the leaking of the details of the meeting, it is reported that Rafsanjani has criticized the state of affairs and the treatment of Beheshti. And again the news is leaked.
This comes soon after Mir Hossein Mousavi stated that the Revolution has failed to get rid of the roots of tyranny and dictatorship and that he is seeing signs of both in Iran today. Mehdi Karroubi has said that he does not believe in this kind of Islamic Republic. And Mohammad Khatami has indirectly accused Khamenei of being a partial arbiter. (Others like Ayatollah Dashgheib have also criticised the SL). All of these could lead to one logical conclusion: that Khamenei is not fit to lead the Islamic Republic.
Now it may be that Rafsanjani is also putting Khamenei under pressure, not just by his strong protest and “ultimatum” but by allowing the news to be leaked. If this is the case, Rafsanjani would have skilfully used the attempt to arrest Beheshti’s wife to his advantage. In this case, Khamenei should be very mad at the people behind the arrest.
This leaked news may also be an attempt by Rafsanjani to say to the protestors: go out on 22 Bahman, and we (Rafsanjani and his people) will ensure that the regime does not crack down too hard.
If so, this could be a tactic which Iranian insiders call “feshar az paeen, chaneh-zani az bala”: pressure from below, negotiations at the top. Khatami tried this during his Presidency, with limited success. At that time one could argue that there was not much pressure from below, but now it seems the pressure from below is quite strong. It remains to be seen how skilful the negotiators are.