Afghanistan: Is It A Battle If No One Shows Up?

It has been eerie to watch the first few days of Operation Moshtarak, the US-Afghanistan-ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) military offensive against the Taliban in Helmand Province. It is not just the observation of the battle from thousands of miles away; it is that this encounter has been scripted.

The offensive was signalled weeks ago in declaration from US military and political headquarters, reporters were suitably embedded, and the ritual proclamations were issued. BBC radio even turned over several minutes of prime-time programming to the speech, in full, of a British commander to his troops on the eve of battle. (Ever since William Shakespeare put words in the mouth of Henry V at Agincourt in 1415 --- "We few, we happy few, we band of brothers" --- this has been required in presentation of English/British wars.) Yet all the scripting could not set down the final-act resolution of this question:

What if you threw a war and no one showed up?

The Afghanistan Occupation: 700 Military Bases (and Counting)

This morning an Afghan official is declaring that 12 Taliban were killed on Sunday. That makes it a score draw with number of dead civilians, as 12 perished in an American rocket strike. In total, about 40 Taliban are reported dead since the start of the offensive. That's 40 bad guys in what was supposed to be a showdown battle for the Taliban "stronghold" of Marja and in what The Washington Post, voicing the words of a US Lieutenant-Colonel, is calling "last-ditch efforts" by the enemy.



The official line of victory was offered by a British general, "The operation went without a hitch. We've caught the insurgents on the hoof, and they're completely dislocated." Now, the narrative goes, US-British-ISAF forces will bring in 2000 Afghanistan police to restore order in Marja.

Hmm.....

An alternative interpretation would be that the Taliban chose not to fight in the "stronghold". Indeed, if you go with the concept of "asymmetrical warfare", that would be the expected move. Faced with the overwhelming firepower of the US and ISAF, most of the insurgents would disperse and resume the battle --- explosive devices, guerrilla attacks, moves against the Afghan Army and police --- when the US-ISAF threat had dissipated.

One of the misleading analogies in the US-UK press this week has been that Marja 2010 is not Fallujah 2004, the Iraqi town that was the arena for two major battles between US troops and Iraqi insurgents. The script reads that, unlike Fallujah, there has been little confrontation, little bloodshed, and relatively little damage. That "victory" story misses an important point. In both the Fallujah battles, most of the top insurgents had left the town in advance of the US attack. Those who stayed behind effectively provided violent cover for a tactical retreat.

So here's the twist in the script. The US-led forces probably did not want a fight. That is why the offensive was signalled so long in advance. Speaking a few minutes ago on the BBC's top radio programme, Air Chief Marshal Jock Stirrup, the head of Britain's Defence Forces, declared, "We are not battling the Taliban. We are protecting the local population."

And that takes this play beyond any immediate staging. The issue moves to whether Marja and other Afghan towns can be held, and that in turn brings up all the questions beyond US artillery: the strength of the Afghan police force, the significance of development, the legitimacy and competence of local government, the policies of Kabul. (Those who would like a sobering lesson in what may be involved can check out the story of the northern Helmand town of Musa Qala, which has bounced back and forth between Taliban and British control since 2006.)

No doubt we will hear, over and over, in forthcoming days about "the battle for hearts and minds". (Let me correct that: I just saw the article, "Troops Fight for Hearts and Minds in Afghan Assault", published by Agence France Presse and being pushed by the ISAF public-relations staff via Twitter.)

Already, however, The New York Times has shifted its headline from Rah-Rah-Victory to "Errant U.S. Rocket Strike Kills Civilians in Afghanistan". And the BBC shifted from glorification to tough questions this morning, challenging Stirrup over the dead civilians and "victory". His response? "We will know in about 12 months" whether success had been achieved.

Operation Moshtarak ("Together") was a showpiece. If you want a battle, look for it not in the biff-bam-boom of this telegraphed offensive, but in the less dramatic but more important contests to come.