Tuesday
Jan122010
Iran: How Far Do The Green Movements Go?
Tuesday, January 12, 2010 at 6:56 
Monday was distinguished by statements from the opposition. Both Mehdi Karroubi and Mohammad Khatami issued analyses and, in the case of Karroubi, a five-point proposal to complement the 1 January declaration of Mir Hossein Mousavi.As protesters draw breath during a relatively long pause between major demonstrations, the question may not be how the regime reacts to these statements --- my reading, set out yesterday, is that the Iranian Government's immediate concern is challenges within the establishment than with the pressure beyond it --- but how the Green movement(s) respond.
While Karroubi and Khatami were clear in their criticisms of the regime, both also emphasised that their approach rested on non-violence on all sides and that their resolutions were within the system, adhering to the Constitution. What, however, does adherence to the Constitution entail? Would this just be a question of apologies, compensation, and the punishment of some officials? Or would the demands reach to the removal of President Ahmadinejad for his responsibility in the failures and abuses? Do they include a change in the position of the Supreme Leader?
(Our initial evaluation that Karroubi had specifically mentioned Khamenei in his five-point plan has not been followed by other summaries. We are double-checking.)
An analysis from an activist sets out the issue forcefully:
The green movement, at least when it comes to its slogans, has defined some short-term objectives. Slogans which, at an earlier point, consisted of calling Ahmadinejad a liar or questioning his 63% share of the vote have now become more direct and confrontational, addressing the dictator himself and wanting an end to the dictatorship.
Why is it that, when the demand of the main body of the movement has evolved to such an extent, the leaders, namely Mousavi and Karroubi, refuse to announce it openly? Why is there no mention of this demand in the statement issued by Bazargan, Soroush, Kadivar, Ganji, and Mohajerani (the five Iranian expatriate intellectuals who issued their 10 Demands two days after Mousavi's New Year statement)?
The demand for the removal of Khamenei is, in reality, a demand for fundamental change; it is tantamount to the negation of his policies for the last 20 years, but at the same time, it does not equal the overthrow of the regime. This demand does not even mean the negation of the supreme leadership as a principle. Even the most conservatives groups within the green movement can remain loyal to Khomeini’s ideals (that is, loyalty to the supreme leader), while simultaneously agreeing that Khamenei is not competent for the position.
Reader Comments (11)
When protesters chant 'Death to the dictator' are they referring to AN or KH?
re: (Our initial evaluation that Karroubi had specifically mentioned Khamenei in his five-point plan has not been followed by other summaries. We are double-checking.)
Point three in the Persian text you linked from Salaam News contains a reference to adhering to "the principle of velayat-e faqih, and the Islamic Republic supported by 98 per cent" (presumably a reference to the 1979 referendum on instating an Islamic Republic). It's not the main focus of the point, which is about pursuing the reform struggle through non-violent means.
Acknowledging the 'principle of velayat-e faqih', i.e. guardianship over the state by religious scholars, doesn't necessarily entail support for Khamenei or the institution of leadership as it currently stands - it allows a whole spectrum of interpretations ranging from unquestioning adherence to Khamenei's orders to some kind of non-executive supervision of the state by a collective body of senior scholars (I think Montazeri's view was along these lines).
The rhetoric of Karrubi and others seems to be designed to gather support from across as wide a range of political tendencies as possible, without overstepping key ideological boundaries (that he and other senior reformist politicians most likely continue to believe in) and thus guaranteeing an intensified crackdown and closing of conservative/hardline ranks against any reforms.
Also meant to add that there's no other reference to the Leader in the Karrubi statement.
Catherine - interesting question. I suspect the "dictator" protesters had in mind straight after the election may have been Ahmadinejad, at least for some, though i would suspect that most are now thinking of Khamenei.
Hi Mukharbish.
That's my impression, too, but I was wondering if there's any way of knowing for sure who is meant, and whether from let's say 7 December on we can assume it's KH.
i suppose the only way of 'knowing for sure' is to ask participants in the protest directly who they are referring to.my impression is based on the context provided by other slogans directly referring to Ahmadinejad or Khamenei. anti-khamenei slogans i think already appeared before dec 7 but have certainly intensified since that date.
another possibility is that 'dictator' in the chant is a kind of personification of the regime's repressive apparatus as a whole.
Mukharbish,
Clarification much appreciated.
S.
Herein lies a major obstacle for the Green Movement. There is a huge spectrum within those who desire change- ranging from the mildly dissatisfied to the militant. Though I suspect all would settle for the removal of AN and judicial reform as a start, there is an even wider gulf between those who's ambition would stop soon after this and those who will only settle for the dismantling of the constitution and theocracy. Within this, there is also significant divergence on the tactics that should be used to ring these changes- either working inside or outside 'the system'.
The same problem of a multi-constituent and mult-agenda movement existed 1977-9. Some thought the Shah could remain as a figurehead, others wanted a restoration of the 1906-07 constitution, others were prepared to work with Baktiar, some wanted separation of religion, regional autonomy, class revolution and others simply wanted rid of the Shah and had thought little beyond that.
Probably only a minority supported or understood the implications of velayat-e faqih’. However, Khomeini, by force of personality (and no little amount of deception), was able to forge a unified (for some perhaps provisional) goal of the Shah's non negotiable immediate exit, rejection of Bakhtiar, Islamic government and velayat-e faqih. Khomeini never once budged from this clear sense of purpose- there seemed little point in trying to do so.
Critically, as Keddie writes "the middle classes, represented chiefly by the revived National Front, had little choice but to join forces with Khomeini and acknowledge his leadership, despite some their private reservations."
Neither Mousavi, nor Khatami, are in any position to dictate an agenda. The one they propose is hardly radical (compared to Khomeini). The only thing that unites them to the fringe is AN's removal and probably a degree of judicial reform. Hence, the regime would be wise to comply- as I suspect the more radical elements of the opposition would then be extremely isolated.
I suspect that there may be constitutional provisions for removing AN. But I wouldn't be sure. The dismantling of velayat-e faqih, however, would mean ripping up the constitution. That could happen- but I see it more likely occuring only when Khamenei dies.
The movement is fundamental - Ahmadinejad is not the problem.
Khamenei is the problem.
As long as you have one man as dictator, NOTHING can change.
Replacing Ahmadinejad with another revolutionary sheep will not change ANYTHING.
Fantastic analysis by ChrisE. I find myself becoming a Chris E fan. Great stuff raised by Scott.
Between Scott and Chris, you both managed to touch on at least 3 of the 5-or-so subjects that I always have in my head as "underfocused on" or "underwritten about", even amongst people and media who actually focus on the domestic situation. Even though I'm a little tired, I'll try to legibly synopcize my thougths on the 3:
**Issue 1. The extent to which regime opponents are actually cohesively behind the general ideological goals of Khatami, Moussavi, Karroubi, et al.** This is a slightly different question than the more frequently posed question of "to what extent are the Green leaders actually leading, etc." We've thankfully seen more analysis of this since Mousavi released his 5 points.
**Issue 2. To what extent does the criticism coming from the conservatives matter?** I have to admit this is one area where I tend to differ ever so slightly with Scott, tending to be about 20% more skeptical on average with reference to whether any particular criticism coming from these camps actually matters. Although this is an extremely complex issue, if I had to try to sum it up, I'd perhaps pose the issue like this: "To what extent are the critics acting only as 'loyal opposition' to Ahmadinejad, vs to what extent are the people speaking actually ready to at least remove Ahmadinejad, if not the Supreme Leader or form of government." I suppose there are many places one could set the "bright line" between significant opposition and loyal opposition/mild rebuking, and other people could propose their own lines. Subject to future revision, I'm currently choosing to set the line at "likely willingness to go as far as overturning the presidential election."
To me, Ali Larijani and Seyed Mohammed Marandi provide examples of people who provide "insignificant opposition", and I long ago crossed them off my list of people who might lend support to the Greens (and people who one should watch in hope they might do so. . although with Larijani I suppose one could argue that he is important enough to be watched regardless) Yes, as Scott has noted, Marandi has criticized Ahmadinejad, and yes, Marandi has stated that he did not vote for AN. However, there is no question that Marandi supports the regime as currently functioning, and strongly frowns upon any attempt to unseat AN. Larijani, for his part, is another person who occasionally provides critiques of, or has disagreements with, AN. However, in no way does Larijani want to nullify the elections, support the protesters, or send AN packing. In fact, I believe I could argue that to the extent that you might perceive a gap between Larijani and Ahmadinejad, it is pretty much the same miniscule gap you might perceive between AN and the Supreme Leader. Its not a significant gap, and paying too match attention to it hoping for some "real" dissent from Larijani is a big time-waster (basically waiting for Godot.)
**Issue 3. To what extent are the "Green Leaders" opposing the regime / opposing the "system"?** Obviously their opposition is "significant" under #2, but to paraphrase Scott, how far are they willing to go? I sometimes wonder, when Mousavi advocates following the constitution, whether he does so because he is determined to preserve the system, or because he has come upon it as a strategy to appear to be continuing to support the system while actually oppositing everything about it. Perhaps for an analogy I could turn to the fact that I'm a Unitarian, and I've seen many Unitarian ministers use The Bible to advocate the exact opposite social, political, and sometimes even religious beliefs vs. what fundamentalists use it for. I'm not an expert on the Iranian constitution, but I'm pretty sure that it is broad and subject to many possible interpretations, and one could use it to promote an agenda that is fairly opposite to the one that is currently in place. Certainly the balance between the autocratic and democratic components could be interpreted in a variety of ways (my hunch is with a Montazeri-type benevolently-guiding leader, a government that is much closer to a Western style government than it is to the current Iranian regime could pass muster under the Iranian Constitution) Are the "Green Leaders" conciously employing this as a strategy?
Here's one more of my wacky analogies: It must be obvious to many observers that Mousavi, Karoubi et. al know they are in a Catch-22 situation where they are on record favoring continuing to play a game (lets call it "The Islamic Republic Game"), but all the rules of the game are indefinitely rigged against them by the Gamemaster, so they have no chance of winning. Clearly, they must have realized at least 100 times by now that even if one really believes in playing The Islamic Republic Game in the long run, at some point the Gamemaster must be removed or overthrown, if for no other reason than to restore fairness to the Game. They also must have contempated by now that even if they honestly would prefer to play a fair version of The Islamic Republic Game, it might actually be better for them to play an entirely different game (perhaps "The Democracy Game"), vs. continuing to play the preferred game under perenially rigged rules. At what point might they implicitly or explicitly admit this and tacitly/implicitly lend support to that solution? [Perhaps I'll try to clarify this analogy a little better at some point :) ]
P.S. Scott, somewhere buried in a box in storage, I have a paper in a box somewhere. It's on the Is/Ought difference. It was written during the first semester of my sophomore year of undergrad, in International Relations 200-and-something, I beleive. If you ever feel you need some backing, I can perhaps take some time and dig it up ;-)
People in Iran are fully aware of the competition between Rafsanjani organized crime mob and the military-industrial fascist government in making deals with foreign countries on how to exploit Iranian national wealth.
The movement is no longer the pawn of the Rafsanjani mob in this competition. WE SHALL NOT STOP at Khamenei. We shall UPROOT I.R. altogether, Rafsanjani, Khatami and Mousavi included.
To clarify, when people chant "death to dictator" they reffer to the dictator in general and by definition & it's not a priticular person, it's the system including Khamanei, Ahmadinejad, Basij & IRGC and whoever is taking away their freedom
Almost all recent chants are against the regime all together, including, "death to Velayate faqih/islamic authority" "down with Taliban, in Kabul & Iran" the taliban in Iran is reffering to babrbaric Islamic repuublic similar to Islamic Taliban, "Iranian Republic" inteat of Islamic Republic and even after Mousavi & Karoubi asked the people to stop chanting such slogans it only lead to not chanting pro-Mousavi songs anymore meaning that most Iranians do not see Mousavi as their leaders anymore.
Mousavi & Karoubi's plans are only to save the system and Islam from a comming revolution and very carefully fabricated in order to serve bith sides of the oppositions and only a small fraction of people's demand is reflected in their plans.
As an Iranian who had lived in Iran for most of my life and always have contacts with people returning from Iran have to tell you that almost anyone not associated with the regime, even the religious ones are now demanding a secular democratic regime & complete change of the system.
Karoubi & Mousavi could come up with any statement trying to fool the people into accepting a