Iran From the Outside: Helping Through "Active Neutrality"

Mahmood Delkhasteh, an academic, columnist, and activist, writes in The Guardian of London:

Since the late 19th century, almost every generation of Iranians has seen at least one major upheaval or revolution. The first revolution for democracy in the Middle East took place in Iran in 1905, at a time when European countries (excepting the UK) were under various forms of dictatorship. No country has experienced so much constant turmoil and political unrest in the past century as Iran.

Besides the current demand for democracy in Iran, however, there has always been the demand for independence. Iranians have an ingrained sensitivity about the independence of their country, traceable far back even in the epic mythical tales of ancient Iran.

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In Shahnameh (or Book of the Kings), for example, the legendary warrior hero Rustam is the defender of Iran's independence. We should not presume that these are just stories created to pass spare time in tea houses. There is rather a principle which, a thousand years ago, transformed the unknown philosopher-poet Ferdusii into a national love affair and turned a warrior into a legendary hero. It still affects the Iranian psyche today.


Thus, it is no surprise that contemporary arguments about the benefits of globalisation, the weakening of nation states, and the semi-irrelevance of national governments whose role is merely to balance the demands of multinational corporations with public demands, have hit a wall of steel within Iran. The country's independence cannot be negotiated on these grounds.

Of course there are numerous Iranian scholars and intellectuals who have bought into these arguments, but the west should be aware of the gap between them and the national public consciousness of the Iranian people. This revolution is not staffed by these self-appointed intellectuals and political activists, but is to be found among the people themselves. And because it is horizontally organised and networked, it has been impossible for the regime to decapitate it.

The chants and slogans teach us how this collective movement is increasingly clarifying its democratic demands through self-assessment and critical dialogue, internally and in response to the changing reality. The initial response to the vote rigging, for example, was expressed in the simple question: "Where is my vote?" Gradually, people realised that voting was only a means through which to exercise their authority over the state, and that as long as this was impossible demanding the right to vote was irrelevant.

This small awakening, combined with the brutal repression of their peaceful demonstrations, shifted the movement's core demand from ending political corruption to demanding, as the slogan went, "Independence, Freedom [and an] Iranian Republic".

This slogan prefigures the republican nature of the future regime as one based on principles of both independence and freedom. It is a secularised version of a slogan popular in the 1979 revolution: "Independence, freedom, Islamic Republic". In both cases, independence and freedom are the main demands. These were imagined to have been possible in the form of an "Islamic republic" in the previous revolution but, as the state has since proved that it is neither Islamic nor a republic, people have learned to express the original demands within a new discourse.

The concept of independence is understood by the majority in Iran as "negative equilibrium" – an idea originally championed by Mohammad Mossadeq, the democratic prime minister who was overthrown in a CIA-engineered coup in 1953. Mossadeq argued that Iran could not secure its fragile existence through "balancing out" interfering powers against each other, as had been government policy in the preceding decades (whether this be setting Russia against Britain or the US against Russia). Instead, he suggested that no foreign power should be allowed to violate or compromise Iran's independence in the first place. Thus, while the demand for freedom may be understood at an individual level, the desire for independence is seen as an exercise of freedom in collective or national form.

Any foreign interference in favour of either the opposition movement or the regime, therefore, violates this sense of independence and weakens the process of revolution. Recently, the exiled ex-president, Abulhassan Banisadr, urged foreign governments to adopt "active neutrality" towards the regime and the country's evolving political situation. This means taking two different kinds of actions: negative (or withdrawing) actions, and positive (or active) ones.

The first negative move should be to remove the threat of military attack and economic sanctions as a way of forcing the regime to make concessions about the nuclear issue. Both these are lifelines for the sinking regime, which needs some sort of international crisis to keep itself afloat. A democratic Iran does not need the atomic bomb; it needs not to have it.

Second, foreign governments should not give their financial or political support to the opposition. They should withdraw as potential actors from this stage.

In addition to these withdrawals, there are certain ways that foreign governments can act positively to hasten the revolution.

One is to actively and publicly oppose the violation of human rights in Iran, in accordance with the demands of global public opinion.

The second is to prevent foreign companies from selling equipment or services which enable the regime to spy on, censor and control the opposition. Third, they can identify and publicise the names of those members of the regime who have stored money in foreign banks, and expose the amount of these deposits and investments.

Finally, foreign governments can support efforts to bring Iran's leaders to the international courts of law so that they can be tried for committing crimes against humanity.

Such actions, as part of a wider policy of "active neutrality", can both weaken the Iranian regime's capacity to use violence against the people of Iran and send a message to Iranians that no country will interfere in Iran's domestic affairs after this regime is gone.

When the people are certain that they will not be exploited in this way, they can mobilise their resources in full to end the life of a corrupt and criminal regime and advance the democratisation of Islamic countries.

Iran Analysis: The Supreme Leader Warns Rafsanjani

Hat-tip to a valued EA source for this story:

On the surface, the meeting was simply the greetings of a Supreme Leader to those organising the anniversary celebrations of his Islamic Republic. It was an occasion to declare that the most important aspect of any ceremony is the presence of the Iranian people, and it is important to protect them and guarantee their security.

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Not so far below the surface, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has just told other important Iranian political figures --- not those in "the opposition" but those within the establishment: Get Beside Me.

Of course Khamenei referred to the Green movement but he did so primarily to shoo it away: this was "merely a small deceived group". Behind them was the bigger threat of "the enemy [who] is trying to shaken our great national treasure, February 11 (anniversary of Iranian Revolution)".

The important passage in Khamenei's speech came after he declared, "Our real need is understanding that this is an important time for making decisions....We need to be in the arena in full force and make wise moves." He asked, or rather demanded, that all people with responsibility in the "elite" should "make their approach clear" and end their "two-sided stance". They should do so "without any ambiguity and playing of tricks"; the silence of the "elite aids the sedition."

Hashemi Rafsanjani, you have just been served a warning.

In the midst of the current battle between conservative/principlist critics and the Ahmadinejad Government, symbolised by the hostility over the alleged role of former prosecutor Saeed Mortazavi in the Kahrizak prison abuse case and the influence of close Ahmadinejad ally Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai, Rafsanjani spoke to a group of students and university lecturers. He praised the current televised debates as an alternative to protest on the streets but said little about specific political issues.

Far too little for the Supreme Leader.

Ayatollah Khamenei's speech points to his frustration with Rafsanjani's cautious, ambiguous statements. But, going public with that frustration, it also shows the Supreme Leader's growing worry over the situation. Seven months ago, Khamenei could talk tough but still praise Rafsanjani, believing that the incipient opposition could soon be defeated. Well, the opposition is still here, Rafsanjani still hasn't chosen sides, and Khamenei must be hoping that this does not last another seven months. (Indeed, he may be thinking that, if this does last seven months, he may not be in a position to lecture Rafsanjani or the opposition any longer.)

Iran: Letter from Tehran "The Regime is Over"

An EA reader has passed us this letter from a friend in Tehran, received yesterday. We post it as it is written, with no editing:

Sorry for taking so long to write to you, I’ve been lying low - I wasn’t really sure whether it was safe for me to write or not, and I just wanted to be careful.

Do you remember Khatami being attacked during Moharram [the assault in Jamaran on Tasua, 26 December --- see video]? We happened to be visiting some friends who live near there and you’ll never believe it but we virtually had a ringside view!

Things are definitely changing here, remember I told you about the last demonstration I had seen in October, and the brutality of the basij etc. Well this time it almost seemed as if some of the attackers really didn’t want to be there! It seems that some of them are getting disillusioned with it all.

The regime is over - it’s just a matter of time! They really can’t last much longer.

Even in the time since I moved back here last year I can sense the change. The hardliners are getting quieter by the day --- indeed I am increasingly hearing them not just criticizing the regime, but actually sympathizing with the movement. They’ve gone from supporting the regime, to silence, to criticism, to support for the opposition in a few short months. Amazingly we are now seeing some of the very religious people beginning to turn away from the Supreme Leader, and even blame him for the younger generation turning away from Islam.

As I told you before families are divided, and on occasion I see people who would have traditionally been much more conservative and even pro-regime, now criticizing the regime and as I say even the SL! This was unheard of even a few months ago.

I get the sense that even among the conservatives they are fighting among themselves! The feeling is that once the economy collapses it will definitely be the end of the regime, and the word on the street is that that is not far away. Every other factor for regime change is in place, and it seems that the opposition’s support grows every day.

Iran: How Far Do The Green Movements Go?

Monday was distinguished by statements from the opposition. Both Mehdi Karroubi and Mohammad Khatami issued analyses and, in the case of Karroubi, a five-point proposal to complement the 1 January declaration of Mir Hossein Mousavi.

As protesters draw breath during a relatively long pause between major demonstrations, the question may not be how the regime reacts to these statements --- my reading, set out yesterday, is that the Iranian Government's immediate concern is challenges within the establishment than with the pressure beyond it --- but how the Green movement(s) respond.

While Karroubi and Khatami were clear in their criticisms of the regime, both also emphasised that their approach rested on non-violence on all sides and that their resolutions were within the system, adhering to the Constitution. What, however, does adherence to the Constitution entail? Would this just be a question of apologies, compensation, and the punishment of some officials? Or would the demands reach to the removal of President Ahmadinejad for his responsibility in the failures and abuses? Do they include a change in the position of the Supreme Leader?

(Our initial evaluation that Karroubi had specifically mentioned Khamenei in his five-point plan has not been followed by other summaries. We are double-checking.)

An analysis from an activist sets out the issue forcefully:

The green movement, at least when it comes to its slogans, has defined some short-term objectives. Slogans which, at an earlier point, consisted of calling Ahmadinejad a liar or questioning his 63% share of the vote have now become more direct and confrontational, addressing the dictator himself and wanting an end to the dictatorship.

Why is it that, when the demand of the main body of the movement has evolved to such an extent, the leaders, namely Mousavi and Karroubi, refuse to announce it openly? Why is there no mention of this demand in the statement issued by Bazargan, Soroush, Kadivar, Ganji, and Mohajerani (the five Iranian expatriate intellectuals who issued their 10 Demands two days after Mousavi's New Year statement)?

The demand for the removal of Khamenei is, in reality, a demand for fundamental change; it is tantamount to the negation of his policies for the last 20 years, but at the same time, it does not equal the overthrow of the regime. This demand does not even mean the negation of the supreme leadership as a principle. Even the most conservatives groups within the green movement can remain loyal to Khomeini’s ideals (that is, loyalty to the supreme leader), while simultaneously agreeing that Khamenei is not competent for the position.

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[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vSWNFp2mSC0[/youtube]

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