The Latest from Iran (9 January): Watching Carefully

2225 GMT: More on Khamenei Speech (see 1445 and 1850 GMT). An EA reader who watched the Supreme Leader's address today sends an interesting e-mail, "His speech did not sound aggressive. It sounded more as a request for calm and acting with wisdom after the fallouts of Ashura. It appeared that he was lacking in confidence. Same for the crowd."

2220 GMT: Halting the Mothers of Martyrs. An Iranian activist reports that, during their weekly march in Laleh Park, about 30 of Mothers of Martyrs in the post-election crisis and their supporters were arrested and taken to Vozara detention centre.

2200 GMT: Mortazavi --- Scapegoat or Valued Official? Iran-watchers may want to set aside a few moments for former Tehran prosecutor Saeed Mortazavi, whose future may turn upon the developments in the internal contest amidst conservatives and principlists.

Days after Mortazavi was reportedly named as prime "suspect" in the Parliamentary investigation of the deaths of Kahrizak detainees, he was formally named as President Ahmadinejad's advisor to combating smuggling of drugs and currency.

NEW Latest Iran Video: Sharif University Demonstration (9 January)
Iran: Four Responses to the “Wrong Questions” of the Leveretts (Lucas)
Iran: “What is This Opposition?” Right Answers to Wrong Questions (Shahryar)
The Latest from Iran (8 January): Karroubi Under Attack

Interpretation? Mortazavi is now the proxy in the battle between key conservatives/principlists and Ahmadinejad. The President wants him as a sign of Ahmadinejad's authority and as a firewall to any move by Parliamentary challenges; Ahmadinejad's critics see Mortazavi's downfall as a necessary victory in their battle.

Another marker in the dispute is a statement by a "pro-Government" student organisation criticising Ahmadinejad for the appointments of Mortazavi and for Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai, the former First Vice-President --- a few days after his appointment, he was removed from office amidst vehement criticism from the conservatives/principlists  who may be aiming at Mortazavi ---  who is now Ahmadinejad's chief of staff.

2150 GMT: A Release. An EA reader writers that Reza Najafi, an Iranian translator, was released from jail on Thursday. Najafi worked for Caravan Publishing, which is owned by Arash Hejazi, the doctor who tried to save the life of Neda Agha Soltan.

1920 GMT: The Khamenei Manoeuvre (Part 2). This article, from Payvand, should be read in conjunction with the passage of the Supreme Leader's speech offering some rhetorical concession on violence:

Majlis Speaker Ali Larijani has criticized the people who made derogatory remarks about Mohsen Rezaei in regard to his recent letter to the Supreme Leader about Mir-Hossein Mousavi's recent proposals. Larijani made the remarks at a meeting with national police chiefs in Qom on Thursday.

"Rezaei has been a real mujahid (one who struggles in the cause of Islam) and strived wholeheartedly during the (1980-1988) Iran-Iraq war. Naturally, since he has entered the political scene, some of his ideas may be criticized. But why do some political figures question his career as a mujahid?"

"Today, society needs convergence not discord and not steps meant to undermine recognized figures' positions," he added.

It is not too speculative to treat Larijani as a channel for the political views of the Supreme Leader, and this manoevure is a clear call --- "Back Off" --- to those "hard-liners" who have criticised Rezaei for suggesting that a deal may now be struck with Mir Hossein Mousavi.

And there's more. Larijani said, "We should not call anyone who has different views a dissident and a hypocrite. In line with the Supreme Leader's directives, all people should try to create unity in the country to prepare the ground for economic activities, investment, and development."

That passage walks hand-in-hand with this week's declarations by high-profile MP Ali Motahari, on video and in print, calling for some negotiation of views and approaches to get out of the current post-election difficulties.

1850 GMT: Mixed Messages. Borzou Daragahi of The Los Angeles Times picks up on a passage from today's Supreme Leader statement (see 1445 GMT) that may point to some pull-back from all-out confrontation:

Relevant bodies should fully respect the law in dealing with the [post-election] riots and the ongoing events. Those without any legal duty and obligations should not meddle with these affairs, Everyone should hold back from arbitrary acts and everything should go within the framework of the law.

The obvious connection to make is that Khamenei's message is, first and foremost, to the conservative/principlist politicians who have been pressing for some sign of regime concession on the crackdown. That has including Presidential candidate Mohsen Rezaei's letter and the challenge of member of Parliament Ali Motahari (covered in this week's EA updates).

Doesn't look like this part of Khamenei's message has filtered down through the ranks, however. Brigadier General Mohammad-Reza Naqdi, the head of the Basiji militia, preferred to pick up on the Supreme Leader's passage praising action against the "corrupt" and "rioters":

Now, all our people expect the security and intelligence organs as well as the judiciary to take action. People will jump to the fray if they feel these bodies are lax in their duties. People are critical of the laxness of security and judicial bodies against conspirators.

And Islamic Revolution Guard Corps commander Brigadier General Abdollah Araqi has proposed involving the Basiji militiamen, who are now within the Revolutionary Guard, in some IRGC operations.

Most Basijis are not inclined to militarism and so we have trained those interested in military activities separately within the framework of several battalions. The most-trained Basijis are now with Imam Hussein Battalions and their employment in security issues could be influential.

1840 GMT: Getting It Right About the Opposition. Following our responses to this week's attempt by Flynt and Hillary Mann Leverett to promote the legitimacy of the Ahmadinejad Government by belittling the opposition, Abbas Milani adds his critique in The New Republic. The take-away quote: "The U.S. can either stand with the people of Iran, and support their quest for democracy—a democracy, incidentally, that offers the only solution to the nuclear problem as well—or it can side with those who defend the moribund regime."

1815 GMT: The University Demonstrations Continue. Compared to the tumult of last month, Iran's universities have been relatively muted in terms of open protest (though not, it should be noted, signed of opposition such as exam boycotts). Today, however, students at Sharif University came out in a show of protest over detentions of their classmates.

We've posted three clips.

1510 GMT: I'll be back in a couple of hours to round up latest news and analysis. Thanks to EA readers for keeping the information coming in.

1500 GMT: For Mahmoud, It's the Nukes. President Ahmadinejad, meanwhile, is staying away from (or being kept from) the internal situation, as he declared in his nationally-televised speech that that further UN Security Council sanctions will not deter Iran from pursuing its nuclear programme:

[Other countries] issued several resolutions and sanctioned Iran ... They think Iranians will fall on their knees over these things but they are mistaken....We are not interested in conflicts (but) you are continually demanding things.

They should not think they can put up obstacles in Iranians' way ... I assure the people ... that the government will whole-heartedly defend Iran's rights and will not back down one iota.

1455 GMT: Reza Razaghi, one of the members of the central legal committee of Mir Hossein Mousavi, was arrested early this morning and moved to an unknown location.

Yadoolah Eslami, a former member of Parliament, has also been arrested.

1445 GMT: Khamenei's Back. Just arrived back in snowy Birmingham to find that, a few thousand miles away, the Supreme Leader has appeared publicly for the first time since Ashura. (You can have a peek at the video.)

Textbook stuff from Ayatollah Khamenei, speaking to visitors from Qom, about how appropriate it is to come down hard on the demonstrators: "The officials of the three forces saw for themselves what the nation is asking for, therefore, they must perform their duties well towards the corrupt and the rioters." (Note: I would be grateful if readers could verify whether Khamenei referred to Ahmadinejad by name.)

The Supreme Leader also played the foreign-spectre-behind-the-opposition card: "The U.S. and Britain and other arrogant powers, as well as their domestic misguided (allies), acted under the banner of struggle against the Imam (Ayatollah Khomeini) and the revolution since the very beginning of the victory of the Islamic revolution. The situation is the same now."

0320 GMT: The Newest Deal has an analysis, which matches up with some information I've received, of the offering-up of former Tehran Prosecutor General Saeed Mortazavi as a sacrifice for the deaths of detainees at Kahrizak Prison. A broader way to consider this is that Mortazavi's fate is a "firewall" for the Ahmadinejad Government. If he is punished, the line might be held against pressure on others, including the President.

0300 GMT: Friday was a day, apart from the drama of the gunfire at Mehdi Karroubi's motorcade, to pick up pieces of information and put them together. I had the pleasure of a long chat with a couple of top Iran-watchers. Parts of the discussion will be shaping analyses in forthcoming days, but the two general lines of note were "marathon, not sprint" and "change is coming".

Meanwhile, some of those pieces to note before making my way back to Britain....

The Western media is now responding quickly to headline news from Iran: within hours of the Karroubi incidence, The New York Times, The Times of London, and The Guardian of London, amongst London, had posted stories.

Iran human rights organisations reacted by building the incident into another demand on the Government, referring to possible Basiji and Revolutionary Guard involvement in the events in Qazvin and calling on the regime to ensure the safety of opposition leaders. Reformist members of Parliament, such as Mohammad Reza Tabesh, are asking Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani to safeguard "insulted" legislators.

The Government is definitely going to use the Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MKO) "terrorist" line as a battering ram against the opposition: state media indicated on Friday that 5 Ashura detainees going on trial will be charged with membership of the organisation.

More news is emerging of students at Iran universities boycotting final examinations in protest at detentions of classmates.

Iran: "What is This Opposition?" Right Answers to Wrong Questions

EA's Josh Shahryar offers this analysis, also published in The Huffington Post:

On Wednesday in The New York Times, Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett attempted perhaps the most stinging dismissal of the importance of the ongoing opposition protests in Iran.

Bloggers and other foreign policy experts refuted many of the Leveretts' specific points, especially their overestimation of government-sponsored protests and underestimation of opposition demonstrations. [EA's immediate reaction is in Wednesday's updates.] I have covered the numbers on my blog, but a very good second opinion is offered by Daniel Drezner in ForeignPolicy.com.

Drezner and Kevin Sullivan of Real Clear Politics set a wider challenge, however, when they argue that, beyond the Leveretts' distortions, there are "good" analytical questions.

Those questions need a response, not necessarily because they are "good", but because if they are not addressed, the Leveretts may get away with a blatant attempt at skewing facts to hammer in their argument that President Barack Obama should forget about the possibility of regime change in Iran.

This is how the Leveretts set out their three queries:

Those who talk so confidently about an "opposition" in Iran as the vanguard for a new revolution should be made to answer three tough questions: First, what does this opposition want? Second, who leads it? Third, through what process will this opposition displace the government in Tehran? In the case of the 1979 revolutionaries, the answers to these questions were clear. They wanted to oust the American-backed regime of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi and to replace it with an Islamic republic. Everyone knew who led the revolution: Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who despite living in exile in Paris could mobilize huge crowds in Iran simply by sending cassette tapes into the country. While supporters disagreed about the revolution's long-term agenda, Khomeini's ideas were well known from his writings and public statements. After the shah's departure, Khomeini returned to Iran with a draft constitution for the new political order in hand. As a result, the basic structure of the Islamic Republic was set up remarkably quickly.

Let's see what ancient China has to offer before I add my assessment. Back in the olden days, this man traveled hundreds of miles to meet a Taoist sage somewhere in China. After the necessary greetings, he said, "I have come a long way to ask you something. What is the answer to the ultimate question in the universe?" The sage smiled and barked, "Well, that is not what you should be asking. You should ask: is there an answer to the ultimate question in the universe?"

In this parable, the first question posed by the Leveretts is fair: what does this opposition want?

Well, certainly not what Mir Hossein Mousavi wants. Even if we ignore the protesters' repeated calls for the freedom of detainees and other chants that call for help from Imam Hossein against tyranny, I think "Down with the Dictator" --- heard for the last six months, heard loudly and clearly --- is a slogan that embodies the demands. President Ahmadinejad Must Go.

In recent months, however, protesters have also widely started chanting against Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The funeral of Grand Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri was filled with noise denouncing the Supreme Leader. Ashura's protests days later were condemned by the regime for committing the same offense.

Certainly, Mousavi is still bargaining with the government. However, people on the street aren't ready to chicken out of their demands, even in the face of gunfire. If the government hadn't forcefully stopped them from presenting their demands through the media, you would have already seen that clearly.

The second question of the Leveretts is one the Taoist sage would have barked at: Who leads it?

The two questioners attempt to fool us into believing that their enquiry is fair by paralleling it with the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Revolutions need leaders and the current protesters don't have one --- quod erat demonstrandum, this is not a revolution.

The first assumption is not true, however: it is not a prerequisite for revolutions to have leaders. Consider the February Revolution of 1917 that overthrew Tsar Nicholas I of Russia. Academics are generally in agreement that it was without what we today consider a definite and centralized leadership. Almost a century later, if you envisage scattered activists working together to bring people out to protest, then Iran has no shortage of those. Mousavi, often considered the de-facto "leader" of the current protesters -- didn't even sanction or support protests that were joined by hundreds of thousands in Ashura.

The third question of the Leveretts made me smirk because it has no immediate relevance: through what process will this opposition displace the government in Tehran?

Well, I wish I knew. But just because the protesters' demands have not been met yet, does not mean that we need to figure how they are going to achieve them. That is their task, a quest for which they've been coming out onto the streets of Iran, chanting as loud as they can, getting arrested, and spilling blood for the past six months to show their commitment to achieving those demands.

Who knows what might overthrow the regime? Maybe the Islamic Republic of Iran Army (Artesh) will finally step in. Maybe millions will turn up and storm Khamenei and Ahmadinejad's house and the parliament. Maybe the violence will get so rampant that the leaders of Iran will simply board a plane to Moscow and flee. This we don't know.

But we do know that simply because they have not met their goals yet, does not mean they won't in the future. The Leveretts' attempt to parallel this movement with the Revolution of 1979 tries to force us into believing that we need to know how, but we really don't.

When the change happens, we will know. Until then, all we can do is support the opposition because they're not just fighting for political rights, but for their human rights. If President Obama believes the Leveretts and discounts the power of the Green Movement, he risks making enemies of the open and secular Iran of the future, just like Jimmy Carter did when he discounted the Revolution of 1979. (Not to mention the fact that he would be guilty of legitimizing an illegitimate regime.)

The Leveretts' piece made me really grateful to an old professor of mine, Dr. Rick Schubert, bless him. Dr. Schubert gave me a D in Philosophy 101, but he taught me what now has become my Golden Rule: questions are equally as important as the answer to them, so be careful before you ask. Maybe the Leveretts should attend one of his classes.

The Latest from Iran (5 January): The Longer Game

2225 GMT: Arguing Over the Mousavi Statement. Habib-allah Askaroladi, a leading principlist politician, has declared, "Today it is important not to allow the extremists to change the national scene into a battlefield.”

That's not a surprising statement. This, however, raises an eyebrow: Askaroladi breaks from Presidential candidate Mohsen Rezaei in recommending Mir Hossein Mousavi's recent statement as a possible route to conciliation: “Nowhere in Mousavi’s statement is an about-face seen.”

2155 GMT: Diplomatic Protest. The Iranian consul in Norway has resigned in protest at his Government's treatment of the Ashura demonstrators. He is also reported to have sought asylum.

A spokesman for the Iranian Embassy would not comment on what he called lies and rumours.

2100 GMT: We've posted video of Monday's CNN interview with the former member of Parliament Fatemeh Haghighatjoo and Tehran University academic Seyed Mohammad Marandi. There's also the transcript of the thoughts of former Obama Administration official Ray Takeyh.

1705 GMT: A Victory for the Government. After months of wrangling, Iran's Parliament has ratified President Ahmadinejad's economic bill aimed at gradually cutting energy and food subsidies. Of 243 members, 134 votes for a reform subsidy organization to enforce the plan.

NEW Latest Iran Video and Transcript: Haghighatjoo and Marandi on CNN (4 January)
NEW Iran: How Outside “Help” Can Hurt the Green Movement
Latest Iran Video: Maziar Bahari on Britain’s Channel 4
Iran: Five Expatriate Intellectuals Issue “The Demands of the Green Movement”
Latest Iran Video: Interview with Committee of Human Rights Reporters (3 January)
Iran: In Defence of Mousavi’s “5 Proposals”
Iran: The Genius of Washington’s “Strategic Leaking” on Nukes & Sanctions
The Latest from Iran (4 January): Watching and Debating

The breakthrough came with a compromise on oversight, insisted upon by Parliament, The Supreme Iranian Audit Court, charged with supervising "financial operations and activities" of organizations which benefit from the state budget, will monitor the organization and submit reports on its performance twice a year.

1635 GMT: Patrolling the Cyber-Revolution. Iranian authorities have reiterated that access to filtered websites is a crime, complementing the declaration by the Ministry of Intelligence yesterday of criminal activity for any association with more than 60 "foreign groups", such as Yale University, accused of fomenting insurrection.

1630 GMT: Apologies for no update service for most of today, as Internet access has been impossible out of my location in Beirut.

0555 GMT: Jackson Swayze, Neda...Ahmadinejad/Khamenei? Austin Heap reports the message that went up when the President's website was hacked:

Dear God, In 2009 you took my favorite singer –-- Michael Jackson, my
favorite actress –-- Farrah Fawcett, my favorite actor –-- Patrick Swayze, my
favorite voice –-- Neda.

Please, please, don’t forget my favorite politician – Ahmadinejad and my
favorite dictator – Khamenei in the year 2010. Thank you.

0530 GMT: Another Jail Sentence. Journalist Bahman Ahmadi Amoui, arrested in June, has been sentenced to seven years and four months in prison and 34 lashes.

0525 GMT: The Letter of the Professors. A story we saw on Sunday but let slip because we were not sure of the significance --- by last night, it was the lead Iran story in Western media such as The New York Times.

Almost 90 academics on the Technical Faculty of Tehran University signed an open letter to the Supreme Leader calling for the end of violence against protesters: “Nighttime attacks on defenseless student dormitories and daytime assaults on students at university campuses, venues of education and learning, is not a sign of strength. Nor is beating up students and their mass imprisonment.”

0520 GMT: Still No Cyber-Mahmoud. The President hasn't been able to blog from his travels in Tajikistan/Turkmenistan, as his website is still down.

0510 GMT: It is becoming clear that the Green movement is in a phase of regrouping and maintaining a lower public profile. There are no immediate markers for protest before the anniversary of the Islamic Revolution on 22 Bahman (11 February), although there was some chatter yesterday about a "40th day" memorial on 7 February for those killed on Ashura last week.

After an intense phase of discussion of the Mousavi statement on Sunday, there was less to note politically yesterday. Much of the Internet attention was on the "10 demands" of the five expatriate Iranian intellectuals, although it is still unclear how much impact their statement will have inside Iran.

Less news also from the regime. There was the flutter that "foreign nationals" had been arrested on Ashura, but nothing further emerged during the day. Less news of arrests as well --- perhaps because the Government is running out of targets to detain --- so last night was led by the seriousness/black comedy of the "blacklist" of 80/62/60 foreign organisations that are off-limits to Iranians.

Iran: Authority and Challenge --- Bring Out the (Multi-Sided) Chessboard

0730 GMT: The streets in Tehran and across Iran are at their quietest in the last two weeks, but behind the scenes, the political challenge is growing, both in intensity and complexity. Bring out the multi-sided chessboard --- this is far more than a game between two players. Consider:

1. There is the "regime", as exemplified by the Supreme Leader and his offices.
2. There is President Ahmadinejad and those who are still his allies in "Government".
3. There are the factions of the "Green movement".
4. There are opposition figures like Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi.
5. There are the conservative/principlist factions who are pressing for some, however limited, concessions from the Government to defuse the continuing resistance to "legitimacy"

Responding to our queries over the aims and language of the Mir Hossein Mousavi statement, EA readers --- who reflected our initial claim that Mousavi's declaration had divided opinion in the Green movement --- have brought out multiple possibilities, both anticipated and unexpected. Perhaps the most intriguing came last night:

Iran: The Non-Violent “Watershed” of the Mousavi Statement (Shahryar)
Iran: A Gut Reaction to Mousavi’s “Martyrdom v. Compromise” Statement (Lucas)
Iran Document: Mousavi’s “5 Stages to Resolution” Statement (1 January)

By offering a five point compromise, even each and every point is unacceptable, [Mousavi] has started the argument for compromise amongst the cronies of the regime....The regime collapsing over night is terrible. The regime has to evolve to collapse over a period of time, and the Mousavi plan is a great path forward. It sets a simple basic agenda that if enforced will spell the end of the Islamic Republic of Iran as we know it as a dictatorial theocracy. Any one of the five points is a no-starter, no-go for the regime, however...if the current stalemate continues it is also the end of the regime.

In a sense Mousavi is masterfully acknowledging that he is losing control of the Green wave, but also masterfully turns this to a time pressure on the regime, saying deal with me or deal with the wrath of the people who will rip you apart.

That analysis, however, takes us to individuals and groups who often do not make it to the public microscope. In the last 48 hours --- returning to initiatives in the days and weeks before that --- the clerics, politicians, and members of Parliament who do not sympathise with the Green movement or Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, but who also are unsettled by the post-election and the political and economic approach of the Government, have been pressing for their own "compromise". Rule out the Green movement's challenge, even put it to the judicial sword if protests continue, but also acknowledge some errors in the detentions, the mass trials, the unwillingness to accept any mistakes were made after 12 June.

My initial reading was that this move within the establishment --- seen in the letter of Presidential candidate Mohsen Rezaei, the proposals of MP Ali Motahari, the calls of clerics like Ayatollah Makarem-Shirazi and possibly Ayatollah Javadi-Amoli, and possibly even in the general statements of Hashemi Rafsanjani --- was a threat to Mousavi, undermining his 5-point proposal and forcing him into either capitulation or ostracism with the Green Wave.

The EA reader's comment turns that reading around: it is Mousavi who puts pressure on a regime which is far more than the Supreme Leader and the President, exposing and widening its own fissures which persist and possibly mean more, amidst the erosion of its authority, than the supposed strength of its security forces and its punishments.

That reading in turn takes us back to earlier multi-sided chess matches, especially between June and the end of August when Ahmadinjead's inauguration for a second term was not assured, when the President was battling with other conservative/principlist factions and even the Supreme Leader for control of key ministries, and when Parliament was flirting with the idea of throwing out Ahmadinejad's proposed Cabinet.

All of that in-fighting seemed to recede by September but the resilience of protest --- it just won't go away --- may have revived the contests. Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani's daily show of his fist to the demonstrators may also be an unsubtle display of his power and ambitions; alternatively, it could be an assertion of the Supreme Leader's wishes, in which President Ahmadinejad could take on the role of cipher or scapegoat. The members of Parliament, who also have the President's proposed economic programme --- still unpassed after three months --- as a target, may choose not to bow down in acceptance, as they did at the start of September.

All or none of those possibilities may occur. They are important, however --- even as they go unnoticed by many outside Iran --- for they are the manoeuvres and the contests that occur between the public surges of the Green Wave. They are the fabric of power, a fabric that may be stitched together yet again or may now fray as a Government unravels.

The Latest from Iran (2 January): The Ripples of the Mousavi Statement

2240 GMT: Just Remember, It's the Zionists. And the Americans. At the end of a tiring, sometimes confusing day trying to interpret the political signals not only from Mir Hossein Mousavi but from others "within the Establishment", the simplicity of Kayhan offers a refuge from thought. Here is its front page:

Mousavi's latest statement was written by Mossad. And the CIA.

That's that, then. Thanks, guys, for saving me any further need for research. Or reflection. Or sense.

2155 GMT: Another Attack  on Mousavi's Organisation. Kalemeh reports that Mohammad Reza Tajik, a senior aide to Mir Hossein Mousavi, has been arrested.

2110 GMT: Larijani's Latest. Ali Larijani, the Speaker of the Parliament, continues his tour of the country and his denunciation of the opposition, telling an audience in northeastern Iran: ""In the parliament we have considered such moves [of unrest] like walking on a minefield which would only cause deep rifts and damage the country's prestige."

Is Larijani playing bad cop to the conservative/principlist not-so-bad-cop (Rezaei, Motahari) in pressing for a resolution? Is he beyond compromise, setting out "they shall not pass" either as his personal position or as the (unacknowledged) representative of the Supreme Leader?

I leave it to others to work through the possibilities. Just wanted to ponder this: how many times have we mentioned Larijani in the updates in last few days? And how many times have we mentioned Ahmadinejad?

NEW Iran: The Non-Violent “Watershed” of the Mousavi Statement (Shahryar)
NEW Iran: A Gut Reaction to Mousavi’s “Martyrdom v. Compromise” Statement (Lucas)
NEW Iran Document: Mousavi’s “5 Stages to Resolution” Statement (1 January)
NEW Iran: 2009’s Year of Living Dangerously (Part 1)
Latest Iran Video: Protests Against and for the Regime (31 December)

1750 GMT: What Say You, Rafsanjani? As both Mir Hossein Mousavi and conservative/principlist factions make their political moves for a resolution, attention has now turned to a statement by former President Hashemi Rafsanjani at today's meeting of the Expediency Council, which he chairs.

Both Mousavi's Kalemeh and the state outlet Islamic Republic News Agency say Rafsanjani called for "unity" and "peace" by strengthening the bonds between Iranian people and the Government and that he praised the demonstrations of Iranians on the streets. IRNA then adds, however, that Rafsanjani said:

The Islamic establishment became victorious and continues its existence by relying on the people. I hope the desecrators will learn a lesson from the meaningful presence of the people on the street.

Press TV then adds the gloss, "Rafsanjani said the Wednesday rally also rendered ineffective the plots against the Islamic establishment."

1745 GMT: The Court of Appeals has upheld the six-year prison sentence of journalist Ahmad Zeidabadi.

1740 GMT: Karroubi and Mousavi Move? Saham News reports that Mehdi Karroubi has met Mir Hossein Mousavi for an hour in the home of Mousavi's nephew Seyed Ali, slain last Sunday by security forces. In addition to paying respects, Karroubi discussed "issues surrounding Mousavi's statement".

1715 GMT: The "Conservative/Principlist" Manoeuvre With Mousavi. OK, here's the political game: conservative and principlist activists within the establishment are going to play up the Mousavi statement as a route to compromise in the post-election conflict. This will fit both the Mohsen Rezaei letter to the Supreme Leader (1050 GMT) and the proposals of MP Ali Motahari (1400 GMT). This is being propelled by Tabnak, which is linked to Rezaei.

Here's the tip-off: the English-language Tehran Times, citing Tabnak, has declared:

Former presidential candidate Mir-Hossein Mousavi has issued a statement in which he condemned the disrespect of religious sanctities by some protesters on Ashura day (December 27) and made five proposals for resolving the current issues facing the country....Mousavi’s first and second proposals imply that he has accepted that the election is over, a Tabnak analyst said.

The article makes no reference to the first part of Mousavi's statement, with its denunciation of the Government and its declaration that he is prepared to die in the cause of protest against injustice and denial of the Iranian people's rights.

1710 GMT: The Sane'i Demotion (see 1535 GMT). Rah-e-Sabz has claimed that the Qom Seminary Teachers statement, denouncing Ayatollah Sane'i as failing to meet the standards of a marja, was signed by only one person: fervent Ahmadinejad supporter Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi.

Press TV, however, is playing up the "statement bearing the signature of Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, the former head of Iran's judiciary" as "Ayatollah Sanei no longer qualified: Clerical body" and adds the jibe that Sane'i has "been criticized by millions of Iranians who took part in the demonstration on Wednesday".

1700 GMT: Nemat Ahmadi, whose arrest was reported yesterday, has issued a denial. Ahmadi was at the farm where another activist, Ali Hekmat, was taken by security forces and went to the police station with him.

1535 GMT: Attacking Sane'i. The move against Ayatolllah Yusuf Sane'i continues: the Qom Seminary Teachers Association has announced that he does not meet the conditions to be a marja (eminent cleric, worthy of emulation).

1400 GMT: More on the Move "Within" the Establishment. Earlier today (0740 GMT), Mr Azadi read the Mousavi statement in the context of "unity" calls from clerics, members of Parliament, and high-profile politicians such as Mohsen Rezaei (see 1050 GMT).

Here's more material for the thesis, with the proposals of influential legislator Ali Motahari. Among his seven points:

The leaders of the Green Movement should formally acknowledge the legitimacy of the President, and stop labeling the June election as fraudulent. Furthermore, they should, in the strongest possible terms, distance their positions, slogans, and agenda from anti-Islamic and westernized groups that have infiltrated the Green Movement and seek its leadership....

The President should acknowledge his mistake during the televised debates, and ask for forgiveness from the parties implicated....

Freedom of speech should be established by Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting and the press should adhere to these standards....

The military atmosphere should be brought to an end, and the national intelligence services must put an end to their unfounded claims against the leadership of the Green movement, accusing them of velvet revolution, soft regime change and months of preparation for regime change based on collaboration with foreigners. They should see the roots of post election developments not in foreign intervention but in our own ambitions, worldly goals, illusions, misjudgments and mismanagements. They should apologize to the nation for their excessive use of force against people....

All the detainees, who have often been arrested for unfounded reasons, should be released as soon as possible , except those who have damaged public properties and have resorted to destroying public buildings, particularly those took part in the riots during Ashura....

The full identify and photos of those guilty of initiating, aiding and carrying out the events that took place in Kahrizak, University of Tehran, and Sobhan Apartment Complex should be revealed to the public, and their sentences should be announced....

The judiciary should not remain indifferent in the face of extremist and sectarian supporters of the government who under the mask of Velayat-e Faghih (Guardian of the Jurisprudence) intend to eliminate all reformist and Principalist political figures and order the disruption of public gatherings.

1330 GMT: And If the Nuclear Distraction Doesn't Work (see 0925 GMT).... Press TV has some more on the interview of  Foreign Manouchehr Mottaki on state television. Having put up headlines on Mottaki's "ultimatum" for the West to accept Iran's offers on uranium enrichment within a month, the website now turns to a Mottaki speech on Friday to play the "foreign intervention" card:

Enemies are afraid of the anti-oppression movement Iran has started in the world. So, they are constantly scheming to stop it from spreading in the Muslim world and elsewhere. Vain enemy support for these scattered incidents that have recently occurred in the country on an insignificant scale, will lead to nothing.

Curiously, however, Mottaki located Iran's Number One Enemy not in the great Satanic expanse of the United States but in Britain.

1315 GMT: We've posted our second special analysis of the day on the Mousavi statement: Josh Shahryar assesses the declaration as a non-violent "watershed" for the challenge to the regime.

1105 GMT: Jailing the Activists. Two more members of Iran's Human Rights Reporters, Parisa Kakaei and Mehrdad Rahimi, members of the Committee of Human Rights Reporters, were arrested yesterday. All but two of the organisation's central committee are now detained.

1050 GMT: Connection? The Mousavi Statement and the Rezaei Intervention. There is an intriuing dimension --- possibly parallel, possibly intersecting --- to Mir Hossein Mousavi's declaration on martyrdom and compromise.

Before the Mousavi statement emerged, it was being reported that Presidential candidate Mohsen Rezaei had written to the Supreme Leader urging a political resolution as Mousavi had now allegedly accepted the post-election legitimacy of the Government.

This morning that line is still being pushed by Press TV's website, which quotes Rezaei:

Although he moved later than he should have, Mousavi has retreated from the position of denying the legitimacy of Mr. Ahmadinejad's government. That retreat as well as his constructive proposal about the role that the parliament and judiciary must play in holding the administration accountable can signal the beginning of a new unifying movement from opposing front.

Rezaei has vocally aligned himself with the regime after Ashura, in public statements and in the letter: "Wednesday demonstrations that brought out millions in a magnificent show of national unity will not only make up for the shame of the sacrilegious events of Ashura but will also play a unique role in foiling enemy plots. Once more, it was proven that Imam Hussein (PBUH) and his reviving path will be the savior of the Iranian nation." So it is clear that any accountability, in his eyes, will be limited to officials rather than reaching up to the offices of the Supreme Leader.

Two questions. First, on the nature of a compromise, at least as foretold by Rezaei: does it include an "accountability" that pushes aside President Ahmadinejad?

Second, has Rezaei's intervention been co-ordinated with Mousavi (see Mr Azadi's interpretation below on an interaction between Mousasvi and other "unity" initiatives such as that of Hashemi Rafsanjani)? Alternatively, is it meant to limit and even undermine Mousavi, especially with the Green movement, by emphasising "retreat"? Or is this a parallel initiative by conservatives/principlists which may or may not intersect with Mousavi in coming days?

0925 GMT: No, It's Nukes, Nukes, Nukes. I would not want to suggest in any way that Foreign Minister Manochehr Mottaki is trying to take everyone's eyes away from what is happening inside Iran, but the timing of this "ultimatum" (his word, not mine) on State TV this morning is interesting: the West must accept accept the Iranian counterproposal either to sell 20-percent uranium to Tehran or swap it for Iran's 3.5-percent stock.

Mottaki declared that the international community "has one month left" to accept, or Tehran will enrich uranium to the 20-percent level.

0840 GMT: We've now posted a special analysis, "A Gut Reaction To The Mousavi Statement".

0740 GMT: We awake this morning to continuing discussion of yesterday's post-Ashura statement by Mir Hossein Mousavi. We have posted the English translation, and we are working on an analysis of the political significance of Mousavi's combination of a passionate condemnation of violence and a readiness to accept martyrdom with his 5-point programme for reconciliation and resolution. In the meantime, EA's Mr Azadi offers this interpretation, which can set against my own thoughts in yesterday's updates:

What is clear is that this statement is to some extent different from Mousavi's previous statements.

Last week, we saw that not only a number of senior scholars in Iran such as Ayatollah Javadi Amoli, Makarem- Shirazi, and Mazaheri recommended all parties and groups to pursue dialogue and unity but also that Ayatollah Fadhlullah in Lebanon emphasised the importance of that dialogue and unity. The seven-point plan of [high-profile member of Parliament] Ali Motahari, the speech of Ali Larijani in Friday Prayers at Mashhad, and the request of [Presidential candidate] Mohsen Rezaei to the Supreme Leader to carefully considering Mousavi’s Statement: all show that Iranian intellectuals and scholars from all parities have come to the same conclusion that this crisis has to stop as soon as possible.

Meanwhile, there have been rumours in Iran that some private dialogue between the Leader and Hashemi Rafsanjani has taken place for resolving the current crisis. In this context, I think Mousavi's statement in a way is very similar to Rafsanjani’s plan for exiting from the current crisis.