The Latest from Iran (6 January): Distractions

2030 GMT: US Walks Tightrope on Green Movement. Earlier today we posted Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's declaration about the "ruthless repression" of the Iran Government. Now State Department official John Limbert, who has direct responsibility for Iran, has put out a longer, more balanced statement.

On the one hand, Limbert continues the rhetoric criticising and cautioning the regime, "I think it's very hard for the government to decide how to react to the legitimate demands of the people. The more violence it uses, the more it will hurt itself in the end....We will never remain silent in the face of state violence and the mistreatment of people."

On the other, Limbert is also assuring that the Obama Administration will not break off discussions with the Ahmadinejad Government: "As you know, the U.S. president is determined to renew ties with Iran despite all the problems -- which we don't underestimate -- based on a new beginning."

NEW Iran: Hillary Clinton on Engagement & Pressure with Regime of “Ruthless Repression”
UPDATED Iran: The 60 Forbidden Foreign Organisations
Latest Iran Video and Transcript: Haghighatjoo and Marandi on CNN (4 January)
Iran: How Outside “Help” Can Hurt the Green Movement

2020 GMT: Setareh Sabety has posted an article commenting on the recent declaration of five Iranian intellectuals living abroad and declaring, "[Their] ten demands...should be embraced because they provide the democratic framework within which we can debate the future of our beloved Iran."

2010 GMT: Kalemeh is reporting the latest statement of Mehdi Karroubi that he is "prepared for everything" and "could not have imagine" the behaviour of the regime in the post-election conflict.

1950 GMT: Mesbah Yazdi Calling for Death Penalty? Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, close to President Ahmadinejad, ran out the standard line on the "evil" protests as the product of the "West" and Jews today. He allegedly added, however, that the demonstrators were "corruption on earth" and, as such, are subject to the death penalty.

1940 GMT: Iran's Energy Boost. "Turkmenistan has opened a second gas pipeline to Iran....Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad inaugurated the new 30km (19 miles) pipeline with Turkmen President Kurbanguly Berdymukhamedov in a ceremony in the desert near the Iranian border."

What is interesting beyond the story is that the BBC not only reports the development but praises it for "further eroding Russia's historical domination of its energy sector". Not sure the US authorities will see the deal in exactly the same way.

1930 GMT: Oh, Please (with an MKO twist).... We try our bet to limit the damage, but sometimes you cannot keep a bad article down. Laura Rozen of Politico, who normally has the best pairs of eyes and ears in Washington, swallows The New York Times "Iran Nuclear Bunkers/Tunnels" story (see 0640 GMT). What's more, she inadvertently highlights more reasons for concern, quoting Broad:

In late 2005, the Iranian opposition group [Mujahedin-e-Khalq] held news conferences in Paris and London to announce that its spies had learned that Iran was digging tunnels for missile and atomic work at 14 sites, including an underground complex near Qum. The government, one council official said, was building the tunnels to conceal “its pursuit of nuclear weapons”.

Hmm.... That's Mujahedin-e-Khalq, dedicated by all means to topple the Iranian regime. A neutral source for solid, reliable intelligence?

1430 GMT: With continued quiet, I'm off to address the conference in Beirut. Back for evening updates around 2000 GMT.

1305 GMT: Mortazavi Accused? Alef reports that a Parliament committee has unanimously approved a report, after several months of investigation, naming Saeed Mortazavi --- former Tehran Prosecutor General and current aide to President Ahmadinejad --- as chief suspect in the death of detainees in Kahrizak Prison.

1240 GMT: The day continues quietly in Iran, and in the lull more media mischief (see 0640 GMT). The Washington Times declares, "Iran's Al Qaeda Connection in Yemen", based on the suspect testimony of a former Guantanamo detainee, a suspect letter supposedly from Al Qa'eda Number 2 Ayman al-Zawahiri, and the assertion of a Yemeni politician.

For sheer stupidity, however, this pales into insignificance beside the Guardian's allocation of space to a Brian Binley, whose comment, "End Appeasement of Iran's Regime", offers this approach to resistance:

If the British government seriously wishes to find a solution to the Iran problem, they need look no further than the streets of Tehran and the Iranian people's determination to purse democratic ambitions.
For a number of years now, colleagues and I on the British Parliamentary Committee for Iran Freedom have worked with Iran's largest opposition group in exile, the National Council of Resistance of Iran, and its president-elect Maryam Rajavi to strengthen our policy towards Iran whilst seeking increased support for the Iranian opposition movement.

That would be the National Council of Resistance of Iran, the political wing of the Mujahedin-e-Khalq and its often-violent campaign to overthrow the Iranian Government since 1979.

Such political "wisdom" deserves a separate entry, I think.

0920 GMT: Breaking the Movement. Rooz Online reports the Freedom Movement of Iran, many of whose members have been detained, including the recent re-arrest of its head Ebrahim Yazdi, has suspended operations for the first time in its 48 years. The organisation added, “While we express our regret at the regime’s unlawful confrontation aimed at limiting the free flow of information and the demand that the Freedom Movement of Iran stop the activities of its official website and its analytical website Mizan until further notice, we reserve the right to legally pursue our rights in this regard.”

0730 GMT: To Be Fair. Disdain for some of the US portrayals of "Iran" this morning should be balanced with a hat-tip to Robin Wright of The Los Angeles Times, who considers the possibility of "An Opposition Manifesto in Iran":

Three bold statements calling for reform have been issued since Friday, one by opposition presidential candidate Mir-Hossein Mousavi, one by a group of exiled religious intellectuals and the third by university professors. Taken together, they suggest that the movement will not settle for anything short of radical change.

0640 GMT: Not much breaking news from Iran overnight and this morning, with the outcome that the US papers are awash in distracting rhetoric, tangential stories, and even a forceful call to recognise the legitimacy of the Iranian regime.

The rhetoric comes from Emanuele Ottolenghi in The Wall Street Journal. A long-time proponent of regime changes in countries such as Iraq, Ottolenghi grabs the Ashura story of the martyrdom of Imam Hussein to praise "Iran's Righteous Martyrs": "This time we should root for [them]." (Presumably the United States was unable to root for Imam Hussein in the 7th century.)

The Los Angeles Times, in an article by Robert Faturechi, features the claims that the cost of the Green movement's protests has been the "loss" of three detained Americans:

With street protests raging in Iran, political activism is on the rise among Los Angeles' already vocal Iranian American community. Flag-waving demonstrators clad in the opposition movement's signature green have been a common sight outside the Federal Building in Westwood, and Iranian-language media is abuzz with debate.

But when it comes to the three young American hikers being held in Iran on espionage charges the community has been decidedly silent. No large demonstrations, little conversation, virtually no push for action.

For William Broad in The New York Times, the issue is not the politics either of the Iranian protests or the imprisoned US trio, but Nukes, Nukes, Nukes.

In yet another piece fed to him by by "American government and private experts", Broad launches the latest proclamiation of Imminent Iranian Threat: "Iran has quietly hidden an increasingly large part of its atomic complex in networks of tunnels and bunkers across the country."

On a different page of The Times, however, the Iranian Government has a vocal defence team. Flynt and Hillary Mann Leverett, in the latest of their numerous calls for discussion with President Ahmadinejad and his representatives, open with the declaration: "The Islamic Republic of Iran is not about to implode. Nevertheless, the misguided idea that it may do so is becoming enshrined as conventional wisdom in Washington."

To bolster their argument that the Obama Administration has no choice but to engage with Ahmadinejad, the Leveretts throw out a confetti of unsupported assertions:

Antigovernment Iranian Web sites claim there were “tens of thousands” of Ashura protesters; others in Iran say there were 2,000 to 4,000....Vastly more Iranians took to the streets on Dec. 30, in demonstrations organized by the government to show support for the Islamic Republic (one Web site that opposed President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s re-election in June estimated the crowds at one million people)....

Even President Ahmadinejad’s principal challenger in last June’s presidential election, Mir Hossein Mousavi, felt compelled to acknowledge the “unacceptable radicalism” of some Ashura protesters.

The Leveretts do put a series of challenges, discussed also at EA, about the opposition's leadership, its strategy, and its objectives, but this is all to prop up the "default" option that the regime (whose political, religious, economic, and ideological position is not examined beyond that claim of a million protesters on its behalf on 30 December) must not only be accepted but embraced in talks.

Just as the US Government set aside the inconvenience of Tiananmen Square 20 years ago, so it should put in the closet the trifling annoyance of those Iranians who demonstrate against rather than for the Government. The Leveretts conclude:

As a model, the president would do well to look to China. Since President Richard Nixon’s opening there (which took place amid the Cultural Revolution), successive American administrations have been wise enough not to let political conflict — whether among the ruling elite or between the state and the public, as in the Tiananmen Square protests and ethnic separatism in Xinjiang — divert Washington from sustained, strategic engagement with Beijing. President Obama needs to begin displaying similar statesmanship in his approach to Iran.

UPDATED Iran: The 60 Forbidden Foreign Organisations

UPDATE 0905 GMT: The Open Society Institute, Number 1 on the list, has offered a concise response setting out its priorities: "The Open Society Institute is deeply troubled by the Iranian government's recent decision prohibiting cooperation with international organizations. Although the Open Society Institute does not have any activities whatsoever in Iran we remain extremely concerned about the fate of Dr. Kian Tajbakhsh [the Iranian-American scholar imprisoned for 15 years in October for subversion]."

UPDATE 7 January 0900 GMT: EA readers have given us a couple of additions to the list. Their comments are also echoed by the Iranian Ham-mihan, which asks if President Ahmadinejad and Foreign Minister Mottaki should be prosecuted for appearing at the "blacklisted" Council on Foreign Relations during their visits to New York.

And here's testimony to the wonders of the list. Flynt Leverett, who co-wrote this morning's loud defence of the Ahmadinejad Government in The New York Times (see our updates), is a prominent member of the New American Foundation, which makes the list twice.

The 60 foreign organisations "blacklisted", after an interview by the Deputy Minister for International Affairs at the Ministry of Intelligence, as reported in the Iranian press. Iranians with any contact with these organisations will be considered to have committed a criminal offense.

The list is drawn from English translations by Neo-Resistance and Laura Rozen at Politico:

1. Soros Foundation — Open Society
2. Woodrow Wilson Center
3. Freedom House
4. National Endowment for Democracy (NED)
5. National Democratic Institute (NDI)

6. International Republican Institute (IRI)
7. Institute for Democracy in East Europe (EEDI)
8. Democracy Center in East Europe (CDEE)
9. Ford Foundation
10. Rockefeller Brothers Foundation
11. Hoover Institute at Stanford University
12. Hivos Foundation, Netherlands
13. Menas, U.K.
14. United Nations Association (USA)
15. Carnegie Foundation
16. Wilton Park, U.K.
17. Search for Common Ground (SFCG)
18. Population Council
19. Washington Institute for Near East Policy
20. Aspen Institute
21. American Enterprise Institute
22. New America Foundation
23. Smith Richardson Foundation
24. German Marshall Fund (US, Germany and Belgium)
25. International Center on Nonviolent Conflict
26. Abdolrahman Boroumand Foundation
27. Yale University
28. Meridian Center
29. Foundation for Democracy in Iran
30. International Republican Institute [again --- see 6]
31. National Democratic Institute [again --- see 5]
32. American Initiative Institute (?)
33. Institute of Democracy in Eastern Europe
34. American Aid Center (?)
35. International Trade Center
36. American Center for International Labor Solidarity
37. International Center for Democracy Transfer
38. Association for Union Democracy
39. Albert Einstein Institute
40. Global Movement for Democracy
41. The Democratic Youth Network
42. Democracy Information and Communication Technology Group
43. International Movement of Parliamentarians for Democracy
44. Network of Democracy Research Institutes
45. RIGA Institute
46. The Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School
47. Council on Foreign Relations
48. Foreign Policy Committee, Germany
49. Middle East Media Research Institute (described as an Israeli institute)
50. Centre for Democracy Studies, U.K.
51. Meridian Institute [again --- see 28]
52. Yale University and all its affiliates [again --- see 27]
53. National Defense University, U.S.
54. Iran Human Rights Documentation Center
55. American Center FLENA (active in Central Asia)
56. Committee on the Present Danger
57. Brookings Institution
58. Saban Center, Brookings Institution
59. Human Rights Watch
60. New America Foundation [again --- see 22]

The Latest from Iran (5 January): The Longer Game

2225 GMT: Arguing Over the Mousavi Statement. Habib-allah Askaroladi, a leading principlist politician, has declared, "Today it is important not to allow the extremists to change the national scene into a battlefield.”

That's not a surprising statement. This, however, raises an eyebrow: Askaroladi breaks from Presidential candidate Mohsen Rezaei in recommending Mir Hossein Mousavi's recent statement as a possible route to conciliation: “Nowhere in Mousavi’s statement is an about-face seen.”

2155 GMT: Diplomatic Protest. The Iranian consul in Norway has resigned in protest at his Government's treatment of the Ashura demonstrators. He is also reported to have sought asylum.

A spokesman for the Iranian Embassy would not comment on what he called lies and rumours.

2100 GMT: We've posted video of Monday's CNN interview with the former member of Parliament Fatemeh Haghighatjoo and Tehran University academic Seyed Mohammad Marandi. There's also the transcript of the thoughts of former Obama Administration official Ray Takeyh.

1705 GMT: A Victory for the Government. After months of wrangling, Iran's Parliament has ratified President Ahmadinejad's economic bill aimed at gradually cutting energy and food subsidies. Of 243 members, 134 votes for a reform subsidy organization to enforce the plan.

NEW Latest Iran Video and Transcript: Haghighatjoo and Marandi on CNN (4 January)
NEW Iran: How Outside “Help” Can Hurt the Green Movement
Latest Iran Video: Maziar Bahari on Britain’s Channel 4
Iran: Five Expatriate Intellectuals Issue “The Demands of the Green Movement”
Latest Iran Video: Interview with Committee of Human Rights Reporters (3 January)
Iran: In Defence of Mousavi’s “5 Proposals”
Iran: The Genius of Washington’s “Strategic Leaking” on Nukes & Sanctions
The Latest from Iran (4 January): Watching and Debating

The breakthrough came with a compromise on oversight, insisted upon by Parliament, The Supreme Iranian Audit Court, charged with supervising "financial operations and activities" of organizations which benefit from the state budget, will monitor the organization and submit reports on its performance twice a year.

1635 GMT: Patrolling the Cyber-Revolution. Iranian authorities have reiterated that access to filtered websites is a crime, complementing the declaration by the Ministry of Intelligence yesterday of criminal activity for any association with more than 60 "foreign groups", such as Yale University, accused of fomenting insurrection.

1630 GMT: Apologies for no update service for most of today, as Internet access has been impossible out of my location in Beirut.

0555 GMT: Jackson Swayze, Neda...Ahmadinejad/Khamenei? Austin Heap reports the message that went up when the President's website was hacked:

Dear God, In 2009 you took my favorite singer –-- Michael Jackson, my
favorite actress –-- Farrah Fawcett, my favorite actor –-- Patrick Swayze, my
favorite voice –-- Neda.

Please, please, don’t forget my favorite politician – Ahmadinejad and my
favorite dictator – Khamenei in the year 2010. Thank you.

0530 GMT: Another Jail Sentence. Journalist Bahman Ahmadi Amoui, arrested in June, has been sentenced to seven years and four months in prison and 34 lashes.

0525 GMT: The Letter of the Professors. A story we saw on Sunday but let slip because we were not sure of the significance --- by last night, it was the lead Iran story in Western media such as The New York Times.

Almost 90 academics on the Technical Faculty of Tehran University signed an open letter to the Supreme Leader calling for the end of violence against protesters: “Nighttime attacks on defenseless student dormitories and daytime assaults on students at university campuses, venues of education and learning, is not a sign of strength. Nor is beating up students and their mass imprisonment.”

0520 GMT: Still No Cyber-Mahmoud. The President hasn't been able to blog from his travels in Tajikistan/Turkmenistan, as his website is still down.

0510 GMT: It is becoming clear that the Green movement is in a phase of regrouping and maintaining a lower public profile. There are no immediate markers for protest before the anniversary of the Islamic Revolution on 22 Bahman (11 February), although there was some chatter yesterday about a "40th day" memorial on 7 February for those killed on Ashura last week.

After an intense phase of discussion of the Mousavi statement on Sunday, there was less to note politically yesterday. Much of the Internet attention was on the "10 demands" of the five expatriate Iranian intellectuals, although it is still unclear how much impact their statement will have inside Iran.

Less news also from the regime. There was the flutter that "foreign nationals" had been arrested on Ashura, but nothing further emerged during the day. Less news of arrests as well --- perhaps because the Government is running out of targets to detain --- so last night was led by the seriousness/black comedy of the "blacklist" of 80/62/60 foreign organisations that are off-limits to Iranians.

Latest Iran Video and Transcript: Haghighatjoo and Marandi on CNN (4 January)

On Monday CNN framed the Iran story by interviewing Fatemeh Haghighatjoo, a former member of Parliament who is challenging the system, and Seyed Mohammad Marandi, a Tehran University academic who defends it. The transcript below the video also includes the comments of former State Department official Ray Takeyh:

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A6r0U1tB5U0[/youtube]

CHRISTIANE AMANPOUR, CNN ANCHOR: Tonight, has Iran's opposition movement crossed the point of no return? And is the Islamic republic struggling to survive? We'll examine what is next for Iran.

Good evening, everyone. I'm Christiane Amanpour, and welcome to our program.

For the past week, Iran has again been plunged deep into crisis, with the outcome far from certain. On the holy day of Ashura last Sunday, Iranian security forces used bullets and batons to suppress the biggest anti-government protest since June. At least eight protestors were killed, including one who died when a police van reportedly ran over him, as you can see in these images.

Now, the government says that that van was stolen. Nonetheless, demonstrators vented their anger against Basij militiamen, burning their motorbikes, attacking their buildings, shocked that such a crackdown could happen on Ashura.

Government supporters, for their part, were also outraged that the opposition had turned Ashura into a day of political protests, and so hundreds of thousands of them came out three days later. We'll talk with a former Obama administration official about what all this means for the U.S. in a moment.

But we start with some prophetic words from an Iranian woman, a member of parliament who told me 10 years ago that Iran's conservative leadership was out of touch.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

FATEMEH HAGHIGHATJOO, FORMER IRAN PARLIAMENT MEMBER (through translator): The Koran gives us freedom of choice. If the conservatives want to disagree with the idea of personal freedom, then they are against the essence of the Koran. But unfortunately, the conservatives are doing this in order to maintain their own power.

AMANPOUR: What happens if you don't get what you want?

HAGHIGHATJOO (through translator): The reform movement of President Khatami has started, and it cannot go back. How many people can the conservatives throw in jail? They can't jail the whole population of Iran.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

AMANPOUR: That was 10 years ago. Today, Fatemeh Haghighatjoo lives in the United States after being forced to resign for her outspoken challenges to the regime. And now a visiting scholar at the University of Massachusetts in Boston, she joins me here in our studios.

And from Iran, Mohammad Marandi, head of the North American Studies program at the University of Tehran.

Welcome, both of you, to this program.

Let me ask you first, Mrs. Haghighatjoo, what is your reaction to what you told me 10 years ago? You basically said then that the government can't arrest everyone.

HAGHIGHATJOO: First of all, good evening, and thank you very much for having me here. As I said 10 years ago and still I am saying, the government is not able to arrest all population in Iran. People of Iran need fundamental change in the country, and I am so optimistic that they will see this change in the country in future.

AMANPOUR: And change for you means what exactly?

HAGHIGHATJOO: Change -- change for me, that means people could see their freedom in the country. They -- this diversity in the country, in the population could be seen inside the power structure in the country. And also the portion (ph) of the government is important for people of Iran.

AMANPOUR: Let me turn to you, Mr. Marandi. Thank you for joining us. It looks like the situation has really reached a turning point here, particularly with the events of Ashura and then the competing protests -- or, rather, counter-demonstrations -- on Wednesday. Many here in the United States are calling this a game-changer. How do you see it from there?

MOHAMMAD MARANDI, UNIVERSITY OF TEHRAN: Well, I think that the -- the so-called opposition -- I say so-called, because there is no monolithic opposition, and there is no monolithic conservative or principlist movement. There are many different political groups in Iran that have different agendas.

But I think that the opposition that protested on Ashura made a very major tactical mistake by -- by carrying out, by being very brutal towards the police on that day, and also by carrying out these protests on a day of public mourning.

And I think that there was a major backlash on Wednesday when probably the largest gathering of people in protest of Mr. Mousavi and the green movement in Tehran's history, really, gathered on Wednesday. They were -- I think that was a defining movement. I think Mr. Mousavi, his letter that was written the day after the anti-Mousavi demonstration, revealed that he, too, was a bit rattled.

AMANPOUR: OK, well, let me ask you this. You say that they were outraged, the government supporters, and yet the protestors -- and as you know, very huge sections of the international public opinion were outraged that the Iranian forces used deadly force, gunfire, against the protestors. I mean, does this not really challenge now the authority of the government?

MARANDI: Well, first of all, the -- the protest -- the demonstration in Tehran, it was -- was not necessarily pro-government. It was pro- Islamic republic. And many critics of the government but who are opposed to Mr. Mousavi participated. As I said, it was a huge rally. But they were not -- it's not a monolithic group on any side of the political equation that we can talk about easily.

But I think that the outrage here was that -- that the MEK terrorist organization, which although officially banned by the United States, it is being supported by the United States under different names, they were involved in Tehran, according to their own statements, and they were -- as you can see in the footage -- they attacked police stations...

AMANPOUR: Which we'll show right now.

MARANDI: ... when a police officer was blinded -- sorry?

AMANPOUR: We're just showing that pictures as you speak.

MARANDI: Right. In any case, I can't hear you very well, but they attacked police stations, they destroyed public property, and they attacked police officers. And at the same time, as I said, it was a day of mourning. Ashura is the anniversary of the martyrdom of the grandson of the prophet of Islam, and it's a very holy day in Iran, and that didn't go down well with a majority of Iranians who saw these protestors clapping and whistling and so on.

But I think that, in general, the protests -- the counter-protests, the protest that was critical of Mr. Mousavi on Wednesday, was itself a turning point.

AMANPOUR: Well, let me ask you then, Mr. Haghighatjoo, you are in the reformist camp, obviously. Do you believe that there are violent elements taking part in your demonstration and in your movement? Is that a concern?

HAGHIGHATJOO: You know, what I am going to say is the people of Iran (inaudible) Green movement wanted, you know, requested, demand peacefully without violence. Unfortunately, the government forces try to pull people toward violence. And I would consider (inaudible) scenario by the government, they try to make these crash between -- clash between people in both sides.

And if you look at, since disputed election in June 12 to now, we will see that this protest was silent protest, and that shows that people wanted to do -- to request (inaudible) demand peacefully. But, unfortunately, the government, you know, especially on day of Ashura, you know, acted very violently, bloody against people and protests.

AMANPOUR: OK. Let's move -- since we're trying to figure out what's next, let us ask now about these steps that Mr. Mousavi has put out towards resolution. Now, I'm going to read them off here on our screen. He says, "First of all, the Iranian administration should be held accountable. Secondly, there should be new and clear election laws. Then, there should be the release of all political prisoners, free and informed media, and finally, recognition of legal demonstrations."

Mr. Marandi, do you think there's any chance the government is going to agree to those five ideas that Mr. Mousavi has put forward?

MARANDI: Well, I think the problem is that the government sees things in a different light from Mr. Mousavi. And as I said, there are very many different political factions at play, both in the government and in the opposition.

AMANPOUR: Right, but these seem to be -- this seems -- these seem to be clear requests that seem to manifest themselves under, in fact, the Iranian constitution. Is there any feeling that the government is willing at all to meet Mousavi halfway? Or is this going to be a continued confrontation?

MARANDI: Well, I think that after the anti-Mousavi protests throughout the country on Wednesday, Mr. Mousavi's position has been severely weakened, and I think that is partially reflected in his letter. But I also think that the government is not going to release people, for example, who've blinded police officers or abused police -- police officers and so on.

I do think that there are moves to, let's say, move -- go back to more openness, but I think that the major problem, really, is that Mr. Mousavi has affiliated himself with a more extreme faction within the reformist movement. Even people like Mr. Sahobi (ph) have spoken about how the green movement is moving towards violence. And I myself have experienced death threats every time I come on television to talk about these issues. So it is a reality.

But a lot of the more mainstream reformists, they are moving away from Mr. Mousavi, for example, Mr. Tabesh (ph), who is the head of the reformist faction in parliament.

So there are very sharp internal debates in Iran about policy, about politics, about many issues in the country, but I think that the government and many political factions in the country are no longer willing to discuss serious issues with Mr. Mousavi anymore.

AMANPOUR: OK. We want to show some pictures that we have up on our wall, pictures of Mr. Mousavi receiving condolences when his own nephew was gunned down on the day of Ashura. And I want to ask you (OFF-MIKE) is there, do you believe, a split inside the factions in -- in Iran? Mr. Marandi has talked about people moving away from the reformist movement. Is this true?

HAGHIGHATJOO: No. I wanted to say that, if we have really -- if the government (inaudible) for green movement, then we will see people would side with Mousavi or would side with government. I disagree with Mr. Marandi's analysis regarding weakening Mousavi's position, because the government, you know, try to bring (inaudible) by paying money in some place, by bringing paramilitia to the city, by bringing student from school to the (inaudible)

And I would say this is not pro-government demonstration. Let's see. If the government allow...

(CROSSTALK)

AMANPOUR: So you're talking about competing rallies to see whose are bigger?

HAGHIGHATJOO: Yes, yes, and then we will see what we're going on. And then the second issue, unfortunately, I -- unfortunately, I don't think so the government and the supreme leader is going to accept Mousavi's fair position, because, you know, they think they can control issue. Unfortunately, their -- their solution is wrong solution. And this is not real answer to the crisis.

AMANPOUR: One final question to Mr. Marandi. You know, so much has been made and so many fears raised about the actual security of the reform leaders, the opposition leaders, such as Mr. Mousavi and Mr. Karroubi. I've been told that actually a decision has been made to step up their security by the Iranian government. Does that ring true to you? Do you think that they're going to try to make sure no harm comes to those principal figures?

MARANDI: Yes, I think so, especially since his nephew was killed under very suspicious circumstances. He was not killed in the demonstrations themselves. And the fact that he was singled out and assassinated, I think, is something that the many people in the political establishment find suspicious, and they -- they believe that perhaps terrorist organizations were behind it to increase tension in the country.

I also believe I -- I should add one final point, and that is that, within Iran itself, there are -- we shouldn't be speaking about the government and the opposition, because within the, let's say, the conservative groups or the principlist movements, there's no consensus. And the same is true with the reformists. Many key reformists have come -- distanced themselves completely with Mr. Mousavi and the green movement, especially since Mr. Mousavi has more and more aligned himself with -- or at least silently accepted the support of Western, American-backed television stations being broadcast into Iran, as well as former shah supporters and the MEK terrorist organization.

AMANPOUR: OK, Mr. Marandi. What do you say as a final word against - - you know, many people in Iran, obviously, are trying to discredit the reform movement, saying that they're agents of -- of -- of foreign countries. What do you say to that?

HAGHIGHATJOO: Unfortunately, this is analysis of the government and pro-government, you know, people. This is not...

MARANDI: I didn't...

(CROSSTALK)

MARANDI: ... for the government or Mr. Ahmadinejad.

HAGHIGHATJOO: Sorry. No reformists in the country will, you know, take (inaudible) Mousavi (inaudible) everybody support Mousavi. After Mousavi's statement, we see many people outspoken to support Mousavi's statement and all reformists, such as (inaudible) Mujahideen and also outside of the country, opposition and Iranian people who just (inaudible) for the country support Mousavi's current position.

AMANPOUR: All right. And we will talk to you again another time. And you, too, Professor Marandi. Thank you both very much for joining us.

MARANDI: Thank you.

AMANPOUR: And when we return, is the turmoil in Iran an opportunity or a challenge for the U.S. president, Barack Obama?
...
BARACK OBAMA, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES: What's taking place within Iran is not about the United States or any other country. It's about the Iranian people and their aspirations for justice and a better life for themselves. And the decision of Iran's leaders to govern through fear and tyranny will not succeed in making those aspirations go away.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

AMANPOUR: So that was President Obama just a few days ago. We're joined now by Ray Takeyh, former Obama administration official on Iran and now continuing with the Council on Foreign Relations, joining me from Washington.

Mr. Takeyh, thank you for joining us. You probably heard our other two guests, and we're just particularly playing that sound bite from President Obama. Has he stepped up his rhetoric? And why is he doing that now?

RAY TAKEYH, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, SENIOR FELLOW: Well, I think it's inevitable as the situation in Iran deteriorates and as you have a greater degree of human rights abuses and government forceful suppression of the dissent movement that the United States and the president would react in this such manner. It's inconceivable for me -- for the president not to have done so, particularly strong language in terms of depicting Iran as -- as a tyranny.

AMANPOUR: What does that mean, then, for his desire to continue or to try to hold the door open for negotiations?

TAKEYH: Well, I'm not quite sure if the two are incompatible. You can have negotiations with Iran, as the United States has had negotiations with many adversarial countries, while also at the same time disapproving of the internal practices of those regimes, now, whether that was the Chinese government or -- or other such non-representative states.

I -- I think you can do both of them, but the president and the United States will have to stand up and declare that some of the behavior of the clerical regime is unacceptable, but also be open to negotiating some sort of a restraint on Iran's nuclear program, which also violates Iran's international obligations.

AMANPOUR: So you talk about the nuclear program. A deadline has come and come for Iran to respond to the -- to the proposals of the West. Iran is now putting its counterproposal.

TAKEYH: Right.

AMANPOUR: Where do you think this is headed in the -- in the immediate term?

[15:20:00]

TAKEYH: Well, I suspect, in the immediate term, the United States and its allies will try to ratchet up economic pressures on Iran, particularly targeting the Revolutionary Guard organization and its business -- business enterprises, maybe even some aspect of the Iranian petroleum sector, so you begin to see intensification of economic pressure on Iran in the hope that external pressure, combined with internal pressure, will cause Iran to adjust its behavior...

(CROSSTALK)

AMANPOUR: This is a tried and true -- Mr. Takeyh, this is a tried and -- some would say -- not so true method, that sanctions and pressure haven't really worked. Why would it be different this time?

TAKEYH: Well, it may not be different this time, but the idea is that you have a greater degree of international cooperation, particularly with a greater degree of assistance from Russia. That may be more hopeful than real, but that's essentially what the -- what the assessment is today.

Now, second of all, is the Iranian government internally is rather weak and vulnerable and it may seek some sort of an agreement abroad to at least mitigate international pressures.

I mean, as I said, this is -- this is a theory. And like most speculative ideas, we'll see how it pans out in practice.

AMANPOUR: You wrote an analysis on what was going on, and you basically compared the revolutionary situation back in '79 to what's going on right now, in that both seem to have, let's see, uncertain responses to the challenges of the regime. Do you think the government -- go ahead.

TAKEYH: Well -- well, it's important to suggest that history doesn't always repeat itself, actually, as a matter of fact, seldom repeats itself. Some of the challenges that the Islamic republic faces today are not dissimilar to the challenges that the monarchy faced. But the situations are also different.

I think the Iranian government at this point, for instance, if the supreme leader was receptive to some of the proposals made by Mr. Mousavi, you could perhaps see some sort of a peaceful resolution for this. But however it comes about, in terms of internal compromise, the supreme leader would have to accept that his power will be diminished, and I'm not quite sure if he's ready to do that.

AMANPOUR: Now, you heard what Mr. Marandi, who supports the Islamic republic, said in terms of saying that it's -- you know, the reform movement is fractured, that, you know, they're agents of the -- of international entities. What is the analysis inside the -- inside the U.S. about the strength of the reform movement?

TAKEYH: Well, in my view, that -- the -- the opposition movement is somewhat incoherent. It doesn't have a central nervous system. It doesn't even have an identifiable set of leaders or even a coherent ideology. It is a protest movement.

But it's been a peculiar protest movement in a sense that it has sustained itself. And the longer it sustains itself, the more ideology and so forth and even leadership will suggest themselves.

And whether they're agents of the West and that sort of a thing, that's just obviously nonsense. And I'm not sure if that rhetoric really impresses anyone. It certainly convinces no one.

Iran: Five Expatriate Intellectuals Issue "The Demands of the Green Movement"

Five Iranian intellectuals living overseas --- Abdolkarim Soroush, Akbar Ganji, Mohsen Kadivar, Abdolali Bazargan, and Ataollah Mohajerani --- have followed Mir Hossein Mousavi's recent 5-point statement with a declaration of 10 demands to be met by the Iranian Government:

1. Resignation of Mr. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, renewal of the election under the supervision of the independant organs. Cancellation of the Guardian Council's oversight and establishment of an independant election
commission.

The Latest from Iran (4 January): Watching and Debating

2. Release of all political prisoners and prisoners of conscience. Prosecution of those involved in murders and torture of recent months in a public court of law with retribution to the victims and their families.

3. Freedom of press and all audio-visual media. Cancellation of censorship, banning of newspapers, filtering of internet. Expansion of satellite services and acceptance of private TV channels. Expulsion of those who
put out fraudulent lies over recent events.

4. Recognition of the activities of political parties, student movement, women's movement, non-government organisations and civil society, and labor unions, with the right to assembly.

5. Independence of universities and their administrations. Expulsion of military forces from the campuses. Purge of the illegal Cultural Revolution Council.

6. Persecution of torturers and murderers for recent crimes.

7. Independence of the judiciary, with its head an elected official. Cancellation of all illegal special courts.

8. Expulsion of all military forces and law enforcement from the political, economic, and cultural scene.

9. Independence of the religious establishment from the government and administration.

10. All high level positions in the country to be elected by the people, with term limits and accountability.